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FOREWORD

On the 3rd and 4th November 2011, The Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research and the Institute of Sociology – Faculty of Philosophy of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, organized an international conference on the topic ***Identity in the Era of Globalization and Europeanization***. Researchers from Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Romania, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Switzerland and Australia, from various scientific disciplines participated at the conference, providing for the truly international and multidisciplinary character of the conference. In this edition of the Annual of the ISPJR are several works of authors employed at the ISPJR, whose papers are related to the implication of globalization on the economic and social policies, the changes of identity, the national identity in Europe and the Balkans, political identity, and religion. According to the thematic content, the papers included in this collection point to the importance and the effects of globalization and Europeanization on the economic, political, national and cultural identity.

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POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

ABSTRACT

Political identities in one society are undoubtedly related to political parties, the social cleavages that these parties are structured on, i.e. their ideological (political) profiling. Can we talk about political identities when depolitization, departization and floating voters have become the most significant characteristic of contemporary political life? If these tendencies can be recognized in established democracies, do they and how do they pour into or are recognized in the so-called postcommunist societies, one of which is Republic of Macedonia itself? The additional challenge for the research team was to examine this issue in the specific political environment in Macedonia, which is represented by strong political confrontations on the political scene, confrontations that oftentimes interfered with normal political dialogue.

The main goal of the research project was to determine the different political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, to see on which social cleavages they are differentiated on and where are their positions on an imagined ideological spectrum. Or to put it differently, whether the strictly distinguished political confrontations represent one dichotomous, i.e. segmented political structure, soundly founded on the social cleavages of the Macedonian society. We've tried to do that by: analysis of the social affiliation of citizens, analysis of their party affiliation and analysis of a certain number of political attitudes and values that they've accepted. We started from the basic assumption that if these three elements are related then we can say that the party-political divisions are founded on social divisions and that the high political polarization in Macedonia is based on the existence of differentiated social profiles of citizens, who belong to different and strongly confronted cultures/poles.

Key words: identity, political identities, party identities, R. Macedonia, political parties

INTRODUCTION

Researching political identities in one society is undoubtedly related to political parties, the social cleavages that these parties are structured on, the positions and policies of those parties, i.e. their ideological political profiling. If ideas give sense to political organization and ideology defines the personality and identity of the political parties, making them recognizable on the political scene, which is something all politicologists agree on, then what is their identity based on and what differentiates them from other political parties? In a time of the end of history and ideology can we at all talk about political identities when depolitization, departization and floating voters have become the most significant characteristic of contemporary political life? Is the New as opposed to the Old policy, marked by postmaterialistic values and liberal individualism capable of producing solidarity and homogeneity, i.e. political identities that are very much needed for political action? And ultimately, if these processes and tendencies can be recognized in established democracies, do they and how do they pour into or are recognized in the so-called postcommunist societies, one of which is Republic of Macedonia itself?

There's quite an extensive politicological literature that deals with these issues and many authors, by means of theoretical debates or research studies (comparative, longitudinal, case studies) offer new arguments and information in defense of their theses (Diamond, L. and R, Gunther 2001, von Beume, K. 2002. Vahudova M. A. 2008, Kitshel H. 1992, 1995, Merkel 1997, Klingeman 1994, Kaldor M. and Vejvoda I.: 2002, De Waele J. M (ed), 2002). There are few analyses of this type in Macedonia though. If one of the challenges of the research team was to try and give if only a small contribution to the theoretical and empirical elaboration of the problem, the other challenge came as a result of the specific political environment in Macedonia, represented by strong political confrontations on the political scene, confrontations that oftentimes interfered with normal political dialogue or confrontations that presented all elections as historical and referendum elections when as a rule they were accompanied by violence and irregularities, giving room to disputing the legitimacy of the winner. The political conflict based on the idea Traitors – Patriots pushed the citizens of Macedonia into one continuous political battle in which one Macedonia needed to conquer some other Macedonia – completely… On the other hand, there are no anti-system parties in Macedonia; the strategic goal of all of the political parties is our accession to EU and NATO, all of them accept the concept of liberal democracy and strive to establish it in the Republic of Macedonia etc.

The study entitled Political Identities in the Republic of Macedonia presents the results from a scientific research project of the same name, conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in the period from 2006 to 2009.

The main goal of the research team was to determine the different political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, to see on which social cleavages they are differentiated on and where are their positions on an imagined ideological spectrum. Or to put it differently, whether the strictly distinguished political confrontations represent one dichotomous, i.e. segmented political structure, soundly founded on the social cleavages of the Macedonian society. We've tried to do that by: analysis of the social affiliation of citizens, analysis of their party affiliation and analysis of a certain number of political attitudes and values that they've accepted. We started from the basic assumption that if these three elements are related then we can say that the party-political divisions are founded on social divisions or if we see this through the prism of the Macedonian highly polarized political environment, that such political polarization is based on the existence of differentiated social profiles of citizens, who according to their perceptions of the world and some aspects of the personal dimension belong to different cultures/poles.

Such a defined research task set the subject, goal and the methodological approach to our research. Within the subject of the research we identified the political parties and citizen/voters in terms of their ideological-political profiles. The political parties were perceived as monolithic units and the research was aimed towards their self-identification (through their name, the statements of their party leaders), towards the analysis of their primary document –the political program of the party and corresponding analysis of their political profile or image in the public (meaning what is the public or the citizens' perception of the party in terms of its ideological-political profile), what is its identity or the way it portrays itself in public communication (or what is the others' perception of that particular party). The researchers had no intention of confirming nor denying the established image/ stereotype of the party, but to only point out the distinctions of that particular "product" offered on the political market.

The second level of analysis was aimed towards the citizens/voters. The survey of the citizens consisted of a complex questionnaire that covered several segments: questions regarding the conservative-liberal values, questions concerning the linear spectrum of the left and right, questions in terms of the dimension of social conformism – personal autonomy $(SC-A)$ and the usual questions related to election behavior and the election preferences of the citizens. Such a designed questionnaire was meant to allow us to gain more knowledge into the basic political and value

orientations of the voters in the Republic of Macedonia and the dependence of these divisions from the party preferences.

The research had to be in line with the complex structure of the Macedonian segmented society, which is we also analyzed the Macedonian political bloc as opposed to the Albanian political bloc.

POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Almost all of the analysts of transition agree that pluralization in Macedonia developed in a conservative environment and rather slowly (Mircev, 1991, Mojanoski, 2000, Milosavlevski, 1993, Jovevska 1999, Spasov, 1993). It was in such a political environment that the pluralistic explosion of the 1990s in Macedonia occurred and a highly segmented party system that remained as such throughout the entire transition period. If the number of the political parties was the first characteristic, then the second was the instability of the political offer (the establishment of new political parties, the division of the old ones, their merger, the transition of certain MPs from one to another political party, all of this brought about a change in the political menu from one to another election).

However, the analysis of the election results in this 20-year period showed that only several political entities stood apart from the others by leaving a special mark on the development of the Macedonian democracy. Those were the parties in whose programs, leaders, views and policies, the majority of the voters recognized their own interests, those that they identified themselves with and for which they manifested either their loyalty or distance.

DOMINANT SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AS BASIS FOR PARTY PLURALISM

Right at the beginning of the transition period the ethnicity of citizens became (the most) significant determinant of their political behavior, which is why all ethnic communities formed their own parties which they used to express and protect their own interests. An array of social circumstances (economic, cultural and political) further emphasized these divisions and the way they were perceived, which means that also in the future this cleavage will remain an important factor in the election behavior of voters.

If we take into consideration the ethnic structure of the Macedonian society, the political parties of the ethnic Macedonians and those of the ethnic Albanians are of special importance to the political stability of the country and the development of

democracy. However, those political conflicts that appear within the ethnic political blocs point to the fact that they are not monolithic and that some other cross-cutting cleavages or circumstances have shaped the political life within them.

Albanian political bloc. In the past period, there were three important political entities differentiated in the Albanian political bloc: the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI).

If we analyze the political dynamics of the parties in this ethnic bloc we will distinguish the following characteristics: firstly, all of the political parties have their focus (exclusively) on the Albanian national cause, which after 2001 was rationalized with the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Secondly, they differ only in the radicality of their views regarding the rights of the Albanians and the radicality depends on the fact whether that particular party is the governing or the opposing party; thirdly, the intra-ethnic conflict is so strongly expressed that not only do these parties oftentimes use quite rough and at times militant rhetoric, but they even do not refrain themselves from attacking the party headquarters which sometimes includes physical assaults, too. This animosity, especially evident in pre-election campaigns, gets passed down from the élites to the members which makes it hard to identify a particular cleavage as a cause for the confrontation; and fourthly, the instability of the party system is even more expressed than in the rest of the political parties in Macedonia: from the beginning of the transition period up till now there haven't been any political parties with a differentiated and stable voter's body, but voters just go from one party to another.

Macedonian political bloc. For the whole transition period there were two dominant political parties in the Macedonian political bloc – SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, with a numerous and stable voter's body which made the political system function as a result of their complete alternation of power. They in fact expressed the second division or confrontation in the Macedonian society. Some refer to it as left wing - right wing and some as communism - anticommunism. Further down, we will give an overview of the profiles or the identities of these two poles, the same way they were presented in the public and perceived by the majority of the voter's body.

As a result of the political structures of the former socialist state, SDSM had made full use of the advantages of the old-new party and up until 1998 had been continuously in power (and later from 2002 to 2006). Its critics emphasize the fact that this party had never really fully transformed and by recognizing in it the old communist spirit, they blamed the party for further continuous attempts to maintain its monopoly position in society. By being referred to as Yugo-nostalgic, 'komunjar' - sympathizers of communism and serbophiles who are opposed to all projects that

aim to disassemble communism, the social democrats were blamed not only for being too attached to the traditions of the People's Liberation War (regarded above all as a communist revolution, but also as a certain type of antimacedonianism) on the account of other historic traditions of the Macedonian people, but also for slowing down economic reform.

Understandably, SDSM never admitted to this criticism and defended itself by saying that they were the ones who democratized the Macedonian society and established the Republic of Macedonia as an independent country in one very famous expression: SDSM – nation-building party, as a guarantee and the future for the country.

VMRO-DPMNE is one of the newly created political parties with nationalist orientation, which has integrated into its name the name of the most famous Macedonian revolutionary organization from the beginning of the twentieth century, an organization that the majority of the Macedonian population is emotionally attached to. This sentiment in the Macedonian people, related to the ideal of creating an independent state was particularly nurtured in some families, so one can assume that the core of this party (at least in the first years of its creation) was extracted precisely from this environment. Having been criticized as an unserious party, extremely nationalistic and with bulgarophilic baggage, VMRO-DPMNE was accused that in the case they do come to power they would divide the country, make way for terror and would be incapable of balancing out interethnic relations. Of recently though, (with the party's win on the Parliamentary elections of 2006) it was also accused for obstructing EU and NATO integrations. By denying these accusations, VMRO-DPMNE reminded the public that it was only owing to their self-awareness and the pressure they imposed at the beginning of the transition period that Macedonia was able to establish itself as an independent state (referring here to the srbophilia and the yugoslavianism of SDSM) and emphasized its capacity for reforms (especially in the field of economy) as realistically the only political force that could pull the country out of what seemed an everlasting transition process.

In these divisions we can easily recognize above all, the cultural and symbolic aspect of political confrontation (different holidays are celebrated, different heroes glorified, different historic traditions are relied upon) and two worlds are being offered, one that personifies good, and the other evil.

But this is not the complete political identification of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE. By identifying themselves as left, i.e. right wings, both parties have strived, especially in the last 4-5 years, to reinforce this dimension in their activities so that they could become more recognizable to the voter's body. The need for such a differentiation level most probably comes as a result of the fact that the

voter's body can not be held much longer in a state of high political mobilization merely with long narratives and that specific and efficient policy needs to be offered to solve the accumulated problems. Should the linear ideological spectrum prove inefficient for the differentiation of policies, we would have to look for that differentiation line in the liberal-conservative division based on social values and national identity – a field in which this differentiation is all the more visible even among the Macedonian political parties.

In this way, VMRO-DPMNE is promoting more and more the family, religion, tradition, is trying to establish law and order and adherence to laws by prescribing severe punishments for the offenders, while at the same time not showing enough tolerance towards differences. Also the party is promoting itself even more as a kind of modern technomanagerial structure which is relentless in the improvement of the economic prosperity of the country for joining the EU and NATO.

The need to establish the ideological profile of SDSM has been an ever-present topic in the public since 2006, when the party lost the parliamentary elections and was faced with a crisis. This has been emphasized by SDSM's party leaders as well, but also by the general public and political analysts, who voiced their concern that the Macedonian left wing is impersonal, lacking in ideas and utterly defensive – has no platform that citizens might recognize. The need for having a story of their own that would be aimed at the target groups of the electorate was the main topic of discussion on the Tenth SDSM Congress back in May of 2009.

ARE THERE ANY SIMILARITIES?

The objective transitional environment as well as due to the globalization processes (with special emphasis on the Eurointegration processes), while when it comes to the socioeconomic sphere the arrangements with the World Bank and the IMF also had a major influence, practically contributing to the convergence of their program documents and practical policies. If we add the way in which these parties exercised their power (corruption, authoritarianism, violation of many principles of democracy) the conclusion of many was that 'they are all the same and Macedonia has basically no choice!'

Parallel to these convergence processes, the division of the Macedonian society did not lose its intensity. The division of the political camps into the two of the biggest Macedonian parties and two of the biggest Albanian parties became a source of constant conflict fueled by intense hatred. And this was not only political. Knowing that someone is only a member of the opposite political camp was a reason enough to hate that person, to want to harm them. As one political analyst

noted: 'with such violent hatred and strong political revanchism, the only way we'll go is down.'

This division and strong negative emotions towards the Other had also a pragmatic component. In a country where the unemployment rate is over 30% throughout the whole period of transition, where over 20% of the population lives in poverty and where the state is the No. 1 employer, the victory of the Ours was related to people's expectations for employment in the state administration and public enterprises, for job promotions, private business prosperity etc.

If we come the conclusion that the motive for political mobilization of these two worlds is symbolically cultural and ideological, but also more and more pragmatic, we ask ourselves the question: to what extent do the citizens or voters belong to these two different worlds, if we take into account their views, life orientation and value judgments. This dimension was further researched through a survey conducted on a national representative sample of 1,599 respondents (mass survey).

POLITICAL AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS OF THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The legitimacy of the aforementioned opposing political identities comes as a result of the voting behavior of the loyal voters, whose attitudes, opinions and value criteria create the differentiated profiles of voters. The three scales of values – one of them related to the division left – right, the other one to the division liberalism – conservatism and the third one to the specific issues regarding the Macedonian political environment were supposed to reflect the ideological-political profiles/ differences.

When it comes to the dichotomy left – right, a big majority of the respondents (around 70%) share the so-called left values (they prefer small social differences, a broad package of social services, social security only under the jurisdiction of the country, favoring a type of co-decision in companies etc.). The loyal voters of both the left and the right do not deviate much from the general distribution and that this information refers to both the voters from the so-called Macedonian and Albanian political bloc. When it comes to assessing the value of socialism, a big proportion (over 75%) feel that socialism was in no way a repressive system and that this system took care of everyone. But in the case of the voters of the parties from the Albanian political bloc the criticism towards socialism is very strong (for example, 65% of voters stated that socialism was a repressive system). This criticism in the Albanian political bloc is the result of the perception that the ethnic Albanians were represses and strongly marginalized during the socialism.

When it comes to the dichotomy liberalism – conservatism, the survey showed a widely distributed conservative awareness among the respondents, which makes unnecessary the analysis on the differences between the left and the right (over 80% of the respondents strive for harsher punishments, strong leaders, respect of tradition, that we need to fight for our own people regardless if they're right or not…, against the rights of homosexuals etc.) We see a wide distribution of conservative views in the voters from the Albanian political bloc, too.

Concerning the social rooting of political parties the results from the survey suggest that there's no clear or specific social profiling of the political parties. These claims have been confirmed with both the bi-variant analysis (contingency table and contingency coefficient) and the factor analysis. Based on the data collected, the social background of the party is in most part strongly established in the ethnicity of the respondents. The rest of the factors are combinations that can have an influence on the choice of the party, i.e. to be elements (factors or clusters) that would help identify parties in the future. The ethnic heterogeneous environment that converges not only with religious and cultural division, but social as well, points to a segmented socio-cultural society, but only from one aspect – the ethnic one.

Evidently the survey results do not give us the right to differentiate between the various value profiles of voters at the Macedonian political scene, where party affiliation would count as a powerful selective factor in the creation of such profiles.

DIMENSION OF SOCIAL CONFORMISM – AUTONOMY

The research, whose purpose was to analyze the political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, also analyzed the personal dimension of social conformism – autonomy, a dimension oftentimes analyzed in context of a basis for building ideologies, democratic behavior and in general, proper functioning of the system of political culture.

A higher score in the SC-A dimension, which is evidence to the preference of social conformism in the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, is most commonly related to women, more senior respondents, members of the majority in the country and members of the low social class, which (social class) was actually defined by the respondents themselves. This data in fact confirmed the already constructed hypothesis (confirmed in numerous other studies besides this one) that envisaged women (mostly due to the still prevailing traditional values in society) and the more senior individuals (mostly due to the developmental changes) preferring social conformism over autonomy, compared to men and younger respondents. Social conformism, associated with the majority of the country, speaks in favor of the

realistically existing endeavors of the country's minorities to not adapt completely to the bigger proportion of citizens (the majority), to the set rules that should apply to everyone, as well as demands for rights to free expression and changing the prescribed rules.

A higher score of the SC-A dimension is also related to the conservative values (an anticipated and envisaged trend), but also with the socialist, left values.

One thing the SC-A dimension was unrelated with was the choice of a specific political party/option, more precisely supporting a certain political ideology in terms of left and right. Apparently, even though in their programs and public appearances the parties propagate certain politically-ideological values, they still fail to manage to profile themselves clearly and to impose themselves with their ideological values onto the voter's body, thus rendering them unrecognizable to the voters. This process does in no way go in favor with building and developing specific, distinctive and recognizable political identities.

CONCLUSIONS

What is the conclusion here? In general, the research results do not reveal a more significant mutual relatedness between the social affiliation of the citizens and their perceptions of the world (the researched dimensions of their political awareness). Maybe the only exception is the social 'rooting' of the parties in the ethnicity. If our research showed that the profile of the average Macedonian voter in the Republic of Macedonia is a citizen with left orientations, with conservative and conformist views, we cannot say that there are two or more differentiated profiles of voters, as a "natural background" of the opposing political identities. At the same time, this was not a hindrance for these political identities to have at their disposal a continuous and strong legitimacy, confirmed above all through elections. If this is so, in the case of Macedonia, we can say that there are two political arenas which (co)exist simultaneously: one at a level of political parties and political competition and the other at a level of the citizen/voter. Where do we seek for the mediation factors or in other words what is the basis of loyalty?

If party identification is not based on structure and interests, does that mean that it is more of a reflection of the superficial preferences based on the charisma of the political leaders and/or the successfully designed image of the party? Do the insufficiently developed and poor societies, with poor civic traditions, provide fertile soil for party competition in which the political projects and interests of political elites dominate? Or is this a general trend of the contemporary democracies in which professionalization, political marketing and the reliance on the media are

the principal traits of the parties? The affirmative answer to this question reminds us of the authors that have emphasized the immense influence parties have on the psychology of the voters, illustrated by the syntagm changed votes – unchanged voters. This also reminds us of the competitive approach that Ware A. spoke of, which focuses on the party leaders, who as successful entrepreneurs strive to politicize above all the differences that earn them the most profit or election votes. And finally, what does this mean for democracy in the Macedonian plural society, with poor civic traditions and visible elements of authoritarian and subject consciousness?

These and many other questions were also raised before the research team of the project, who aimed at analyzing the political identities of the Republic of Macedonia. Fully aware that the information and conclusions that came out as a result of the analysis of the data obtained from the implementation of this project do not completely solve the problem (they in fact only point to some of its dimensions) we remain hopeful that they continue to be a challenge for new research projects of the academic community in the Republic of Macedonia.

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CULTURAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN MACEDONIA

ABSTRACT

This paper concentrates on the development of the model of political culture of the citizens of Macedonia, during the so called transitional period, with a special focus to the issue of ethnic identities and identities in general, as they were determined by the changes of the general value matrix. Data from the latest research done on political culture and identities (June – September, 2010) will be presented and compared to some previous researches. The focus is on the questions: is Macedonian society really multicultural, and if it is, is that a burden or a contribution to its members? The paper analyses the ethnic environment, the ethnic distance and the perception of self-identities of the citizens.

Key words: Political culture, Identities

INTRODUCTION

Is Macedonian society authoritarian? If it is, is it a residue of the former system or are there other factors reproducing it? Which model of political culture is dominant? Those are the key questions that have been challenging all analysts working on the case of the political culture of Macedonia.

Within the country, those have been one of the most exploited topics in the last two decades, not only in the political rhetoric and the media, but in the everyday conversations of the citizens as well. The political marketing, especially in election years, is flooded with topics related to this issue, since it is still a rather popular choice for logos and strategies of political campaigns. However, in order to get a clearer picture, all the mentioned issues have to be looked at chronologically.

When political changes in the former socialist states in Europe started, the political rhetoric produced the term "countries in transition". Those states (especially former Yugoslav) used this phrase to define themselves, recognizing the political transition as a process of advancement, improvement, progress... With regards to the political culture it was meant to imply transformation of an authoritarian into a participative model, in a sense as Almond and Verba described it in their well known typology (Almond G., Verba S. 1989). Reflecting on the issue of ethnic identities it was expected that narrow ethnic boundaries would be abandoned in favor of some more common values; transforming historical burdens and nationalistic mythologies into a broader, future oriented view.

Exceptions are of course more interesting to analyze. Macedonia is unfortunately one of the most interesting examples in this regard. Radical changes in the matrix of the political culture have taken place in the country during the past two decades. However, they were not following the expected direction of advancement, but moving forward and backward in a rather chaotic manner.

In the pages to follow, some research data which illustrate this, will be presented. They are based mainly on a project "Political Culture and Identities", conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Legal Research, but comparison shall be made with other researches undertaken in the last 20 years, after the Macedonian independence.

The purpose of this paper is to present some indicators related to the development of the model of political culture of the citizens of Macedonia, during the so called transitional period, with a special focus to the issue of ethnic identities and identities in general, as they were determined by the changes of the general value matrix.

PRESENT VALUES AND IDENTITIES

It is impossible for this occasion to present all results from the previously quoted researches, so a summary will be made in order to illustrate this particular topic. The project which was defined as a basis for this analysis[1], was conducted in 2010. It included a face to face survey on a representative sample of 1600 respondents, 6 focus groups (with different ethnic groups) and 20 in-depth interviews.

The following indicators were used in the research.

- Indicators for authoritarian values
- Acceptance of the economic changes (socialism versus capitalism in the perceptions of the population)
- Perception of democracy
- Ethnic and religious distance
- Identities

This essay shall concentrate on the inter-dependence of authoritarian values, ethnocentrism and identities.

*

Authoritarianism in this context will not be analyzed only as a key obstacle towards democracy and a participative political culture, but as a factor which directly influences ethnocentrism and through it – the perception (or rather – the creation) of identities.

The widest framework and a general, introductory question used in the research was: Do the citizens have anybody they see as an "authority" and do they need one at all?

According to the responses, it appears that only around one quarter of the population in 2010 does not have such a need. It is interesting that the number of people who declared that they do not need any authority is somewhat smaller than 1o years ago.

However, the ones that do recognize some authority, identify it mainly within their own ethnic or religious boundaries.

If we look at the average numbers for the whole population, data show that on the top of the list of authorities is "God, or Allah" with 42% respondents who chose this option. This is the case within every ethnic group included in the survey.

However, it is more interesting to look at all of the answers with regards to the ethnicity of the respondents. In this respect, one third of the ethnic Macedonians

had chosen God as their prime authority, while the second one on the list with 20% is the President or the Prime minister (who are both ethnic Macedonians).

Albanians, Turks and Roma chose Allah in a higher number (almost two times more than the Macedonians) , but very few of their answers (with exception of Roma) were related to politicians, as can be seen on the following table:

Table 1. *Question: " Who is highest authority for you?"*

	Ethnic background			
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma
President, prime minister	24,1%	3,3%	7,3%	47,8%
Minister responsible for my professional field	2,5%	1,8%		
My boss	8,4%	2,1%	2,4%	
Professors from my University (for students)	2,1%	8,5%		
Leader of my political party	3,7%	6,7%		2,2%
Head of my religious community	0,7%	1,5%	2,4%	2,2%
God, Allah	30,9%	63,8%	76,8%	43,5%
I don't believe in authorities	27,6%	12,3%	11,0%	4,3%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Further in this direction, all ethnic groups agreed (around 70%) that it would be good if "the state was run by only one person who would have authority". Consequent to the previous answers, they all imagine him/her to belong to their ethnic group. In the discussion on the focus groups, when they were asked why should this person be from their ethnic group, the most common answer was that "only the people from their ethnic group understand the problems of all ethnicities".

Desiring a concentration of power in such a high percent is obviously an indicator showing that the political diversity and distribution of power are perceived as a practical difficulty (This was confirmed in the conducted interviews).

Additionally, in all discussions, the mistrust towards politicians (or authorities in general) who belong to another ethnic group was evident. The following table gives a small, but indicative illustration of the above:

Table 2. *Question: "Ministers in the Government who are Albanians care only about their ethnic group"*

	Ethnic background					
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other	total
Agree	80,0%	14,1%	61,0%	89,1%	75,7%	63,2%
Dissagree	20,0%	85,9%	39,0%	10,9%	24,3%	36,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

If this question was repeated by referring to the Ministers who are ethnic Macedonians, Turks etc., the answers would probably be distributed in a similar pattern.

The distance (or mistrust) is obviously an obstacle hard to overcome, despite all confidence building strategies applied in the country in the past years. Even if we have in mind the fact that all Macedonian Governments included ministers from different ethnic groups, for quite a long period, it is obvious that the citizens still prefer to identify their interests mainly through the ethnic background of their representatives.

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Very surprising, but related and consequent to the previous question is the data according to which almost half of all ethnic groups perceive "too much democracy as **harmful**". This has never been the case in the past 15 years. Authoritarians and people who feared democracy appeared in much smaller numbers, not only ten years ago, but even in the time of the former socialist political system.[2]

Among else, this means that the citizens do not enjoy the contributions of democracy enough. According to the discussions on this subject on the focus groups, the participants often expressed a feeling that their rights were more broken today than before. Mainly they referred to their ethnic rights. It is interesting that the participants, especially the younger ones, explain this situation with an extreme simplification. Summarized it would look like the following: "Democracy means respect of diversity. Diversity leads to doing what you want, which disables the system to function". Trying to find a way out of this situation, those respondents (around half of them) believe that:

- Obedience is very important (51%)
- Discipline, order are most important (49)
- Sanctioning is the only way to establish order 46%
- Severe sanctions are necessary (including beating of the police, death penalty, etc.) around 30%

2) Project: "Ideology in the Macedonian Society", Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical research, Skopje 1986

- Even censorship is sometimes necessary 39% ("because people do not make difference between right and wrong")

It may not be a majority, but it is not insignificant that more than one third of the population **shows all** elements of the well-known Adorno's tested indicators about the authoritarian submissiveness, aggressiveness, and conventionalism.

Compared to previous researches, it appears that those numbers have not changed drastically. The problem is that the changes have obviously gone in the opposite direction. Instead of improvement, we can speak of a certain deterioration. Compared to ten years ago there is less democratic culture, less participation than before; in one word – there is a process quite opposite to advancement going on in the Macedonian society.

Furthermore, the social groups related to those characteristics have changed also. Ten years ago, such answers were typical for the older, less educated, middle class respondents. Today, such answers were given in a greater percentage by younger, more educated, urban citizens. The difference with respect to the ethnic background is evidently narrowing, on the account of some social characteristics, like social status and education.

Related to this context, it should be pointed that even the ideological identity expressed by the respondents does not match the values declared. If asked how they would define themselves, within all ethnic groups appear four almost equal parts: left, right, center and the ones who do not know. Their attitudes however, do not correspond to the chosen political ideology. (Even the outcome of the elections shows that those people vote for different political parties). It shows that they may be randomly picking an ideological identity, rather than really having one.

Evidently, around half of all ethnic groups believe that the system, the institutions are not functioning in favor of their expectations. They relate it to the political parties and politicians which is perhaps why they reach for religious authorities in such high numbers. But it also makes them vulnerable and easy to manipulate with. Having in mind that both major religious communities in Macedonia – the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Islamic community are almost functioning like political institutions, the danger of abuse is even greater.

IDENTITIES

With regards to those previous questions, the widest gap did not appear between the ethnic groups. They think and experience changes almost in a similar pattern. However, when we reach the question about their perception of identity, as they would declare it, the ethnic differences become evident.

One of the regularly asked questions in many surveys was how do the citizens define themselves (perceive their identity). The following table shows their answers in the past 20 years.

Table 3

	1991	1996	2001	2008	2010
European citizen	4%	27%	9%	6%	5%
Balkan citizen	3%	4%	10%	3%	2%
Macedonian citizen	14%	36%	51%	60%	53%
Member of my ethnic group	59%	12%	17%	14%	20%
Resident of my region	3%	3%	4%	2%	0%
Resident of my local community	6%	7%	8%	3%	1%
Just a citizen	3%	11%	0%	9%	18%
Did not respond	8%	0%	1%	3%	0%

The table confirms that the previously presented changes in the political culture do, before all, reflect on their perception of identity and self-definition.

Great differences appear among various groups. The next table shows how the citizens define themselves today, seen from the aspect of their ethnicity:

Table 4. *Question: "How would you identify yourself? (2010)*

How would you identify yourself?	Macedonians	Albanians	Turks	Roma
European citizen	4%	8%	5%	0%
Balkan citizen	1%	0,5%	0,5%	0%
Macedonian citizen	67%	13%	42%	78%
Member of my ethnic group	7%	52%	38%	4%
Resident of my region	1%	6%	0%	0%
Resident of my local community	2%	2%	1%	0%
Just a citizen	18%	17%	15%	17%
Did not respond	0%	0%	0%	0%

Looking at the biggest differences seen on the table, the one that distinguishes mostly is the Albanian group, such as has been the case in all the past years. To the Albanians, being a member of the ethnic group is far more important than belonging to a nation, indicating once more a rather permanent closing within ethnic borders.

On the other hand, Macedonians obviously experience Macedonia as "their" nation, rarely choosing to identify as "members of their ethnic group".

However, all groups show a type of "local-level" character of their identity. There is obviously no common feeling of belonging to a nation, and definitely nothing wider than the nation.

In the same direction are the data regarding the acceptance of some symbols, which further illustrate the above table. For example:

- Preferred or "most favorite" holidays for all ethnic communities are the religious ones (each community placing their own on the top of the list). Exceptions exist among people who practice religion which is different than the one of the majority in their ethnic group (like Macedonian Muslims, Albanian Catholics, Roma Jehovah witnesses etc.)
- Even the national flag is not equally recognized and important for everybody. For example, 88% of the ethnic Macedonians define the present national flag as most important to them (the rest prefer an old national flag, resembling Alexander the Great's symbol). However, only 4% of the Albanians accept the national flag. The rest of them (over 80%) prefer the flag of Albania. The other ethnic groups resemble the answers given by Macedonians.
- All ethnic groups have their own most important historical heroes, who are related to their ethnicity only. Very few of the names pointed, can be described as historical heroes who have importance for more than one ethnic group, as can be seen from the following table (The question in the survey was open, without given optional answers)

Table 5. *Question: "Which historical hero is most important to you?"*

	Ethnic background				
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	Other
Aleksander the Great	12,8%	0,5%		10,9%	18,9%
Josip Broz - Tito	17,9%	1,8%	11,0%	13,0%	37,8%
Goce Delcev (Macedonian hero)	32,1%	0,3%	1,2%	2,2%	10,8%
Skender Beg (Albanian hero)	0,1%	36,4%	3,7%	2,2%	
Kemal Ataturk	0,2%		26,8%		
Other Macedonian heroes	12,8%	0,5%	2,4%		8,1%
Other Albanian heroes	0,1%	34,1%	3,7%	37,0%	
Present politicians	0,6%	2,3%	2,4%		
Other European historical heroes	8,5%	10,3%	3,7%	4,3%	10,8%
Nobody	15,0%	13,8%	45,1%	30,4%	13,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Obviously, there is not much in common for the different ethnic groups. It especially concerns the younger generations, who go in separate schools (from kindergarten to university), learn from different textbooks, cheer ethnic sports clubs, attend their own coffee shops and restaurants, and become members of ethnic political parties.

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Regarding historical legacies and symbols, a real confusion was created in Macedonia by the latest "introduction" of Alexander the Great as "very important for the history of the country". Remembering the past, we can say that this hero was absolutely irrelevant to the citizens, until the beginning of the dispute with Greece which included the question " who has the right to claim his legacy?". At this point, the political conflict between the two countries should not be elaborated further, since it is an entirely different and very complex topic. However, few remarks should be made, due to their direct impact on the values and behavior of the citizens.

This process of reviving the ancient legacy related to the period of Alexander the Great started more intensively in Macedonia in the last 6 years. It was introduced and is carried out by political institutions, so it has a rather "official" manner. The promotion of the importance of "being an inheritor of Alexander the Great" produced irrational, almost humorous disputes about how much are the Macedonians of Slav origin and how much are they Ancient Macedonians? Cities became flooded with monuments and symbols of ancient history. Macedonian population divided again, based on the understanding of their historical genesis.

To illustrate this, we can use the results from this last survey which is analyzed. According to data, 27% of the population thinks that Alexander the Great "is most important, because we originate from him"; 52% said that he is just one of the many historical figures and 11% say that he means absolutely nothing to them. People that support the idea about ancient Macedonian heritage are mainly ethnic Macedonian, urban population.

However, when Alexander the Great is compared to other heroes who have importance to the citizens, it is obvious that he really is "just one of them", for the big majority, as it was illustrated in the previous table 5. It could be an indicator that this hero was indeed introduced in a rather artificial way.

The differences among the ethnic groups related to this question are big, as it can be expected.

The following table shows the responses seen from the aspect of the ethnic background of the population.

Table 6. *Question: "What does Alexander the Great mean to you?"*

	Ethnic background					
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other	total
He means nothing	10,8%	55,4%	43,9%	8,7%	27,0%	23,7%
important, we originate from him	26,8%	4,1%	4,9%	32,6%	16,2%	20,1%
He is just one of many heroes for my people	52,5%	17,9%	30,5%	19,6%	37,8%	41,7%
I do not know	9,8%	22,6%	20,7%	39,1%	18,9%	14,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Why was this new mythology introduced, will be a question for many future analyses. At the moment, the surveyed citizens explain it in the following manner:

Table 7. *Question: "Why was the myth about Alexander the Great introduced as a very important one?"*

	Ethnic background				
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other
It is a deliberate creation of confusion in the identity of the Macedonians	20,8%	21,3%	18,3%	21,7%	24,3%
It is attempt to make Greece angry and not to solve the name dispute	19,2%	44,1%	36,6%	21,7%	27,0%
It is finally an affirmation of the real history of Macedonia	40,2%	2,3%	19,5%	19,6%	18,9%
Do not know	19,8%	32,3%	25,6%	37,0%	29,7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Without elaborating further as to who actually needed such a confusion in the identities, for this purpose it should be pointed only that an additional factor of division within the Macedonian group, and between the ethnic groups was obviously created. It will without doubt reflect on the ethnic distance and ethnocentrism in a negative way in many years to come. It strengthens the need for an authority, especially if the one can be given an ethnic dimension.

CONCLUDING POINTS

The previously presented data certainly illustrate the main topics and questions which motivated this paper. Before all, they confirm that

- The political culture in Macedonia is not advancing from an authoritarian towards a participative model as it was expected.
- There is a presence of authoritarian values among a significant part of the population which provides the dominant color of the picture.
- It would be too simplified to say that those values originate and are related only to the former political system.
- The type of political culture which is dominant (and is stimulated) strengthens the ethnocentrism, especially when identities are concerned.

Tendencies towards ethnocentrism in the Macedonian society (but not only there), constantly feed on authoritarian matrixes. The need for "authority", obedience, loyalty etc., has always been used as a "necessity" in building cohesion of the groups, especially ethnic ones. It was done regardless the danger that the rigidity towards "the other" can easily be transformed into exclusion of "anything different". This true circulus vitsiosus suffocates all diversities: political, ethnic, cultural…It simply ignores a very high priority. As Kymlicka points: 'minority rights should not allow one group to dominate other groups and they should not enable a group to oppress its own members"(Kymlicka, 1995).

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'ANTIQUIZATION' AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: THREE EXAMPLES ONE EXPLANATION

ABSTRACT

To talk about the national identity of one nation it means to talk about its present connected with its past. Unarguably, the identity of the nation is crucial for its future regarding its existence and prosperity. The paper will try to analyze the 'antiquization' in the Republic of Macedonia as parallel process of national identification and international promotion of the country. The thesis of the paper is that the effect of non-recognition of full Macedonian national identity, especially vis-a-vis Greek objections, directly influences and reinforces the shift towards the ancient ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation. The search for antique roots of the Macedonian national identity is the third wave of defence after the successful establishment of first, the federal state and, second, an independent nation. 'Antiquization' as a phenomenon is a defence not an attack but will certainly have longer impact on perceptions of national identity in the Republic of Macedonia.

Key words: Macedonian national identity, antiquization, Alexander the Great, governing myth

INTRODUCTION

While the nation and nationalism were widely elaborated in the second half of the last century, the national identity as a category long time was in the shadow of the analyses of the processes of establishing the nation and nationalism. The studies of national identity more often have delt with the explanation and debating of the nation then the identity *per se*, eventhough when the national identity was used as an analytical category by theorists of nationalism there are little discussions of the way the identities are formed and reproduced in time and space (Bell, 2003: 63-81). The end of the century brought new energy in the research of identity, but now with new enthusiasm in different social sciences and not only in psychology and sociology. The recommendations are for the approaches with more human aspects of the individual identity versus power of the structures and states. Suddenly, the identity research becomes a fashion. That is why in the last three decades the literature abounds with national identity studies. The identities are analyzed on every possible aspect: politics, culture, religion, values, sport etc. On one side, when we see the teardrops when the national anthem is playing on any high level sport competition it is difficult to explain why these happened. On the other side, wars were waged for the national glorification, survival or domination. Twentieth century is a classical example of it.

Eventhough the concept of identity is central to many sociological analyses and it is vital in modernity, it is still undertheorized and incapable for analytical contribution as the moder situations requires (Bendle, 2002: 1-2). Identity is perception. The identity is about feelings as well, and about the meaning to the holder of identity. But identifiers of ethnicity do not generate identity automatically because the key is how the individual will choose to identify with these characteristics. For someone the identity is just simply acquired perception. Identity belongs to future as well as the past. Is not something that already exists, transcending the place, time, history and culture. The cultural identities comes from somewhere, they have history. Still, as everything that is historical, they are constantly under transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject of continual 'game' of history, culture and power. (Hall, 1990: 225) We also have multiple identities and we are members of different collectives and groups. Identites as other human activities are conctructed. They are construction both for individuals and collectives. (Schoplin, 2003: 477-490)

Symbolic resources like political values/institutions, culture, history and geography, provide the symbolic raw material which social actors use as they define national identities in public discourse. Thus, 'what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less *what* resources political actors draw upon

than *how* they put these resources to practical use …' (Zimmer, 2003: 181). In this paper the author will show three examples that explain the 'antiquization' of the Macedonian national identity: First, the dominant western discourse in the social sciences about the origin of the Macedonians, second, the Macedonian governing myth of origin and its shifts, and the third, the process of 'antiquization' of Macedonian national identity and public feelings about the past heroes and events. With one probable explainanions and argument that the process of 'antiquization' is older and now is just strengthen and became dominant identity discourse within the society. It is more matter of how than what, eventhough the 'true history' is all around and easy to support by all parties.

ORIGIN OF MACEDONIANS IN WESTERN ANALYSES

In the second half of 20th century there are many western analysts that are writing about the origin of the Macedonians with the titles like 'Who are the Macedonians?' These analyses are trying to argue about the roots of the modern Macedonians that live in the Republic of Macedonia, but even further, to argue about what means to be called Macedonian historically and regionally. The initial motif was the existence of Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The analyses grew in numbers after the 1991 when the Republic of Macedonia became independent state. The battle about who are the Macedonians and who have the right to the ancient Macedonian heroes and history begun. The main contenders were Macedonians form Macedonia, Greeks from region called Macedonia in Greece and to a narrower extent the Bulgarians. For the latter, the differences were the disputed arguments of the Macedonians and Bulgarians about the medieval kingdom of Samuel and the cultural background of the Macedonians. Three small countries fighting for scarce symbolic and historic symbols. Here are some of the arguments about who are the Macedonians:

1. Until 1923, a bare majority of the population of Macedonia was Slav. It is the national identity of these Slav Macedonians that has been most violently contested aspect of the whole Macedonian dispute, and is still being contested today. There is no doubt that they are Southern Slavs; they have a language, or a group of varying dialects, that is grammatically akin to Bulgarian but phonetically in some respects akin to Serbian, and which has certain quite distinctive features of its own. (Barker, 1950: 10) In regard to their own national feelings, all that can safely be said is that during the last eighty years many more Slav Macedonians seem to have considered themselves Bulgarian, or closely linked with Bulgaria, than have considered themselves

Serbian, or closely linked with Serbia (or Yugoslavia). Only the people of the Skopje region, in the north-west, have ever shown much tendency to regard themselves as Serbs. The feeling of being Macedonians, and nothing but Macedonians, seems to be a sentiment of fairly recent growth, and even today is not very deep-rooted. (Barker, 1950: 12);

2. Who is a 'Macedonian'? The word may be used for an inhabitant, or former inhabitant, of a region called Macedonia, irrespective of ethnicity; for a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, again, irrespective of ethnicity; or for a member of the Macedonian nation or ethnic group. It is the third, apparently most 'natural' usage, which is most controversial. 'Why not Macedonia for Macedonians, as Bulgaria for Bulgarians and Servia for Servians?' Posed in the Times in 1897, Gladstone's question reflected the concerns of a *fin-de-siecle* Western European ruling elite witnessing the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and anxious over the future succession of political control in European Turkey. Already, the new states in the region (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria), as well as a movement claiming to strive for an autonomous Macedonia, were laying claims on the territory and its population, basing these on whatever criteria best suited their national arguments – language, religion, history, household customs, national consciousness. The 'Macedonian Question' thus had high profile, and marked a shift from the politics of empires to that of nation-states. It remained a fraught and contested issue, nationally and internationally, throughout the first half of the century, long after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference redrew national boundaries cutting through the territory. (Cowan, 2000: 1-11);

3. All Balkan territorial disputes have their mythologies; that of the Macedonian question is that of the most bloody, complex and intractable of all, in a small peninsula already well burdened. But unlike Serbia or Greece, in Macedonia there was no basically homogenous population made up of one potentially dominant group that could form the basis of a new nation-state. There was, however, and still is, a plainly dominant majority in the cultural sense, in that there are more people of Slavonic origin living there than of any other group – but only within a patchwork of extreme complexity, with Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlach, Pomaks and Gypsies living along side the Slavonic majority; and, moreover, that majority is itself subdivided into Serbian, Bulgarian and 'Macedonian' elements. (Pettifer, 1999: 15-6);

4. On 3 November 1893 in the Ottoman Vilayet capital of Selanik, nowadays known as Thessaloniki, seven Christian Orthodox intellectuals, speaking the eastern variety of the southern Slavic tongue founded a national-revolutionary and conspiratorial organization in opposition to the ruling Sultan with the

title of the '(Internal) Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation', abbreviated as IMRO, their goal was the establishment of their own state first in the form of territorial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire as a step towards independence. Within the national-revolutionary movements inside the Ottoman Empire, the terms "Macedonia' and 'Macedonian' could refer to at least two different ethno-political contents. On the one hand, they could have regional connotation. This meant that anyone living within the area described as the Macedonian heartland of the 'three Vilayets' – Selanik, Manastir and Kosova – was in this sense Macedonian. On the other hand, 'Macedonia' and 'Macedonian' could be understood in an ethno-linguistic sense, with territorial and denominational components: in this interpretation, Macedonians were only those who (1) spoke east-southern Slavic, and (2) were Christians. (Troebst, 1999: 61-7);

5. Local Macedonians (Lerin, Kostur) constitute a distinct ethnic group, since they are clearly distinguished from the other ethnic groups in the area (such as Pontians, the Vlachs, and the Arvanites) both by themselves and by the members of these other groups. These local Macedonians are the people whose lives have been most dramatically affected by the Macedonian conflict, for inhabitants of the same villages, members of the same families, have adopted Three different national identities with some identifying as Greeks, others as Macedonian, and still others (primarily in the past) as Bulgarians. In fact, I state explicitly that these people refer to themselves as – 'indigenous Macedonians' (i.e., dopii Makedhones). Jane Kowan ('Idioms of Belonging' in Ourselves and Others, p.152) also states that 'dopii' describe themselves as Makedones: 'Let me stress that the term 'local Macedonians' is used here in an ethnic, not a national sense, and that the majority of local Macedonians in Florina and Kastoria now have a Greek (non a Macedonian) national identity. Macedonian has replaced Bulgarian as the national identity most frequently adopted by local Macedonians who reject a Greek national identity. This say the Macedonian conflict in Australia has again become a dispute involving primarily two groups: Greeks and Macedonians. (Danfort, 2000: 49);

6. The course of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a variety of South Slavic (and other) national identities and literary languages, as well as nation-states in which those languages were expected to serve as vehicle of power, although the national boundaries did not correspond to the territorial claims being made by any of the parties involved. The earliest published expression of separate Macedonian identity that we know of, however, dates from 1875. The writer was the autodidact stone mason Gorgi Pulevski (b.1838 - d.1894). Between 1873 and 1880 he published three textbooks, and he made no

attempt to write in a Macedo-Bulgarian compromise. 'Taka i Makedoncive se narod i mestovo njivno je Makedonija' (Pulevski 1875: 48-49). It is possible to identify sixteen textbook published between 1857 and 1880 by Partenij, Makedonski, Sapkarev, and Pulevski. On 22 August 1892, the Kostur parish school council adopted the proposal of a group of six teachers who had met previously in secret, and agreed to eliminate both Bulgarian and Greek and introduce Macedonian as the language of instruction in the town school for the 1892/93 shool year. Za Makedonskite raboti was Misirkov's response to the failure of the Ilinden Uprising and constitutes the ideological culmination of the development of nineteenth-century Macedonian national and linguistic identity. (Friedman, 2000: 182-7) It is prevarication to contend that the concepts of a separate Macedonian language and identity were created ex nihilo by Yugoslav fiat (Friedman, 1985: 34).

That is the first part that clearly states some of the axioms in the western discourse of the origin of the modern Macedonians. It is reach, it is burden by the older historical narratives and it is not holistic. The selection is not done with some specific aim or category but just to show some of the deliberations on the topic. Analysts are trying to ne neutral but with history one can never be sure what is true, what realy happened and what ius just a myth and belongs to a mitology. Now we can turn to the 'historical' part and see the governing myth about the ethnogenesis of the Macedonians and its shifts.

THE MACEDONIAN GOVERNING MYTH

Tracing the origins of the nation became a primary task for historiography in 1990s. 'Since in the sources, "Macedonians", particularly as an ethnic group, are rarely mentioned, Macedonian historians employ a device equally well-known to their Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian colleagues, namely to replace the terms "Christians/Greek Orthodox/Bulgarian Exarchists", usually used for the designation of the Orthodox population of the region during Ottoman times, with "Macedonians"' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 185). The first generation of Macedonian historians traced the emergence of the Macedonian nation back to the nineteenth century. 'Macedonian national history was traced to the nineteenth century, with its most prominent expression being the revolutionary struggle for freedom, equality and independence' (Frusetta, 2004: 112). At last, on 8 September 1991, the year of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Macedonians voted in a referendum and proclaimed full sovereignty and independence. The journey was finished. The impression was that the Macedonians had created their 'natural' nation-state.

The first important shift in tracing the myth of origin was the attempt to find the origins of the Macedonian nation further back in history, namely in the Middle Ages. 'Now, the medieval empire of Czar Samuil and his successors (969-1018), whose capitals were Prespa and Ohrid in Macedonia, was re-evaluated as a Macedonian state although existing scholarship had regarded it Bulgarian' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 179). The Macedonian historiography separated the Macedonian ethnogenesis from the Bulgarian one. During the second historiographical shift in the early 1990s, efforts were made to include the ancient Macedonians in the national narrative. Macedonian historians challenged Greece's 'exclusive ownership' of the symbols and territory of the ancient Macedonians in order to back up their claims to the name and the land of Macedonia and to create their own ancient national patrimony. The main claim was that the ancient Macedonians were not Greeks but a different, non-Hellenic people who joined in the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian people by melting into the Slavs who had come to the region in the sixth and seventh centuries. They asserted that ancient Macedonians and ancient Greeks were completely different peoples. The discourse on the ancient Macedonians was intended to substantiate the Macedonians' claims to a long national pedigree and also to a homeland.

The strongest attack came from Greece in 1990s. 'By calling themselves "Macedonians" the Slavs are "stealing" a Greek name; they are "embezzling" Greek cultural heritage; they are "falsifying" Greek history' (Danfort, 1993: 4). Therefore, the nineteenth and twentieth century rivalry about the 'Macedonian question' gained new impetus and new depth. Macedonian national identity was something everyone wanted to have: the Greeks the right to the name Macedonia, the Bulgarians the right to the language, and the Serbians, even recently, the right to the church. However, according to the theories of nationalism, the most wanted element was primarily territory, as one of the main indicators of the nation. So it was in the Macedonian case. Scholars also devoted their efforts to the issue, trying to figure out the roots of the contested perceptions. 'Where there are clashing interpretations of ancestral homelands and cultural heritages as for example in Macedonia, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Palestine – normal conflicts of interest are turned into cultural wars, and moral and political crusades replace everyday politics' (Smith, 1999: 9). History and culture, two separate but inextricable processes, were 'subjects' of proving 'our truth' against 'their truth'. 'In a time of perceived crisis and with limited alternatives, there was little inclination among ethnic Macedonians as a whole for a radical restructuring of national symbols' (Frusetta, 2004: 118).

Rapid social changes in the society freed some 'hidden' versions of the national narrative too. The main 'ideological' struggle was between the

two strongest political parties on the Macedonian political scene, Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). While the SDSM stuck to the leftwing version of the national narrative (dominant until 1990s), the VMRO-DPMNE tried, from the pre-socialist period right-wing tradition, to present to the public other 'forgotten' national heroes. Efforts were made to re-open questions from history and consequently to re-think parts of the national narrative. The most controversial revisionist effort, according to Brunnbauer, concerned the attempt to include the 'Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation' (VMRO) of the inter-war period in the Macedonian national narrative. 'The rationale of these attempts was to construct a historical rightwing tradition, which the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party could claim for itself, and to oppose the pro-Yugoslav interpretation of Macedonian history that was politically associated with the post-communist SDSM party' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 192-3). The reconciliation of the two historic 'memories' held by both parties, one as a subaltern perspective different from the governing ones, did not find fruitful soil in first decade of independence. After the VMRO-DPMNE stepped down as the ruling government-led coalition party (1998-2002), we saw, at least from the public perspective, a fading out of the attempts to exploit different national 'stories'. But some heroes (like Alexander the Great) remained as dormant stories and did not wait too long.

Let me present the data from the research done in 2001 among 2000 ethnic Macedonians on the questions regarding the national identity and the past. The average Macedonian thougth that the historical roots of the Macedonian state are connected with the **Ilinden uprising** (24.75%) or with **Alexander the Great** (21.35%), and are followed by ASNOM (antifaschist state structure from the World War II) and Czar Samuil. Divergence from the average result was recorded among the age groups 18-25 and 56-65 and university-educated respondents. The younger generation, again, prefer Ilinden (26.46%) compared to ASNOM (12.70%), the older generation prefer ASNOM (25.18%), while primary school-educated respondents prefer the Ilinden uprising (24.04%). ***Interestingly, among university-educated respondents Alexander the Great (24.74%) was the most popular choice.*** Bigger differences, again, are spotted between VMRO-DPMNE affiliates, with Ilinden first (31.02%) and Alexander the Great the second choice (26.74%), giving ASNOM barely (8.02%). Again, VMRO-DPMNE affiliates have significant differences not just in the rating of the historical roots, but in the percentage of importance too. This supports the argument that 'alternative political identities have been emerging, different from those laid down by existing state structures' (McCrone, 1998: 31). This

implies that some social groups have different perspectives on national narratives, view national history differently, or at least have subaltern national 'versions'. In the Macedonian case, these groups are the younger and the older respondents and, to some extent, university-educated groups. (Atanasov, 2004) In the case of the Macedonian national identity there are competing differences between unitary and subaltern national myths and narratives. 'The governing myth thus coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of generating their own traditions and stories' (Bell, 2003: 74). This is the case with many nations, both older and younger ones.

This was a picture of 2001 seen through one simple research question. And with this we conclude the part with Macedonian governing myth of origin and its shifts and will continue with the process of 'antiquization' of Macedonian national identity that stir public feelings about the past heroes and events. This will be the third example of the paper argument. The questions that will be cited are from the research done in 2010. (Simoska *et all*: 2010)

'ANTIQUIZATION' OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY

The data form the research done in 2010 shows that the trend towards 'antiquization' is continuing. On the question 'Do you personally feel as a successor of Alexander the Great?', negatively answered 64,5% of the general public. (Graph 1) Yet, that feels like a succesors answered 35,5%, which is certainly not small percentage if we have in mind that the enhanced process of 'antiquization' is just present in last couple of years (2008-2011). Of course, this feeling is dominant among Macedonians (Graph 2), with almost even ratio between those who feel and do not feel close to the Great warrior.

Graph 1

Graph 2

On the question 'How one can explain the increased interest of the ancient history in Macedonia?', the answers shows that the antiquization has an effect acquiring the new elements of the state identity. This is proved by the answer that 'this is an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia' which is chosen by 29%. With 26% the respondents have chosen the modality 'this is an attempt to make Greece angry and not resolve the name issue' and 21% respondents have chosen that 'this is an attempt to provoke confusion in Macedonian identity'. These are type of answers when the citizens do not have clear opinion and make an enforced selection, and the answers are (3-4 of them) more or less with the same quantity generally (Graph 3). In that case, the columns in the graphs do not have obvious trends. Still, the third answer, for 'an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia', divided by ethnic segregation, is most preferred by the Macedonians (Graph 4).

Modalities on the question: 'How one can explain the increased interest of the ancient history in Macedonia?'

1. It is an attempt to provoke confusion in Macedonian identity
2. It is an attempt to make Greece angry and not resolve the name issue
3. It is an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia
4. Do not know

*Graph 3*   *Graph 4*

And the last question in this argumentation, that will serve to argue about the paper thesis, is the answers on the question 'Which historical person is the most important according to your opinion?'. Here, the Alexander the Great is 'loosing' the battle with the most prominent Macedonian in last 100 years – Goce Delchev (23%) and Josip Broz Tito (14%). The Alexander is shosen by 9% of the interviwees, the same as the Skenderbeg (9%). (Graph 5) This picture is completely changed when the data is segregated by ethnic variable (Graph 6). Then, the Macedonians

make the same selection (chosing the Goce Delchev double then the others), but the Albanians exlusively choose Skenderbeg (36%) as well as the Turks choosing Ataturk (27%).

Graph 5

Graph 6

Yet, the biggest and signigfcant differences in answers related to this question is gathered by the **age segregation**. These data are shown in Table 1. Goce Delchev is the first 'pick' in all generations. But, it is clear that the story of Alexander is already part of the identity concerning younger generations, comparing to older generations which selection as a second choice is Josip Broz – Tito, as significant historical figure in Macedonian history.

Table 1

Which historical person is most important according to your opinion	Age						
	18-25 age	26-30 age	31-40 age	41-50 age	50-65 age	over 65	Total
Aleksandar Makedonski	**11,1%**	**11,4%**	**10,0%**	7,4%	6,6%	9,9%	9,2%
Josip Broz - Tito	7,0%	7,2%	11,1%	**18,3%**	**21,2%**	**21,5%**	13,9%
Goce Delchev	**18,5%**	**18,6%**	**17,5%**	**19,9%**	**26,5%**	**36,4%**	21,4%
Skender Beg	9,1%	9,1%	11,4%	12,2%	5,6%	4,1%	9,2%
Ataturk	1,2%	1,5%	1,9%	1,9%	1,3%		1,5%
Other Macedonian heros	7,4%	6,1%	10,8%	7,7%	10,9%	9,1%	8,8%
Other Albanian heros	14,8%	12,9%	8,1%	8,3%	6,6%	7,4%	9,6%
Current politicians	1,2%	1,1%	1,4%	1,3%	0,7%		1,1%
Ither historical persons	11,5%	12,5%	9,7%	4,5%	7,6%	4,1%	8,6%
No answer	18,1%	19,7%	18,1%	18,6%	12,9%	7,4%	16,7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

These were the three examples that shows that the effect of non-recognition of full Macedonian national identity, especially vis-a-vis Greek objections (and veto in Bucharest in 2008 as a blocade to become a member of NATO as a state), **directly influenced and reinforced the shift towards the ancient ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation**. The story of Alexander was already existent and in use but the governmental structures have choosen to re-interpret it and to make it more significant by building the huge statue of one 'warrior on his horse' in the Skopje main square. Actually, the process of antiquization is agenda that consist of more elements but this is the 'biggest' one.

CONCLUSION

The complex of questions for Alexander the Great gives new knowledge in relation to peceptions and interpretations of state identity. Namely, already big part of Macedonians 'feels' as succsesors of Alexander and, yet, part of them are convinced that 'he is the most important because our people have its origin by him'. It is difficult to talk about the debtness of these feelings, but the starting quantitative

analyses say that 'Alexandromania' is supported by people from cities, those with higher education and people from right wing ideological campus. Main reason for the antiquization is 'the final confirmation of real history' of the Macedonians. Despite these loops, the identity of Macedonian is rather stable, and is llinked with the state and the culture, but new elements of 'antiquization' and 'alexanromania' are emerging as part of main body of Macedonian national identity discourse. The attitudes that he is our direct ancestor and that this is our real history are supported by increasing number of Macedonians. Alexander as important historical figure is second choice by the younger generations.

The argument is supported by two conclusions. First, symbolic resources like political values, history and geography, provide the symbolic raw material which social actors use as they define national identities in public discourse. As Zimmer put it, what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less *what* resources political actors draw upon than *how* they put these resources to practical use. In Macedonian case the choice is clear what is chosen and how are the resources employed practically. Second, the search for antique roots of the Macedonian national identity is the third wave of defence after the successful establishment of first, the federal state (1944) and, second, an independent nation (1991). The defence started anew with the conflict of 2001 and the turbulences that the nation had to go through after the spill over of the Kosovo conflict on Macedonian soil and with Macedonian-Albanian crisis. 'Antiquization' as a phenomenon (2008-2011) is also a defence not an attack (an answer on Greek objections and blocades), but will certainly have longer impact on perceptions of national identity in the Republic of Macedonia. Once you have 'learned' who you are, it is a river of no return.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF SELF AND ADHERENCE TO VARIOUS SOCIAL CATEGORIES AMONG THE STUDENT POPULATION IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

ABSTRACT

Pluralistic society adopted the discourse of identities on a large scale. Identity is considered a modern phenomenon with its origins in Western individualism, and the problem of how to reconcile the relationship of self-identification and the existence of the "other" in order to answer the question "who am I" and "Where do I Belong" is becoming more scientifically and practically exploited.

The Republic of Macedonia in terms of its plurality and in terms of crises in various fields, is a challenge for researchers of identity. Thus, in spring 2011, the research team from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted research within the scientific research project *Perception of identities among the student population in Macedonia*. One of the primary goals of the scientific research project was the identification of self-identity of students and its relation to the sense of bonding with different social roles, groups and affiliations.

The results showed the complex relationship between personal and social determinants of identity and the various roles that "I" play in everyday life, and indirectly confirmed the need of society to care about identity and its relations with the "others" among its citizens.

Key words: self-identity, personal identity orientation, social identity orientation, perception of identities

INTRODUCTION

Changes in values and social change taking place in the last decade of the 20th century bring to the fore the complex problems of identity. Actually, discourse on identity is a modern phenomenon, having its origin in the Western individualism, because only in a plurastic society does a multiplication of identities comes into being. Hence, the problem emerges of how to reconcile the relation of self-identification and the existence of the "other" in order to answer the questions "who am I" and "where do I belong." The identity problem did not exist in a traditional society due to the fact that in such a kinship society the social status of individuals is strictly fixed. In contrast, modern people are confronted with a variety of choices, as a result of which there is instability of identity because the principle of ascription, characteristic of a traditional society, is replaced by the principle of achievement. Identity versus societal roles has been topic of interest in this research. Having in mind that identity represents the unique shaped human being, this research challenged the intensity of acceptance societal roles and the nature of social roles according to the characteristics of personal and societal identity.

The concept of identity is a modern one. It appeared in the 18 century when the conflict among individuals and society raised. In the 19 century, the accent was on the process of individualization. That is the process of transformation from heteronymous to autonomous locus of control was processed on ontogenetic and also phylogenetic level. In a modern society there is multiplication of identities as the society structure multiplied itself (gender identity, national identity, political, religious... and many more). Traditional society does not have the problem with multiple identities. In traditional society, social status of individual concepts is fixed. In a modern society, individuals have been faced with many choices. The problem of identities is a relevant field of research in modern society, having in mind that there is a tension between singular and plural identity on individual and collective level. Other issues concerning identity arise with the extension of the process of globalization. The tendency of global society is to construct one general model of identity which will be released from any type of history member of collective memory (Golubovic, 2000).

The concept of identity

Human is personal and societal being at the same time, so, the concept of identity is connected with the question of interconnection between the individual and collectivity aspect.

Identity, as it was defined in a Psychological vocabulary is *the feeling of sameness in important determinant attributions*. In psychology, identity of personality has two basic directions: first, similarity and differentiation with other persons and second as a subjective feeling of sameness beside relevant changes of personality in time framework. Personality itself has the feeling of personal and relatively persistent sameness (Krstic, 1991).

Laing in "Self and Others" clearly accented the interconnection of personal identity and others. According to him, integration and construction of identity suppose somebody else. Namely, there is complementarity between "me" and the "other" and that means that every relationship consumes definition of "me" from the "other" perspective and definition of the other from the side of "me" (Laing, 1961).

Identity as we now in psychology is known and derives mainly from the work of psychologist Erik Erikson in the 1950s. Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development is one of the best-known theories of personality in psychology. Much like Sigmund Freud, Erikson believed that personality develops in a series of stages. Unlike Freud's theory of psychosexual stages, Erikson's theory describes the impact of social experience across the whole lifespan.

One of the main elements of Erikson's psychosocial stage theory is the development of **ego identity**. Ego identity is the conscious sense of self that we develop through social interaction. According to Erikson, our ego identity is constantly changing due to new experience and information we acquire in our daily interactions with others. In addition to ego identity, Erikson also believed that a sense of competence also motivates behaviors and actions. Each stage in Erikson's theory is concerned with becoming competent in an area of life. If the stage is handled well, the person will feel a sense of mastery, which he sometimes referred to as **ego strength** or **ego quality**. If the stage is managed poorly, the person will emerge with a sense of inadequacy (Fulgosi, 1987).

Shaping the identity is a process which is pretty much connected with the experiences considering the societal world. During this process many aspects of identity become differentiated. So we have: national identity, gender identity, political identity etc. But in this process of identity differentiation, there is always the feeling that there is the core, the unchanged feeling about itself sameness during the time and experience. This concept has been derivated by Arieti's theory of personality. Arieti distinguished two types of personality: the generalized one

and the specific. The first one has been characterized by the belief that the self is independent on specific incarnations: belief such as "I am a teacher, but if I were a doctor or a farmer, I would be the same person". The specific type of personality anchors the inner self to specific aspects of one`s personality and adheres to beliefs such as "I cannot imagine having a different ethnic identity and remaining the same person" (Arieti, 1967)

This Arieti's theory nicely fits with the centre - periphery model of believes given by Rokeach. Rokeach found that our core believes are more difficult to change than those that are peripheral (Laponce, 2004). The core beliefs of the generalized personality are that the self is multiform and not permanently anchored in any one of these forms, while the specific personality has a core belief of anchorage in some exclusive and non-changeable identity.

 The start point of this research was Arieti's personality theory and Rokeach's concept of core and peripheral values. The main interest in this research was to find the interconnection among "the core" presented by personal and social identity and identification with some societal roles.

The ideas about researching societal roles rose from the Laponce research, which considered the intensity of the attachment and identification of the self with some societal roles. Laponce has a tendency to explore the minority effect and societal roles. His hypothesis was that respondents who are minority in the country where they live, will be much more attached with their ethnicity.

How can we define personal identity? From own personal experience and self-awareness we know that it is there, in side of us. It's a fact of conscious life, as common as the word "I." But it is hard to define it.

Personal identity means - seeing the self as distinct and different from others. The person is guided by her/his own goals rather than the group's goals (Stets & Burke, http://wat2146.ucr.edu/papers/02a.pdf).

Social identity usually is determined as sets of meanings that an actor attributes to it while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. Social identities are at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine `who I am/we are' in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations" (Wendt 1994).

Research has been conducted among students, so it is important to notify some developmental tasks regarding this period of lifespan. According to the developmental psychology, students are in a period of *early adulthood or period of decision years,* they are the youth. Youth is an "optional" period of development in which an individual is legally an adult but has not yet undertaken adult work and roles.

According to the developmental psychology, main developmental tasks for this period are achievement of independence from parents, identity stabilization, intimacy, and emotional stability, responsibility for self and others, and also establishing citizenship responsibility. This period is marked with the final preparation for adult roles. Youth attempt to crystallize their vocational goals and to establish sense of personal identity. Their needs for peer approval are demised and they are largely psychologically independent from their parents. The shift to adulthood is nearly complete (Gormly & Brodzinski 1990).

Goals of the research

The primary goal of this scientific research project was to identify the hierarchy of different societal roles among students and the intensity of bonding with different social roles, groups or affiliations.

Another goal of this research, besides identification of hierarchy of societal roles among students was, identification of inter connection between societal roles and identity.

Research framework

In spring 2011, the research team from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted research within the scientific research project *Perception of identities among the student population in Macedonia*. The survey included students from State Universities in the Republic. The sample counted 451 subjects, 156 male and 295 female; age from 18 till 25 years; Ethnicity: 234 Macedonians and 201 Albanians. The sample was occasional and the research was applied collectively on the classes.

Instruments

To achieve the research goals two instruments were applied.

- AIQ Aspects of Identity Questioner (Cheek & Briggs, 1981, 1982). This instrument has many versions. Some of these versions, beside a scale for personality identity orientation and social identity orientation scale had few more: collectivity identity scale and relation identity scale. In this research we included two scales:
- Personal Identity Orientation. This scale contains 9 items on a seven point Likert scale;

- Social Identity Orientation. This scale contains 6 items on a seven point Likert scale.

Cronbah's alpha for Political Identity Orientation scale is 0,84 and Cronbah's alpha for Social Identity Orientation scale is 0,80. This findings show that both scales have high consistency. The Cronbach's Alpha for the Questioner (two scales together) was 0,83.

The other instrument which was used was **_Questioner for attachment to different social roles_** (Laponce 1996). Laponce determined the personality as a bundle of roles: fathers, sons, teachers, non-voters and so on. According to him, _the self is a theatre where the roles are the actors and, on the stage of the self, specific selves play their roles either one at a time, or by two or three or more, but rarely with all of them holding hands, as for a curtain call._

- The 13 roles, identities, or characteristics of self were run through a grid of 4 scales (the equivalent of 4 acts) used to locate each role between polar opposites on a seven-point Likert scale. In the order in which they presented, the scales measured:
  - The level of common interests
  - The level of solidarity
  - The psychological difficulty of envisaging a change of the identity concerned: change of religion, sex, nationality, political party….
  - The importance attached to each role or identity

The roles which were included in the research were the following: gender, age; nationality; profession; religion; preferred political party; state or province of birth; city of residence; university; ethnic group; class; family and close friends.

Hypotheses

General hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity orientation will determine the level of attachment to different social roles.

Given that the connection to the various social roles is defined by four aspects such as common interests with others, a sense of solidarity with others, attitude towards changing the social roles and significance (importance) of the specific role of individuals, we can single out four specific hypotheses:

First sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity orientation will determine the position of their common interests with people belonging to certain social groups (13 according Laponce)

The second sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the sense of solidarity towards people belonging to certain social groups.

The third sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the possibilities and difficulties of changing certain social roles.

The fourth sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the importance of certain social roles for individuals.

Results of the research

AIQ (Aspects of Identity Questioner) in its original form has a few subscales (this depends on the type of this scale modification). In this research we included two subscales: Personality Identity Orientation Scale and Social Identity Orientation Scale. **Personal Identity Orientation** refers to the orientation toward its self, which depends on personal attitudes and values. Self is an object of attitudes formation. **Social identity Orientation** refers to the orientation toward its self, which is determined by other attitudes and values.

Correlation between the two subscales showed high positive value 0,297 (p< 0,01) which means that personal and social identity orientation are positively related.

Table 1 presents the percentage of respondent's answers according to Personality Identity Orientation Scale.

Table 1. *Percent of respondents on Personal Identity Orientation Scale*

Personal identity orientation		
High	Middle	Low
81.9%	17.6%	0.5%

As it can be seen from the obtained data, the highest percentage of respondents had high scores on Personality Identity Orientation scale, which means that highest percentage of respondents highly evaluated their personal values, personal goals and hopes, personal thoughts and ideas etc. for the sense of who they are.

Table 2 presents percentages of respondent's answers according to the Social Identity Orientation Scale.

Table 2. *Percent of respondents on Social Identity Orientation Scale*

Social Identity Orientation		
High	Middle	Low
62.9%	32.6%	4.4%

The highest percentage of respondents belongs to the group with high scores on social identity orientation scale, which means that the highest percentage of respondents highly evaluated their popularity, physical appearance, reputation etc. for the sense of who they are. But, it can be seen also that there is a significant percentage of respondents which belong to a group on the middle level on the social identity orientation scale. These findings suggest that respondents (in comparison with the previous data presented in table 1), have evaluated their popularity, physical appearance, reputation etc. (social issues) lower for the sense of who they are in comparison with personal issues like personal values, personal goals and hopes, personal thoughts and ideas etc. For the students, personal issues are more important than social issues for their sense of who they are.

Results for the hierarchy of social roles

Hierarchy of roles have been detected according to following questions (given in Laponce Questioner)

1. Common interests (with which societal roles one feel to have common interests);
2. Solidarity (the level of solidarity toward each of the offered societal roles);
3. Role changes difficulties (how hard will be to change each of the offered roles);
4. The importance of a role for the personality (how any of offered roles are important for the respondent).

Table 3 presents findings according to the estimated hierarchy or roles according to the respondent's answers on Laponce's Questioner.

Table 3. *Hierarchy of roles according to the four different questions (common interests, solidarity, role changes difficulties and importance of the role for the personality)*

	Common interests	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of role for personality
I .	*Family* (M=5.71)	*Family* (M=6.44)	*Family* (M=6.56)	*Family* (M=6.60)
II.	*Close friends* (M=5.57)	*Close friends* (M=6.21)	*Gender* (M=6.19)	*Close friends* (M=6.36)
III.	*Gender* (M=5.44)	*Profession (student)* (M=5.64)	*Close friends* (M=5.94)	*Religion* (M=5.91)
IV.	*Age* (M=5.21)	*Gender* (M=5.51)	*Religion* (M=5.83)	*Profession (student* (M=5.86)
.....	.....	.....	......	......
XIII.	*Political Party* (M=3.83)	*Political Party* (M=3.64)	*Political Party* (M=3.06)	*Political Party* (M=3.23)

Results show that social roles with which the students are mostly bound (roles that students see the most common interests with, roles with which they feel great solidarity, roles which are hard to change and roles that seem most important for the students), expectedly are: family, close friends and gender. But in the first four positions religion, profession (student) and age emerged also. Preferred Political Party is the role that students least bound with. The remaining six roles are somewhere between the mentioned roles.

The first three tables give general input in the research's findings. These tables give description of the estimated scores achieved on two scales and the general hierarchy of roles. Hierarchy of roles refers to the importance which students give to any of 13 appointed societal roles.

The next findings refer to the clarification of previously pointed research hypothesis. The general hypothesis challenges the interconnection between the level of personal and social identity orientation with the level of attachment to different social roles.

To explore this interconnection statistical test which was used is regression coefficient. Regression coefficient was calculated for all the 13 roles and for scores of two scales (personal identity scale and societal identity scale). Table 4 shows results for determination of the roles acceptance according to the social identity orientation and Table 5 show results for determination of the role acceptance according to the personal identity orientation.

Table 4. *Regression coefficients (societal identity orientation and roles)*

SOCIAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION				
Standardized B coefficient	Common interest	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of the role for personality
Gender		0,110*		0,124**
Ethnicity	0,149**	0,166**		
Religion	0,153**	0,175**		
Political party	0,141**	0,165**		
Place of birth	0,121*	0,125**		0,101*
Place of residence	0,168**	0,165**		
Class (social)		0,150**	0,167**	

*= p < 0,05;   **= p < 0,01

Students with high social identity orientation feel solidarity for 7 from 13 social roles, they see common interest with 5 different social roles, 2 social roles are important for them and with only one social role they would have difficulties to change it. Namely, highly developed social determinants of the personality (individuals with high social identity orientation) will contribute to the development of:

- position on larger common interests and a greater sense of solidarity to the people of the same ethnicity, same religion, political party, place of residence and birthplace;
- greater importance and greater solidarity to the people of the same gender and birthplace
- greater solidarity to the people of the same social class and attitude about the difficulties of changing the class to which they belong.

Table 5. *Regression coefficients (personal identity orientation and societal roles)*

	PERSONAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION			
Standardized B coefficient	Common interest	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of the role for personality
Gender		0,186**		0,164**
Age		0,168**		0,209**
Nationality		0,231**		0,210**
Ethnicity		0,223**		0,175**
Profession (student)	0,204**	0,153**		0,179**
Religion		0,144**		
Political party				
Place of birth		0,149**		0,182**
Place of residence	0,113*	0,224**		0,201**
University		0,136**		0,165**
Class (social)		0,168**		0,253**
Family	0,148**	0,155**	0,156**	0,183**
Closed friend	0,125**	0,280**	0,288**	0,286**

*= p < 0,05;   **= p < 0,01

Students with high developed personal identity orientation feel solidarity for almost all 13 social roles, 12 social roles are important for them, they see common interest with 4 different social roles, and with only two social roles they would have difficulties to change them. Namely, highly developed personal determinants of personality will contribute to the development of:

- great sense of solidarity for all the social roles except political party;
- greater importance for all the social roles except political party and religion;
- Family and Close friend are social roles that students see common interest with and would have difficulties to change.

Discussion and Conclusions

The survey started in order to clarify the relationship between self-identification and the existence of the "other". It meant a response to the question of the relation

between "Who Am I" and "Where do I Belong". The results first described the students "What are they." The Tables 1 and 2 showed that most students are individuals with highly developed personal and social identity orientation, which would mean that when they define themselves- personal determinants (like personal ideas, thoughts, morals, desires ..) will be important, but also social determinants (their popularity among others, their physical appearance, attractiveness ..). However, comparison of the impact of personal versus social determinants- show that personal determinants are more important in creating the image "Who am I". Furthermore, Table 3 shows the social roles that students are most connected with and thus answering the question "Where do students belong." Predictably, the most important social roles for students are: Family, Close friends and Gender, but also Religion, Age and Profession (as student). The results of Tables 4 and 5 have proved the general hypothesis which stated that the personal and social determinants of self (core beliefs) will determine the relation to various social roles (13 in the survey). But this relation is very complex.

If we consider individual hypotheses separately, we can say that:

The first sub-hypothesis predicted that: The level of students' personal and social identity orientation will determine the position of their common interests with people belonging to certain social groups (13 according to Lapons), and we can say that this **is partly confirmed**. Social identity orientation (Sio) will affect the intensity of common interest of 5 different social roles, while Personal identity orientation (PIo) will affect the intensity of common interest of 4 different social roles.

The second hypothesis predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine the sense of solidarity towards people belonging to certain social groups-it **is confirmed**. SIo will determine the sense of solidarity with 7, and PIo with 12 social roles.

The third hypothesis predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine position on the possibilities and difficulties of changing certain social roles-can say that **it is not confirmed**. SIo will determine difficulties for changing only one social role, while the PIo will determine difficulties for changing only 2 different social roles.

The fourth sub-hypothesis that predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the importance of certain social roles for individuals- it **is partly confirmed**, only in the case of PIo. SIo will determine whether only two roles are important to students, while PIo determines whether 11 roles are important to students.

CONCLUSIONS

- Except for the political party, students are bound for almost all offered social roles- the average score for all 12 social roles were above 4. This finding perfectly fits, actually corresponds to the life stage where they belong. The top four were: family, close friend, profession and religion;
- Almost 82% of the respondents have high scores on the scale of Personal Identity Orientation (persons who have positive attitudes and values toward themselves) and almost 62% of the respondents have high scores on the Social Identity Orientation Scale (persons who valuated social acceptance for their own self acceptance);
- The personal identity orientation and the social identity orientation are not unrelated. If someone has a highly developed personal identity orientation- it means that he or she has a highly developed social identity orientation. The correlation coefficient is highly significant;
- The personal and social determinants of self (core beliefs) or Personal and Social Identity orientation of the students will determine the relation to various social roles (13 in the survey). But this relation is very complex, multidimensional and different depending on different social roles and different aspect of relations to social roles. Persons with high personal orientation give importance to many more social roles, and they feel solidarity with more social roles in comparison with persons with high social orientation. With one word, personal identity orientation toward self more than social identity orientation determine the attachment to social world of the personality: high personal identity orientation causes stronger attachment with many social roles. Family and close friend, which appear not to depend on social identity orientation, now, in the case of persons with personal orientation- are the most important social roles in every aspect.

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