



UNIVERSITY "Sts. CYRIL AND METHODIUS" - SKOPJE

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL
AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH

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FOREWORD

Annual of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Skopje, is one of the communication forms of the researchers with the scientific and wider public. The authors of the papers in this issue of the Annual with their knowledge and experience contribute not only to the recognition of the very important issues in the social and political life but also for the development of sociological, political, legal and other thought in the country.

This edition of the Annual of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research presents the findings obtained by a survey of the attitudes and opinions of citizens of Macedonia on the most burning issues of economic, social and political life within the project called "PUBLIC OPINION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC ISSUES - 2012"

In this project we announce the findings obtained by the Institute of Sociological and Political-Legal Research - Skopje by a survey of the views and opinions of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia on the most current issues of the economic, social and political life.

The main objective of this research was to see to what extent the awareness of the citizens is developed and the level of their familiarity with these findings on the socio-economic conditions in the Republic of Macedonia, the essence of the measures they undertake and how they react to the changes that occur. In that respect, the research provides an opportunity to discover not only possible discrepancies between individual and publicly expressed views and assessments on various issues, but also to reveal the extent to which publicly expressed evaluations and assessments of socio-economic issues, events and problems become acceptable or insufficient or clearly supported and justified by the citizens.

The essence of this project is found in the ability through it to analyse the social reality and practice, to discover the causes of social contradictions and legality.

Jorde Jakimovski, PhD

SAMPLE AND THE METHODOLOGICAL FEATURES OF RESEARCH

The field survey lasted from 23 June to 7 July 2012. The survey data collection was carried out according to the procedure: “door to door”.

The population frame was adult population in the Republic of Macedonia, and the research sample was stratified and random with a size of 1000 respondents.

This sample is representative by gender, age, ethnicity (primarily the major ethnic groups: Macedonians and Albanians), region and type of settlement (rural-urban). According to the stratification and sample size, the survey data are with 95% accuracy and with a possible boundary error, which ranges from plus or minus 1.7 (for questions with two possible answers) to 6.5 (for questions with 7 and multiple choice answers).

Klime Babunski

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**THE PUBLIC ON THE OVERALL SITUATION,
AMBIANCE AND PROJECTIONS FOR
OVERCOMING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DIFFICULTIES**

For more than 20 years the socio-economic development of the Republic of Macedonia was followed by numerous difficulties and problems that has all the features of the economic and social crisis. It may be felt almost in all spheres of everyday work and life and naturally it is expected to have a significant impact on the awareness and sense of the people regarding the economic and social situation in the country.

The relative poverty (as measured by the methodology) is estimated at 30.4%. The non-pecuniary dimension of poverty (especially poor housing conditions and low educational level) additionally affects 30% of the population. The reasons for the deterioration of living standards are in the contraction of employment and the low sectoral growth in sectors with high productivity. Sectors with relatively high productivity, such as trade, transport and communications and manufacturing industry, release labour force in this period. Industrial production compared to 1990 decreased to 55.3% in 2011. Employment in agriculture increased from 10.5% in 1995 to 19.1% in 2011. Republic of Macedonia in this period is being deindustrialised and converted into an agricultural state.

Pensions are important not only because they reduce poverty for the elderly, but also support other family members. Social assistance programmes in significant part

cover the poor, as opposed to the non-poor, substantial amounts (75%) are provided for the poor, suggesting unnecessary spending of funds. The Government allocates more than half of its total revenue for transfers aimed at social protection, or one-fifth of the GDP of current transfers. Most of these transfers are for pensions, and the rest for various types of social support. Resources allocated to social transfers are a heavy burden on public finances and take away resources from other important costs also with a higher rate of return on invested assets, including investments in infrastructure.

In the country there is no good infrastructure which is an important national asset, that will improve the welfare of the population and will facilitate investment. These negative trends are occurring in the background of economic and social upheavals that affected the country as a market economy. From these preliminary remarks on the economic and social situation one may already sense the importance of these issues, as well as the efforts within the public opinion in the Republic of Macedonia to determine the attitude of the public towards the current economic and social situation and the prospects of its improvement.

1. HOW ARE THINGS GOING IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The issue for the situation in the country was opened in the survey with the introductory, inevitable and important question, wherefrom other questions arise and logically follow.

Generally, are things in the Republic of Macedonia going in the right or wrong direction?

Among the respondents, as it can be seen from Table 1, the most numerous are those who think that things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the *wrong direction* 67.3%.

The research attempted to separate the views of respondents who support the ruling parties, those who support the opposition parties, and those who do not support any party. The differences in the attitudes regarding the states in the Republic of Macedonia are visible and expected among the members of the aforementioned political orientation. What is noticeable at first is the more striking criticism of respondents who support an opposition party. 87.4% of the total number of supporters of an opposition party that were covered in the survey, said that things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the *wrong direction*, while regarding the respondents who support the ruling party this negative assessment was given by 49.0%. On the other hand, regarding the statement of the views of

citizens providing positions with a positive sign, most of the respondents who answered the question with positive direction (51.0%) support the ruling party, as opposed to the respondents who support an opposition party (12.0%).

Figure 1: *Are things in the Republic of Macedonia going in the right or wrong direction?*




Table 1: *Positions as to how things are going in the Republic of Macedonia, according to the political orientation*

| | Political orientation | | | Total |
|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| | Supports a ruling party | Supports an opposition party | Does not support any party | |
| Right direction | 51.0 | 12.6 | 30.7 | 32.7 |
| Wrong direction | 49.0 | 87.4 | 69.3 | 67.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The answers of the respondents, divided by their specific socio-professional characteristics show a succession of similarities and differences, so that some features of the respondents were announced as important, and some as irrelevant regarding their position on the states in the Republic of Macedonia. The views of respondents considering their gender and level of education do not show any significant differences, which can be interpreted with some egalitarianism in the management of the situation in the country.

Age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, residential area and regional belonging appear as a factor of differentiation of positions. There is also a difference between

young and old respondents: respondents with respect to the position provided. *Things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the wrong direction* is usually an assessment among respondents aged 18-29 years (73.8%), and it is the lowest in the age group above 65 years of age (61.3%). The more increased criticism of the younger participants in the assessment of the states in the Republic of Macedonia is likely due to the high unemployment rate.

The ethnicity of respondents (Table 2) affects the differences in their assessments of the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. Thereby, we obtained very interesting information. Namely, even 91.1% of total number of respondents of Albanian origin, said that things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the *wrong direction*. Only 8.9% of respondents from this ethnic community stated that things are moving in the right direction. On the other hand, the answers provided by the respondents of the Macedonian ethnic community differ significantly. Thus, from this community 56.9% stated that things are moving in the *wrong direction*, whereas 43.1% answered that things are moving in the *right direction*.

Table 2: Positions as to how things are going in the Republic of Macedonia, according to the ethnic background

| | Ethnic origin | | | | Total |
|------------------------|---------------|----------|---------|-------|--------------|
| | Macedonian | Albanian | Turkish | Other | |
| Right direction | 43.1 | 8.9 | 33.3 | 21.9 | 32.7 |
| Wrong direction | 56.9 | 91.1 | 66.7 | 78.1 | 67.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

It is interesting to note that respondents with Islamic and Catholic religion in only 13.0% and 17.6% of the cases believe that things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the right direction. Such a response was more frequently provided by respondents of the Orthodox religious community - 42.9%.

As for the socio-economic status, it is interesting to note that students farmers, and housewives feel more affected by the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. Namely, as much as 76.1% of students, 77.3% of housewives and 74.4% of farmers believe that things in the Republic of Macedonia are going in the *wrong direction*.

In terms of the regional origin, that things are not going in the right direction the citizens of the Polog region (85.5%), Vardar region (77.6%), Southwest region (74.2%) are most confident.


2. FUTURE

Although the previously presented data are a clear evidence of how citizens see the general situation in the Republic of Macedonia, we need direct information about their views on the disposition and expectations associated with the future. In other words, we are interested in the psychological state as a product of the crisis regarding the socio-economic state, but also as a prerequisite for the successful overcoming thereof.

2.1. The situation in the social - economic life (high unemployment rate, poverty, intense social turbulence, etc.), results in a loss of confidence of a large segment of the population in terms of the efficiency of the economic and social measures, striking uncertainty is mainly present with the population, often going into defeatism, but in some cases into revolt, in the basis of which there is a sense of hopelessness and despair. Therefore, the respondents were asked: **In your opinion what mood nowadays prevails among most citizens of Macedonia?**

The overall distribution of responses suggests that the majority of respondents feel *concern and fear* (26.3%) and *bitterness and revolt* (25.2%), and fewer believe that *the situation will soon improve - optimism* (20.7%). Proportionally a small number of respondents feel *hope and fear* (13.8%), even fewer of those have *motivation for active participation in solving problems* (3.7%).

Figure 2: *What type of mood prevails among citizens?*



As it may be observed, most people feel fear, which is mentioned by even 40.1% of the respondents. Although we can not establish whether it is fear that motivates or inhibits, it is certain that the constant anxiety and concern is caused by the state of the economy, but also the sensitive background of the political and ethnic scene which at any moment may start burning with unforeseeable consequences. Therefore, the government should lower the level of emotional tension present in citizens, or to remove their fear and gain their trust.

With reference to the socio-demographic characteristics that influenced the shaping of the general position on the mood of citizens as statistically relevant the following are manifested: the, political orientation, ethnicity, education, socio-economic status and regional affiliation.

According to the political orientation, supporters of a party that is part of the government and supporters of the party that is part of the opposition manifested significant deviations from the general distribution in different modalities. In that respect, 31.0% of the supporters of a party that is part of the government have the opinion that *the situation will soon improve*, or 16.1% think that there is concern and fear. On the other hand, respondents who support a party that is part of the opposition more frequently than the general average (34.6%) are of the opinion that *concern and fear* prevails among the population, 33.0% believe that there is *bitterness and revolt*, and only 10.4% believe that the situation will improve - optimism.

Ethnicity of respondents is the following factor that shows deviation from the normal distribution. In that respect, the superior *bitterness and revolt* prevails among Albanians (35.9%), and the belief that the situation will soon improve among Turks (30.8%).

Comparing the question with the education of respondents, we may conclude that with the large number of respondents with incomplete primary education (concern and fear - 40.7% and hope and fear - 14.8%) and with primary education (concern and fear - 39.8% and hope and fear - 15.0%) the *fear* is present.

The socio-economic status of respondents also has certain influence on the determination of the respondents, so above-average *fear* prevails among farmers (concern and fear - 39.5% and hope and fear - 7%) and housewives (concern and fear 27.3 % and hope and fear 20.5%). According to the region to which they belong, respondents of the Pelagonija region (33.6%), Southwest region (31.5%) and Southeast region (29.2%), have above-average optimism - a belief that the situation will soon improve, while relatively fewer respondents in the Southeast region (16.9%) answered with *bitterness and revolt*.

The global conclusion emerging from our research is that people believe that the feeling of *fear, concern, revolt and passivity* (with 75.6% of respondents) is very present. Only a small number of respondents (20.7%) believe that things will


soon improve. It is positive that one-fifth of the population has a sense of soon improvement, because faith and hope that the contradictions in the socio-economic development can be overcome is necessary so that they are motivated to undertake the necessary activities to accomplish that.

Table 3: Positions as to what type of mood prevails among most of the citizens in Macedonia according to the education

| | Incomplete education | Elementary education | High school education | Higher or University education | Total |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|
| Concern and fear | 40,1 | 39,8 | 25,6 | 20,3 | 26,3 |
| Bitterness and revolt | 14,8 | 18,8 | 24,7 | 29,9 | 25,2 |
| Indifference and passivity | 11,1 | 6,8 | 8,5 | 15,0 | 10,3 |
| Hope and fear | 14,8 | 15,0 | 13,5 | 13,6 | 13,8 |
| Belief that the situation will soon improve | 18,5 | 15,8 | 24,1 | 16,9 | 20,7 |
| Motivation for active involvement in solving problems | 0,0 | 3,8 | 3,5 | 4,3 | 3,7 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

2.2. The overcoming of the current crisis, or the economic and social difficulties, will require, as the relative majority of citizens (49.7%) considers, a period of 10 years. The number of those who believe that the economic and social difficulties will be reduced by five to ten years (32.4%) is interesting.

Figure 3: Projection on the overcoming of the economic and social difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia



When analysing assessments on this issue structured according to the place of residence of the respondents, it can be concluded that there is somewhat inversely proportional relationship between the degree of urbanisation and the number of respondents who expect that the economic and social difficulties will be overcome even after 10 years. Thus, the majority of respondents who expect the overcoming of difficulties to happen after 10 years are respondents living in a village (53.3%), and their number is the lowest in Skopje (45.9%). Lower presence of optimism among the rural population can be interpreted with the objective financial situation of the village in the Republic of Macedonia. However, probably a more important reason for that is the development of the village on the basis of the centre-periphery model, monosectoral development and undeveloped basic municipal and social infrastructure.

The assessments regarding this issue structured by the political orientation of respondents, except for respondents who support a party that is part of the government where, as it might be guessed - optimism is most present (29.1% answered that the economic and social difficulties will be overcome in the following five years, 38.7% answered “in five to ten years”, and 32.2% answered “after ten years”). However, the sense of pessimism is most present with respondents supporting the opposition and more present among undecided respondents (does not support any party). This situation can not be assessed as favourable. On the contrary, the proportionally larger presence of pessimism among the opposition and undecided respondents, indicates seriousness of the socio-economic difficulties.

Table 4: *Overcoming of the economic and social difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia according to the political orientation of respondents*

| | Supports a ruling party | Supports an opposition party | Does not support any party | Total |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| In the following five years | 29,1 | 13,7 | 14,0 | 17,9 |
| In five to ten years | 38,7 | 25,8 | 31,6 | 32,4 |
| After ten years | 32,2 | 60,4 | 54,4 | 49,7 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

The arrangement of assessments that the economic and social difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia will be overcome even after ten years is very unusual according to the regional affiliation of respondents. Namely, this response is most present among respondents of the Vardar region (64.2%), Eastern region (56.7%)

and the Polog region (56.4%). This response was not that often among respondents in the Northeast region (39.5%) and the Southwest region (40.4%).

Similarly as the question of the mood of the citizens, this question does not include optimism. The feeling of fear, concern, revolt and passivity (75.6%) and the projection on the overcoming of the economic and social difficulties even after 10 years (49.7%) prove that their roots, at least in the eyes of the citizens, are extremely deep.

3. SUCCESS IN LIFE

From the responses we received to the question: **What is nowadays most important to succeed in life** it can be seen that the most widespread is the opinion *participation or association with the government*. The answer ranked second is that *one needs to have money* while having *personal capacity and education* is the third.

Table 5: *What is nowadays most important to succeed in life?*

| | |
|--|-------|
| To have personal capacity and education | 20,4% |
| To be honest and fair | 16,9% |
| To have money | 21,0% |
| Participation or association with the government | 41,7% |
| Total | 100,0 |

The specific socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents have a different impact on distribution. Statistically most significant correlation regarding the importance for success in life is seen in terms of the political orientation, level of education, socio-economic status, political orientation and age.

In terms of the political orientation of respondents, the distribution of answers to this question varies considerably. Thus, success in life through *participation or association with government* concerns respondents who support the party that is part of the opposition. This modality was suggested by 55.5% of the total number of respondents who support a party that is part of the opposition, as opposed to the 33.0% of respondents, supporting a party that is part of the position. Only 9.3% of respondents who are supporters of an opposition party believe that most important for success in life is to have a *personal capacity and education*.

The ethnicity of respondents shows a certain level of dependence. Namely, the modality of participation or association with the government was mostly the option

chosen by Albanians (50.8%). Regarding the modality *to have money on order to succeed in life*, it seems that the importance of this modality is most present among Serbs, Roma and the Vlachs (31.5%).

Education of respondents shows dependence regarding the issue of success in life, in a specific way. In that respect, there is a straight line correlation between the position of personal ability and higher education. More educated respondents (higher and university education) perceive the chance of success in life in the *personal capacity and education* in a larger number (26.6%). On the other hand, those with incomplete primary education more frequently than the general distribution consider that most important for success in life is *to have money*.

Table 6: *Most important to succeed in life according to the socio-economic status of respondents*

| | Unem- ployed | Employed in the private sector | Employed in the public sector | House- wife | Farm- er | Stu- dent | Total |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--|----------------|-------------|--------------|-------|
| To have personal capacity and education | 17,1 | 24,1 | 21,3 | 13,6 | 114,0 | 26,1 | 20,4 |
| To be honest and fair | 15,9 | 16,3 | 11,6 | 31,8 | 16,3 | 6,5 | 16,9 |
| To have money | 22,1 | 20,5 | 18,7 | 27,3 | 30,2 | 21,7 | 21,0 |
| Participation or association with the government | 45,0 | 39,1 | 48,4 | 27,3 | 39,5 | 45,7 | 41,7 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

Naturally, there are mutual differences in the attitudes by the socio-economic status of respondents. Farmers appear in significant deviations from the general distribution of responses to the modality that it is most important *to have money* (30.2%) for success in life, compared to the level of the whole sample (21.0%) . Regarding the modality *to be honest and fair* the concentration of responses among housewives (31.8%) is most evident and it is the least frequent among students (6.5%).

Regional affiliation of respondents also has some influence on the position of the respondents regarding success in life, thus, for example, if *honesty and fairness* is most important for respondents in the Eastern region (29.9%), *participation or association with the government* is most important in the Polog region (50.0%).

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**BETWEEN CIVIC AND ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE
ATTACHMENT OF RESPONDENTS TO SPECIFIC
VALUES / CATEGORIES**

The identity of the individual category is a complex category and consists of multiple identity features through which their affiliation / attachment to several social groups is expressed. Thus, the individual has a sense of belonging to their family, their religion, their ethnic group, their place of birth, their profession, etc. All those feelings of belonging / attachment or all the identity features, make up the complex notion of identity, indicating on one hand the prudence by which we should approach in making their analysis, but on the other, hand the dangers of simplification.

Do we feel a greater attachment to the members of our own gender than to members of our profession or religion? Do we and to what extent we recognise common interests with other people belonging to our profession, religion, friends, etc..? These and many other questions were the focus of interest of sociologists and political scientists, as well as, of social anthropologists. The problem is very interesting also from the perspective of politics, since the establishment of these relations is directly related to numerous dimension of the political life in one society. From the elections, to offers by the political parties, the design of public policies and their sustainability, to the political identification and mobilisation etc.

When it comes to multi-ethnic societies, the most exploited or most explored identity features are the ethnic and civic identity, their interconnection, and association with some of the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent,

in the research often referred to as independent variables (gender, age, social and economic status, etc.). In fact, in culturally heterogeneous societies the basic problem with attachments is located in the fact that the determination of the behaviour of individuals from their particular socio-cultural affiliations weakens and sometimes completely delegitimises their national attachment. That, however, may cause serious problems in the functioning of culturally heterogeneous communities, to compromise their democratic development and political stability. In this regard, studies of this type are particularly interesting in multicultural societies (Kimlika 2004), which certainly include the Macedonian society, which except for its multicultural / multiethnic features can be marked as typically divided society. In divided societies the ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic cleavages are reflected in political life, as well (Horowitz 1985, Liphart 1999), structuring the political processes, power relations in society and political development.

This research measured the respondents' attachment to certain values / categories, as follows: to Republic of Macedonia as a country, to their own ethnic group, the place of birth, to religion, to the Balkans and finally to Europe. In the case of the Balkans and Europe the respondents were told that these categories are not perceived as geographical terms, but above all it is about sharing common views and values. Respondents had the opportunity to express their attachment to these six categories through a five-point grading scale where the lowest degree 1 indicates absence of attachment ("I'm not attached"), and the highest degree 5 -full attachment ("I am completely attached").

Overall results of the survey indicate that the largest percentage of respondents opted for higher levels of attachment, or in our case the distribution of responses shows a high concentration in the fourth and especially fifth grade of Likert scale ("I am completely attached"). This conclusion applies to the general distribution of responses, and to the so-called cross data, in the which attachment to a particular category is brought into a relation with some of the independent variables.

There are some exceptions from this *general* rule, relating to the categories Balkans and Europe, where there was more equitable distribution of responses to Likert five-point grading scale, including the mean point of the scale (third degree), which was chosen by relatively more respondents compared to the other categories. The second exception relates to attachment to Republic of Macedonia, where in some intersections with independent variables the same phenomenon may again be observed, which suggests that the intensity of the attachment is not as high as to the other items.


Such a distribution of responses allows us to show the results of the research by the obtained mean values on the scale (which is otherwise normal) and also by percentage of respondents who opted for the modality "I am very attached."

WHAT TYPE OF ATTACHMENTS ARE PREFERRED BY RESPONDENTS?

The overall distribution of responses suggests that attachment to mutual origin and cultural background (ethnic group, religion, birthplace) or traditional features / values are far more important to respondents than those associated with the civil concept of the nation (commitment to Republic of Macedonia, the Balkans and Europe). This is demonstrated by the obtained mean values (Table. 1) of Likert scale, but even more through analysis of the responses of respondents who opted for the modality “I am completely attached” (Figure 1).

Table 1: Attachment of respondents to specific categories (mean values)

| What is your attachment to: | Republic of Macedonia as a state | Your ethnic group | Your birthplace | Your religion | Balkans | Europe |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------|--------|
| | 3,98 | 4,49 | 4,38 | 4,27 | 3,29 | 3,46 |



As for the relationship of the independent variables on the attitudes of the respondents, the survey showed that ethnicity, religion, age and socio-economic status of respondents are particularly significant for the creation of their attitudes. Given the multicultural nature of the Republic of Macedonia, we find it especially interesting to present the data obtained from respondents belonging to the two largest


ethnic groups in Republic of Macedonia (Table. 2 and Figure. 2). (The number of members of other ethnic groups in the sample is quite small and therefore not suitable to (further) statistical processing).

Table no. 2: Attachment to certain categories according to the ethnicity of respondents ('m very attached%)

| | RM as a state | Ethnic group | Religion | Birthplace | Balkans | Europe |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------|----------|------------|---------|--------|
| Macedonians | 61,7 | 62,7% | 52,0% | 62,7% | 21,4% | 21,9% |
| Albanians | 16,9 | 79,8% | 68,5% | 62,1% | 17,3% | 47,2% |

All differences between respondents of Albanian and Macedonian ethnicity are statistically significant at the level of 0.01, except the attachment to the birthplace and the Balkans where there is no statistically significant difference.

Figure 2 Attachment to certain categories according to the ethnicity of respondents (I'm completely attached %)



The primary differences in attachment of the citizens of the two largest ethnic communities to these categories are reflected in the following: 1. Drastic difference in the attachment to Republic of Macedonia (state) between the members of the two

ethnic groups 2. Increasingly more emphasised devotion to their own ethnic group and religion among Albanians than among ethnic Macedonians 3. Greater interest / commitment to Europe among ethnic Albanians than among ethnic Macedonians. In general terms, this distribution of responses was expected. In several studies of this type (Laponce, for example) researchers note that people react according to the so-called minority syndrome or minority groups prefer or emphasise their (minority) affiliations. Therefore, the increasingly emphasised devotion to their own ethnic group and religion among Albanians is an expected reaction. Their greater attachment to Europe compared to the ethnic Macedonians is also expected, due to the name dispute and the longstanding status of candidate country for EU membership. What is worth mentioning is the large difference in the percentage of respondents, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, who said they were completely attached to the Republic of Macedonia as a state.

High and almost equal attachment to the birthplace/homeland of respondents in both communities is somewhat surprising. It remains unclear what is the reason for the great attachment to the homeland of respondents that by far exceeds the attachment to the Balkans and to Europe.

The analysis of the mean values and the calculated difference between them for the two categories (ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians) again shows the great difference in attachment to Republic of Macedonia and then to Europe (Table 3).

Table No. 3 Attachment to certain categories by ethnicity (mean values).

| What is your attachment to: | Macedonians | Albanians | Difference M-A |
|---|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Republic of Macedonia as a state | 4,36 | 3,01 | 1,35 |
| Your ethnic group | 4,39 | 4,75 | -0,36 |
| Your birthplace | 4,40 | 4,33 | 0,07 |
| Your religion | 4,17 | 4,53 | -0,36 |
| Balkans | 3,35 | 3,14 | 0,21 |
| Europe | 3,30 | 3,87 | -0,57 |

Below we will present the preferences of social groups (by age, religion, socioeconomic status, education, political orientation) in relation to the examined categories. In other words, we will try to point out which categories of respondents showed a greater and lesser intensity of commitment to the state, religion, birthplace, ethnicity etc.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS AND ATTACHMENT TO EXAMINED CATEGORIES

Attachment to Republic of Macedonia

First, because of the importance given to this issue in culturally heterogeneous societies in terms of political integration and social cohesion, in addition we will present the distribution of responses obtained on the five-point grading scale of attachment to Republic of Macedonia by the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians. There is a clear difference in the attitudes of respondents from both communities in terms of the attachment to the Republic of Macedonia as a state. Unlike Macedonians relatively balanced distribution of responses is apparent among the Albanian community, with the highest concentration of responses in the third (neutral) degree of attachment (Table No.4).

Table No. 4 Attachment to Republic of Macedonia by ethnicity (%)

| | Macedonians | Albanians |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| I am completely not attached | 2,5% | 14,5% |
| 2 | 3,6% | 19,8% |
| 3 | 11,4% | 32,7% |
| 4 | 20,8% | 16,1% |
| I am completely attached | 61,7% | 16,9% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

Statistically significant to 0.00


Table No. 5 Attachment to Republic of Macedonia by age (%)

| | 18-29 years of age | 30-39 years of age | 40-49 years of age | 50-65 years of age | above 65 years of age |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| I am completely not attached | 9,1% | 5,4% | 8,4% | 4,2% | 4,7% |
| 2 | 13,9% | 6,9% | 6,4% | 3,3% | 5,5% |
| 3 | 22,2% | 17,3% | 17,2% | 17,7% | 7,8% |
| 4 | 21,0% | 24,8% | 20,7% | 19,1% | 14,1% |
| I am completely attached | 33,7% | 45,5% | 47,3% | 55,8% | 68,0% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |


Statistically significant to 0.00

Besides ethnicity other characteristics of the respondents also influence their attachment to Republic of Macedonia. The data analysis indicates that age, socio-economic status, religion and political orientation is related to the degree of attachment to the Republic of Macedonia.

Older, compared with younger categories expressed the highest degree of attachment (Table. 5) and those with orthodox religious affiliation (61.5%) compared to Muslims (22.5%) (Figure No. 3).



Statistically significant to 0.01



With regard to political affiliation, respondents who stated that they support a party that is part of the government, expressed greater attachment to the state

(51.3%) compared to respondents who stated that they support a party that is part of the opposition (40.1%). Respondents who stated that they do not support any party, are very close to the supporters of the ruling party (49%) according to the percentage of attachment (Figure No. 4).

The difference between supporters of the ruling parties and supporters of the opposition parties is statistically significant at 0.01 level.

Attachment to the ethnic group

When it comes to attachment to their own ethnic group, the analysis of the data suggests association of the age of respondents, their ethnic and religious affiliation, the level of education and socio-economic status with the level of attachment to their ethnic group. The highest degree of commitment (“I am completely attached”) is expressed in a greater percentage by respondents of the older categories, Muslims (79.1%), those with lower level of education (78%), and according to the socio-economic status - housewives (79.5%), retired (74.4%) and farmers (72.1%).

As for ethnicity, respondents of Albanian ethnicity expressed much greater attachment to their own ethnic group than respondents of Macedonian ethnicity (Table. 6).

Table No. 6 *Attachment to the ethnic group by ethnicity (%)*

| | Macedonians | Albanians |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| I am completely not attached | 2,3% | |
| 2 | 3,3% | 0,4% |
| 3 | 10,0% | 3,6% |
| 4 | 21,7% | 16,1% |
| I am completely attached | 62,7% | 79,8% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

In general terms, the distribution of responses in both communities shows the same tendency-concentration of responses on the higher degrees of the scale, but the intensity of the commitment, however, varies considerably.


Attachment to religion

Unlike the other categories, differences in the gender of the respondents for the first time appear regarding the attachment to religion. Thus, women in a higher

percentage (61.7%) opted for the highest degree of attachment (“I am completely attached”), compared to men (54.2%). As for age, almost all categories have a high degree of attachment to religion, whereby the younger population (18-29 years of age) is no exception (59%), a phenomenon which is not typical for most European countries. Ethnic and religious affiliations are important for the intensity of attachment to the religion of respondents, whereby Muslims and Albanians expressed greater attachment to their religion than those with orthodox religion and Macedonians.

There are also differences in terms of attachment to religion by the political orientation of respondents, so that supporters of the parties that are part of the government express higher level of commitment to the religion that those who support the opposition parties (Figure No. 5).

Figure No. 5 Attachment to religion (Orthodox and Muslims) by the political orientation



Statistical significance at 0.05

Attachment to Europe

In this occasion we will also comment the commitment of respondents to Europe, given the importance that this attachment has in the context of the European integration of the country, as well as, given that the attachment to supranational identities and values can be an indicator of openness and cosmopolitanism of citizens. The analysis of cross data indicates relatively high values of the average degree of the scale and far more equitable distribution of the answers at all levels of Likert scale compared with other categories of attachments.

There is a clear difference in the intensity of attachment of ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. This difference may be seen in the distribution of answers on the scale, and between the values of the modality “I am completely attached” (the difference is more than 25 percentage points) (Table No. 7).

Table No. 7 *Attachment to Europe by ethnicity (%)*

| | Macedonians | Albanians |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| I am completely not attached | 11,4% | 8,1% |
| 2 | 12,8% | 8,5% |
| 3 | 31,7% | 19,0% |
| 4 | 22,2% | 17,3% |
| I am completely attached | 21,9% | 47,2% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

Statistical significance at 0.00

It is interesting that in terms of the political orientation of respondents major differences may not be observed between respondents who support ruling parties, those who support opposition parties, and the so-called undecided, which may be in favour of the thesis that the most important political parties have a relatively uniform policy in terms of the association of the Republic of Macedonia to the European Union.

CONCLUSION

The identity of the individual category is a complex category and consists of multiple identity features through which their affiliation / attachment to several social groups is expressed. Thus, the individual has a sense of belonging to their family, their religion, their ethnic group, their place of birth, their profession, etc. All those feelings of belonging / attachment or all the identity features, make up the complex notion of identity, indicating on one hand the prudence by which we should approach in making their analysis, but on the other hand, the dangers of simplification.

Research on these affiliations is very important in terms of policy and the development of democratic performances of society and what is of particular importance in multicultural societies, where the achievement of social cohesion and integration is one of the primary challenges faced by these societies.

Research on the attachment of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia to certain categories showed that the attachments to traditional values are prevailing. Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are primarily attached to their ethnic group, religion and birthplace, compared to attachments that have a feature of the civic identity-Republic of Macedonia as a state, the Balkans and Europe, to which the extent and intensity of attachment is smaller.

Several characteristics of the respondents are related to the intensity of attachment to the inspected categories, whereby ethnicity has quite a big impact. This confirms the so-called minority syndrome, and shows significant differences in the intensity of attachments of the two largest ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia.

Given the fragility of multicultural societies and the need to ensure broad social integration, political elites should observe the results of this type of research with particular attention. The obtained results, on one hand indicate the differences in the individual segments of the population and help to understand the attitudes and reactions of social groups in everyday political life. On the other hand, this type of research, especially longitudinal, enable monitoring of trends which are necessary for building policies that will strengthen civic identity of the individual and the group, as an important prerequisite for the democratic development of culturally heterogeneous societies.

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MEDIA AND POLITICS

The media play a major role in the public in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as, in all other modern societies. Electronic media are very influential and guide and build the public opinion. Citizens build their own political views by watching the programmes, primarily on national TV stations and channels. Over the past two decades, various TV stations and programmes have had various impacts on the public. Modern public can not be imagined without a strong media support. However, the trust of citizens in the media is often reflected by the confidence that citizens have in some of the policy options, of the political parties, as well as of the civil society. All stakeholders of the policy in one country, as is the case with the Republic of Macedonia, interact through the media with the public and seek support for their policies. Therefore, the responsibility of broadcasters with national coverage is increasing and defines their programme content. Therefore, one often asks the question about citizens' trust towards national TV stations. The question: "In which of the following Macedonian television stations, when reporting

on political issues, do you have the most confidence?” the highest percentage of citizens said they have no confidence in any TV station with near 27%. This means that every fourth respondent has no trust in television reporting on political issues. Greater confidence among the actual televisions, according to respondents, is given to Alsat with 16.5% and Kanal 5 with 15%. The second group of broadcasters with less confidence are Sitel with 12%, Alfa with 10%, and MTV and Telma with 7%. The fact about the confidence in 24 Vesti TV with 6% is interesting, given that this TV has existed for only one year. Apparently the struggle and competition to gain the trust of the citizens in reporting on political issues is great. According to the independent variables, younger respondents have more confidence in Alsat and Kanal 5, while older again in Kanal 5 and MTV. The ethnic variable is for Alfa and Kanal 5 among Macedonians, while the trust in Alsat among Albanians is convincing. Citizens who support the ruling coalition mostly watch Alsat, Sitel, Kanal 5, while those who support the political opposition watch Alfa, Kanal 5 and Alsat.

At the same time, the confidence by citizens in print media is also quite interesting. For a long period of time, print media were perceived as “more serious” journalistic products and suggested the topics debated in the public. Although throughout the time, print media are slowly losing the battle with the electronic media and the Internet, they are still influential, but to a much lesser extent. These media also experience transformation in the appearance and the impact of the political centers of power. The question: “In which newspaper do you have the most confidence when reporting on political issues?” the highest percentage of citizens said that they have no confidence in any newspaper with 47%, which is a sign that fewer people today believe in and are informed by newspapers. This means that every second respondent has no confidence in newspapers for reporting on political issues. Dnevnik has the highest percentage of trust in newspapers with 14%. Far behind Dnevnik are Koha with 8%, Vecer, Utrinski Vesnik and Nova Makedonija with 7%. Less confidence is shown for Focus with 5%, Journal with 3% and the smallest confidence was shown for Den with 1%. For a longer period of time, Dnevnik has been the most trusted newspaper by the citizens regarding political issues. According to the independent variables, younger respondents have more confidence in Koha and Dnevnik, while older people in Dnevnik and Utrinski Vesnik. The ethnic variable is in favour of Dnevnik among the Macedonians, while the confidence in Koha among Albanians is understandably convincing. The citizens who support the government have more confidence in Dnevnik, while the citizens who support the opposition have most confidence in Utrinski Vesnik. Koha is equally trusted by citizens who support both the position and the opposition.

Apart from the political issues, the media are often influential in many other areas. Often the impact is in the negative direction. The media have always been pointed out by citizens as one of the factors that negatively affect interethnic relations. For that purpose, in the survey citizens were asked to identify which television deteriorates interethnic relations the most. Here, we will not present a list of the specific televisions, since it is not the purpose of the research. We will only mention that the majority of respondents (66%) identified one of the televisions, which confirms the thesis that in the awareness of citizens media really represent such a negative factor. Interestingly, among Albanian population the number of people who identified a television is much higher (over 80%) than in the Macedonian population (59%). Thereby, along with the power of televisions despite the imposition of the political agenda in the public and the influence on the attitudes of the citizens, it can be seen that they can also have direct negative impact. In this case we referred to the interethnic relations in Macedonia. Although statistical differences by the ethnicity variable are observed, the data suggest that televisions have equally negatively affect on all social groups when it comes to ethnic relations.

| Which factors worsen interethnic relations the most? | Macedonians | Albanians |
|---|--------------------|------------------|
| The citizens themselves by their prejudice | 14,7% | 13,3% |
| Ruling political parties | 28% | 44,8% |
| Opposition political parties | 16,9% | 11,3% |
| Media | 15,9% | 19,8% |
| Religious communities | 10,5% | 1,2% |
| I don't know | 14,1% | 9,7% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

Citizens are also divided as to which political factors worsen inter-ethnic relations. Moreover, for a long period there has been a lack of self-criticism in the assessment of the role of the citizens themselves. The answer that the prejudice of the citizens is the most important factor in the deterioration of interethnic relations barely exceeds ten percent among all ethnic groups. Generally speaking, the largest differences occur in terms of ethnicity and political affiliation of citizens. Logically, citizens who are in favour of an opposition party, see the responsibility in the ruling parties (55%) and vice versa - supporters of the government (30%) believe that precisely the opposition is to blame for the deterioration of interethnic relations.

In terms of ethnicity, the biggest difference is between Macedonians and Albanians, as shown in the following table:

CITIZENS FROM THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

For decades now, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, had the feeling of threat by the neighbouring countries. Thereby, the ranking list has changed depending on the current policy, even though, Greece has consistently had the first place (in varying percentages). That is also the case in this study, where to the question: “Which of the neighbouring countries has the greatest negative impact on the situation in Macedonia?” the following answers were obtained:

- Greece - 68%
- Serbia - 17%
- Kosovo - 7%
- Bulgaria - 4%
- Albania - 4%

Thereby, there are striking differences between Macedonians and Albanians, as seen in the following table.

| Which of the neighbouring countries has the greatest negative impact on the situation in Macedonia? | Macedonians | Albanians |
|--|--------------------|------------------|
| Serbia | 2% | 56% |
| Bulgaria | 5% | 2% |
| Kosovo | 9% | 0% |
| Albania | 6% | 0% |
| Greece | 79% | 42% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

Notably, the Macedonians are mainly influenced by the current political situation in which the Greek-Macedonian dispute is predominant, while ethnic inclinations prevail among Albanians.

Other differences between social groups are not statistically relevant.

WHICH OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES HAS THE GREATEST NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN MACEDONIA?

Republic of Macedonia, as a relatively young democratic state that gained its independence twenty years ago, still has a succession of open issues with the neighbouring states who argue its identity, language and culture. On the other hand, multiethnicity, multiculturalism and multiconfessionality, as one of the main features of the Macedonian society greatly influence the determining of overall relations in the country, but also in the creation of the attitudes of citizens in relation to neighbouring countries.

Hence, the answers to the question: *Which neighbouring country has the greatest negative impact on the situation in Macedonia* vary depending on the ethnicity of the respondents.

Of the total number of respondents even 68.2% of them believe that Greece is the country that has the greatest negative impact on the situation in Macedonia, Serbia was indicated by 16.5% , Kosovo by 7%, Bulgaria by 4.4% and Albania by 3.9%. As much as 56% of members of the Albanian community believe that Serbia is the country that has the greatest negative impact on the situation in Macedonia. This is not a surprising information, given the antagonism between Albanians and Serbs, arising as a result of the Kosovo issue. As opposed to them, 78.6% of respondents of the Macedonian majority indicated Greece. It is interesting that the citizens of the Turkish community also indicated Greece in a high percentage (59%), which confirms the loyalty to the state of this community, as well as, the traditionally tense Turkish-Greek relations. However, the percentage of those members of the Turkish community (30.8%) who think that Serbia is the neighbouring country with the most negative impact on the situation in Macedonia, is also noticeable.

Not only ethnic, but also the religious background of citizens has great influence in creating their views on the neighbouring countries. Thus, significant differences are observed in the respondents' answers depending on their religious affiliation. 78.6% of respondents belonging to the Orthodox religion believe that Greece has most negative affect, and only 1.6% indicated Serbia. Among respondents belonging to the Islamic religion the percentage of those who have given their response by indicating Serbia and Greece is identical - 47.8%.

The fact that the vast majority of respondents belonging to the Orthodox religion pointed Greece even though it is a state in which Orthodoxy is dominant, inevitably leads to the fact that in the background of the answer to this question is the dispute with the name of our country, and the blocking of our entry into the Euro-Atlantic structures by our southern neighbour.

From the analysis of the responses it can be concluded that the creation of the attitudes of citizens in relation to neighbouring countries is closely correlated with their ethnic and religious affiliation, and depending on the traditionally bad / good relations that their ethnic community has with individual neighbours in a historical context.

PROVIDED THAT YOU USE SOCIAL NETWORKS (FACEBOOK, TWITTER...), IN WHICH SEGMENT ARE YOU MOST ACTIVE?

We live in the era of information and communication technologies that completely changed the manner of our everyday communication and functioning, thereby redesigning our overall socio-cultural milieu to an almost unrecognisable extent.

With the emergence of ICT we experienced a major transformation thanks to the two primary features of these technologies: enabling rapid and greater access to information, dissemination of information and the method of communication. ICT eliminated the spatial and time barrier.

Networking has become one of the main features of the method of communication and connection between people, regardless whether friendly or professional communication is concerned. So, connecting through social networks, people not only communicate, debate and share information of various kinds, but they also create so-called virtual communities. Some of the social networks have over 100 million active participants: Facebook (1 billion users), Twitter (500 million), Skype (145 million), LinkedIn (160 million), Dropbox (100m) etc.

In the Republic of Macedonia, social networks and networking has become part of the culture of our daily communication. However, given that a relatively new type of information and communication technologies is concerned, certain variations in terms of the percentage of users in social networks are expected, according to the age of respondents, level of education and socio-economic status.

42.4% of the respondents do not use social networks, 41.7% use them for the purpose of socialising, entertainment and games - 15.2% and only 0.75 for political organising (commenting on political issues, organising protests and so on.) As age increases in the age group of respondents, so does the percentage of those who use social networks decline. In the age group 18-29 years of age, only a small percentage of 14.3% do not use social networks. The next group of 30-39 years of age - 24.8%, and already for the next group of 40-49 years of age, the percentage increases to 44.3%. Dramatically increasing of the percentage may be observed in the group of 50 to 65 years of age and it is 70.7%.

This information is expected, given that the younger generation, as the greatest user of social networks, was practically born and raised in the era of ICT. Hence, for them this kind of communication, debate and organising is almost the only known way. As their age increases, there is a growing gap between the older generation and ICT, hence the number of users of social networks reduces.

The level of education also has an impact on the percentage of users of social networks. Even 96.3% of respondents with incomplete education do not use social networks, with primary education - 77.4%, with high school education - 39.9% and with higher and university education - 26.6%.

In terms of the socio-economic status, more than 70% of pensioners, housewives and farmers do not use social networks. The percentage of the unemployed who use social networks for socialising, entertainment and games is 55.4%. 49.8% of the employees in the private sector use them for socialising with friends, and 18.9% for fun and games. Seen in percentages, the state in the public sector (budgetary institutions) is almost identical.

From the given results it is noticeable that in the largest percentage, social networks in the country are used for socialising, entertainment and games. For political organising, commenting on political issues, organising protests and the like, the percentage is negligible, almost non-existent. This indicates a low level of democratic awareness among the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the absence of civic activism.

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PRESSURE ON MEDIA - DEMOCRACY UNDER QUESTION

VIEWPOINT

Every society that takes care of its own democracy, actually cares about freedom of expression. There is no democratic society where freedom of expression is not a clearly defined goal, which should be daily confirmed.

Nowadays, freedom of expression is much more than the basic concept: individual right, freedom to express your own opinion and to hear someone else's opinion. This freedom today may not exist, cannot be accomplished if it does not mean media freedom, freedom that occurs as an integral element of every communication channel.

Freedom of expression is a necessary prerequisite for creating public, and precisely for that "product": free thinking public, "natural environment" is necessary, in which a government "by the people for the people" is created. This democratic government is possible, because it is through freedom of expression (which is the freedom to seek, to produce, to spread and receive information) that people, the *demos*, can articulate their interests, set their requirements to the government and control the government in the execution of public works.

So, the creation and functioning of the public is possible to the extent that the media freely or autonomously, and in accordance with professional

standards and socially acceptable market behaviour, not only manage to inform the public, but also manage to control the government. Hence, it is no accidental at all that freedom of expression in the last two hundred years is a valuable starting “point” in any “political agenda”. This freedom has been constantly threatened, decreased, attacked, but also expanded and promoted, it is in constant “technological development” and its social and political architecture is given in the philosophical concept of negative and positive freedom, which is a generally accepted standard of civilization¹.

Transitional democratisation in Southeast Europe, especially in the Balkans in recent decades is particularly rich in examples of media non-freedom. We were (are) witnesses of the inflow of new print media, new radio and television stations, which completely changed the media scene. But one cannot put a sign of equality between the plurality of the media on one hand, and the increased media freedom and / or increased democracy, on the other hand. The summarising of the results so far suggests that expectations were exaggerated. “Minus conditions” occur in countries that were positive examples: such are the events of the media scene in Hungary, in 2011 and 2012. In parallel, some countries, especially those in the Western Balkans, have not managed to improve and make the improved media scene stable. Early transitional “freedoms” unfortunately remained at the level of exception, freedom of expression, freedom of the media failed to become a rule.

DOWNHILL

In this respect, Macedonia has the role of a “negative champion”, a country from the bottom of the list! Series of analyses and assessments already alarming, even dramatically, point to serious problems in the context of freedom of expression. This condition is not visible only from the inside, but also from the outside.

Macedonia, although a candidate for membership in the European Union since 2005, still receives serious critical remarks in the annual reports of the European Commission about the media scene and media freedoms. The latest report from October 2012 stated²: “... Further efforts are needed to ensure that these standards

¹ Negative freedom is understood as freedom or relief from the pressures of government, “the government will not prevent” when public expression and media are concerned, and positive freedom means liberty, the existence of institutional capacities, “the government has a task to enable them to exist and work “and hence the real possibility, due to the government arrangement, for free public expression. In this respect, freedom is not only non-interference, but also guaranteed non-interference and guaranteed possibility for public expression. In the modern sense the dual concept of negative - positive freedom was defined by Isaiah Berlin, in the middle of the last century.

² see: THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT Brussels 10.10.2012 SWD (2012) 332 final Chapter: 2.2. Human rights and protection of minorities page 14

(referring to the key judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – our note) are consistently applied. Simultaneously, there is a constant concern for the lack of pluralism and self-censorship. Thus far there is no active body for self-regulation in the media. The Broadcasting Council should demonstrate that it practices a non-discriminatory and transparent approach. There is a continuing concern for the large segment of advertising campaigns funded by the government, which are placed in media that support the government.” In addition, experts in this kind of international diplomatic communications state:” In general, the media sector is mentioned as one of the weakest, in an otherwise generally positive report ... “.³

And many other, established international organisations focused on monitoring and evaluation of media freedoms in their reports clearly indicate the growing problems of the media scene, that is, the reduction of the freedom of the media in Macedonia, they particularly emphasise the “downward line” in the last three or four years.

Amnesty International in the “Annual Report 2012”, in the section about Macedonia, under the title “Freedom of Expression “ begins the assessment with the following observation: “The freedom of expression of journalists and independent media workers were increasingly limited by the interference of the authorities, ranging from direct intimidation to control of the advertising companies.”⁴

A similar assessment was also given by the international, that is, the European Federation of Journalists, which in the jointly issued statement (7 July 2011) in support of the campaign for media freedom and journalists’ rights in Macedonia state: “Macedonian journalists are under enormous pressure from politicians and from media owners and recent events show that the country has reached a point where it just becomes unbearable to work freely in journalism.”⁵

This “intolerance” becomes a special challenge for SEEMO⁶ (MOJIE), and, as stated in their report, it was decided that the mission in Macedonia (4-6 October 2011) is to be conducted several months earlier than it was originally planned, just because the more frequent reactions from international institutions on the developments in the media scene in Macedonia. ⁷ SEEMO in its report identifies areas with dominant problems, such as: media ownership and influence over editorial policy, violation of professional standards, the status of the MRT, which is

³ see: Politicka Mislja, Skopje, No. 38, June 2012, issued by: Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Democracy Institute „Socieatas Civilis“ „Media and Freedom of Expression“, Chimek Anja, page. 9

⁴ see: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/macedonia/report-2012>

⁵ see: <http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-and-efj-support-campaign-for-independent-journalism-and-pluralism-in-republic-of-macedonia>

⁶ South East Europe Media Organisation, within IPI – International Press Institute

⁷ see: [seemo.org/files/Media Scene in Macedonia edited.pdf](http://seemo.org/files/Media_Scene_in_Macedonia_edited.pdf) - Report on the SEEMO Press Freedom Mission to the Republic of Macedonia

more a state than a public service and dependence of MRT of government funding, the role of campaigns funded by the government in print and private broadcasting media, as well as, numerous lawsuits for insult initiated against journalists and disproportionately high punishments compared to the average journalists' wage. The report emphasises that this state has had a negative trend in the past two years, and the result is "divided journalists and divided society." In its conclusions, the Report accepts the assessment of "Freedom House" that "Macedonia is partly free" and adds that the media scene is not pluralistic, whereby it explains: "... political, economic and legal pressure on the media leads to self-censorship." It all leads to the undeniable conclusion that in such conditions the public is left with no information of public interest.

The grades given in the Media Sustainability Index⁸ prepared by IREX⁹ on the media scene in Macedonia go even into more detail. "Media Sustainability Index" (MSI) is a regular annual report produced on the basis of standardised methodology. Grades are given on certain dimensions¹⁰ of the media scene, from 0, as the lowest, to 4, as the highest grade. Areas are evaluated numerically, and this quantification is a result of a series of qualitative evidence, statements, descriptions, arguments and conclusions. Here are the quantitative assessment of individual areas and a choice of the qualitative descriptions of these grades:

- *Freedom of speech (1.49)* "The guarantees for freedom of expression ... in the Constitution and media laws are insufficient This is largely due to weak law enforcement, selective activities against media that are critical of the government, as well as the ineffective and very troubled judicial system. ... the freezing effect is reflected in the growing self-censorship." ¹¹

- *Professionalism in journalism (1.47)*. The policy on political parties to avoid certain media "... deepens the polarisation of the media. Such a practice narrows the possibilities for the basic standards for media balance and stimulating of significant debate in the society to be met." Parties and the media have responsibility for "displacement of democratic processes in society and heated polarisation ... panellists agree that the level of respect for journalistic ethics is fairly low." ¹²

- *Plurality in the news (1.52)* Media pluralism is "nominal", it only exists in the number of media, "... but there is no plurality of views." And when it comes to

⁸ see: irex.org/system/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Macedonia.pdf Such regular annual reports are produced on the basis of standardised methodology

⁹ International Research Exchange Board, founded in 1968, is an international non-profit organisation, particularly active in the area of education and media, as well as in other sectors.

¹⁰ For each of the stated areas there is a list of indicators which are analysed, assessed in a panel discussion, attended by representatives of the professional media public, that is, of certain areas of the media scene.

¹¹ see: irex.org/system/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Macedonia.pdf , page. 89-90

¹² see: also, page 90-92

information on the network, the situation is the same, also on the Internet “ most of the content comes from traditional media and pro-government views dominate, on the network, as well. The public broadcaster strongly promotes the views of the government, not only within informative, but also through other programmes.”¹³

• *Business Management (1.20)* The media industry indicates sub-standard business management. “Generally speaking, media are struggling to diversify income, but the underdeveloped economy and low purchasing power of citizens largely cancels such efforts. ... State funded advertising is also a problem. The government is among the five largest advertisers and there are no laws regulating this practice.”¹⁴

• *Supporting Institutions (1.93)* It was estimated that the extinction of industry media associations (of electronical and of printed media) is due to the low awareness among media owners, as well as the cessation of donor support. On the other hand, trust was expressed in the newly established journalists’ trade union, having in mind “its efforts, exerted energy” articulated positions and provided assistance. Although it is emphasised that the Association of Journalists of Macedonia (AJM) “initiated a formal dialogue with the authorities on the rights of journalists,” the controversy of the whole process is simultaneously highlighted. It was estimated that the work and efforts of other NGOs, despite the ones already mentioned, “remain idle, faced with the strong government will to push through their own “agenda” in the media.”¹⁵

Consequently, the “dark clouds create a black horizon”, create the overall assessment of the media scene in Macedonia – 1:52.¹⁶ According to the methodology, the descriptive assessment from 1 to 2 index points reads: “*Unsustainable mixed media system*”, and the content of this assessment is: “*The country minimally meets the objectives, with segments of the legal system and the government, contrary to a free media system. Perceived progress in defence of media freedom, increased professionalism and management of new media can be too short to be considered as sustainable.*”¹⁷ In the IMO, it was stated in the very beginning that the total grade (1.52) for 2011 is the lowest grade so far, from the beginning (2001) of the measurements in Macedonia. This assessment (1.52) is smaller for more than one index point compared to 2005, when the total grade was 2.58, which is the highest grade that the Macedonian media scene has received within the IMO.

¹³ see: also, page 92-93

¹⁴ see: also, page 93-94

¹⁵ see: also, page 94-95

¹⁶ see: also, page 87

¹⁷ Naturally the content of the assessment is general and applies to the group of countries at the same level, it is not a description of a particular country, nor for Macedonia. It should be emphasised to avoid twisting specific, clearly negative, critical assessments of Macedonia relating to the second part of the general formulation “Progress perceived...” which actually does not refer to Macedonia - IMO has not seen any progress in Macedonia.

A similar critical approach in the evaluations of media freedom in Macedonia is noted in the “Index of Press Freedom in the World 2011-2012,” prepared by Reporters without Borders (RWB).¹⁸ Macedonia is on 94th place, and from the region less free are the media in Albania – 96th and Montenegro – 107th. Balkan and Macedonian media conditions are described as: “... use of media for private or criminal interests, unfair competition in very small markets and self-censorship among a growing number of poorly paid journalists.”¹⁹ The disaster continues, or rather, the disaster becomes even greater! According to the latest report “Index of Press Freedom in the World in 2013,”²⁰ of Reporters without Borders, Macedonia, this time, is on the 116th place, which is the worst place compared to all the countries in the region and the assessment is that the bad examples from Hungary and Italy are followed and that “... The Macedonian Assembly is preparing to make “censorship legal,” repeatedly treating journalists in the “hot and cold manner”, who are often left alone without protection.”

Although these opinions are from different sources, there is an emphasising noticeability of their critical approach and consent: the Macedonian media scene is more characterised by non-freedom, rather than freedom.

In contrast to that, in the Macedonian Constitution a range of liberties are guaranteed, which directly or indirectly, constitute the freedom of expression. Article 16 of the Constitution reads:²¹

“The freedom of belief, conscience, thought and public expression of thought is guaranteed.

The freedom of speech, public address, public information and the free establishment of institutions for public information is guaranteed.

The free access to information, the freedom to receive and convey information is guaranteed.

The right to respond in the public media is guaranteed.

The right to correction in the public media is guaranteed.

The right to protection of the source of information in the public media is guaranteed.

Censorship is prohibited. “

¹⁸ see: <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html>

¹⁹ According to “The development of media ownership structure in the Republic of Macedonia: Trapped democracy”, issued by Transparency Macedonia, editor MA. Saso Ordanoski 2012, p. 99, in Macedonia the index of the freedom of the press of RWB has seen “disasterous decline” from the 34th place in 2009, to the already indicated 94th place for 2011/12 Moreover, this is the worst position since 2003, when RWB included Macedonia in the freedom index for the first time.

²⁰ see: <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html> or http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf accessed on 31 January 2013

²¹ The underlining is from the author.

Such guarantees are overallly in the “spirit” of positive freedom. The non-interference of the government is a supposed condition and the projected norm is that the government, the state, according to the guarantees will establish opportunities, will meet the prerequisites for free public expression. Hence, it is quite evident that there are serious contradictions, almost two separate worlds. The government neither makes sufficient efforts, nor manages to achieve results that would be “realistic image” of the freedom of expression provided by the Constitution. On the contrary, the displayed assessments identify the government as one of the main reasons for non-freedom. This discrepancy becomes a kind of a “black hole” that swallows everything.

In the Macedonian media reality the indicated freedoms of the Constitution “simply” disappear and the defining of the current state on the media scene is in particular “sealed” with the events of 24 December 2012 in the Macedonian Assembly. “Asking” reporters with the help of physical persuasion to leave the gallery: their usual position in the plenary hall of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is contrary to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and since the current Constitution was adopted, it is a precedent of introducing open censorship.²² Moreover, this act is not only contrary to the Constitution, but it is also a criminal act, because revocation or restriction of “... human rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution, law or ratified international agreement ... shall be punished by imprisonment from three months to three years ... “. ²³ Finally, such an act is contrary to the basic principle of each Assembly, and it is the publicity in the operation. Even in the Rules of Procedure of a “censoring Assembly”, as the Macedonian Assembly on 24 December 2012 was, it was written that “The sessions of the Assembly and other bodies are public.” ²⁴ In fact, adopting a decision that would exclude the public from the work of the Assembly, from the session, at which the budget for 2013 was being adopted, would be a precedent from international

²² The removing of journalists caused disapproval not only by the domestic but also by the foreign public. Thus, the International Federation of Journalists and the European Federation of Journalists, in a statement from 31 December 2012 join their members: The Trade Union of Journalists and Media Workers of Macedonia and the Association of Journalists of Macedonia, condemning the decision to remove the journalists from the plenary hall, before the budget debate, point out that journalists “deserve an apology and a promise that such a measure should not be repeated.” <http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-condemns-media-ban-in-macedonia-parliament> (accessed on 30 January 2013)

²³ see: Criminal Code consolidated version 2004, <http://www.pravo.org.mk/documentDetail.php?id=233> пристапено на 21.01.2013

²⁴ see: <http://www.sobranie.mk/?ItemID=ACC6DA520871404DAC43337AA45027A5> Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of RM, consolidated version Article 2. In the same Article a possibility was given that the Assembly could work without the presence of the public, but provided that there is a decision of the working bodies or the Assembly. No working body or the Assembly has adopted or announced such a decision.

volume. The adoption of the budget in each country is a political process of high public interest, which automatically implies providing maximum publicity in the decision-making process.²⁵

PUBLIC IN THE CONDITINS OF NON-FREEDOM

But is it possible for the media which work under unbearable conditions of non-freedom to pursue their two primary functions: to provide control over the government, and to provide articulation of the interests of the public? That is, what publicity is possible in terms of non-free public, media expression? Under conditions of pressure, under conditions of censorship and self-censorship, the media become an instrument in the hands of the government and/or the owners. The media no longer inform, but they serve to control, mobilise and manipulate the public!²⁶ They do not allow the public to establish their own “agenda”, but impose the government-party “agenda” to the public, creating black and white political awareness, binary public, which is divided into “those who are with us” and “those who are against us.” Critics state that the public is trapped in the “party servility” and it almost does not show “civic initiative and integrity.”²⁷ That is, under conditions of party divided public: “... social mobilisation in defence of freedom of expression is possible only in the context of biased political manoeuvring and is not an indigenous value in society.”²⁸

Hence, taking into account the given assessments of the alarming media non-freedom, one of the central points of the public opinion research was to provide empirical data on the degenerative processes, which have not only affected the media,²⁹ but it is realistic to expect, that they have also affected the public in

²⁵ Because of all these “violations” the determining of the criminality of the removal of journalists from the plenary hall is a vital challenge for the democracy in the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, it is of the same, essential importance to see the outcome of the lawsuits announced by Naser Selmani - President of AJM, in the interview with Radio Free Europe (<http://www.makdenes.org>) broadcasted on 13 January 2013.

²⁶ The media manipulation is especially in the focus of the analysis by Zarko Trajkovski “Mama Mia: Framing Without Shame”. See <http://www.plusinfo.mk/mislenje/753/ANALIZA-Mama-MIA-vramuvanje-bez-sramuvanje> (accessed on 17 February 2013)

²⁷ See Political Thought, Skopje, No. 38, June 2012 issued by: Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” “Media as an Illegal Political Factor” Drtkovski Goce, p. 13-14)

²⁸ See: Media Sustainability Index: [irex.org/system/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Macedonia.pdf](http://www.irex.org/system/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Macedonia.pdf) , page. 89

²⁹ Regarding the current conditions or deevolution processes in the journalistic profession (from a later date) there is an illustrative column by Branko Geroski “Journalism or a Big Stinky Nothing?” published on 10 February 2012 on www.plusinfo.mk see: <http://www.plusinfo.mk/mislenje/749/Novinarstvo-ili-edno-golemo-smrdeno-nishto>

the Republic of Macedonia.³⁰ Consequently, research attention was centred on the relations in the triangle: media-public-government or two key elements.³¹ On the one hand, the relationship: media-public and in this respect, above all, the confidence of the public in the media; and, on the other hand, the evaluations of the public on the (non)freedom or pressure on the media and the views of the public on the sources of such pressure.

Confidence is undoubtedly a key element in the relationship media – public, but also an extremely compound, complex concept. Confidence should not be confused with the size of the audience. Number refers to the quantitative side, and trust to the qualitative side of the relationship media – public. Trust is a concentrated reflection of the editorial policy of the medium, to the qualities, such as: objectivity, analytical, and critical approach. The trust also reflects the ability of the medium to articulate different, even conflicting social interests, but also to identify the public interest and appropriately to such communication activity, the public to be able with its own dynamics and in a democratic manner to create “social common denominator.”

The first question, in this part of the survey, asked respondents to express the extent of their own (dis)agreement with the view: “*The media in Macedonia can be trusted.*”³² The received data leave no possibility of doubt: the majority of respondents did not agree with this position: 23.1% - “totally disagree” and 46.7% - “disagree”. On the opposite side are the negligible 4.2% who “completely agree”, that is, 26% of respondents who “agree” that the media in Macedonia can be trusted.

On a theoretical and principle level (dis)trust is often seen as a direct confirmation of the functionality of democracy.³³ Such distrust means criticality, awareness of necessity of publicity and control and, of course, awareness that the powerful, precisely because of their power, should not need be trusted (much). But when mistrust is in such a large volume: two thirds of respondents (69.8%) do not believe in the media and when it has such a high intensity: almost every fourth respondent “totally does not believe” (23.1%), then undoubtedly *the public and democracy*

³⁰ This thesis was the direct cause to ask questions on the relation media - public in the public opinion survey. Also, some of the above mentioned events and evaluations, have occurred after the field data collection, but the continuing negative trend is a further reason and evidence about the correct and current research focus.

³¹ Given the limited resources, and given the different structure of the problem of public opinion research, rationality imposed a choice of a smaller number of key problems or questions about the media.

³² Wishing to avoid the suggestion of criticism in evaluation or criticality to be “response” to the question, the proposition in this and in the next question was worded positively. Hence, the critical approach in the answers received in that manner has enhanced authentication.

³³ see: *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 59, No.2, Cambridge University Press, 1997, „Trust, Distrust and Scepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies“

are seriously threatened. The media have no credibility with the public, in their audiences, or differently said, the public does not have (its) media to believe in!

It is worth to stress, that the current, two-third distrust in the media is larger than the average mistrust in EU countries. Namely, according to public opinion surveys in the EU Member States, mistrust in the media ranges from: 35% for the radio; from 42% to 46% for TV; from 51% to 52% for newspapers, and from 39% to 41% for the Internet.³⁴

As mentioned previously, the following question in this context referred to the respondents' evaluation of non-freedom of the media. Respondents had to express the extent of their own (dis)agreement with the statement, which was again positively worded: *"The media in Macedonia are not under pressure and are able to report freely."* The disagreement again dominates: 44.6% - *"disagree"* and 26.7% - *"totally disagree"* with this position. In contrast to those who answered *"agree"* (22.8%) or *"completely agree"* (5.9%) with the statement: *"The media are not under pressure and are able to report freely."*

No matter how terrible these data are, they are certainly not surprising. In fact, in terms of "unbearable media non-freedom" the only possible outcome or result is *"robbed public"* and *"compressed media."*

Where are the reasons for this situation?³⁵ Hence, the last question in this context asked respondents to indicate the source from which the greatest pressure on the media comes, and on such a basis to record the "causal side" of non-freedom. *Three commonly indicated sources of pressure, are "the government" – 39.8%, "the government and the owners" – 28% and "the owners" – 14%. Incomparably less numerous are those who think that the pressures on the media come from the "opposition" – 4.3% or "the opposition and the owners" – 2.8%. However, 11.1% of the respondents answered that "the media are free and not under pressure."*

The indicated structure of responses shows that the public, as opposed to all the "twists" and the daily exposure to a number of media manipulation, has kept its "own common sense" and quite rationally identifies the "tandem" from which the greatest pressures originates: the government and the owners. Also, it should be emphasised that the public, although a victim, is not dead! The obtained data show that respondents are rational and critical, which suggests that although the public is "voiceless": it does not have its "own" media, that is, it shows enormously low trust in the media, the public is still not "mindless", it manages to create its "own" reality other than the media constructed reality.

³⁴ see: Standard Eurobarometar EB72-2009, EB74-2010, EB76-2011

³⁵ The issue is certainly not new, in fact within the professional and expert-scientific media public it is consistently one of the central issues. However, given our research it was quite relevant, to address this question to the respondents in order to become familiar with the views of the citizens, the general public.

And before the end, we shall lay down another research data and explanation for these findings and indicate the cornerstone of bipolarity among respondents. The answers to all three questions show great stability, insignificant statistical differences according to different socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, such as gender, age, education, ethnicity, whereby, however, one important feature significantly affects the responses, it is: the political orientation of respondents (see Table 1).

| Table 1 | | POLITICAL ORIENTATION | | | |
|---|---|---|---|----------------------------|--------|
| | | Supports a party that is part of the government | Supports a party that is part of the opposition | Does not support any party | TOTAL |
| How much do you agree that the media in Macedonia can be trusted? | I completely agree | 6.5% | 2.7% | 3.6% | 4.2% |
| | I agree | 39.1% | 20.9% | 21.5% | 26.0% |
| | I disagree | 37.2% | 50.5% | 49.9% | 46.7% |
| | I completely disagree | 17.2% | 25.8% | 25.0% | 23.1% |
| How much do you agree that the media in Macedonia are not under pressure and are able to report freely? | I completely agree | 7.7% | 3.3% | 5.9% | 5.9% |
| | I agree | 36.4% | 16.5% | 18.5% | 22.8% |
| | I disagree | 35.2% | 47.3% | 48.1% | 44.6% |
| | I completely disagree | 20.7% | 33.0% | 27.5% | 26.7% |
| According to you, the media in Macedonia suffer the greatest pressure from the: | Government | 25.3% | 51.6% | 42.7% | 39.8% |
| | Opposition | 4.6% | 3.8% | 4.3% | 4.3% |
| | Owners | 18.0% | 3.8% | 15.4% | 14.0% |
| | Government and owners | 24.5% | 33.0% | 28.0% | 28.0% |
| | Opposition and owners | 5.7% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.8% |
| | The media are free, they are not under pressure | 21.8% | 6.0% | 7.7% | 11.1% |
| | Total | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

As the table shows, the political orientation structures in a bipolar way the surveyed individuals: the supporting of a government party or an opposition party strikingly determines the differences in the answers of respondents, whereby, it is clearly evident that those who support a party that is part of the government are on one side and the rest of the respondents are on the other side: those who support a party that is part of the opposition or do not support any party. Simultaneously, in particular, the answers of those who support a party that is part of the government deserve “zoomed” attention. Within this group of respondents, collectively speaking, the majority: 54.55% - disagree that the media can be trusted, 55.9% disagree that the media are able to report freely and that the greatest pressure comes from the government – 25.3% and from the government and the owners – 24.5%. Apparently, although it is certain that the “party dioptré” manages to discipline the answers of these respondents, it still fails to completely distort the perception of reality.

Hence, the question that deserves full and constant research attention is: when and how, this undisputedly major segment of respondents, of the public, will be able to articulate its own interests, the public will obtain “its” (more) free media and democracy its (more) free public.

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LABOUR VALUES OF THE MACEDONIAN POPULATION

INTRODUCTION

Changes in the Macedonian business environment in the last two decades are significant and complex. The change of the economic and political system had an impact on all aspects of life, especially the manner of doing business, but also meant a change of values in general. The importance of cultural values and the relationship they have with the manner of performing the managerial practice is emphasised by many researchers in this field.

Hofstede (1980) states that all spheres of life in national cultures are mutually related: family, work, religion, economic behaviour, health, crime, punishment, science, art, literature, management, leadership. However, one can not set aside one separate national managerial or leadership culture, but it is important that management and leadership can be understood only as part of a larger (national) culture.

The research seeks to answer the questions: “Are there unique Macedonian labour values”, “Which values are preferred in the workplace by employees,” “Is there a difference between the value preferences of the population in Macedonia by gender, age, education “, “ Which values are of particular importance. “

Consequently, in this research there is an attempt to identify the preferences of the working population in Macedonia regarding the work, that is, the labour context. The fact is that Macedonia faces a specific paradox. On the one hand, there is a high unemployment rate, which has been around 30% for years, but on the other hand the comments of employers that they can not find quality employees and retain the best are becoming louder. Refraining from the educational system of the country and the management system of business entities, which certainly contribute to this paradox, this study focuses on labour values. Values are important because they characterise individuals, as well as, societies, show changes over time and explain the motivation base of attitudes and behaviour. When we talk about values, we talk about what we think is important for us in our lives. Everyone of us possesses many values (value of accomplishment, security, belonging, love towards the humankind ..), but with varying degrees of importance. Even though values as type of motivation are universal and common to people and separate them from other species, individuals and groups still differ in terms of the importance they give to values. Individuals and groups have different value priorities or hierarchy of values. Hence, it is expected that the values are the basis for action and an instrument used to increase workplace performance, that is, productivity or efficiency. In the context of organisational sciences, values are an expression of human intention, presented in the form of behaviour.

It is important to note that for the purposes of this study the term value is used in respect of what the individual wants and/or prefers as a feature of the work context or the job, so that the term value in this meaning is used more as a verb than as a noun. That is, what is more valued (preferred) by the respondent in the work context.

VALUES AND WORK: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The concept of values is a subject of great interest in the social sciences. Values play an important role not only in sociology, but also in psychology, anthropology, organisational sciences and other related disciplines. In social psychology (Argyris and Schoen, 1978; Furnham, 1997; Rocheach, 1973; Rocheach and Ball-Rocheach, 1989), in the area of ethics (Taylor, 1989), social anthropology (Hofstede, 1980;

Inglehart, 1997) and in organisational sciences (Argyris and Schoen, 1978; Gilliland et al., 2003; Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Schein, 1985).

Values by Rokeach (1973) are defined as lasting beliefs and specific ways of behaviour that are preferred. There are final values and instrumental values. The final values are personal beliefs about lifelong goals. Instrumental values are personal beliefs about ways of behaviour or how to reach the final values (Rokeach, 1973). Values have a significant impact on future actions and decisions by the individual. They determine the belief of people in what is fundamentally correct or incorrect.

Labour values can be defined as views of employees about what can be expected from the work and how to act to achieve these expectations. These are generalised expectations about different aspects of the work (salary, autonomy, working conditions), and the results related to performance (achievement, accomplishment, prestige) (Dose, 1997; George & Jones 1999; Ros, Schwartz & Surkiss, 1999). Labour values are hierarchically arranged in terms of their importance to the individual. Labour values give the answer to the question as to what is important for the individual's work or his/her life, including the issue of money, social interaction, intellectual stimulation, status, fulfilment, achievement. They provide the foundation for the judgment of the world around him/her.

On the other hand, the analysis of the early theories of organisation (Murray, 1938; Lewin, 1943, Holland 1966) and later theories of organisational culture (Schein 1985), shows that employee behaviour is influenced by the specific characteristics of the work environment, or organisational culture. Employees who will fit into the work environment will be more enthusiastic in terms of work and will enjoy it. Conversely, for those who do not fit work may cause negative results, such as boredom, poor job performance, lack of satisfaction (Westerman, Yamamura, 2007).

Work organisations should understand that each employee, performers, as well as Managers, are guided and motivated by a hierarchy of their own unique personal values. Organisations need to allow employees to connect personal values with organisational values. The building of this connection will affect the increase of their commitment and their remaining in the organisation, the employee engagement, which will lead to higher achievements.

“The values contain a large number of social attitudes, by allowing them to better describe social behaviour” (McNeil EB and Rubin Z, 1977: 537). Values are created when a number of individual views are linked in a common position, which concerns many social phenomena, and include all relations contained in each of the integrated views.

USED METHODOLOGY

Data for this study were collected through a survey of public opinion conducted in September 2012 on a sample of 1,000 respondents. The sample was structured by gender: 50.7% men and 49.3% women. According to their age, respondents were over 18 years old, grouped into 4 categories: from 18 to 29 years of age 25.2%, from 30 to 49 years of age 40.5%, from 50 to 65 years of age 21.5% and over 65 years of age 12.8%. The educational level was as follows: incomplete primary education 2.7%, primary education 13.3%, secondary education 53.9%; higher and university education 30.1%. 25.8% of them were unemployed, and 46.2% were employed (30.7% in the private sector and 15.5% in the public sector), 12.5% retired, 4.4% housewives, 4.3% farmers, 4.6% students and 2.2% others. According to their religion: Orthodox 61.8%, Muslim 31.6%, Catholic 1.7%, other religion 1.6%, non-affiliation to any religion 3.3%. 37.5% were from a village and 62.5% lived in a city. All data were collected face to face. Besides demographic data, survey respondents were asked to state the extent to which they The Likert type of scale was used with verbal description from 1 to 6, where 1 is not important and 6 is very important.

The survey used the instrument built by a group of researchers (Scott. W. Lester. Rhetta L. Standifer, Nicole J. Schultz and James M. Windsor 2012), which is the result of extensive research of relevant literature (Lester, Standifer, Nicole, Schultz, Windsor, 2012; Anetzberger, Teaster, 2010) and a test of their grouping. 15 specific aspects of work and employment context were included. These are:

- 1) Teamwork (working in a team / group);
- 2) Autonomy at work (or the extent to which you may individually decide how to organise and perform work);
- 3) Secure job (without fear of dismissal);
- 4) Professionalism (or vocational training and knowledge of the work);
- 5) Flexibility of working hours (possibility of arrival / departure to / from work earlier / later and use of working holidays of their choice);
- 6) Existence of formal authority (existence of strictly defined managerial positions followed with responsibility for decision-making and use of organisational resources);
- 7) Technology (availability and advancement of labour technology, which involves using a combination of tools, machines, computers, skills, information and knowledge in the production of goods and services);
- 8) Communicating face to face (direct communication);
- 9) e-mail communication (communication via the Internet);

- 10) Communicating through social media (like facebook, twitter, skype, linkedin);
- 11) The structure of the work (or clear definition of all positions of the work and the working process);
- 12) Participation in decision-making (respect of your opinion when making decisions);
- 13) Continuous learning (support by the employer in learning while performing tasks, attendance at conferences, seminars, training, formal education);
- 14) Fun at work (entertainment, humour and friendship in the workplace);
- 15) Recognition for the performed work (praise and reward by supervisors for the performed work).

VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENT

Initially the reliability of the instrument scale has been checked based on the Cronbach alpha coefficient, the value of which is as follows: Alpha = 880. This instrument has satisfactory metric characteristics needed for analysis of the results. Double-alternative correlation was made to determine the coefficients of simple correlation between a number of variables. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used.

RESULTS FROM THE RESEARCH

In order to discover what participants really value in the workplace and in the labour context, they were allowed to indicate the values in accordance with their importance. Table 1 presents the values and frequencies according to which they were ordered. Taking the social context into consideration, particularly the economic one, in which the country is found, it is not surprising that "secure job without fear of dismissal" is something that they valued as most significant. The second place was given to "professionalism or vocational training and knowledge of the work." The third place was shared between "recognition for the performed work or praise and reward by supervisors for the performed work" and "technology or availability and advancement of labour technology, which involves using a combination of tools, machines, computers, skills, information and knowledge in the production of goods and services."

Table 1: *Priority in values*

| | | M | SD | % |
|------------|------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| 1. | Stable job position | 5.4910 | 1.02614 | 85% |
| 2. | Professionalism | 5.3920 | 1.04280 | 82% |
| 3. | Technology | 5.2300 | 1.17409 | 75% |
| 4. | Recognition for the performed work | 5.1740 | 1.20714 | 75% |
| 5. | Communicating face to face | 5.1170 | 1.25255 | 73% |
| 6. | Continuous learning | 5.1020 | 1.25266 | 71% |
| 7. | Participation in decision-making | 5.0540 | 1.21514 | 70% |
| 8. | Teamwork | 5.0260 | 1.30730 | 69% |
| 9. | Structure of work | 4.9160 | 1.29020 | 64% |
| 10. | Autonomy at work | 4.7980 | 1.28095 | 63% |
| 11. | Formal authority | 4.6470 | 1.37996 | 57% |
| 12. | Flexible working hours | 4.5200 | 1.56782 | 56% |
| 13. | E-mail communication | 4.2410 | 1.67742 | 47% |
| 14. | Fun at work | 4.1420 | 1.57554 | 43% |
| 15. | Communicating through social media | 3.6840 | 1.77744 | 33% |

The endeavour was to discover whether there are dependencies in the evaluation of aspects of work by gender, age and education.

H0 = evaluation of aspects of the work are independent of gender.

H1 = evaluation of aspects of the work is dependent on gender.

For all variables the level of dependence was tested with the level of significance of $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.01$. The obtained results indicate that statistically significant are the correlations between gender and formal authority (0.080) at significance level $\alpha = 0.05$ and between gender and face to face communication (0.063) at significance level $\alpha = 0.05$. Regarding gender and formal authority, as can be seen from Table 3, for women existence of formal authority is more important than for men, 36% of women decided that formal authority is very important, while 30% of the men considered it as very important.

Table 2. *Priority in values according to the gender*

| Women | Men |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position |
| 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism |

| | |
|--|--|
| 2. Technology | 3. Technology |
| 4. Communicating face to face | 4. Teamwork |
| 5. Acknowledgements | 5. Acknowledgements |
| 6. Continuous learning | 6. Continuous learning |
| 7. Teamwork | 7. Communicating face to face |
| 8. Participation in decision-making | 8. Participation in decision-making |
| 9. Structure | 9. Structure |
| 10. Flexible working hours | 10. Autonomy |
| 11. Autonomy | 11. Flexible working hours |
| 12. Formal authority | 12. E-mail communication |
| 13. E-mail communication | 13. Formal authority |
| 14. Fun at work | 14. Communicating through social media |
| 15. Communicating through social media | 15. Fun at work |

Table 3: *Formal authority (existence of strictly defined managerial positions followed with responsibility for decision-making and use of organisational resources)*

| | Gender | | Total |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Male | Female | |
| Not important | 3,7% | 2,2% | 3,0% |
| 2 | 4,9% | 3,9% | 4,4% |
| 3 | 14,2% | 12,8% | 13,5% |
| 4 | 21,9% | 18,5% | 20,2% |
| 5 | 23,1% | 24,3% | 23,7% |
| Very important | 30,4% | 36,3% | 33,3% |
| No answer | 1,8% | 2,0% | 1,9% |
| Total | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

With regard to gender, communication face to face, as can be seen from Table 4, is more important to women than to men, where 56.4% of the women chose very important and 48.9% of the men. From the results of the cross-tabulation of the evaluation of work and gender and the correlation coefficients, it can be concluded that there is no difference in the valuation aspects of work between men and women, except for the aspect of formal authority and communicate face to face.

Table 4: *Communication face to face (direct communication)*

| | Gender | | Total |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Male | Female | |
| Not important | 2,4% | 1,4% | 1,9% |
| 2 | 2,0% | 3,4% | 2,7% |
| 3 | 9,5% | 6,5% | 8,0% |
| 4 | 13,4% | 11,4% | 12,4% |
| 5 | 22,5% | 19,1% | 20,8% |
| Very important | 48,9% | 56,4% | 52,6% |
| No answer | 1,4% | 1,8% | 1,6% |
| Total | total | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Hypothesis of the existence of dependency between evaluation of work aspects in relation to age.

H0 = evaluation of aspects of the work are independent of age.

H1 = evaluation of aspects of the work is dependent on age.


For all variables the level of dependence was tested with the level of significance of $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha=0.01$. The results indicate that at significance level of 0.01 there is a negative correlation between age and: teamwork (-0.89); stable job position (-0.096); professionalism (-0.099); flexibility of working hours (-0.099); technology (-0.114) face to face communication (-0.085); E-mail communication (-0.232); communication through social media (-0.185); fun at work (-0.84). At significance level of 0.05 statistically significant is the correlation of age with continuous learning (-0.062). The negative correlation indicates that with the increasing of age the significance of the selected variables is reduced. Independent of age are: autonomy at work, formal authority, structure of work and recognition for the performed work.

Table 5: *Percentage determination by age*

| | 18-29 | 30-49 | 50-65 | above 65 |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|----------|
| Teamwork | 57.1% | 50.4% | 48.8% | 41.4% |
| Stable job position | 72.2% | 72.1% | 69.3% | 57.8% |
| Professionalism | 69.8% | 59.7% | 61.9% | 57.8% |
| Flexible working hours | 39.7% | 37.5% | 29.8% | 28.9% |
| Technology | 68.3% | 55.8% | 53.0% | 53.1% |
| Communicating face to face | 61.5% | 50.8% | 48.4% | 47.7% |

| | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| E-mail communication | 43.3% | 30.3% | 21.4% | 23.4% |
| Communication through social media | 34.5% | 17.3% | 12.6% | 19.5% |
| Participation in decision-making | 53.2% | 42% | 48.4% | 43.8% |
| Continuous learning | 58.7% | 49.4% | 48.4% | 50.8% |
| Fun at work | 25.0% | 25.2% | 22.3% | 20.3% |
| Formal authority | 37.3% | 29.6% | 34.0% | 35.9% |
| Autonomy | 39.7% | 35.8% | 40.5% | 32% |
| Structure | 45.6% | 40.2% | 46% | 43% |
| Acknowledgements | 62.7% | 54.6% | 54% | 50% |

Figure 1: Age and percentage determination on values regarding the workplace



There is also a priority of values in accordance with age groups as shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Priority of values in accordance with age

| 18-29 years of age | 30-49 years of age | 50-65 years of age | Above 65 years of age |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position |
| 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| 3. Technology | 3. Technology | 3. Acknowledgements | 3. Technology |
| 4. Acknowledgements | 4. Acknowledgements | 4. Technology | 4. Continuous learning |
| 5. Communicating face to face | 5. Communicating face to face | 5. Teamwork | 5. Acknowledgements |
| 6. Continuous learning | 6. Teamwork | 6. Communicating face to face | 6. Communicating face to face |
| 7. Teamwork | 7. Continuous learning | 7. Participation in decision-making | 7. Participation in decision-making |
| 8. Participation in decision-making | 8. Participation in decision-making | 8. Continuous learning | 8. Structure |
| 9. Structure | 9. Structure | 9. Structure | 9. Teamwork |
| 10. E-mail communication | 10. Flexible working hours | 10. Autonomy | 10. Formal authority |
| 11. Autonomy | 11. Autonomy | 11. Formal authority | 11. Autonomy |
| 12. Flexible working hours | 12. E-mail communication | 12. Flexible working hours | 12. Flexible working hours |
| 13. Formal authority | 13. Formal authority | 13. Fun at work | 13. E-mail communication |
| 14. Communicating through social media | 14. Fun at work | 14. E-mail communication | 14. Fun at work |
| 15. Fun at work | 15. Communicating through social media | 15. Communicating through social media | 15. Communicating through social media |

From the table which represents the priority of values by age it can be seen that all age groups ranked “stable job position ” as first and “professionalism” as second, while “technology” was ranked as third for the age groups from 18 to 29, from 30 to 49 and for the age group of above 65 years. For the age group from 50 to 65 years “acknowledgements” were ranked third.

The hypothesis of the existence of dependence between evaluation of the aspects of work in relation to education.

H0 = evaluation of aspects of the work as independent from education.

H1 = evaluation of aspects of the work as dependent on education.

For all variables the dependence level was tested according to the significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\alpha = 0.01$. The results indicate that at the level of significance of 0.01 all variables with education positively correlate: teamwork (0.142), autonomy (0.157), stable job position (0.186), professionalism (0.205), flexibility (0.104), technology (0.205), face to face communication (0.125), e-mail communication (0.231), social media (0.099), the structure of work (0.183), involvement in decision-making

(0.147), continuous learning (0.226), fun at work (0.134) and acknowledgements (0.102). At significance level of 0.05 is authority (0.077).

Table 7: Percentage determination in accordance with education

| | Incomplete primary education | Primary education | High school education | Higher and university education |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Teamwork | 40,7% | 36,8% | 50,1% | 58,5% |
| Stable job position | 33,3% | 51,9% | 61,0% | 72,4% |
| Professionalism | 33,3% | 51,9% | 61,0% | 72,4% |
| Flexible working hours | 22,2% | 24,8% | 35,6% | 40,5% |
| Technology | 37,0% | 49,6% | 55,7% | 67,8% |
| Communicating face to face | 40,7% | 39,8% | 53,1% | 58,5% |
| E-mail communication | 25,9% | 19,5% | 28,2% | 40,9% |
| Communicating through social media | 11,1% | 18,0% | 21,3% | 24,3% |
| Participation in decision-making | 37,0% | 37,6% | 45,3% | 53,2% |
| Continuous learning | 33,3% | 36,1% | 48,8% | 65,4% |
| Fun at work | | 13,5% | 23,7% | 30,9% |
| Formal authority | 25,9% | 27,1% | 32,5% | 38,2% |
| Autonomy | 14,8% | 31,6% | 36,2% | 43,9% |
| Structure | 29,6% | 31,6% | 42,9% | 50,2% |
| Acknowledgements | 40,7% | 45,9% | 51,9% | 62,1% |

Figure 2: Education and percentage determination on values regarding the workplace




Table 8: *Priority of values in accordance with education*

| Incomplete primary education | Primary education | High school education | Higher and university education |
|--|--|--|--|
| 1. Acknowledgements | 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position | 1. Stable job position |
| 2. Teamwork | 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism | 2. Professionalism |
| 3. Communicating face to face | 3. Technology | 3. Technology | 3. Technology |
| 4. Technology | 4. Acknowledgements | 4. Communicating face to face | 4. Continuous learning |
| 5. Participation in decision-making | 5. Communicating face to face | 5. Acknowledgements | 5. Acknowledgements |
| 6. Stable job position | 6. Participation in decision-making | 6. Teamwork | 6. Teamwork |
| 7. Professionalism | 7. Teamwork | 7. Continuous learning | 7. Communicating face to face |
| 8. Continuous learning | 8. Continuous learning | 8. Participation in decision-making | 8. Participation in decision-making |
| 9. Structure | 9. Autonomy | 9. Structure | 9. Structure |
| 10. E-mail communication | 10. Structure | 10. Autonomy | 10. Autonomy |
| 11. Formal authority | 11. Formal authority | 11. Flexibility of working hours | 11. E-mail communication |
| 12. Flexible working hours | 12. Flexibility of working hours | 12. Formal authority | 12. Flexibility of working hours |
| 13. Autonomy | 13. E-mail communication | 13. E-mail communication | 13. Formal authority |
| 14. Communicating through social media | 14. Communicating through social media | 14. Fun at work | 14. Fun at work |
| 15. Fun at work | 15. Fun at work | 15. Communicating through social media | 15. Communicating through social media |

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine what respondents value, desire or prefer as a feature of the work context or work, that is, what the respondent values more (prefers) in employment context. We checked the reliability of the instrument scale based on Cronbach alpha coefficient that is of the following value $\text{Alpha} = .880$. This instrument has satisfactory metric characteristics needed for analysis of results. The conducted double-alternative correlation showed coefficients of simple correlation between a number of variables. We used Pearson's correlation coefficient.

In terms of priority of evaluation, it was revealed that the first places were occupied by: stable job position, professionalism and technology and recognition for the performed work. Despite the economic uncertainty that is present in the Macedonian business environment and that is certainly the reason for the decision of all participants to give high rating to the option "stable job position" without fear of dismissal and in order to interpret the displayed order of values in the context of the workplace defined in Table 1, they may be connected with the theory of hierarchy of needs of Abraham Maslov. There are 5 levels of personal needs: physiological, safety needs, love and belonging, respect and self-realisation (Jones, George, 2008). In this case, the stable job position is the one that will ensure the realisation of physiological needs (need for food ..) , as well as, the need for safety and it is not peculiar that it was ranked first. Consequently, in this respect, is also the recognition for accomplishments that includes praise (or something that will allow them to keep their job, but also to be respected) and reward for the work done (money or benefits that will ensure satisfaction of physiological needs, also satisfying the need for recognition, respect). The choice of professionalism is also in the same line, that is, it is expected that professional education and knowledge of the work will help them to retain their job, or it will provide a level of salary that will allow them to buy food and clothing, but also to meet the need for respect and self-fulfilment. In order to have a motivated workforce, managers/employers must determine which needs employees in organisations try to meet. Consequently, they need to provide conditions and rewards that will contribute to boost employee performance.

In terms of internal connection between the evaluation of specific aspects of work (15 items) and gender, it was shown that there is correlation for only two items (formal authority and communicate face to face). This finding suggests that the priority of valuing specific aspects of work is the same in men and women, except for formal authority and communication. Women gave a higher value to formal authority and communication face to face, as opposed to men.

We also examine the connection between the evaluation of specific aspects of work (15 items) and age. The following items proved to be independent of age: autonomy in work, formal authority, structure of the work, and recognition for the achievements. For all other items there is a negative correlation, indicating that as age increases, the importance of evaluation of specific items decreases.

For all ages the first two places are reserved for the items: stable job position and professionalism. For the other ones (18-29, 30-49 and over 65) the third position was given to professionalism, whereas for the age group of 50-65 acknowledgements were in the third place. For this age group (50-65), unlike other age groups: participation in decision-making, autonomy and fun at work is also important. For the age group 18-29 years as expected higher significance was given to continuous learning, e-mail communication and communication through social media. In this age group fun at work was valued as the least important. Most likely, this age group has enough fun out of their work.

We also examined the dependence between the evaluation of specific aspects of work (15 items) and education. It was found that all items are positively correlated with education. It was established that the educational categories: incomplete primary and primary education ranked participation in decision-making at a very high level, whereas the educational categories high school and university education gave high ratings to acknowledgements and continuous learning. By the educational category higher and university education, as it was predicted, higher rating was given to continuous learning, then to acknowledgements, while for the category of high school education the order is reversed - acknowledgements and then continuous learning.

CONCLUSION

Values affect perceptions and behaviour and have implications for interpersonal interactions, as well. When employees have similar value systems, they tend to perceive external stimuli in a similar way. Among other things, this similarity in interpreting and classifying the environment serves to clarify their mutual communications. Individuals with similar value systems behave similarly. Value similarity facilitates the interaction of individuals to achieve common goals, because it will reduce the ambiguity of information and conflict. Hence, individuals with similar values will be more satisfied with their interpersonal relationships (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998). Because the culture of organisation is in the function of shared values, the overlapping of individual and organisational values provides access to the measurement of organisational culture and understanding its effect

(Posner, 1993). Several studies have found that the overlapping of the individual and organisational values have: greater commitment, job satisfaction, organisational commitment as a result (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Chatman, 1989; Posner & Schmidt, 1993; McDonald, 1993; Cable & Judge, 1996).

Research focused on values and work attracts great attention in the organisational sciences. The relation of values or evaluation of aspects of work with the area of human resources management is very important and can contribute to the proper structuring and implementation of all functions of human resources. Thus, the concept of values can be important in structuring job positions, which includes appropriate working conditions which will be acceptable for certain categories of employees. Thus, for example, as can be seen from the results that young employees with higher education despite stable job position, professionalism and technology highly valued continuous learning, e-mail communication and communication through social media, while for the category of 50-65 years of age, with university education, besides stable job position, and professionalism, acknowledgements and participation in decision-making have high ratings based on their significance. The results can also be used in the recruitment process, selection, professional and career development, especially in the process of retention of employees. Values of employees should be taken into consideration in building a successful motivational system that will allow the organisation to increase its competitive advantage. Since values indicate the general direction of the activities of individuals, it is quite obvious that organisational values have some effect on individual values, and vice versa, so that their mutual compliance should be created.

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RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN MACEDONIAN SOCIETY

*„ Why not imagine
European public space
as ethical ... framework...?
Nilüfer Göle*

INTRODUCTION

Religion in the contemporary Macedonian society is specifically profiled. On the one hand, it carries its existence for decades on the margins of society, or the “private sphere”. On the other hand, religious collectivities make attempts to properly position themselves in the emerging social circumstances. The changing of the social structure contributed that Macedonian citizens, somehow overnight, become “more aware” of religion, trying to catch up with current events. The long existence¹ of religion in the private sphere, indirectly influences its acting on the public scene. Moreover, lengthy transition years and the changeability of the social actors on the scene, as well as, the situation within the religious groups, contributed significantly, that they are primarily oriented to the right-inclined political structures, while mostly colouring the national identity. In this context, the function of religion

¹ During the period of socialism, in Macedonian society the attitude towards religion changed, gradually reducing the “atheist restraints.”

is seen primarily through its role as protector of the national identity, strengthening its symbolic function.²

Clear revitalisation of religion in the Macedonian society can be seen through the process of deprivatisation of religion,³ or abandoning the private, often called the invisible sphere and its apparent and zeal expression on the public scene. Intensification of religious life in the religious collectivities themselves increasingly thrusts and enters the public domain, followed, for example, through their greater presence in the media, highlighting the place and position of religion in structuring the national collectivity, animating the issues about the return of the seized properties, then, religious education or religious science, as well as many other issues that are of interest to the believers themselves and the citizens in general. The public role of religion is obviously oriented towards its general ethical dimension and the need to devise, develop and implement engagement of religious communities in the spectrum of social activities.⁴

The issue of religion and morality is very complex, especially during the transition period, but in this paper, that is, project it was only partially researched. Often in public discourse the phrase that connects religion and morality is present, suggesting that religion should be a “source” of moral behaviour and help to overcome the present crisis of values. Modern religious polarisation of morality is based on the concept of public religion, suggesting that religion should provide adequate support to individual and public morality in society. Religious leadership, through its mission, in a pragmatic meaning of the word, gives an important input to the revival of the leading tenets of ethical conduct of religious collectivities. Spiritual leaders are often under the observation of the public eye, so that many times their behaviour is subject to articles in the media, it is commented on the social networks and the citizens and believers, more openly express their considerations, views and criticism of their actions. It is not seldom that critical tones pervade from the very religious groups, reflecting the different considerations and tendencies in them. In his review of the crisis in the Church, Professor Ratomir Grozdanovski states that “this crisis should make the Church more resistant, more

² Cacanaska, R., *The Religion in Macedonian Society*, YUNIR YSSSR Annual – Year XV, *The Sociology of Religion in the Former Yugoslav Republics*, Nis, 2008.

³ Casanova, J., *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago\ London, University of Chicago Press, 1994; Herbert, D., *Religion and Civil Society, Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World*, Aldershot, Ashagate Publishing Limited, 2003; Eder, C., *Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere*, Eurozine, 2006-08-17.

⁴ Casanova, J., *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago\ London, University of Chicago Press, 1994; Herbert, D., *Religion and Civil Society, Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World*, Aldershot, Ashagate Publishing Limited, 2003; Eder, C., *Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere*, Eurozine, 2006-08-17.

spiritual, more moral and strengthen the faith within, in its leadership, clergy and Eminence, then within the believers and finally before unbelievers. ... So, it should establish moral, ethical values and not as a theological-scientific or theological-educational knowledge, but concrete, practical life knowledge- faith and morality shown and proven in life.”⁵

Grozdanovski indicates that the church must practically demonstrate nurturing moral values ...⁶

Considering other self-critical signs of moral of religious communities, I believe that it is important, in public-opinion projects to see the attitude of the citizens, that is believers, towards the moral in their or other religious collectivities. It should also be noted that Macedonia has twice introduced and twice abolished religious science in primary schools. As a substrate for the subject religious ethics was offered, that is taught in primary schools as an optional subject.

Undoubtedly, the 2012 public opinion project must take the current developments in this area into consideration. Without a doubt, it is definitely the “miracle in the church St. Dimitrija” (St. Demetrius). Namely, on 8 April 2012, “according to the statements by church officials and a number of visitors to the church the *miracle* was that the frescoes in the church ... suddenly began to self-purify of deposits of soot and dirt, becoming significantly brighter. Special *self-purification* was observed on the halos of the saints, and on the wings of the angels ... red lines appeared that looked like bloody traces, i.e. as if the wings of the angels were bleeding.”⁷ This event was followed by numerous controversies and polemics, which somehow separated the Macedonian public, into those who thought it was a real miracle, as a message sent by God for the moral decline in society.⁸ In contrast to them, there was another category, which includes those who believe that it is not a miracle, but that it is the work of a human hand. To these two options, a third one was simply added, of those who do not have a clear position what exactly it is. The battery of

⁵ Grozdanovski R., Secularism and secularisation, Lecture at a one-day forum, with leading professors and scholar, on 25 June 2007, in Skopje, p. 10-11, http://www.rrgrozdanovski.mk/index2.php?option=com_content&tas... (accessed on 21 February 2013).

⁶ Grozdanovski, R., Ibid. page 10-11.

⁷ Zoglev, Z., and Cacanaska, R., Conflicting interpretations of the “miracle” in the Church “St. Demetrius” - Skopje - Analysis of the content of articles in the daily press of the Republic of Macedonia, paper for the International Scientific Conference entitled MODERNISATION, CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND SHOWING OF DIFFERENCES, Nis 2012, 113-135.

⁸ The Archpriest Zoran Stamenkovic from the church St. Demetrius says that this is a message from God.

„This is the finger of God, God’s miracle, and miracles have happened throughout centuries, they are happening today and will continue to happen. God directly or indirectly warns us humans. We are witnesses that today the human race is in a great moral decline. All moral values, what is positive, nowadays if you are a good person, honest, if you are fair in the eyes of today’s world, they call you simple, retrograde, and if a person does stupid or illegal things then he/she is smart and modern, unfortunately. (Radio Free Europe – 9 April 2012 - Purified frescoes - a magnet for worshippers)

religion-related questions included a question on the position of the respondents on the current self-purification of frescoes in the church “St. Demetrius”

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ⁹

In the immediate creation of the concept regarding the research part of the changes that are occurring in the field of religion, in the 2012 public opinion project, the following research questions are emphasized:

1. How does it change or what is the trend of structuring believers by their personal religious identification? What is their practice by visiting a religious facility?
2. How does the relationship between religion and morality develop or modify? What is the confidence of respondents in religious leadership? What is the perception of respondents about how “ethical” religious leaders are? To what extent believers themselves respect the moral values taught by their religion?
3. What is the attitude of respondents to the “Miracle at St. Demetrius”?

Based on the established research interest I established a proper hypothetical framework:

1. It is assumed that after the conflict in 2001, according to the personal religious identification, the high rate of believers will gradually reduce. Religious practice will not adequately follow personal religious identification.
2. Religion will basically be a relatively weak foundation for development of morality, which can be seen by the respondents’ trust in religious leadership; perceived morality of the religious leaders, or to what extent believers respect the moral values taught by their religion.
3. It is assumed that the current “Miracle at St. Demetrius” will divide the public in the ones who are in favour and against it.

Generally speaking, religiosity in the Macedonian society was mainly researched through the confessional and personal religious identification, that is, through other key segments of religiosity, as visiting of a religious facility, practicing prayers and the like. Confidence was also partially researched within other projects, but empirical indicators of morality and religion represent a certain novelty. Issues of religion and morality are set in the five-degree Likert scale by measuring the intensity of agreement or disagreement with the given statements.

⁹ Issues of the survey sample and the data analysis are subject to a separate section.

THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE PAPER

Religion in European countries, as Dave says, is specific, reflecting the impact that the complex past has had thereon, and naturally the impact of the elements which it will acquire in the turn to the twenty-first century. What Europe and also the post-communist milieu, in which Macedonia belongs, is characterised by, is a high rate of specified nominal congregation, but a low rate of religious practice. Revitalisation of religion in Macedonian society, particularly clearly shaped the structuring of believers population in certain periods of very high rates of nominal believers, but of *traditionalism* in religious practice.

The basic theoretical framework of the area of religion is based on the concept of public religion. Deprivatisation of religion as a global trend suggests that “religion has abandoned its defined place in the private sphere and is transferred to the unidentified sphere of civil society, participating in the revitalised process of competition, interrupted legitimacy and marking of its boundaries again.”¹⁰ Public life of religion aspects active participation of religious groups, the level of state, political system and civil society. The state determines the legal frameworks of the life of “religion”. In the range of the political system “religious collectivities can fight for certain positions,” according to which they could affect the general political developments. Usually, the main determinant of the first two levels, indicates the basic defence and movement around the acquired privileges, while the third level is developed on the principle of social justice and defence of the human personality.¹¹

Based on the draft study, the issue about the role of religion in the sphere of morality can be partially problematised or tackled, specifically how religion affects the profiling of individual or public morality of citizens. In his paper Saving, Secularisation and Demoralisation Wilson places the focus on the phrase secularisation and demoralisation.¹² Referring to the empirical indicators of the religious map of Europe, Dave Grace claims that in European societies, religion has a relatively small role. Furthermore, Rodney Stark, as well, examines the role of religion in the creation of morality in contemporary society, through its violation through unacceptable patterns of social behaviour, indicating its relatively low impact. The Croatian sociologist Sinisa Zrnishchak goes even further, by asking the question: “If religion can not demonstrate its power to maintain the moral order in post-communist countries, does that mean that we are dealing with long-term

¹⁰ Casanova, J., Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago\ London, University of Chicago Press, 1994, page 65.

¹¹ Cacanaska, R., Public Religion, Proceedings dedicated to Vladimir Mitkov, Faculty of Law, Skopje, 2010.

¹² Wilson, B., Salvation, Secularisation and De-moralisation, The Blackwell Companion to SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION, Edited by Fen, K., R., Blackwell Publishing, 2001, page 39-51.

... effects of the communist order? Postcommunist revitalisation has no power to significantly change this effect? What is the purpose of religion in post-communist societies?"¹³

In this public opinion project, the relationship between religion and morality is analysed through the perception of citizens about the role that religious leaders have in creating the moral order in society, as carriers or exponents of the practical religious morality in society, and consequently their followers, as well.¹⁴ Therefore, it implies the great and important role of the clerical staff in the society which "is expected to reflect the moral standards, both in private, as well as public life ... because, if they "misrepresent" their flock may be disappointed."¹⁵ In four questions and in several intersections I will try, partially, in the domain of empirical data, to describe the impact of religion on the funding of moral life in the contemporary Macedonian society.

1. PERSONAL RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION

The initial idea of religiosity of the population in the Republic of Macedonia is obtained by the independent variable that is defined by the determination of their own religion. Usually the majority of respondents declare themselves as members of Orthodoxy or Islam, and by symbolic rates the belonging to the Catholic or other religious collectivities in the Republic of Macedonia is followed. Only 3.3% of respondents said that they do not belong to any religious collectivity. Confessional identification has an obvious symbolic and identity framework, which is due to the traditional religious life of the Macedonian population and, above all, the need to identify a **family** religious milestone.

Religious self-identification of respondents is a key segment of religiosity in general. In terms of their attitude to religion, 77% of respondents identified themselves as believers, while the modality something between believer and unbeliever was chosen by 18.4% or for unbeliever less than 5%. The rates of self-determination

¹³ Zrniscak, S., Why, at all, we need Religion? Religion and Morality in Post-Communist Europe, a paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, San Francisco, California, August 14, 2004, page 2.


¹⁴ Just as an illustration I would cite the answer to the question addressed to the President of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, Valentina Bozhinovska, that "the public often has the feeling that the religious leaders lose their basic function, and from religious leaders they turn into heads of ethnic communities . "Among other things, she states tha "religious leaders are not amnestied from the national individual feeling, but in the future they must not be in the role of politics and politicians ... " (Press 24 - Interview with Bozhinovska: 2012 was a year of test for the religious coexistence, 5 January, 2013 - accessed on 27 February 2013- <http://press24.mk/story/make-donija/intervju/intervju-so-bozhinovska-2012-beshe-godina-na-test-za-verskiot-sozhivot>)

¹⁵ Davie, G., Religija u suvremenoj Evropi - mutacija sjecanja, Golden marketing – Tehnicka knjiga, Zagreb, 2005, page. 9.

of the individual “attitude” toward religion are found as religious nominal rates, indicating the self-perception of citizens about their attitude towards religion.


The data for this type of question can be compared with corresponding ones from the previous studies, which are part of a research project conducted in ISPPi. The comparison shows that in the seventies in the Polog region there was a relatively high rate of believers¹⁶, which is increased by ten percent in the post-communist period. The transition process in the pre-conflict period (2001) has the lowest rate of believers in the researched period (65.13%). However, after the period of the conflict in 2001, the rate of believers grew extremely rapidly and peaked at 93.5%. In the last survey of 2012, that rate is reduced and stabilised at around 77%. Through the movement of the rates of personal religious identity, the profiling of religion in the Macedonian society can be largely sketched, while defining the pulse of the central event in the post-socialist period, the conflict of 2001.

Chart No 1: *Produced by the number of believers in different periods of research (1972, 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2012)*



¹⁶ It should be taken into consideration that this project only refers to Dolni Polog. Moreover, this is the first sociological research on religion in Macedonia.

Chart No 2: Produced by the number of believers in different periods of research (1972, 1996/2001, 1999/2000, 2006 u 2012).



When comparing rates of religious self-identification with the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Macedonia is among the highly religious countries, recording similar rates in countries such as: Moldova (77.1%), Poland (76.5%) and Croatia (76.5%), significantly separating itself from the neighbouring Serbia (68.2%) and Bulgaria (52.2%).¹⁷

Another important dimension, clearly visible from the data, is the process of overflow of the undecided in the believers structure in 2006 and later re-filling of the same category with 18%. In simpler terms, as the category believer grows, the modality of the undefined is reduced. Hence, in the research in 2006 it has the lowest rate of 3.4%, and the largest in the pre-conflict period, at the end of the first decade of the transition period 25.6%.

¹⁷ Ančić, B., Zrniščak, S., Religion in Central European Societies: Its Social Role and People's Expectations, Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe 5 (1): 21-38, page 38.

Chart No 3: Produced by the number of undecided respondents (something in between) in different periods of research (1972, 1996/2001, 1999/2000, 2006 and 2012).





Chart No 4: Produced by the rates of undecided respondents (something in between) in different periods of research (1972, 1996/2001, 1999/2000, 2006 and 2012).



What is striking in the intersection of data is that as the level of education from primary to higher grows, so does the rate of believers. 100% of those who have not completed primary education classified themselves as believers, while those with higher or university education have the lowest rate of believers (70.4%).

These data to some extent confirm the real effect of the atheist ideology or it is confirmed that the processes are changing slowly, and in the new social circumstances “the assumption to a certain extent continues to be valid,” as it is typical of modernism, that as the educational process develops, as science evolves, the rate of believers will gradually decrease. To a certain degree these data are in favour of this thesis, but the contemporary tendencies need to be more complexly explored. Indicative and noticeable is the approach of young professionals with higher education in religious collectivities, however, their effect should be further, perhaps, separately investigated.

The rates for personal religious identity also reflect regional characteristics, separating the region of Skopje as a region that has the lowest rate of religious identification (63.6%). Definitely higher is the rate of believers who support the party that is part of the government (83.1%), in contrast to the supporters of parties that are not part of the government, and the rate of whom reaches nearly 13%.

By analysing the results concerning the dimension of religiosity on the average frequency of visiting religious facilities, as an important indicator of the religiosity of the population, most impressive is the fact that most respondents go to religious facilities during major holidays (39.3%) and a little less go sometimes (36.3), while 12.6% of respondents do not remember going or do not go to religious facilities. Only 11.8% or 118 respondents said that they regularly attend religious facilities of their collectivities.

Table no. 1: *Data from the treated question “How often in average do you go to church / mosque / religious facility?” - Public opinion in Macedonia - 2012*

| | Age | | | | | Total |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|--------|
| | 18-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-65 | Above 65 | |
| 1 Yes, I go regularly | 11,1% | 13,4% | 8,9% | 14,9% | 10,2% | 11,8% |
| 2 Sometimes | 36,5% | 34,7% | 40,9% | 33,0% | 36,7% | 36,3% |
| 3 Only during major religious holidays | 39,7% | 42,1% | 39,9% | 37,2% | 36,7% | 39,3% |
| 4 I don't remember | 4,8% | 5,0% | 3,9% | 2,8% | 4,7% | 4,2% |
| 5 I don't go at all | 7,9% | 5,0% | 6,4% | 12,1% | 11,7% | 8,4% |
| TOTAL | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

As for this indicator, Macedonia is closest to Moldova (12.2% of believers go to church every Sunday)¹⁸ and “follows” European trends, noting relatively high rates of self-determination as believers, but with significantly lower rates of regular religious practice. Macedonian believers, according to this indicator of religiosity, could be described to believe, but not to belong¹⁹. The religious practice of the Macedonian congregation is associated with the central events celebrated in the life of every human being, and the celebration of major religious holidays.

It confirms our hypothesis that by the gradual distancing from the conflict in 2001, the rate of worshippers will reduce, according to the personal religious identification. The manoeuvring, according to the data, takes place through the modality of the undecided ones or those who define themselves between believer and unbeliever. The practice of believers population in Macedonia does not follow the footsteps of personal religious identification. Only 11.8% of respondents regularly attend religious facilities. The occasional or attending of religious facilities on the main religious holidays is dominant.

2. RELIGION AND MORALITY

The multidimensional relation of religion and morality was only tackled in a part of the short battery of questions about religion in this project. It is based on research on: trust of the respondents in religious leadership, the respondents’ perception of how “ethical” religious leaders are, as well as the critical attitude of the believers themselves to that how much they personally respect the moral values taught by their religion.

a) Trust in the religious leadership

A fragment that can offer principal bases for the citizens’ attitude towards spiritual leadership is the question of trust that citizens have in religious leaders, as a frontal part of the religious collectivity. According to empirical indicators, available from other surveys as well, citizens of Macedonia, in comparison with the other non-religious institutions, believe in religious communities the most.²⁰ But here we especially raise the question how much confidence respondents have, not generally to the religious collectivity, but only to the religious leadership. The answer which dominates the question of trust that respondents have in the religious

¹⁸ Ibid., page 38.

¹⁹ Davie, G.,Ibid, page 59-85.

²⁰ Cacanaska, R., Social Capital in the Macedonian Society, Yearbook of ISPPi, XXXIV, No. 1 – 2010, page 49-61.

leaders concentrates on the answer – I neither believe, nor disbelieve 35.8% , that is, more than a quarter of respondents have expressed very little trust in religious leaders. 23.2% of respondents do not trust religious leaders at all.

Table No. 2: *Crossing the question “How much do you believe religious leaders?” with the religious affiliation*

| Religious affiliation | | | | | | |
|--|----------|--------|----------|-------|---------------------------------|------|
| | Orthodox | Muslim | Catholic | Other | I do not belong to any religion | |
| 1. Very big trust | 58 | 71 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 135 |
| % | 9,4% | 22,5% | 29,4% | 6,3% | 0,0% | |
| 2. Very small trust | 197 | 58 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 275 |
| % | 31,9% | 18,4% | 35,3% | 31,3% | 27,3% | |
| 3. I neither believe, nor disbelieve them | 202 | 134 | 2 | 7 | 13 | 358 |
| % | 32,7% | 42,4% | 11,8% | 43,8% | 39,4% | |
| 4. I do not believe them at all | 161 | 53 | 4 | 3 | 11 | 232 |
| % | 26,1% | 16,8% | 23,5% | 18,8% | 33,3% | |
| TOTAL | 618 | 316 | 17 | 16 | 33 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 67,2804, df=12, p=,000000

The intersection of data showed a noticeable trend, according to which, as the level of education increases the “amount” of the trust that participants have in the religious leaders declines. The intersection of these two variables defined statistical significance. I would also mention that housewives and farmers have the greatest confidence in religious leaders. 43.9% of respondents who are employed in the public sector, claimed that they neither trust nor distrust the religious leaders.

Table No. 3: Crossing the question “How much do you believe religious leaders?” with education

| | Incomplete primary education | Primary education | Highschool education | Higher and university education | |
|--|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Very big trust | 9 | 36 | 68 | 22 | 135 |
| % | 33,3% | 27,1% | 12,6% | 7,3% | |
| % | 0,9% | 3,6% | 6,8% | 2,2% | 13,5% |
| 2. Very small trust | 5 | 29 | 146 | 95 | 275 |
| % | 18,5% | 21,8% | 27,1% | 31,6% | |
| % | 0,5% | 2,9% | 14,6% | 9,5% | 27,5% |
| 3. I neither believe, nor disbelieve them | 7 | 42 | 191 | 118 | 358 |
| % | 25,9% | 31,6% | 35,4% | 39,2% | |
| % | 0,7% | 4,2% | 19,1% | 11,8% | 35,8% |
| 4. I do not believe them at all | 6 | 26 | 134 | 66 | 232 |
| % | 22,2% | 19,6% | 24,9% | 21,9% | |
| % | 0,6% | 2,6% | 13,4% | 6,6% | 23,2% |
| Total | 27 | 133 | 539 | 301 | 1000 |
| | 2,70% | 13,30% | 53,90% | 30,10% | |

Pearson Chi-square: 43,0775, df=9, p=,000002

Statistical significance is obtained from the intersection of personal religious identification with confidence that respondents have in the religious leadership.

Table No. 4: Crossing the question “How much do you believe religious leaders?” with personal religious identification

| | Believer | Not a believer | Something in between | |
|--|----------|----------------|----------------------|------|
| 1. Very big trust | 130 | 1 | 4 | 135 |
| % | 16,88% | 2,17% | 2,17% | |
| 2. Very small trust | 222 | 7 | 46 | 275 |
| % | 28,83% | 15,22% | 25,00% | |
| 3. I neither believe, nor disbelieve them | 258 | 9 | 91 | 358 |
| % | 33,51% | 19,57% | 49,46% | |
| 4. I do not believe them at all | 160 | 29 | 43 | 232 |
| % | 20,78% | 63,04% | 23,37% | |
| TOTAL | 770 | 46 | 184 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 79,3483, df=6, p=,000000

It is indicative that most responses focus on the answer I neither believe, nor disbelieve, not only from the category of those that defined themselves as non-believers, but among believers, as well. Distrust that believers have is a clear signal, which can also be recognised in the specified paper of the deacon Grozdanovski.

b) Moral integrity of religious leaders

By the following question I tried to collect data on the position of the believers to the moral values of the religious management simply asking them to express the intensity of their agreement or disagreement with the statement that their religious leaders have the highest moral values promoted by their religion. The response rate of the “central position in the scale” dominates, according to which they neither agree nor disagree with the above statement. However, 26.2% of respondents disagreed with this statement, while only 10.7% agree that their leaders have the moral credibility. It is peculiar that 30.4% of the Orthodox respondents expressed “distrust” in the moral values of their religious leaders, while this rate among respondents of Muslim affiliation is 16.8%.

Table No. 5: *Crossing the question: “Would you say for yourself that you are: ...?” with the degree of agreement with the statement that: “My religious leaders have the highest moral values promoted by my religion?”*

| | I disagree | ... | ... | ... | I agree | |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|------|
| 1. Believer | 166 | 160 | 228 | 115 | 101 | 770 |
| % | 63,36% | 72,40% | 80,28% | 91,27% | 94,39% | |
| 2. Not a believer | 32 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 46 |
| % | 12,21% | 2,26% | 2,46% | 0,79% | 0,93% | |
| 3. Something in between | 64 | 56 | 49 | 10 | 5 | 184 |
| % | 24,43% | 25,34% | 17,25% | 7,94% | 4,67% | |
| TOTAL | 262 | 221 | 284 | 126 | 107 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 90,0381, df=8, p=,000000

Statistical significance is obtained by crossing of personal data of religious identification with the degree of agreement with the statement which directly relates to the practical conduct of religious leaders. More than notable is the critical attitude of the believers towards their leadership, which is expressed by their lowest rate of agreement with this claim. Or in general, from 1000 respondents only 107

stated that their religious leaders have the highest moral values promoted by their religion.²¹

c) Validity of moral norms

However, somewhat different are the answers to the question of the respondents' perception of the importance of moral values taught by religion. Half of the respondents agreed that (theoretically) moral values taught by religion are very important.

Table No. 6: Crossing the question of personal religious identification with the degree of agreement with the statement that: "For me, moral values taught by religion are very important?"

| | I disagree | ... | ... | ... | I agree | |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|------|
| 1. Believer | 33 | 26 | 108 | 162 | 441 | 770 |
| % | 54,10% | 52,00% | 62,07% | 75,00% | 88,38% | |
| 2. Not a believer | 14 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 46 |
| % | 22,95% | 12,00% | 5,17% | 2,78% | 2,20% | |
| 3. Something in between | 14 | 18 | 57 | 48 | 47 | 184 |
| % | 22,95% | 36,00% | 32,76% | 22,22% | 9,42% | |
| TOTAL | 61 | 50 | 174 | 216 | 499 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 132,459, df=8, p=0,00000

There is statistical significance in this crossing of the questions, emphasising the importance that religion generally has on providing foundation to the morality in the society. I primarily interpret these answers as theoretical elaboration. Moreover, 71.2% of Albanian respondents believe that moral values that Islam teaches are very important, while only 40.9% of members of the Orthodox religion believe that moral values of their religion are important to them. The highest rate of respondents indicating the importance of moral values is found in the Polog region, and it is the

²¹ Usually, in the opinion surveys, interviews or focus groups, people who declare themselves unbelievers, yet often have their own opinion or considerations on the faith/religion of their family or close ones, and otherwise consider it to be their benchmark. In the project "De-secularisation of Macedonian society", in the interviews with a dozen respondents who identified themselves as unbelievers, the reference to their religion of origin is notable, which they often called my religion, although they actually declare themselves unbelievers.

lowest in the Southeast region. For housewives and students moral values taught by religion remain very important.

d) The actions of the believers ...

In the last claim of the religion fragment I has asked respondents to express their intensity of agreement or disagreement with the statement, if believers do not act as their religion teaches them. The critical review of the respondents may be perceived by the highest rate of responses (28.2%) which is with “middle intensity,” according to which the respondents neither agree nor disagree with the statement offered. However, slightly lower is the rate of respondents who agree that believers do not act according to what their religion teaches them. The crossing of these two variables has a statistical significance.

Table No. 7: *Crossing the question of personal religious identification with the degree of agreement with the statement: “I think that believers do not act as their religion teaches them?”*

| | I disagree | ... | ... | ... | I agree | |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|------|
| 1. Believer | 87 | 79 | 221 | 173 | 210 | 770 |
| % | 79,82% | 81,44% | 78,37% | 73,31% | 76,09% | |
| 2. Not a believer | 7 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 22 | 46 |
| % | 6,42% | 1,03% | 4,61% | 1,27% | 7,97% | |
| 3. Something in between | 15 | 17 | 48 | 60 | 44 | 184 |
| % | 13,76% | 17,53% | 17,02% | 25,42% | 15,94% | |
| TOTAL | 109 | 97 | 282 | 236 | 276 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 25,6939, df=8, p=,001186

There is a greater rate of Albanians (31.9%) that express this attitude regarding their religion, whereas that rate is slightly lower in Orthodox respondents (27.0%). Education is an important indicator of the intensity of the agreement or the disagreement with this view, which is statistically significant.

Table No. 8: *Crossing the statement “I think that believers do not act as their religion teaches them “ with education*

| | Education | | | | Total |
|----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------|
| | Incomplete primary education | Primary education | Highschool education | Higher and university education | |
| 1. I disagree | 25,9% | 17,3% | 11,7% | 5,3% | 10,9% |
| 2.... | 11,1% | 16,5% | 9,1% | 7,6% | 9,7% |
| 3.... | 40,7% | 30,1% | 27,8% | 26,9% | 28,2% |
| 4.... | 11,1% | 23,3% | 24,3% | 23,6% | 23,6% |
| 5. I agree | 11,1% | 12,8% | 27,1% | 36,5% | 27,6% |
| Total | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Pearson Chi-square: 53,2891, df=12, p=,000000

Based on the presented data, it may be indicated that respondents are aware of the importance of religion for morality, but in the sphere of the practical understanding of the proclaimed and respected moral norms there is a deviation. Therefore, it can be indicated that religion is not an important source of moral values. This connection is more theoretical than real.

3.The miracle in “St. Demetrius”

Among other things, the deviation from moral standards, in 2012, indirectly marked the miracle with the self-purification of the frescoes in the church “St. Demetrius” in Skopje. In the battery of questions about religion, I asked respondents to state their position regarding the self-purification of the frescoes in the Skopje church “St. Demetrius”, in terms of which 56.6% of respondents simply do not have any particular opinion. The current event, followed by debates and controversy in the media and the general public, was not enough, for more than half of respondents to have their own opinion. 23.1% of them expressed their scepticism indicating that it is a creation made by a human hand, and the smallest percentage of respondents, only 20.3% believe that it is God’s creation.

Table No. 8: *Crossing of personal religious identification with the question of what you think is the self-purification of the frescoes in the church “St. Demetrius”?*

| | Creation of God | Creation made by a human hand | I don't have any particular opinion | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Believer | 179 | 160 | 431 | 770 |
| % | 88,18% | 69,26% | 76,15% | |
| 2. Not a believer | 3 | 27 | 16 | 46 |
| % | 1,48% | 11,69% | 2,83% | |
| 3. Something inbetween | 21 | 44 | 119 | 184 |
| % | 10,34% | 19,05% | 21,02% | |
| TOTAL | 203 | 231 | 566 | 1000 |

Pearson Chi-square: 47,8744, df=4, p=,000000

The statistical significance is expected, according to which, 27.8% percent of Macedonian respondents were in favour of the fact that it is God's creation, and only 2.8% of the Albanian respondents believed that it is a miracle of God.

Table No. 7: *Crossing the question: “regarding the recent event connected with the self-purification of the frescoes in the church “St. Demetrius” you think that it is ...” with ethnicity*

| | Ethnicity | | | | Total |
|--|-----------|----------|---------|---------------------------------------|--------|
| | Macedonia | Albanian | Turkish | Something else (Serbian, Roma, Vlach) | |
| Creation of God | 27,2% | 2,8% | 7,7% | 26,0% | 20,3% |
| Creation made by a human hand | 18,3% | 36,7% | 12,8% | 24,7% | 23,1% |
| I don't have any particular opinion | 54,5% | 60,5% | 79,5% | 49,3% | 56,6% |
| Total | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Pearson Chi-square: 90,0775, df=6, p=,000000

The current event, which received strong media support, divided the believers' tissue, or the general public, into groups in favour and against the event. However, although this event at times in the media obtained its "explanation" and "therefore" regarding the moral decline in society, yet great part of the public remained reserved thereto, noting that they do not have their opinion. The hypothesis was partially confirmed, by the empirical indicators of this phenomenon.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Religion is a dynamic category, on which social conditions have a great influence. However, the change in the social circumstances contributes for some elements of religion to change, but the changes in certain trends progress very slowly.

The public role of religion suggests that religion goes from the private to the public sphere and that religious collectivities have an active part in the work of the public space and that it precisely affects the general profiling of religion. On the basis of the indicators obtained, the stabilising of the structure of believers may be pointed out, through the prism of the personal religious identity of 77%. The high rate of worshipers, according to their personal religious identification is not complemented with an appropriate degree of religious practice.

The relationship of religion and morality, that is, the influence of religion on morality in the society is relatively small, clearly sketching through the little trust that citizens have in spiritual leadership. The image is supplemented by data on the perception of citizens about their morality, and the evaluation to what extent they possess the highest moral values. Not less interesting is the perception of citizens regarding the actual behaviour of believers, or whether they act as their religion teaches them.

The division, or lack of opinion on the current occurrence in the church "St. Demetrius", indicates the creation of groups in favour and against the event, but also clearly profiles the shaping of the largest category of respondents who based on their views did not join any of the two groups.

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