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STATE CAPTURE AND POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Abstract

This paper reviews theory, research literature and data with respect to state capture phenomena in the Central, Eastern European democracies. Specific aspects of state capture in the Eastern European post-communist polities are described and analyzed based on data provided by international and European organizations and joint survey projects.

Key words: state capture, political clientelism, political corruption, post-communist polity, Eastern European democracy

Motto:

“As we approach the fourth decade of the Third Wave of global democratization, global democratic progress remains at something of an impasse. [...] Since 2005, the rest of the world has witnessed not a springtime of democracy but a democratic recession, in which levels of freedom have fallen for several consecutive years and democratic reversal has become more common”.

(*Preface*, by Larry Diamond, in:

Brun, D.A., Diamond, L. (2014) *Clientelism, Social Policy and the Quality of Democracy*, John Hopkins University Press)

THE ISSUE OF “STATE-CAPTURE” IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POST-COMMUNIST POLITIES

After the fall of the iron curtain at the end of the 1980s, the Eastern European former communist countries have enrolled in complex processes of transition to democracy. Later on, the countries which have joined EU and N.A.T.O. have further enrolled in processes of democratic consolidation. All of them have followed the same EU integration map and, in spite of similarities in the type of democracy and democratic institutional architecture, the quality of democracy differs from one Eastern European country to another.

Beyond history and political culture differences, there are characteristic aspects of these democracies which address their very democratic institutional architecture and functioning, quality of governance and quality of democracy. One such characteristic is political corruption.

In this paper we approach the state capture phenomena in Eastern Europe. The Eastern European polities are typically undergoing simultaneous processes of democracy-building and state-building. In this context, state capture phenomena become most interesting: the role these phenomena play in the Eastern European democracy-building and state-building has not been completely understood. We aim at extending the “state-business” approach to a “state-business-media” approach in which state capture is tempted (and, eventually, achieved) by combined actions of complex groups including state officials, high administrative officeholders, politicians, private business, and media actors at the national and transnational (regional) levels. To this aim we make extensive use of both perception-based indexes and real data reported by national and international institutions and organizations involved in the control and/or monitoring of democratic state-building in the eastern half of Europe.

ON THE RATIONALE, GOAL AND METHOD OF APPROACH

The Third Democratization Wave has often been evaluated by political analysts as proving early “reverse” tendencies. One possible source of failure is often identified in the particularities of the state capture phenomena in the Eastern European post-communist polities. We further investigate the state capture phenomena by extending its reach over the relationship between business, governance, legislative, judiciary system, press and democratic institutions. We aim at aggregating a cross-country comparative perspective on the Eastern European democracies of the “third wave” and explain the roots of a potential democracy failure in these states. State capture is a special type of systemic political corruption which has a

particularly negative impact on the Eastern European young democracies: these democracies are involved in complex simultaneous state-building and democracy-building processes. Characterized as weak democratic polities, they might provide the proper context for the emergence of political corruption phenomena which may weaken them even more, and eventually induce their failure.

The main goal of this research is to identify the so-called “grey areas” in the construction of the Eastern European polities, that is, the key structural, functioning and coordination pointers between the parts of a polity and between polities themselves in a particular geopolitical area.

In this paper we aim to develop a necessary preliminary research on the basic modeling elements: the type(s) of political phenomena which might best reveal the polity evolution dynamics, and the means to put in a quantifiable relationship the individual perceptions on the political phenomenon, on the one hand, and the real functioning of the polity, on the other hand. To this goal, we first need to achieve a description of the polity (macro level) in terms of its perceived functioning at the micro level. We make intensive use of various perception indexes on corruption, democracy quality, support for democracy, democratic institutions, governance, and the media as these indexes have been defined and constructed by various international organizations. We expect to identify the indicators which could describe, either directly or indirectly, how the parts of a polity are designed in the Eastern European young democracies, and how do they interact and coordinate with each other. One research question approached in this paper is therefore which indicators could be used in order to achieve a (partial or global) perspective over the dimensions of the state capture impact on the (sectorial or global) functioning of an Eastern European polity. Another research question addresses the issue of whether a lack of-, or a bad coordination between the parts of a polity might result in the emergence of polity failure.

From a political economy perspective, both the theoretical and the empirical research addressing the state capture issue combine so far two fundamental dimensions: democratic governance and its relationship to the firms and business area. In this paper we further develop the analysis of state capture phenomena by taking into consideration empirical evidence on the relationship between political leadership, governance, firms and business, and other democratic institutions: the parliamentary and the justice systems, and also the civil society and the media.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CULTURE ISSUES

Some authors identify the roots of the differences between the Eastern European democratic polities in the historical differences which impacted the formation

of nation-states in the Eastern Europe, in the political culture and regional sub-cultures of the east, central, northeastern or southeastern Europe, or in the different communist heritage of these societies. (Markowski, 2015; Klingemann et al., 2006).

State capture temptations in Eastern Europe have deep roots in the authoritarian past (Markowski, 2015; Bernhard, 1993). Civil society seems to get more aware of its own status, while collectivistic tendencies are characterized by Markowski as diminishing the quality of democratic understanding (2015).

Our approach takes into consideration the historical differences emphasized by the research literature and standard measurement projects between the democracies in the eastern half of Europe. The research literature and the measurement international and European projects are often based on typical groups of countries. In this paper we adopt this organization of countries in groups of comparative democratic performances and corruption evidence.

STATE CAPTURE: DEFINITIONAL AND MEASUREMENT APPROACHES

State capture is a systemic form of political corruption which distorts the functioning of a polity. It is considered as the strongest form of political corruption and the most dangerous for a democratic state.

As Robert Harris approaches its definition, political corruption is made possible by the political system itself: it “captures” its functioning and operations by making it working not for the public welfare, as it should, but for the private welfare and private interests.

Political corruption emerges and grows fast in the so-called “grey areas” shaped by the incompletely or wrongly specified relationships between the different functions of a government and the different components of a polity, flourishing when facilitated by the ambiguity in laws, lack of institutional coordination, and manipulation of governance, legislative and/or judiciary structures and functioning by private interests (Harris, 2003: pp. x). Though usually approached as associated to the private economic interests of firms and private business, political corruption covers a much wider area, which goes from fraud to state capture, from national to transnational issues (Heywood, 1994, 1997).

While scholars emphasize the relationship between the notion of state capture and the concepts of governance, democracy and institutions, international organizations define it in operational terms which allow measurement. Such definitions point explicitly to the capacity of the private firms and business to distort the functioning of the fundamental democratic institutions - governmental, legislative and juridical – in favor of their goals and benefits by providing gifts and direct or indirect payments

to the politicians or to the public officials holding key positions in such institutions. In these definitions, the European and international organizations emphasize the essential aspect of state capture in transitional democracies: its destructive power is associated with incomplete consolidation of democracy, low level of development of the civil society, and insecure property rights (PREM-World Bank, 2010).

State capture could play a major role in weakening a democratic state and finally induce a state failure. The Ukraine case provided a threatening example of political and private business leadership tempting to capture the state with the goal of extracting individual and group benefits. However, it was not the Ukraine case to introduce and define this type of political corruption, but it was actually the case which confirmed the analysis and predictions concerning the potential causes of democracy failure in transition countries in the Eastern Europe.

The World Bank approach has defined the “state capture” as the final result of the illegal actions of individuals and/or collective agents to provide private benefits to political officeholders or high governmental and/or public administrative officials in exchange of influencing and controlling law formation and/or policy design and implementation in their own favor. Using this definition, the “corruptor” and the “corruptee” are characterized as follows:

This type of “capture” phenomena addresses first and foremost the institutions which are fundamental for a state: executive, legislative, judiciary and any other type of regulatory institution which is designed to control state’s functioning.

The “corruptor” agent is defined as any individual and/or collective agents (interest groups, firms) interested in escaping control of regulatory institutions with the explicit scope of maximizing private and/or group interests against state’s interests and against the public good. Moreover, such individuals or groups actually “buy” policy making, laws, decrees and any other form of regulatory acts/processes by providing private benefits to the officeholders in charge with policy or law formation. The typical situation is usually associated or appears in close connection and/or in particular state-building, democracy-building or state development contexts characterized by weak control institutions and legislation, weak channels of political intermediation to governmental, presidential, and public administration institution, and weak or underdeveloped public structures which are supposed to provide support and protection to the societal interest at large (World Bank, 2000: pp. xv-xvi).

The typical situation for the Eastern European post-communist countries appeared as soon as they have involved in complex transition-to-democracy processes at the beginning of the 1990s and continued later as well. At that time, as the World Bank observers noted (World Bank, 2000: p. vii), the economic and political context in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in the North-Eastern Europe or in the

Central Asia covered simultaneous processes of political (democratic) institutions and market economy emergence and development, and processes of privatization which have provided for the emergence and growth of corruption phenomena. This context has stimulated the international organizations, like World Bank, and European structures, like the European Union and its associated institutions, to enact and develop corruption studies and anticorruption strategies aimed at eradicating these phenomena and assist the democracy-building and state-building processes in these regions. State capture has been systematically investigated by the World Bank which transformed it into an institutional priority due to its potentially fundamental impact on the quality of democracy in Eastern European transition and developing countries, and also due to its potentially particularly dangerous role in state failure.

The first systematic survey research on this issue (BEEPS) has been initiated by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which have jointly initiated and developed starting with the 1990s the first project on finding empirical evidence on state capture type of corruption, defining the state capture phenomena, and provide the solution for avoiding and/or eliminating it.

By the end of 1990s when the first stages of the transition-to-democracy processes in the Eastern European countries have provided consistent data collections and stimulated the survey research, the World Bank has initiated a project concerned with the measurement of particular actions by business actors which have been considered as directed to state capture goals: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).

Definitions based on abuse and illegal use of office able to distort democratic state functioning

In BEEPS, state capture may be identified by examining a number of indicators revealed by survey research. There is a class of illegal activities which have been identified and included in the definition of state capture (World Bank, 2000; p.vii): exchange of Parliamentary votes and/or presidential decrees for private benefits and interests; exchange of courts decisions for private benefits/interests; abuse and/or misuse of central bank funds; illegal funding of political parties, illegal funding of electoral campaigns by private actors (i.e., persons, business companies, small firms).

In the BEEPS project, state capture has been investigated by means of the unofficial payments required/received by the state officials and politicians from the private business companies/firms in exchange of modifications to governmental regulations, court decrees and legislative outcomes (i.e., laws). Such unofficial payments appear as the corruption level perceived by the firms from their experience

of interaction with key economic, political and juridical officeholders.

Modeling the state capture phenomena, the BEEPS approach has been initially based on the state-business relationship investigation and on economic principles and indicators. Firms' perceptions on Governance are confronted with perceptions over corruption and/or difficulties in doing business. The survey research investigates several state capture activities, like: "*problems doing business*", with a special focus on the "*unofficial payments in sectors*", and in particular on the unofficial payments aimed "*to influence the content of new legislation, rules, decrees, etc.*" **In Table 1** such data are extracted from the BEEPS database for several countries from each grouping specified in our approach. The data in **Table 1** are but a brief example of how this research defines and employs (composite) indexes of firms' perceptions on the political corruption situations which they have encountered.

Table1. *State capture activities describing state-firms relationship and composite indexes of corruption.*

country	2002-2005		2013	
	problems doing business (corruption, functioning of the judiciary, macroeconomic instability, uncertainty about regulatory policies)*	unofficial payments and corruption/unofficial payments in sectors: to influence the content of new legislation, rules, decrees, etc.	Graft Index	Bribe Tax Index**
Central Europe				
Czech Republic ¹	25%-75%	<5%	3%-4% (2009) 4%-5%(2013)	approx 30%(2009) 10%-12%(2013)
Hungary ²	0%-75%	<5%	6%-7%	50%-60%
Poland ³	25%-100%	5%-10%	<2%	15%-20%
Slovenia ⁴	0%-50%	2%-3%	<1%	30%-35%
Western Balkans				
Albania ⁵	50%-75%		<10%	< 35%
Macedonia ⁶	25%-75%	5%-10% (2002);<5% (2005)	8%-10%	< 5%
Croatia ⁷	25%-75%	5% (2002); <5% (2005)	4%-6%	approx. 15%

Eastern Europe				
Bulgaria ⁸	25%-100%	5%-10%	approx. 14%	approx. 5%
Romania ⁹	25%-100%	<5% (2002); 5%-10% (2005)	8%(2009) 6%(2013)	30%-40%(2009) 5%-10%(2013)
ex-USSR countries				
Ukraine ¹⁰	25%-100%	5%-10% (2002); <5% (2005)	15%-20% (2008) 40%-50%(2013)	40%-50%(2008) approx. 100% (2013)

Sources: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), (World Bank, IFC, Enterprise Survey)

*The figures in **Table 1** show the largest interval simultaneously covering the values for all four selected indicators;

For the Bribe Tax Index, **Table 1 has selected only the set of indicators which identify "the extent to which specific regulatory and administrative officials require bribe payments in order to secure a government contract" (BEEPS-at-a-Glance).

A major advantage of this approach relies in the way in which state capture phenomena are measured by means of the firms' perceptions and direct experience: instead of employing the number of firms engaged in these activities, the approach quantifies the share of firms which are directly affected by the outcomes and/or the impact of these activities (World Bank, 2000; p.vii). On this basis, the approach constructs several aggregate indexes (BEEPS) and composite indexes (Enterprise Survey) which measure the impact of state capture phenomena across several transition countries (2002-2005) and consolidating democracies (2008-2013) in the eastern half of Europe (see **Table 1**). One major disadvantage is that it considers exclusively the relationship between state and firms and the economic background of this relationship. Moreover, this model takes into consideration the illegal activities which fall under the incidence of state capture phenomena leaving apart other types of relationships between the state, government, Parliament and juridical system of a democratic regime which might become the target and the vector of state capture phenomena.

Definitions based on legal use of office aimed at distorting state functioning

Initial approach has targeted illegal actions and illicit benefits. Further theoretical and empirical studies developed in scholarly approaches on state capture have advanced the definition of state capture so as to include a broader class of political corruption phenomena based on resource extraction from the state / officeholders to private benefits of individuals and groups/firms, and eventually redistribution in exchange of votes, influence and control over law and policy makers and over the fundamental state institutions. This class of political corruption phenomena includes several forms and combinations of corruption phenomena based on rent extraction, resource redistribution and competition: (i) political clientelism, (ii) institutions and resource predation, (iii) fusion, (iv) exploitation of resources, institutions and people, and (v) formation of specific state institutions and capacities aimed at making state capture procedures operational and effective (Grzymala-Busse, 2008).

Moreover, later approaches have introduced a new class of state capture activities which have a legal character notwithstanding their negative effects on the public good. In this respect, Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro Vicente introduced the notion of legal corruption (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005). Their definition of corruption covers a more general perspective over this class of phenomena by including both illegal and legal actions. The authors replace the classical perspectives over corruption as “abuse of public office for private gain” and as “influence of the public policy in exchange for votes” (Stokes 2009, 2011; Bardan, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978) with the idea of “appropriation of public office/policy for private purposes” (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005: p.2) which covers the state capture phenomena as well (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005: p.3).

Based on their definition, they develop a political economy model of political corruption which is able to explain the state capture phenomena as a consequence of the relationship between politician and private sector actor(s) which is exploited by both parts for their personal benefit. This relationship consists in the two parties exchanging favors which may include procurement / acquisition contracts, formation of law, allocation of legislation, electoral campaign funding, an explicit change of power from one elite actor to another following previously established (hidden/unofficial/private) agreements, etc. Basically employing an allocation mechanism as a means to explain the various processes of “capture”, the model succeeds to explain the state capture by the legal corruption as the mutual agreement between some of the economy actors to the disadvantage of the population (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005: p.4).

In our comparative analysis of this type of state capture phenomena in the Eastern European countries we have included political clientelism approaches.


STATE CAPTURE MODELING


Governance-Based Models

In the World Bank measurement model, governance is modeled as a set of rules, mechanisms and institutions which provide for the exercise of authority in a country. Governance is achieved from the convergence of the appointing, controlling and replacing processes, the policy making capacity, and the institutional resources and norms. The model associates them with six standard variables in the survey research. Government formation and control processes are described by two variables, that is, (a) voice and accountability, and (b) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. Government's policy making capacity is described by other two variables, namely (c) government effectiveness, and (d) regulatory quality. The rules with regard to the interaction between the citizens and the state, and between the citizen and the government are described by two more variables: (e) rule of law, and (f) control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010; pp.4-5).

Our approach aims at an extended modeling approach on the state capture which could include both legal and illegal forms of corruption. Moreover, we try to extend the state-capture-by-business model by further investigating other relevant relationships beside the classic state-business one. We further extend some conceptual relationships described by various authors in the state capture and political influence research literature.


Figure 1 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e). Political Stability (WGI, World Bank).WGI (WB): Governance Indicators in Central, Northern, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and in former USSR states.







(1c)

One possible extension is to associate the relevant variables in the governance-based modeling of state capture (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman, 2000) so as to emphasize the context(s) which might facilitate, stimulate or actually produce state capture phenomena. To this aim we have identified the political instability data in the World Bank governance-based model and have associated it with the variables of governance and rule of law. The data provide support to the association between state capture and political instability induced by low quality of governance and weak rule of law for the countries in the eastern half of Europe (see **Figure 1 a, b, c, de and e,**).





Source: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/BEEPS>.

One such context is the political instability induced by activities which could be classified as state capture intended. In order to associate a facilitating context with the state capture situation, we have investigated its potential relationships to vote buying (in Parliament) and policy buying (in Government) by mixed interests groups consisting of politicians, business actors, juridical actors and media partners in situations in which all actors involved (or, at least, some of them) hold key positions in the Parliament, Government, administrative, judiciary and control institutions. As a matter of fact, this is a classical scenario of state capture by state officeholders with the particular aspect of the joint actions between state officeholders/ state high officials and political leadership, business, and media actors. It is associated to contexts in which political instability is facilitated by (low quality of) governance and by the specific dynamics of rule of law.

Though this type of situation is often approached in a transnational (geopolitical) perspective, the data provides support to the idea that indicators of state capture


could be defined and constructed from the association of variables describing the dynamics of the coordination between parts of a transitional polity.

Institution-Based Models

Political clientelism is one of the possible ways in which state capture may occur and operate. While there is not a general consensus with regard to its definition, different authors have emphasized some aspects which are relevant: dyadic relations, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration (Hicken, 2011). Other authors construct a quantifiable relationship between political clientelism and the ways in which institutions in a democratic regime are affected by its impact (Volintiru, 2012a, 2012b).


Our approach models the facilitating context for state capture phenomena by selecting the indicators which describe the institutional architecture, its quality and flexibility as well as its performance in terms of democratic function. We have selected a number of 8 variables from the IPD database (Institutional Profiles Database, 2012): A100 = Functioning of political institutions; A104 = Freedom of information; A107 = Legitimacy of the political authorities; A203 = Internal conflicts; A302 = Level of corruption; A311 = Capacity for state reform; A505 = Priority of the elite in relation to development and growth; A506v = Political authorities' decision-making autonomy. These variables are taken into consideration as describing structural elements of contextual facilitation of state capture phenomena. Their values are congruent with the situations of political instability and weak rule of law in the young democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe and prove that they act as quality of democracy conditionals in these countries.

Figure 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e). *The values of the selected (eight) IPD variables for the countries in the eastern half of Europe (2012).*



(2b)


**Eastern Europe
IPD2012**



(2c)


The values of these variables and their dynamical relationship have provided for a quantitative comparative analysis in the countries of the eastern half of Europe as reported by IPD 2012 (see **Figure 2 a, b, c, d** and **e**).

**Central Europe
IPD2012**



(2d)


**Baltic States
IPD2012**



(2e)

ex-Soviet States

IPD2012



Source: *Institutional Profiles Database 2012*



State Capture and the Judiciary System

As a difference from the indexes based on perceptions of corruption, data available in Romania on the individual cases of political corruption provides for a different perspective on this phenomenon, though data is not sufficient as to draw general conclusions.

Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) has succeeded to prove independent from the political influence and political clientelism phenomena and report most relevant cases of political corruption starting with prime-ministers and members of the Romanian parliament. Many of these cases fall under the state capture specification and prove to have appeared as early as 2002-2005 when the judiciary system was rather weak and subjected itself to corruption attempts from both political and business leadership.

Romanian DNA data have been included in this paper as a feedback to the perception-based evaluations performed by the European and international measurement projects. For a transitional country, Romania was characterized in 2002-2005 by a warning level of state capture activities. This level has ever increased until 2009 (see **Table 1**). The judiciary cases reveal that the level identified in 2002-2005 by means of perception-based firms' experience reporting data was real, though much lower than it really proved to have been (see **Figure 3 a, b**). It is only nowadays that we realize that the reliability of this survey research is being confirmed after almost twenty years. This only means that the state capture data should be intensively employed in correlating actual processes with their context and initial conditions of 2002.

Figure 3 a, b. Romanian DNA reported data in judiciary cases from 2002-2013. DNA has lately completed the trials of judiciary cases of grand political corruption activities which often fall under the specification of state capture phenomena.



Source: Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA). Available at: <<http://www.pna.ro/faces/results.xhtml>>. Accessed: 6 January, 2016.

As reported by several judiciary institutions, the politicians and private business actors sentenced in Romania (after 2012 only) have been trialed and convicted for abuse in office, for buying Parliamentary votes concerning legislation and other decisions, bribing high officials in the judiciary systems for obtaining favoring courts decrees, and bribing high officials in the Government for private business groups benefits against the public good and societal interests¹¹. Looking at the data, one conclusion which can be nevertheless drawn is that in Romania, for example, the persons convicted in the current judiciary cases of grand corruption

have been active in the political realm as early as 2002-2005, the period of time for which BEEPS project has provided the first clues on state capture activities. This makes a relevant point for the critics of the perception-based indexes of corruption or democracy: the BEEPS indexes succeeded to reveal that the state capture activities have certain characteristics and are identifiable in various degrees in almost all transitional democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Political Clientelism and State Capture Temptations as Mirrored by the Eastern and Central European Media

Based on various measurement projects and data collections developed during the past years by international organizations, we further extend this class of activities so as to include other types of actions and actors, like (i) mass communication and media companies, press media (newspapers, radio, television), and internet media (socializing networks), as well as (ii) actions by foreign state actors in the realm of international relations. The corruption and state capture in the Yanukovich case in Ukraine (Katchanovski, 2015; Baldwin, 2015), and the latest political developments in Moldova show that this latter factor could be relevant in state capture phenomena (Katchanovski, 2006).

In several Eastern European countries, the danger of state capture is almost always associated with another type of phenomena which could be aggregated under the label of “media capture” by business and political leadership. State capture has been defined as a particular type of relationship between business and state officeholders which mutually exploit it in order to “capture” (i.e., to control it for personal benefit) law or policy formation, legislation, judiciary decrees and resource allocation. However, media proved to play a pivotal role: it has often been used in transitional countries of Eastern Europe for inducing resistance to democratic reforms (Hegedűs, 2006), and lower the trust in state, governance and social justice (Podumljak, 2014; Örnebring, 2012). The occult relationship between high officials and officeholders in private business, political leadership and judiciary system is often magnified by the capacity of the elites to use media in order to hide corruption from the population. Against this type of political clientelism an Eastern European media project has been initiated (Civil Response to Clientelism in Media) and is currently implemented in Croatia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro (see also [Expert Forum](#) and [Macedonian Institute for Media](#)).

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER MODELING RESEARCH WORK

We aim at further extending the definition of media capture by politicians and business.

While some polity models are aimed at explaining uprisings and insurgence (Cederman, 1997), they cannot explain the democratization phenomena. Following Tilly's theory about the mechanisms and processes explaining the revolution, our approach aims to identify a different design of a polity model.

The final result of this preliminary research is that the study of all these variables presented above might enhance a new look at the problem: a polity model could be designed by taking into account the structural, functional and complex dimensions of the consequences produced by political clientelism and its associated processes which diminish the quality of democracy in the studied countries.

Notes

(Endnotes)

¹ Czech Republic BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69243, Czech Republic (Enterprise Survey - Czech Republic Country Profile 2013)

² Hungary BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69266, Hungary (Enterprise Survey – Hungary Country Profile 2013)

³ Poland BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69288, Poland (Enterprise Survey – Poland Country Profile 2013)

⁴ Slovenia BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69336, Slovenia (Enterprise Survey – Slovenia Country Profile 2013)

⁵ Albania BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69212, Albania (Enterprise Survey – Albania Country Profile 2013)

⁶ Macedonia BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69285, Macedonia (Enterprise Survey – Macedonia Country Profile 2013)

⁷ Croatia BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69242, Croatia (Enterprise Survey-Croatia Country Profile 2013)

⁸ Bulgaria BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69241, Bulgaria (Enterprise Survey-Bulgaria Country Profile 2013)

⁹ Romania BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69323, Romania (Enterprise Survey-Romania Country Profile 2009, 2013)

¹⁰ Ukraine BEEPS-at-a-Glance 69343, Ukraine (Enterprise Survey-Ukraine Country Profile 2008, 2013)

¹¹ See full list of convicts on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_corruption_scandals_in_Romania. Accessed: January 6, 2016).

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