UNIVERSITY "Ss. CYRIL AND METHODIUS" in SKOPJE

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH

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# FOREWORD

Dear reader,

It is with great pleasure that I present to you the *Special Edition Annual of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research.*

The content of this edition consists of selected scientific papers presented at the international Conference *Challenges of Contemporary Society II* organized in 2017 by our Institute. Conference themes frame had been kept wide, including challenges for democracy and democratization, management business and workforce interrelations, contemporary social challenges, as well as media, public health and education trends. The outcome of this position is the variety of papers that you will be able to enjoy, like participation behavior in student organizing, gender gap in charitable giving in Bulgaria, changes in marital behavior in the case of Macedonia, emerging trends of semi-authoritarianism in Serbia and others.

I hope you will find this Annual Special Edition both informative and interesting and that it will give you a greater understanding of the themes which have been elaborated by our contributors. Ultimately, our goal is to attract readers who have interest on these areas and to further instigate regional academic exchange of thoughts and vigorous debate.

**Editor-in-chief**

**Natasha Gaber-Damjanovska, PhD**

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# LANDMINES AND REFUGEES: OUT OF THE FRYING PAN, INTO THE FIRE

**Abstract**

Since September 2015, when Hungary started to secure its borders with Serbia with militarized razor-wire fences and closing the routes for displaced people, refugees and migrants seeking refuge in European countries are having to find alternative routes to the hope. Their desperation has compelled thousands of them to take long journey through cornfields toward the mine suspected areas in the Serbian-Croatian border. Due to their lack of knowledge about the area and having limited contact with local communities makes them more vulnerable to landmines and unexploded ordinances. On the other hand, being outside of the protection of a state increases the vulnerability. According to the latest reports by Croatian Mine Action Center, "the current status of mine suspected areas in Croatia amounts to 444 km2" Mine suspected areas are contaminated with 43,361 mines and also large number of unexploded ordinances. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at the dangers displaced people face when fleeing through minefields. Surveys, reports and case studies conducted by agencies and international organizations involved in mine action and the protection of refugees, will be analyzed dealing with this tragic problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

**Keywords:** Refugees, Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance, Migration, Croatia

## OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES THAT REFUGEES FACE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS ROUTE

‘When the law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law’ says French Politician Frederic Bastiat. In this quote Bastiat did not just mention the moral and law, he also mentioned the nature of a war. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it was not just the rebellion against dictators, it was also struggle not to losing their moral sense and their respect for the natural rights. Some Reformists have partly succeeded some could not. But things never went which are expected by Modern Democracies that supported so-called revolutions. Conflicts were taking lives, destroyed families, and destroyed the law or in other words ruined respect for the law in the Middle East. This hopelessness brought almost 11 million homeless and 6 million refugees who are desiring to have better life and brighter future in Europe, the land of peace and prosperity. However those refugees brought Europe reactionary ideas. Now the pest of unnatural laws and immoral behaviors by former Middle Eastern Pharaohs are spreading through Western Balkans, Central Europe and finally all over the world like a deadly virus.

A news from the Guardian states that ‘After the closure of the Western Balkans route as a result of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, the number of people reaching Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route drastically decreased. The Central Mediterranean Route from North Africa to Italy has become the primary entry point to Europe.’ (The Guardian, 2017)

Although after the EU-Turkey Statement seems like changed the migration route, it might not be so. After the Agreement, the migration via Central Mediterranean Route has just gone underground and there are still suffers from harsh migrate policies by governments in Eastern Europe.

The Greek-Turkish borderline ‘River Meriç’ is still the most usual land route and Aegean Sea is still most usual sea route for refugees from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and even Turkey. The coast of River Meric might be the biggest black market and the most safe harbor for the human traffickers in the East Europe. The bottle water prices start from $5 to $15 and bread prices start from $2 to $5 which are more than 1000% expensive than Turkish market prices. By those exploitation, Syrian Refugees are still desiring to cross the river however they do not want to get beaten and robbed by Greek Border Police and exiled from Greece, but only 5% of them can successfully pass and head to the Republic of Macedonia via Gevgelija border. On the other hand, Due to the fact that people cannot leave, hundreds of refugees are continuing to arrive every day. Limited infrastructure and capacity of the facilities lead to horrible congestion and many unaccompanied children who are the most vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and trafficking are paying the heaviest price. According to latest report which was published by the UNICEF in May 2017, at least 300,000 unaccompanied and separated children crossing borders alone have been documented in 80 countries in the years 2015 and 2016.

It is impossible to mention all challenges refugees face here but only a few of them can leave Republic of Macedonia behind and head through the dangerous land mine zone in Croatia, or to the wall in Hungary.

## LANDMINES AND REFUGEES

The conflict in Syria has caused the largest refugee crisis of the beginning of 21th century. This crisis has brought the world's attention the frightening risks that refugees face. Landmine and unexploded ordnance are two of them. From the beginning of their long journey to peace, Syrian refugees encounter risks due to landmines or unexploded ordnance contamination in Syria and the minefields along Syria's border with Turkey that had been mined by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1950s. Almost at the end of their long journey to peace, the Europe, this insidious threat welcomes them at the Croatian border where about a million landmines were laid along, during the breakup of former Yugoslavia.

Many landmine and unexploded ordnance victims are, or have been, refugees in the Europe (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2015). The Council of Europe's former Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg has stated that "… in certain areas of Europe, migrants in search of asylum have stepped on mines. They do not see the warning signs when they are trying to cross these contaminated areas during the night" (Child Rights International Network, 2017). Here are two examples that corroborate this statement. In Greece, immigrants made up most of all civilian casualties. 104 Non-national had been killed and another 187 were injured in the border minefields, according to an official from Greek Army Land Minefield Clearance Battalion (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2013). According to national database of mine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 948 of 1,846 civilian landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties were returnees, refugees, or IDPs between 1992 and 2009 (Centar za uklanjanje mina u BiH (BHMAC), 2009: 11).

As we highlighted above, for many years, landmines and unexploded ordnance along the borders of some European countries have caused casualties among displaced people. Croatia's border has a potential to be one of those. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at the dangers displaced people face at the door of peace when fleeing to Europe through minefields.

## OVERVIEW OF DEMOGRAPHICS OF LANDMINE CASUALTIES

Landmine and unexploded ordnance are two of the most insidious threats to civilians. Peace agreements may be signed, hostile aggression may be ceased but landmines and unexploded ordnance are left behind as the one of the enduring heritages of war. Landmines are explosive devices that are triggered by mostly pressure or movement. They are designed as anti-personnel or anti-tank. Anti-personnel mines are designed to be activated by people and that are often aimed to injure them, while anti-tank mines are intended to defeat vehicles. Unexploded ordnance are explosive weapons that didn't explode when they were used in conflict. Both pose a serious and continuous threat to civilians until they are removed. These explosive devices can be found on roads, footpaths, forests, deserts, agricultural lands or in other places surrounding living areas where people are carrying out their daily routines. Because their locations are unknown, they are invisible and they can remain active long after conflict has ended (Gözübenli, 2016). Although it is easy and cheap to make a landmine because of its simple technology, clearing mines is dangerous, time-consuming and costly work. It costs as little as $3 to make a landmine (Keeley, 2003: 7). It costs $300-$1000 to remove one (Andersson at al., 1995: 718). Until 1999, for every 5,000 mines that are demined, one deminer have been killed and two have been injured. There were 1,675 casualties among deminers since 1999 (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2016a). (See: F-2).

In 84 countries, there are an estimated 110 million landmines still planted in the ground. More than 200,000 km2 of the world's surface is contaminated with landmines (Kasban at al., 2010). This area is larger than half of Germany. Despite the inadequate data of collection on landmines and unexploded ordnance incidents, a total of 102,970 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2016a: 44) have been recorded between 1999-2015 including 26,230 people killed (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2016a), according to the Landmine Monitor 2016, the latest annual monitoring report by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (hereinafter referred to as ICBL). This number does not include the thousands of casualties that go unreported when victims are killed or injured in remote areas, where communication options are limited.

In 1999, there were averages of more than 24 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties daily. According to the latest monitoring report, there were averages of 17 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties occurring each day in 2015. Latest statistics shows a sharp increase of 75% from casualties recorded for 2014 (See: F-1). The reason of this sharp increase can be explained by armed conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.




**Figure 1:** *Number of mine/UXO casualties per year (1999–2015) Note. International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), (2016), Landmine Monitor 2016. (2016a: 44)*

Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% per year. Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known (Gözübenli, 2016: 3). Since 1999, civilians have accounted on average for 76.3% of all casualties (See: F-2).




**Figure 2:** *Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by civilian/military status recorded (1999–2015)*

11,774 child casualties of a total of 27,990 civilian was recorded (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2016b) since 2005, when systematically collect collecting of age-disaggregated landmines and unexploded ordnance casualty data in began.




**Figure 3:** *Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by age (1999–2015)*

INSIDIOUS DANGER AT THE DOOR OF EUROPE

**Overview of Mine situation in the Republic of Croatia**

According to the latest reports by Croatian Mine Action Center, "the current status of mine suspected areas in Croatia amounts to 444 km2" Mine suspected areas are contaminated with 43,361 mines and also large number of unexploded ordinances left over from the war in former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 (Croatian Mine Action Centre: CROMAC, 2017). A total of 1,980 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties, including 512 killed, 31 unknown and 1437 injured, have been recorded in the country since 1999. There are no reliable estimates for the total number of people killed by landmines in Croatia. It's estimated that more than 300 civilian have been killed by landmines since the 1991-1995 war in former Yugoslavia has ended.


**Figure 4:** *Movement of refugees and migrants through the Balkans. Note. Reprinted from ACAPS (2015), Briefing Note – Balkans: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Transit, 6 November 2015.*




**Figure 5:** *Minefields at Croatian-Serbian border Note. Reprinted from Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia, retrieved from website welcome.cms.hr*

## HAZARDS REFUGEES FACE AFTER HUNGARIAN BORDER BARRIER

As stated in the United Nations Mine Action Project Portfolio "*During four years of armed conflict in Croatia, mines were laid by all the warring parties, mainly to protect defensive positions, which changed frequently, but also in areas of strategic importance, such as railway lines, power stations and pipelines*," (United Nations Mine Action Project, 2017) landmine locations are well marked and are known to the local population. But "*the majority of suspected mined areas are woods and forests followed by agricultural land, underbrush, meadows and pastures.*" (United Nations Mine Action Project, 2017)

After Hungary built a border barrier along its Serbian border, refugees dreaming to reach their target have found a new route to the European countries (See: F-4). Their desperation has compelled thousands of them to take long journey through cornfields toward the mine suspected areas in the Serbian-Croatian border. Just two days after the completion of Hungarian border barrier, on 16 September 2015, Croatia became one of the main transit countries for refugees with about 12,000 entries per day (European Economic and Social Committee, 2016).

A map by the Croatian Mine Action Centre shows a heavily contaminated stretch of eastern Croatia, near Serbia which is the only way for refugees and migrants trying to reach Western Europe (See: F-5). The entire mine suspected area on the territory of the country is marked with 14,018 mine warning signs. This corresponds to one-third of the number of landmines contaminated in the country.

When they flee their own countries due to desperate conditions of conflict, war and poverty, refugees no longer have the protection of their own state. They often lack official recognition as refugees, citizenship status; and adequate documentation to regularize their status. So refugee mine victims are caught this insidious danger outside the protection of the state. On the other hand, lack of knowledge of the area and having little or no contact with more informed local communities make refugees and migrants more vulnerable to landmines and unexploded ordnance.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance incidents effect not only direct victims, but also their families and immediate vicinity struggling under psychological and socio-economic problems. Refugees who are survivors or other persons with disabilities face rising risks due to a lack of essential items, accessibility to necessary health and rehabilitative services as well as due to other forms of neglect and discrimination. Men and boys are the largest groups of landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties. For example in 2015, There were 546 females recorded as casualties in 2015 where 2,435 casualties the sex was not known.. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2016a). (See: F-6). Considering that most refugees come from patriarchal societies, male landmines and unexploded ordnance victims make their family more vulnerable. On the other hand female victims can be the most disadvantaged group and suffer different forms of discrimination as survivor. Child survivors also have more specific needs in all aspects of assistance, particularly psycho-social support and special education. Challenges from displacement multiple additional barriers to their full and equal participation..




**Figure 6:** *Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by sex (2015). Note. Only the casualties for which the sex was known*

## INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this year, the UNHCR announced that 65.3 million people around the world became.refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs around the world. Day by day, the need of ensuring safety of displaced persons from the risks of landmines and unexploded ordnance heightens.

While the lack of necessary protection during their journey on the EU migration routes remains undetected, the measures taken by the EU countries to prevent further movement to their preferred destination increase their vulnerability to become a victim of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

The lack of official recognition as refugees, conflict victims and landmine or cluster munition victims; citizenship status; and adequate documentation to regularize their status presents both immediate and longer term challenges to receiving needed assistance. It's clear that victims and other displaced persons with disabilities often face insufficient and unequal access to shelter, education, specialized healthcare and rehabilitation within refugee camps. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, also known as Ottawa Treaty, are responsible for ensuring adequate assistance for landmines and unexploded ordnance victims on their territory, no matter their citizenship status. As of June 2015, all the member states of the European Union became bound by Ottawa Treaty. EU and the country at the door of the EU should increase the accessibility of assistance to victims.

Due to their lack of knowledge of the arrival area and having limited contact with more informed locals, refugees and migrants need to access scarce local resources. In this context, in the Republic of Croatia some initiatives were established by local citizens. For example, Facebook page entitled "Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia" that campaigns to provide useful information have been warning them of the dangers of landmines in English, Croatian, Arabic and Dari languages. States should take lessons from this example and should clearly express their commitment and mobilize national and international resources to overcome such barriers for refugees and asylum seekers.

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**Other Resources**

Child Rights International Network http://www.crin.org/en/home/what-we-do/crinmail/crinmail-1185

Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) MIS Portal https://misportal.hcr.hr/HCRweb/faces/intro/introduction.jspx

Croatian Mine Action Centre: CROMAC (2017) Mine Situation, https://www.hcr.hr/en/minSituac.asp

Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia and website welcome.cms.hr

The Guardian, (2017) Migrant sea route to Italy is world's most lethal, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/migrant-death-toll-rises-after-clampdown-on-east-european-borders

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# CONTEMPORARY CHANGES OF MARITAL BEHAVIOR

## A CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

**Abstract**

The numerous social, economic, political, cultural and other changes in all spheres of human life have greatly stimulated the demogeographic changes that the majority of the population in the world faces today. These demogeographic changes are expressed through the changes

in fertility and fertility rates, extended life expectancy, new understanding of marriage and family, reduced number of so-called “universal marriages”, new types of illegitimate communities, delayed marriage, celibacy, an increased number of divorces, children born outside marriage, etc. Therefore, the marital status of the population as one of the basic demographic indicators, with all its characteristics and specificities, is very challenging to study, because it largely reflects on some segments of the demographic development of the country. Marriage as an institution is still associated with the creation of the family as one of the most important sociological forms and pillars of society. This paper elaborates the trend of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia, the crude marriage rate, the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15 and the general marriage rate. Marriages are processed according to certain characteristics of the bride and groom and also, an analysis of the regional differences is made.
The analysis of the contemporary demographic conditions is very important for policy makers, social scientists, demogeographers, and anyone seeking to understand society, family and marital behavior in order to predict the future trends.

**Keywords**: number of marriages, marriage rate, Republic of Macedonia.

## INTRODUCTION

The union of a man and a woman, recognized by the society or ceremony is as old as the human civilization itself and marriage of any kind is seen in all the human societies (Rasool 2016). Marriage is most often defined as state of living together of two persons of the opposite sex, as husband and wife in an agreed relationship, regulated by law or custom (Kjurciev et al., 2011). In fact, marriage represents the social framework of reproduction (Devedžić 2004).

The right to marriage is one of the basic human rights and according to the legislation in the Republic of Macedonia, it can be concluded between the citizens of our country, but also between our citizens and foreigners (Madjevikj 2009). According Marriage Law, the lowest limit for marriage is determined by adulthood, with the age of 18 years (there are cases of marriage under the age of 18 while the upper age limit for marriage is not determined). The age of 18 years is the minimum legal age for marriage without parents' approval and 16 years with parents' approval in the Republic of Macedonia, both for men and women (Miladinov 2015).

Marriage has its social and individual significance. The social significance refers to the perception of marriage as an institution, i.e. a social structure that ensures the maintenance of cultural needs; it is a system of obligations, rights and privileges of roles that are legalized by a civil contract that can be terminated if both sides agree. Individual significance is reflected in the intimate connection and commitment to the sustainability of a relationship with the loved one (Pernar 2010).

Marriage and divorce behaviors are of interest to both demographers and the general public as they shed light on family formation, family composition and fertility (Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics 2015), but over time, the marriage has evolved and has taken different forms. In this regard, people today marry less than before, and when they decide to do so, then it happens later in life.

However, we must mention the influence of the increasing number of illegitimate communities (cohabitation). The practice of living together without a legal marriage is widespread and is on the increase worldwide. In some areas, it is a well-established practice; in other areas, it is fairly new (Faust K 2004). In fact, cohabitation before marriage is considered as a substitute for marriage (Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004) and with the rise of cohabitation, the marriage rates decline (Devedžić 2004). These kinds of communities in the Republic of Macedonia are particularly frequent in the last ten years, but no state institution keeps any records.

However, apart from new thoughts about life and new types of informal communities, in most countries, even in the most developed, the expectations of marriage as a lifetime commitment in their own marriages remain strong (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; Byrt 2009). The research on population marriage trends, followed by the analysis in the composition of the population by marital status are of great importance because within marriage occurs the majority of the population reproduction (Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004).

## METHODS OF WORK AND DATA SOURCES

The available census data, as well as the data from the vital statistics, enable analysis of the population structures and processes (Madjevikj 2005). Observed through the published statistical data by the official statistics, which refer to the Population Natural Change in the Republic of Macedonia, among the other data on the vital events and processes (number of births, deaths, number of divorces), also can be find data on the number of marriages, the number of marriages by the age of the spouses, marriages according to the marriage order, marriages according to the previous marital status of the groom and the bride, as well as the number of marriages according to certain characteristics of the spouses as ethnicity and educational attainment. By examining the marital status in relation to other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, race, ethnicity, income, and education, understanding marital status as a demographic characteristic can be advanced.

A much clearer picture of the number of marriages can be obtained through calculating the marriage rates. The simplest measure of marriage is the crude marriage rate, or the number of marriages in a year per 1,000 population at midyear. Rate, as a relative number that represents the frequency of an event in a given time interval, is one of the most important indicators of certain events. The crude marriage rate has disadvantages since it expresses the number of marriages compared to the entire population, including children and singles, instead of concentrating on the population at risk, that is, of married people.

The marriage rate is directly conditioned by the number of marriages. The greater the number of marriages is, the highest the marriage rate will be and vice versa (Ivkov 2005; Blagojević et. al, 2015). Crude marriage rates are used most effectively for gross analyses in areas that may not have the additional data to calculate more refined measures. Note that the crude marriage rate represents the number of marriages, not the number of people getting married (Faust 2004).

In addition to the crude marriage rate, the marriage rate according age is also calculated. That is, the number of marriages in a given year is divided by the number of the population aged over 15 in the same year, as well as the general marriage rate, which is expressed as the number of marriages per 1,000 women aged 15 and over (Faust 2004). Changes in the number of marriages do not explain marriage trends, unless account is taken of the number of people available to marry (Wilson and Smallwood 2007). This way, the research could give even stronger results. In order to calculate the marriage rates, it is necessary to have available data on the total number of the population. Therefore, the data from the regular annual publications by the State Statistical Office, Population estimates by sex and age by municipalities and statistical regions for the analyzed years and the Statistical Yearbooks were used, taking into account the fact that the last Census of the population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia was conducted in 2002.

For the purposes of this research, analytical-statistical, mathematical-statistical and comparative methods were used. During the analysis and data processing, the results of the research were compared to what has been done so far, and treats this issue, that is, relevant demogeographic studies.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The marital status of the population with all its characteristics and specificities is a special challenge for studying by geographers, because it reflects at some segments in the demographic development of the country or its separate regions (Madjevikj 2009). Unfortunately, the experiences point out that marriage, although one of the oldest universal institutions of humankind, in the post-transitional phase of European societies gradually loses its significance.

**T - 1:** *Number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016*

| Year | Number of marriages | Index 1991 = 100 |
|---|---|---|
| **1991** | 15,311 | 100 |
| **1994** | 15,736 | 102.8 |
| **2002** | 14,522 | 94.8 |
| **2011** | 14,736 | 96.2 |
| **2016** | 13,199 | 86.2 |

**G - 1:** *Number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016*




*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016.*

For the number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia and how their number has changed over the years, we can see data in Table 1 and Graph 1. The number of marriages significantly decreased in the analyzed period, i.e. 13.8%. The highest number of marriages was recorded in 1994 and this number was only slightly lower in 1991. The lowest number of marriages was recorded in 2016, or 1,537 marriages less compared to the previous analyzed year. However, a clearer picture of the trend in the number of marriages can be obtained by calculating the crude marriage rate and the general marriage rate. The highest value of the crude marriage rate in the analyzed period was recorded in 1994, and since then it is constantly decreasing, reaching 6.4 in 2016. This same trend is recorded in the general marriage rate and in the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15. The number of divorces per 1,000 marriages points out to the fact that the number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia is decreasing, while the number of divorces is continually increasing. Following consistent falls in marriage rates in the last quarter of the 20th century and the early years of this century have seen some relatively large fluctuations in marriage numbers and rates (Wilson and Smallwood 2007).

**T - 2:** *Marriage rates in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016*

| Year | Crude marriage rate | General marriage rate | Number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15 years | Number of divorces per 1,000 marriages |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1991 | 7.5 | 20.1 | 10.0 | 32.4 |
| 1994 | 8.1 | 21.4 | 10.8 | 38.9 |
| 2002 | 7.2 | 18.2 | 9.1 | 90.2 |
| 2011 | 7.2 | 17.2 | 8.7 | 119.0 |
| 2016 | 6.4 | 15.2 | 7.6 | 150.4 |

*Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.*

The changes in the marriage rate are related to the idea of changes, the increased level of education and changes in women's participation in the labor market, the manner of choosing a spouse, changes in the age of getting married, etc. Therefore, significant results can be gained when analyzing the demographic characteristics of married people (Madjevikj 2009).

## NUMBER OF MARRIAGES ACCORDING TO THE AGE OF THE BRIDE AND GROOM

The lifetime in which most men and women enter a marital union is determined by the characteristics of the global social system, family and marriage (Petrović 1981; Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004). The age of marriage to a large extent depends on the territorial and ethnic affiliation and the cultural characteristics and accepted norms of behavior. As the age of getting married is one of the most important determinants of reproductive behavior, the best years of marriage are those in which there is a maximum of biological preconditions in order to achieve the greatest reproduction. However, with the changes in the lifestyle in contemporary societies, with the process of individualization and the adopted system of values, the attitude of individuals to marriage as an institution, as well as the "ideal time" for marriage changes (Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004).

**T - 3:** *Marriages by the age of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016*

| Year | Total | ≤ 20 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60 ≤ | * |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Percentage share of the number of marriages by the age of the bride** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1991 | 100 | 28.2 | 45.7 | 17.7 | 4.3 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| 1994 | 100 | 27.7 | 44.2 | 18.3 | 4.6 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.0 |
| 2002 | 100 | 19.8 | 44.1 | 23.8 | 6.3 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| 2011 | 100 | 13.1 | 36.5 | 30.4 | 11.6 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| 2016 | 100 | 9.0 | 33.7 | 31.8 | 13.7 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| **Percentage share of the number of marriages by the age of the groom** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1991 | 100 | 4.2 | 40.3 | 37.1 | 11.5 | 3.2 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| 1994 | 100 | 5.1 | 39.8 | 35.5 | 11.8 | 3.7 | 2.3 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| 2002 | 100 | 3.3 | 34.1 | 38.0 | 14.5 | 5.3 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| 2011 | 100 | 2.1 | 24.0 | 37.9 | 20.7 | 7.6 | 5.2 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 |
| 2016 | 100 | 1.4 | 20.0 | 37.1 | 23.0 | 8.6 | 6.3 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.0 |

** unknown*

*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations.*

Thus, in the analyzed period, a significant "marriage aging" was recorded, that is, postponing the first marriage in the older year of the marital contingent, and accordingly, the "aging of fertility" can be expected (Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004). In Table 3, we can note that in the entire analyzed period, the highest share in the number of marriages was recorded in the age group of 20 to 24, but with an increased participation of the age groups of 25-29 and 30-34 in the recent years for the bride, i.e. the age groups of 30 to 39 years for the groom, also with an increased participation of the age group of 40-49 in the recent years. The general trend of moving the age limits when getting married (Madjevikj 2005), to a large extent is due to the appearance of many adults cohabiting with a partner before ever marrying (Copen et. al, 2012). Demographic data support later ages of first marriage. Marital timing is impacted by school enrollment and higher levels of education; conversely, income, employment stability, and home ownership facilitate marriage formation, particularly for men (Lloyd and South 1996; Byrd 2009). Also, late marriages in recent years can be explained by the way of thinking of modern girls, their higher level of education, and poor material conditions because of which the young people are deciding for later marriages (Blagojević et. al, 2015). In other words, females are getting into marriage later year by year due to the growth of urbanization and engagement among women in economic areas (Karimov 2014).

**T - 4:** *Number of marriages by the average age of the bride and groom*

| Year | Average age of bride | Average age of groom | Average age of bride at first marriage | Average age of groom at first marriage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1991 | 23.0 | 26.3 | - | - |
| 1994 | 23.0 | 26.4 | 22.9 | 26.0 |
| 2002 | 24.3 | 27.4 | 23.8 | 26.8 |
| 2011 | 25.9 | 29.1 | 25.4 | 28.3 |
| 2016 | 27.1 | 30.1 | 26.5 | 29.3 |

*Data source: SSORM, 25 years of Independent Macedonia, and authors' calculations.*

It is noted that the increase in the mean age occurs for both men and women, as we approach the end of the research period. Men marry for the first time at older ages than women (Copen et. al, 2012), but, while men continued to marry at older ages than women, the gap narrowed for about 3 years.

## NUMBER OF MARRIAGES BY THE MARRIAGE ORDER FOR THE BRIDE AND GROOM

In the graphs below, we can note that the most of the marriages that were recorded in the analyzed period were first marriages for both, bride and groom.

**G - 2:** *Marriages by marriage order for the bride, in %*




**G - 3:** *Marriages by marriage order for the groom, in %*




*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations*

Although this trend continues in recent years, the number of marriages of higher order for the spouses is constantly increasing, especially for the groom.

## MARRIAGES BY FORMER MARITAL STATUS OF THE BRIDE AND GROOM

Most of the spouses that are getting married were never married before, but the share of the never married before brides is higher than the share of the never married before grooms. The number and share of the spouses that were divorced is increasing for both, bride and groom. The participation of the widowers in the number of people getting married is insignificant, with less than 1% for the bride and less than 2% for the groom.

**G - 4:** *Marriages by the former marital status of the bride*




**G - 5:** *Marriages by the former marital status of the groom*




*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations*

## NUMBER OF MARRIAGES ACCORDING TO THE ETHNIC AFFILIATION OF THE BRIDE AND GROOM

In the mutual connection of traditional understandings, cultural achievements, religious affiliation, and other, the ethnic affiliation, to some extent, influences some of the following: age of getting married, norms and attitudes for the number of children, size of family, divorces and more.

**T - 5:** *Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016*

| | 1991 | 1994 | 2002 | 2011 | 2016 | 1991 | 1994 | 2002 | 2011 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the bride** | | | | | | **Percentage share** | | | | |
| Total | 15,311 | 15,736 | 14,522 | 14,736 | 13,199 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Macedonians | 9,082 | 8,794 | 7,710 | 7,572 | 7,042 | 59.3 | 55.9 | 53.1 | 51.4 | 53.4 |
| Albanians | 3,940 | 4,853 | 4,773 | 5,134 | 4,428 | 25.7 | 30.8 | 32.9 | 34.8 | 33.5 |
| Turks | 647 | 638 | 568 | 653 | 496 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 3.8 |
| Roma | 667 | 500 | 551 | 645 | 437 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.3 |
| Vlachs | 0 | 19 | 7 | 25 | 17 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Serbs | 0 | 227 | 122 | 140 | 149 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Bosnians | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 91 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Other | 941 | 550 | 733 | 428 | 522 | 6.1 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 2.9 | 4.0 |
| Unknown | 34 | 155 | 58 | 19 | 17 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| **Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the groom** | | | | | | **Percentage share** | | | | |
| Total | 15,311 | 15,736 | 14,522 | 14,736 | 13,199 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Macedonians | 9,160 | 8,852 | 7,819 | 7,704 | 7,162 | 59.8 | 56.3 | 53.8 | 52.3 | 54.3 |
| Albanians | 3,998 | 4,938 | 5,033 | 5,059 | 4,508 | 26.1 | 31.4 | 34.7 | 34.3 | 34.2 |
| Turks | 661 | 673 | 572 | 697 | 523 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.0 |
| Roma | 685 | 525 | 574 | 656 | 454 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 3.4 |
| Vlachs | 0 | 32 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Serbs | 0 | 221 | 130 | 138 | 101 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| Bosnians | 0 | 0 | 0 | 123 | 108 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Other | 777 | 369 | 337 | 328 | 308 | 5.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Unknown | 30 | 126 | 41 | 14 | 18 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 |

*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations*

In Table 5 we can note that in the number of marriages, dominant are the marriages of the bride and groom of Macedonian ethnicity, by more than 50% in all analyzed years, (although a decreasing trend is noted), followed by the number of marriages by the bride and groom from the Albanian ethnic affiliation. This can be explained by the percentage share of the Macedonian and Albanian population in the total. The number of marriages for brides and grooms by other ethnic affiliation participates in the total number of marriages with less than 5% per year.

## NUMBER OF MARRIAGES BY THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE BRIDE AND GROOM

Important to this research is the availability of data on the educational attainment of both spouses (SSORM publications), so that analysis of the trend of marriages according to the educational attainment can be done.

**T - 6:** *Marriages by the educational attainment of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016*

| Year | Total | No education | Less than primary | Primary school | School for skilled and high-skilled | Secondary school | Vocational school, faculty and higher | * |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Marriages by the educational attainment of the bride** | | | | | | | | |
| **1991** | **15,311** | 380 | 1,090 | 5,868 | 1,757 | 4,773 | 1,229 | 214 |
| **1994** | **15,736** | 285 | 781 | 6,549 | 1,215 | 5,383 | 1,299 | 224 |
| **2002** | **14,522** | 289 | 474 | 5,418 | 980 | 5,724 | 1,456 | 181 |
| **2011** | **14,736** | 451 | 124 | 4,218 | 0 | 6,137 | 3,679 | 127 |
| **2016** | **13,199** | 227 | 96 | 2,587 | 0 | 5,861 | 3,888 | 540 |
| **Marriages by the educational attainment of the groom** | | | | | | | | |
| **1991** | **15,311** | 171 | 694 | 4,610 | 3,114 | 5,033 | 1,497 | 192 |
| **1994** | **15,736** | 137 | 518 | 5,417 | 2,340 | 5,735 | 1,383 | 206 |
| **2002** | **14,522** | 161 | 362 | 5,169 | 1,729 | 5,617 | 1,318 | 166 |
| **2011** | **14,736** | 332 | 93 | 3,840 | 0 | 7,592 | 2,759 | 120 |
| **2016** | **13,199** | 148 | 79 | 2,444 | 0 | 6,964 | 3,043 | 521 |

**= unknown*

*Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations*

**G - 6:** *Percentage share of marriages by educational attainment of the bride in the period 1991-2015*




**G - 7:** *Percentage share of marriages by educational attainment of the groom in the period 1991-2015*




*Data source: SSORM, Natural population increase, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations*

The number of marriages in which the spouses have completed university is increasing, especially among women, but on the other hand, increasing the level of education, increases the age of marriage (Golubović and Marković Krstić 2004). To enter the university and get higher education means to get into marriage at higher ages (Karimov 2014).

Women with more education and better economic prospects are more likely to delay first marriage to older ages but are ultimately more likely to become married and stay married (Copen et. al, 2012).

## REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE NUMBER OF MARRIAGES

The place of residence we choose affects every aspect of our being. It can be determined by the income we earn, the people we meet, the friends we create, the partners we choose, and the opportunities offered to our children and families (Scott et. al, 2011). It also affects acquired attitudes about life, habits and customs, while cultural and demographic differences that refer to marriage, can also play an important role.

Given the differences in the distribution of the population and its structure, as well as the differences in the level of development among regions, there are certainly regional differences in the marriage trend. To a large extent, despite other factors influencing the territorial concentration or dispersion of the total population, depending on its ethnic affiliation of traditional views and opinions; cultural achievements, the enclosure of the environment, the religious structure of the population in mutual connection with the ethnic affiliation, social and political situations in the state, inter-ethnic relations and other also have their influence (Madjevikj 2009).

**G - 8:** *Number of marriages per regions*




**G - 9:** *Number of marriages per regions (%)*




*Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.*

In the analyzed period, most of the marriages were recorded in the Skopje region. This can be related to the massive internal migrations, mainly directed towards the Skopje region, which caused the highest concentration of population in the region, i.e., almost 1/3 of the total population in the Republic of Macedonia lives in this region. However, if we analyze the crude marriage rate, we will note that the primacy is recorded in the Polog region, followed by the Southeast, Southwest and Northeast region.

**T - 7:** *Crude marriage rates by regions for the period 1991 - 2016*

| Regions | 1991 | 1994 | 2002 | 2011 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **East** | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.3 |
| **Southeast** | 7.7 | 7.6 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.6 |
| **Southwest** | 8.2 | 8.9 | 8.5 | 8.2 | 6.5 |
| **Pelagonia** | 6.9 | 7.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 5.5 |
| **Polog** | 8.5 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 9.1 | 8.0 |
| **Northeast** | 7.6 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.5 |
| **Skopje** | 7.2 | 7.7 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.1 |
| **Vardar** | 7.3 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 6.0 |
| **R. Macedonia** | 7.5 | 8.1 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 6.4 |

*Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.*

The changes arise from the changes in the total number of population and its ethnic structure, the spatial distribution of the population, the concentration of nationalities in certain regions or their dispersion to a larger area, migration, social relations, political events in the state and immediate surroundings, inter-ethnic relations, the general marriage trends, the educational and cultural achievements, the attitudes about marriage etc. The results of the regional analysis show that there are differences in the number of marriages and the geographical location that could serve as a basis for new, additional research on multiple indicators in order to determine the impact of culture, tradition, customs and habits in all of the regions.

## CONCLUSION

The opinion of marriage and divorce is of interest to demographers as well as the general public, since they participate in the formation of the family, the composition of the family and the fertility. Marriage (partnership) and family (parenthood) represent very important life goals, both at the level of value preferences and life practices (Bobić 2003). Namely, the study of marriages is usually approached from the perspective of the importance of marriage for reproduction, bearing in mind that marriage is a dominant frame for the population reproduction (Ivković et. al, 2014).

Changes in the marital behavior of the population are considered in the context of socioeconomic transformation and in line with the peculiarities of modern society: urbanization, long-lasting education process, increased consumer opportunities, emancipation of women, aspiration to personal success, individualization etc. The main reasons that condition the changes in the number of marriages are in the socioeconomic sphere, sex and age-related irregularities expressed at the regional and local level, the migration, social and political changes, stability of the state, transition processes and more (Madjevikj 2009).

Preference of people to have a career before tying the knot is the main reason that more and more people are opting to marry in their thirties. Education and finding a job are both time consuming. By the time people find some sort of financial stability, and this is irrespective of gender, they have already crossed the 30age mark. There is not a single cause that is associated with the delayed marriage of either one or both the sexes (Rasool 2016).

The changes in the marital behavior that the most of the World is facing today are also present in the Republic of Macedonia. They can be recognized in the reduced number of marriages, reduced marriage rates, increased age at the time of getting married, increased participation of the brides and grooms with university education in the total number of marriages, etc.

Therefore, the analysis of the unemployment rates from the aspect of the demographic variables (as the age and the marital status of the population), social variables (such as education and traditions) and economic variables (such as income and participation in the labor force), as well as the definition of the main reasons to get married or not, the regional differences in the number of marriages and, ultimately, their impact on the fertility is more than necessary. Our findings are the first stepping-stone to the new, additional researches on the subject, which would eventually help create social policies, as well as create a population policy in harmony with the trend of the population development and population marital status.

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# THE GENDER GAP IN CHARITABLE GIVING FOR EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY FROM BULGARIA IN THE PERIOD FROM 1878 TO 2015

**Abstract**

In 2015, within the project *„Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions"*, funded by the Scientific Research Fund at the Ministry of Education, records of donations in the sphere of Education for the period from 1878 to 1944 in Bulgaria were examined and a nationally representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards donating for Education" was conducted.

Based on the collected archive documents, the data from the representative survey and additional literature and investigations, the donation activity in the sphere of Education in Bulgaria is traced through the following three historical periods: from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944; in the period from 1944 to 1989; after the „Velvet revolution" of 1989 to 2015.The donation activity for educational causes is different in the studied historical periods of the development of Bulgaria. The philanthropy depends on the political situation and regulations.

The giving is a value for a lot of Bulgarians in the period from the Liberation to 1944. There have been made a lot of donations for different causes, but mostly for education, followed by social causes - helping orphans and poor children during this period. Results show that about 25 percent of the donors are women.

After 1944 the donation activity has been practically interrupted. The situation has changed dramatically in comparison to the previous examined period. Donor funds have been closed. Donation has been destroyed and the consequences have been extremely negative.
The donation gradually returned to the Bulgarians' public life after 1989, but overall it has not been mainly oriented towards education. Approximately two-thirds of the all donors for education are women. The most motivated Bulgarian donor in Education is a woman with a high educational degree (minimum secondary education), living in a big city (capital and district town), employed, married or live in cohabitation.

**Keywords:** donation, donor, education, Bulgaria

## INTRODUCTION

The philanthropy is characterized by a different activity in the studied historical periods of the development of Bulgaria - from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944; in the period from 1944 to 1989; after the „Velvet revolution" of 1989 to 2015. The distribution of charitable events in the society depends to a large extent on the transformations in the society, the political structure and the regulation.

Compared to the period from 1878 to 1944, the donor activity in education has a certain decrease in the contemporary Bulgarian society. There are differences in the main motives for donation among different groups of the contemporary donors. Furthermore the social profile of the private donor is changing.

The term charitable giving is defined as a positive action, gratuitous help (beyond personal interest) to other/s or dedicated to a cause by donation of funds, tangible property, voluntary work (Кабакчиева (съст.), 2011: 11).

## METHODOLOGY

Based on the collected archive documents (within the project *„Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions" (in 2015))* and additional literature, the donation activity in the sphere of Education in Bulgaria is traced through the two historical periods: from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944 and in the period from 1944 to 1989;

The gender gap in charitable giving for Education is analyzed in detail after the „Velvet revolution" of 1989 to 2015 (through the third studied period). The conclusions are based on the following three surveys:

- In 2011, the first study was conducted by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum;
- The second study was conducted by Alfa Research Ltd. in July 2015;
- In 2015, within the project *„Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions"*, funded by the Scientific Research Fund at the Ministry of Education a nationally representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards donating for Education" was conducted.

## CIVIL ACTIVITY AND PHILANTHROPY OF BULGARIAN WOMEN IN THE PERIOD FROM THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA (1878) UNTIL 1944

In the period from the Liberation in 1878 until 1944 donation is a value for a lot of Bulgarians. As a whole, they are committed in the care of the sick persons, orphans, widows and communities in need. In addition, they are actively involved with their own means, land and labor in the construction of monasteries, churches, chapels and schools.

Pepka Boyadjieva (2012) summarized that the giving for educational causes is concentrated on the activity and energy of a number of Bulgarians (public figures and intellectuals, as well as ordinary citizens) and organizations for a long time during the Renaissance (the Bulgarian Renaissance includes the processes in the society in the 18th and 19th centuries) and after the restoration of the Bulgarian state in 1878. She adds that donor initiatives do not only have a clear priority in the sphere of education, but also become a manifestation of genuine civic awareness and commitment to the development of Bulgarian nationality and national identity (Бояджиева, 2012: 28). As a result, the donated funds and land for building of schools is increased. Supporting Funds which help talented students are created. During this period, Bulgarians are distinguished by high donor activity and donation is performed to various causes, but mostly for education; followed by social causes – helping of orphans and poor children (Кабакчиева (საст.), 2011: 13).

The donations in education are related to a variety of objectives. They cover a wide range – it can start with a donation for training and to pass through the supporting of poor, but talented students and in order to finish with donations for dining, clothes, books, and so on. A lot of the funding for education purposes comes from donations and wills, although the cost of education is state-regulated (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

Information on the more famous donors in the period 1878-1951 can be found in the three volumes of the Encyclopedia „Donation" (Николова, В., Стоянова, Р. (съст.), 2012). About 75% of the named donors are male. Female names are much less. Although these data does not concern the donations for education, we can assume that women's donor activity is also lower than men's donor activity in this sphere.

In fact, during the research period, the Bulgarian woman is limited to show her own empathy and willingness to work for the welfare of the society. She is not allowed to the public space and she can not develop her potential. This concerns both her ability to participate more actively in the church life and her participation in the development of Bulgarian public education.

Data from a scientific study related to the female donors of the Bulgarian Orthodox temples during the Renaissance show that „a number of restrictions on women in the public space of the Orthodox Church are regulated in Byzantium" (Пенчева, 2015: 5). Pencheva (2015) notes that this is a reflection of the religious worldview and the understanding of the woman as a source of temptation for the male half of the population. She adds that in a number of monastic statutes (rules) the basic requirement is the prohibition of the female presence (female wards are detached in the churches and they are located on the second floor). Gradually, the Bulgarian woman changed the church attitude towards her. Many male monasteries are being transformed and have allowed the women presence during the temple holiday and the great Christian feasts (Пенчева, 2015: 5).

Exactly the charity is one of the forms of modification when the woman enters in the sacred space of the temple. Pencheva (2015) divides the women's donations to the Orthodox churches during the Renaissance on the basis of the donation object: donations to the construction of temples, donations to the interior decoration, donations to church plate and liturgical literature, and donations to temple support. The Bulgarian woman demonstrates a high civic activity and a national consciousness (Пенчева, 2015: 7).

The Bulgarian woman gradually has become a part of the social activity during the Renaissance. The church has been opened to her, as well as the school system. Until the beginning of 1930, the woman was devoid of education, and even the shared opinion in the society is that for the girl it is „a shame to learn" (Андонова, 2015: 36-37). The place and the role of the Bulgarian woman are very well presented by V. Paskaleva – „The monastery schools have been visited only by young men for ages. The Bulgarian girls remain illiterate. Only a minority of them receive some kind of education, usually the girls who are preparing to become nuns. They learn in the „Read Letter" in Girls' monasteries. But the women's monastery education is developed much slower than the male. It is hampered by the backward Christians' view that the woman is made up of the man's rib and that she should not be self-sufficient, as the Oriental attitude towards the woman as a slave, which is deeper routed in our nation" (Паскалева, 1964: 18). However, women charity organizations were set up in the last years of the Renaissance. Their main objectives are „the development of the girls education and social activity" (Пенчева, 2015: 16).

According to Georgeta Nazarska (2017), the available data from the archival documentation shows that the private donation funds support the education of Bulgarian students during a long historical period - from the end of the 19 century to the mid-1940. The share of women in the total number of the fund beneficiaries is 30,8%. It varies for the individual funds. The reasons can be different - women's interest in subsidized specialities, their social status and others (Назърска, 2017: 262-263). Although the educational chances of women increase, they rarely had the opportunity to acquire higher education. Moreover, „female educational elites do not acquire the necessary social influence - in the research period their group is not empowered in the private or public sphere, including in the professional field" (Назърска, 2017: 271).

The restricted access to education is a prerequisite for women to become rarely donors for Bulgarian education. However, the Bulgarian woman is awake and engaged in the public work. This conclusion is a consequence of the many female organizations in the Renaissance, which are the forerunners of an organized women's movement (Стоянова, 2015: 19). According to Pencheva, the female rebellion against the patriarchal worldview and manners of the society changes the Bulgarian woman activity. She gradually leaves the religious space and focuses on secular public spaces. The social and professional status of the active Bulgarian woman was changed - by a nun at the beginning of the Renaissance, at the end of the period she was a teacher and activist of the women charity organization. Exactly through the donation the Bulgarian woman manages to acquire a number of spheres from the public space (Пенчева, 2015: 16).

However, the donor activity of the woman can not be fully deployed and actually reflects the female fighting spirit. As a result of some legislative changes after 1944 donor practices are ceased and the donation is no longer a leading value in Bulgarian society. The donation was revived after 1989. It was only then a new beginning of the female charity was established.

## LIMITATION OF DONOR PRACTICES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1944 TO 1989

After 1944, the donor activity in Bulgaria practically disappeared. Between 1945 and 1951, with a series of legislative changes, the donations made in the previous period were gradually transferred to the state. As a result, the charity activity ceased to exist and the education is fully governed by the state policy and the training of „socialist ideals" (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

The giving has been destroyed, and the consequences after that are extremely negative. According to Petya Kabakchieva, on the one hand, the names of thousands of donors sink into oblivion, their will is neglected; on the other hand, the very idea of donation and charity was loosing value because the state had to had to be the only „benefactor" (Кабакчиева (съст.), 2011: 13).

The donation practices have been re-established in 1980. This was related with the creation of Fund „13 centuries Bulgaria". But in this case, donation is again subordinated to the state policy and it is carried out in a „socialist spirit". In other words the donations did not have this economic significance for education and they are essentially material, especially for books and works of art, as well as for free work (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

## WOMEN DONORS IN EDUCATION AFTER 1989

After 1989, the charitable giving gradually returned to the public life of the Bulgarians, but in general it is oriented towards non-educational spheres (Бояджиева, 2012: 28). This conclusion is based on two surveys on donor attitudes among Bulgarians held in 2011 and 2015 respectively.

The first study was conducted by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum and it was conducted by the Open Society Institute - Sofia[1]. The results from this survey show that the respondents most often donated for „social causes – for disadvantaged people - the needy people, adults, disabled persons, orphans“ (48,6%) and „Health causes - treatment of children, purchase of equipment, treatment of adults" (43,4%). Only 2,6% of them have donated for education („educational causes - scholarships, for the schools"), and for „culture and art" the share of donors is even lower -1,7% (data are received from the answers to the question „What causes do you donate for?").

The results from the second study (it is conducted by Alfa Research Ltd. in July 2015) that is related to the attitudes towards charitable giving also show that the donations for education are insignificant. The interviewees have guessed that the individuals donate mainly for health and social causes. More than half of the respondents gave the answer „health causes" (54%), followed by the donations for „social causes" (45%). According to the respondents only 5% of the people donated for educational causes (data are received from the answers to the question „What causes do persons donate for?“[2]).

These data are also confirmed by a third study - the representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards giving in Education“, conducted in 2015 within the project „Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions". This is the most thorough research of contemporary Bulgarian culture in this sphere. The analyzed donor activity of the privet donors in this paper below is based on it. The social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor of Education is also presented.

## DONATION ACTIVITIES FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

There are different criteria for classifying of the donors. Most often, they are based on the fundamental subjects of the law (for all legal systems) - physical persons, legal entities, the state and the international organizations. From this point

[1] Проучване на Български дарителски форум за дарителските нагласи сред българите, http://www.dfbulgaria.org/2011/prouchvane_daritrlski_naglasi_bulgari/

[2] Дарителството в България през 2014 г. (Анализ на Български дарителски форум), http://www.dfbulgaria.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Rezume_2014_final.pdf

of view, the physical persons and the legal entities can be considered as donors. The researched social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor in Education refers to a physical person.

The representative sociological survey (the third study mentioned above), that is entitled „Attitudes towards giving in Education” and conducted among 1283 Bulgarian citizens, confirms the results of the two surveys quoted above (they held in 2011 and 2015 by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum).

The contemporary Bulgarians donate most often in the following three causes – 1. in causes of social occasions; 2. for health reasons and 3. for overcoming the impact of natural disasters. There is less giving activity in education, culture and art, for religious purposes, as well as for animal care, ecology and sports initiatives. This conclusion is based on the answers to the question „Which of the following causes have you donated for?“. The question was raised to the physical persons that donated in the last five years (see: T-1).

**T-1:** *Donor activity for different causes*

| **Which of the following causes have you donated for?** | **Yes** | **No** | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Social causes (for disadvantaged people, the needy people, adults, orphans) | 81,1 % | 18,9 % | 100 % |
| Health causes (for treatment of children, purchase of equipment) | 63,4 % | 36,6 % | 100 % |
| For overcoming the impact of natural disasters | 59,5 % | 40,5 % | 100 % |
| Education | 25,9 % | 74,1 % | 100 % |
| Culture and art | 24,7 % | 75,3 % | 100 % |
| Religious purposes | 24,1 % | 75,9 % | 100 % |
| Animal care | 18,9 % | 81,1 % | 100 % |
| Ecology | 16,3 % | 83,7 % | 100 % |
| Sports initiatives | 16,1 % | 83,9 % | 100 % |

However, the most of Bulgarians have positive attitudes towards giving for educational purposes. To the question „What is your attitude towards giving for education?”, total 64,7% of the respondents have chosen the following two answers - „entirely positive” and „rather positive”. 16,7% of the interviewees indicated the option „both positive and negative”, and with „rather negative” and „entirely negative” answered 5,3% and 6% of them (see: G-1).

**G-1:** *Attitude towards charitable giving for education*




The data from the research revealed some prerequisites for the development of culture of giving in education.

## DONATION ACTIVITY IN EDUCATION BY GENDER

Are the men or the women more motivated to charitable giving for educational purposes? What is the social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor in Education? The answer to these questions was sought on the basis of data from the study.

The applied Chi square analysis shows that there is no correlation between gender and attitudes towards giving in education.

Total about 61% of the men have „entirely positive” (34,5%) and „rather positive” (26,4%) attitudes, while the women with positive attitudes are over 68% (see: G-2).

**G-2:** *Attitude towards giving for education by gender*




The correlation between the gender and charitable giving for education is very little – the Cramér's V is 0,131. 19,3% of the men have donated for educational purposes, and 30,9% of the women (see: T-2).

**T-2:** *Gender gap in giving for education*

| | | Sex | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Man** | **Woman** | |
| **Did you donate for educational causes?** | Yes | 19,3% | 30,9% | 25,9% |
| | No | 80,7% | 69,1% | 74,1% |
| **Total** | | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

There is a tendency for women to donate more in Education. This conclusion is based on the answers to the question „In the next 6 months, would YOU PERSONALLY make a donation for education, regardless of its form and size?". Certainly, 4,3% of men and 9,8% of women are going to make a donation. 19,4% of men and 24,4% of women (see: T-3) are likely to donate in Education.

**T-3:** *Donation for education, regardless of its form and size in the next 6 months by gender*

| | | Sex | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Man** | **Woman** | |
| **In the next 6 months, would YOU PERSONALLY make a donation for education, regardless of its form and size?** | I will do it | 4,3% | 9,8% | 7,2% |
| | I will rather do it | 19,4% | 24,4% | 22,0% |
| | I will not rather do it | 24,0% | 20,1% | 21,9% |
| | I will not do it | 33,3% | 23,8% | 28,3% |
| | I don know/ I can not answer | 19,0% | 21,9% | 20,5% |
| **Total** | | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian woman – donor in Education

Of all interviewees, about two-thirds are the persons donated for education are women (68%). Women are more involved with educational problems than men (see: T-4).

**T-4:** *Donation for education by gender*

| | | Sex | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Man** | **Woman** | |
| **Did you donate for educational causes?** | Yes | 32,0% | 68,0% | 100,0% |
| | No | 46,8% | 53,2% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | | 42,9% | 57,1% | 100,0% |

The group of women who have donated in education was selected. The purpose was to reveal the socio-demographic profile of the female donors. The distribution of this group by ***degree of their education, their family status, the type of settlement where they live in, their employment and the professional groups to which they belong*** is presented as follows:

Concerning the educational degree, the largest share of women-donors (41,7%) graduated higher and upper secondary education, 40,9% of them have a secondary education and 17,4% have primary and lower of primary education (see: G-3).

**G-3:** *Women who have donated for education by their educational degree*




Approximately three quarters (72,5%) of the women in this group are married or live in cohabitation. The divorced or widows (16,5%) are ranked as second, and the lowest group is the one of the unmarried women - 11% (see: G-4).

**G-4:** *Women who have donated for education by their marital status*



Most of the women-donors - a total of about two-thirds - live in the capital Sofia and the district towns. The donors from the smaller settlements are significantly less. In smaller town live 11,3% and the villages' residents are 22,6% of them (see: G-5).

**G-5:** *Women who have donated for education by settlement*




Regarding the impact of employment on the giving in education we can point out, that our expectations are for greater activity by the permanently employed. The hypothesis that the largest share of the donations in education are made by the employed persons has been confirmed. Unemployed ones, permanently not-working because of sickness, pensioners, and students are giving rarely than those with permanent and/or higher income. To the group of the employed women belong over 70% (see: G-6).

**G-6:** *Women who have donated for education by employment*




A comparatively small share of contemporary Bulgarian women – donors for education are among the low-skilled and unskilled workers (a totally 20%). Significantly more are women – donors who have graduated a higher education and respective have good professions (see: G-7).

**G-7:** *Women who have donated for education by the social groups to which they are added*



The presented data show that the most Bulgarian woman motivated to charitable giving for educational purposes have a high education degrees (minimum secondary education), are married or live in cohabitation, they come from a city (capital and district town), are permanently employed and possess a higher professional qualification.

## CONCLUSION

There is not a gender inequality in the contemporary Bulgarian society. Women are allowed to enter in all educational levels. Their chances of professional realization, leadership and higher social status are increased. The preferred type of settlement is determined by their employment. The largest share of female teachers is an additional prerequisite for the active inclusion of Bulgarian woman in educational causes. The old Bulgarian national revival woman have come to live again. The contemporary woman in the act in conditions of freedom and greater gender equality, where charity giving is not an abstract concept but a real quality.

In the three historical periods, the Bulgarian woman manifested a clear national consciousness and a high civic activity. Gender equality in the conditions of democracy creates some prerequisites for the full development of her potential related to the wellfare of society.

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# MORAL MOTIVATION AS PREDICTOR FOR ACTIVITY IN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION

## Abstract

Student organizations exist and should exist to protect the rights and interests of their members. If certain research is correct and say that more than 80% of students in Macedonia are not members of any student organization, then the situation is worrying and of course it is necessary to find suitable ways to change it.

Therefore, a research team at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted a research on student organization, in particular about the ways in which students work, their attitudes and opinions about student organization, and their motivation to behave in accordance with the concepts of social justice.

In the period of May 2017, 669 students from different faculties at the University "Ss. Cyril and Methodius" were examined about their views and opinions for student organization,

as well as their moral motivation, or whether they are morally motivated to behave in accordance with the principles of social justice in society.
The results show that students do not understand the concept of social justice and are very little aware that with their behavior they contribute to the fight for social justice. This also means that if they are not fully aware about their potential contribution in society they will not be active in the processes of student's life and their future.

**Keywords:** students organization, moral motivation, social justice, University "Ss. Cyril and Methodius" - Republic of Macedonia, attitude toward students' organization

## INTRODUCTION

"An essential distinction in motivation is the distinction between two tendencies: the tendency of approach and the tendency of avoidance; in the motivation of approach, behavior is directed by a positive or desirable event or outcome, while in the motivation for avoidance, behavior is directed by a negative or unwanted event or outcome (Elliot,1999)" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 3).

"Positive outcomes in the domain of morality are those moral behaviors that an individual should apply, while negative outcomes are immoral behaviors that the individual should not apply. The key to self-regulation is to activate positive, moral behaviors – to do what is moral, despite the inhibition of negative, immoral behaviors – not to do what is immoral. If an individual has self-regulation, then he/she will be motivated to behave morally, and he/she will avoid being immoral (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006)" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 6).

The next distinction in motivation is the distinction between the self and the others, more precisely, personal and social responsibility. Individuals who have perceived the concept of responsibility will be able to understand which behavior means personal responsibility, and which social responsibility.

"By combining these two concepts: the concept of self-regulation and the concept of responsibility we come to the 2 x 2 Model of Moral Motivation, which consists of 4 cells that are referred to as: Self-Restraint, Self-Reliance, Social Order, and Social Justice" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 6). "Although all these four motives are present to some degree in the moral system of each individual, the unique socializing history and life experience created a greater focus on one or more motives in each individual" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 7).

| Model of moral motivation | | Responsibility | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Personal responsibility | Social responsibility |
| Self-Regulation | Tendency for avoidance | Self-Restraint | Social Order |
| | Tendency for approaching | Self-Reliance | Social Justice |

*Graph no.1 2 x 2 Model of moral motivation (Sheikh, 2007, p.32)*

"Self-Restraint and Self-Reliance reflect the differences between the self-regulation orientations of activation and the inhibition in the domain of personal responsibility, whereas Social Order and Social Justice represent these regulatory orientations in the realm of social responsibility" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 6).

"The Social Justice motive involves a very different set of communal obligations involving the motivation to provide for others and to help others in the community advance, and is associated with efforts to insure greater economic and material support, often involving matters of opportunity, income and equity" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 8).

"Moral behavior from a Social Justice perspective is equivalent to contributing to the social welfare of others, and individuals expect to be rewarded for good behavior, but do not expect to be punished in the absence of this behavior. In contrast to the Social Order motive, Social Justice is associated with political liberalism and low scores on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006)" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 9). "Both involve beliefs in social responsibility; however, Social Order is focused primarily on what we should not do and inhibitory behaviors so as to maintain a moral, ordered community, whereas Social Justice focuses primarily on what we should do and activation behaviors in promoting a moral, just society. It was this motive that was the subject of analysis in this research, because we believe that this motive should be associated with students' activism, or more precisely, students' attitude toward their organization and representation" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 9).

## SOCIAL ATTITUDES

There are many definitions for the term *attitude* in psychology and all of them incorporate certain knowledge, beliefs and opinions, certain (complex) emotions and feelings and certain actions and behaviors toward a particular object (object of the attitude): person, thing or event.

Attitudes are certainly formed during socialization process and they (some of them) can be pretty stable over time, but they (also some of them) can change as a result of some events. A social attitude is defined as "a behavior pattern, anticipatory set or tendency, predisposition to specific adjustment or more simply, a conditioned response to social stimuli (Dockery & Bedeian, 1989, p. 11)" (Chaiklin, 2011).

The structure of every attitude can be explained and understand with three aspects which are included in so called "ABC model of attitudes" (McLeod, 2014). The first aspect is "affective component" and "involves a person's feelings/emotions about the attitude object"; the second aspect is "behavioral (or conative) component" and includes "the way the attitude we have influences how we act or behave" and the third aspect is "cognitive component", which "involves a person's belief/knowledge about an attitude object". (McLeod, 2014).

If the idea that people are rational beings is accepted, then we can expect people to behave according to their attitudes and all the three aspects to be in the same direction.

**Components of the attitude about student organization and representation**

The attitude about student organization and representation according to the ABC model, was disassembled into its components, which were actually presented in three subscales: the Cognitive Component (**Cognitive Subscale =** sum of 13 questions about student's information about the activities of the student organization and the leading persons of the organization), the Affective Component (**Affective Subscale** = sum of 4 questions about the student's satisfaction with several aspects of student organizations), and the Behavioral Component (**Behavior Subscale** = sum of 8 questions about the student's involvement in the student's formal organization).

The Cronbach Alpha coefficients for each subscale separately (for the Cognitive subscale = 0.883; for the Behavior subscale = 0.661 and for the Affective subscale = 0.834), as well as the item total correlation of each item of all subscales (all significant at the 0.01 level) indicated that all the subscales can be seen as separate scales with their own sum score.

A descriptive analysis of all subscales demonstrated the following results.

**Table no.1** *Descriptive analysis of Cognitive, Behavior and Affective subscales*

| | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitive Subscale | 0 | 13 | 2.76 | 3.076 |
| Behavior Subscale | 0 | 7 | .77 | 1.222 |
| Affective Subscale | 4 | 20 | 10.42 | 3.485 |

As it can be seen from the table, the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the cognitive component is from 0 to 13, and M is 2.76; the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the behavioral component is from 0 to 7, and the arithmetic mean is 0.77; the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the affective component is from 4 to 20, and the arithmetic mean is 10.42.

A graphic display of the frequencies distribution follows.

**Graph no.2** *Score distribution of Cognitive component*




**Graph no.3** *Score distribution of Behavioral component*




**Graph no.4** *Score distribution of Affective component*




The data show the unequal distribution of the Cognitive Subscale and, in particular, the uneven distribution of the Behavioral Subscale. The majority of respondents have low scores close to zero on the two presented subscales. Only the affective component has a certain score shifting towards the middle.

The relation of all three components of the students' social attitude toward student organization represented by the coefficient of correlation is presented in the following table.

**Table no.2** *Correlations among attitude's components*

| | Cognitive component (subscale) | Behavior component (subscale) | Affective component (subscale) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitive component (subscale) | 1 | .628** | .385** |
| Behavior component (subscale) | .628** | 1 | .178** |
| Affective component (subscale) | .385** | .178** | 1 |

***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)*

The coefficients speak of a statistically significant positive correlation between all three components. A high score of the cognitive component is paired with a high score of the behavioral component, as well as a high score of the affective component. This result suggests that those students who have greater knowledge and more information about the student organization are more active in the organization, and they have a more positive attitude towards their formal organization.

Student's motive for social justice

The introduction section mentioned that this research used the Subscale for Social Justice Motive as part of Moralism Scale. "Moralism Scale is a 24-item scale that incorporates items representing each of the four cells of the proposed model of moral motivations: Self-Restraint, Self-Reliance, Social Order and Social Justice. Each item consists of a scenario in which the target person decides whether to engage in a particular behavior. Participants are asked to make two types of ratings: first, they rate the extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference, from 1 ('*not at all a matter of personal preference*') to 9 *('completely a matter of personal preference*). Second, participants rate the extent to which they believe the subject in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior, from 1 ('*feel very strongly he/she should not*) to 9 ('*feel very strongly he/she should'*), where 5 is the midpoint ('*neutral*'). These are called the Moralism Preference subscale and the Moralism Evaluation subscale, respectively" (Sheikh, 2007, p. 15). Since we predict that the motive for social justice is the one in relation with student's activism, we extract only those 6 scenarios which examine what we should do and activation behaviors in promoting a moral, just society.

**Table no.3** *Descriptive analysis of Moralism Preference and Moralism Evaluation subscales*

| | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Moralism Preference**-Extent to which a person views the scenario to be a matter of personal preference | 6 | 54 | 46.16 | 8.680 |
| **Moralism Evaluation**-Extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference | 6 | 54 | 38.58 | 7.699 |

As it can be seen from the table no.3, the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the first type of ratings about the matter of personal preference (Moralism Preference) is from 0 to 54, and M is 46.16; the theoretical and the obtained range of the second type of rating (Moralism Evaluation) is from 6 to 54, and the arithmetic mean is 38.58. If theoretical mean is 30, than it can be seen that in both ratings the respondents are above that score, and the first rating (about the extent to which a person views the scenario to be a matter of personal preference) is more extreme.

The Cronbach Alpha coefficient for the first type of ratings (Moralism Preference) was 0.846, and the Cronbach coefficient for the second ratings was 0.701.

This is the graphical presentation of the theoretical model of Social Justice coordinate system.




**Graph no.5** *Graphical presentation of motive for social justice*

Since the respondents first rate the extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference (from "*not at all a matter of personal preference*" to *"completely a matter of personal preference"* (Sheikh, 2007, p. 45-48), the horizontal axis divides the respondents into those on the left side (up and down) who understand the social responsibility and those on the right side of the coordinate system (up and down) who do not understand social responsibility. Afterwards the respondents rate the extent to which they believe the subject in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior, (from "*feel very strongly he/*

*she should not*" to "*feel very strongly he/she should"* (Sheikh, 2007, p. 45-48), so that the vertical axis divides the respondents into those who are below (left and right) and who haven't got a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable and those who are above (left and right) who do have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable.

According to this coordinate system, the desirable moral motivation is placed on the left upper side, which presents the people who have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable and they understand the concept of social responsibility (they know that their action affects the other). But where are UKIM students positioned on this coordinate system?




**Graph no.6** *Score distribution on Moral Justice subscale*

As can it be seen from this graph, the respondents are grouped in the right upper side, which is the place for those who do have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable, but they still do not understand the concept of social responsibility, and think that doing things, such as giving charity or helping the old lady in the supermarket, is a matter a personal choice.




**Graph no.7** *Frequencies and percentages of respondents in the coordinate system*

Graph no. 7 again presents the fact that majority of students belong in the right upper corner. However, this graph illustrates another important fact that more than a quarter of students are in the neutral zone, zone somewhat in the middle of the coordinate system, zone with no extreme preferences and attitudes.

There was no significant correlation between a student's attitude toward their organization (cognitive, behavioral and affective component/scale) and the Scale for Social Responsibility (Moralism Preference subscale and the Moralism Evaluation subscale), which means that these two variables are not in any kind of relationship. And, expectedly, there was retention of the null hypothesis for these two variables.

## CONCLUSION

The data show three main findings: on the motivation scale for social justice UKIM students show that although they have a tendency to behave in a socially desirable and moral way, they still do not adopt the concept of social justice and do not realize that socially desirable behavior does not concern only them; UKIM students have a rudimentary and undeveloped attitude towards such an important topic as social organization. The behavioral component of the attitude is least developed, and thus is the cognitive component; there is no relation between the motive for social justice and students' activism, or more general, students' attitude toward their organization.

The first finding touches upon adults, society, educational systems: schools, universities because the motive for social justice is primarily socially conditioned. Although students tend to behave in a socially desirable and moral way, they still cannot realize that socially desirable behavior does not concern only them, and this is a concept which should be encouraged in childhood by all persons who are in position to be adults, teachers and educators.

Even though the second finding looks like it should primarily concern students themselves, it is still obligation of adults to provide safe environment for students (youth in general) to freely express their potentials.

The third finding logically follows from the research data: there is no variation in dependent variables, such as were the cognitive, behavioral and cognitive component of the attitude, and especially the behavioral component where more than 90 percent of the respondents have score 0 or 1 on that subscale.

The conclusion from these research findings will be as follows: the educational system of the country has to invest in its students because good student organization, in addition to exercising rights, freedoms and needs, and engaging in improving students' standard and their well-being, means investing in an efficient, motivated and democratic youth.

According to all previous experiences around the world, it can be said that one of the basic goals of universities and society in general should be investing in providing a suitable ground for student parliaments to become true temples of democracy, tolerance, understanding, a sense of community and, of course, desire, motive, vision, but also knowledge for a better university as a better educational environment and a better society in general.

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# SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM ACCEPTED: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PROBLEMATIC INVOLVEMENT IN SERBIA

**Abstract**

The relationship between Brussels and Belgrade has never been straightforward. Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević, EU authorities have welcomed different opposition forces and altogether failed to pursue reforms and consolidate institutional infrastructure. Accordingly, this paper examines the EU's position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-authoritarianism in Serbia. It is argued that as long as the problematic Serbian elites pretend, or even manage to meet some of the EU's expectations, the Brussels administration will continue to ignore the pursuit of a wide range of unfavourable domestic policies. Such an approach has regrettably given the Serbian regime the opportunity to cement its power base, thereby obstructing the implementation of any substantial democratic improvements.

**Keywords:** Serbia, European Union, semi-authoritarianism

## INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Serbia has never been straightforward. Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in the early 1990s, the EU's participation in economic sanctions against the newly established Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, severely affected the Serbian citizens but not the regime of Slobodan Milošević. It consolidated further by benefiting from the proceeds of a black market economy and various media outlets constantly accusing the West, as well as the democratic opposition, of being anti-Serbian. Moreover, when different opposition representatives requested Western support for the emerging democratic force necessary to oust Milošević and prevent additional violence, their efforts were ignored (Panić 2015: 78). This, together with the rejection by the EU's representatives in late 1996 of the opposition Zajedno [Together] alliance's municipal victories in favour of Milošević's decision to annul the results and demand new elections, were interpreted as the West's intention to assist Milošević, the perceived key factor in the whole process, to stay in power (Spoerri 2015: 46-47).

Later, with the progress of the Kosovo crisis and the 1999 NATO intervention, the West started to promote narrative suggesting that the time to get rid of Milošević had come. In contrast to previous years, substantial foreign aid was allocated to the democratic opposition, which seemed to have become more united in contrast to a decline in popular support for the regime (Spoerri 2015). Once Milošević was overthrown in October 2000, the West welcomed the new democratic forces. Although initially cooperative, the coalition leadership faced several internal conflicts with various members trying to promote their separate visions for the country's future. The politics of alternatives or other opportunities, as well as an ever-present struggle with the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation, provided enough space for the opposition (many of whose members had once sided with and played important roles under the Milošević regime, although they were never subjected to a lustration afterwards) to organise and challenge the political elite (Radeljić 2014; Radeljić 2017). Consequently, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) was established in 2008 by Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, the former Deputy President and General Secretary respectively of the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, was on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the time). As soon as the former Radicals turned into Progressivists, they started to place an emphasis on their apparently new profile and, even more so, on expected outcomes. The reasoning behind this is that they would appear to differ significantly from their previous affiliation. Apart from discrediting the performance of the then leadership, the SNS invested efforts in promoting military neutrality, greater social justice, worldwide cooperation and EU membership. In 2012, Nikolić's advocacy secured him the presidency. Two years later, Vučić progressed from being First Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister, a position which he held until becoming President of Serbia in May 2017. Their radical past and far-right rhetoric no longer seemed relevant.

In this paper I look at the EU's position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-authoritarianism in Serbia. In her seminal work, Marina Ottaway defines semi-authoritarian regimes as "ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. This ambiguous character, furthermore, is deliberate. Semi-authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails" (Ottaway 2003: 3). With this in mind, the Progressivists' behaviour in Serbia is undoubtedly semi-authoritarian and the EU has largely refrained from confronting it. While welcoming the Progressivists with Aleksandar Vučić at the forefront, the Brussels authorities have regularly suggested that they expected a lot from him in terms of regional developments – primarily in the case of the Kosovo's status, but also in terms of Serbia's problematic ambition to position itself between the East and the West. This in turn could be interpreted as indicating that, as long as Vučić was prone to responding to their demands, a whole range of domestic policies – some more detrimental than others – would be of secondary concern. Aware of the expected dynamics, the regime has used every opportunity to further reinforce its power.

## 2. THE EU WELCOMES THE FORMER RADICALS TURNED PROGRESSIVISTS

The literature tackling Western support of corrupt, military and authoritarian regimes is voluminous. For example, during the Cold War, the West (in particular the USA) supported such regimes in its fight against Communism, whilst the Soviets tended to support undemocratic regimes against the West. This suggests that "[t]he international system can play a permissive role, as well as a very active role, in democratization, and it can support or block democratic change" (Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2010: 10). The present EU has regularly collaborated with countries whose regimes are authoritarian (Babayan and Risse 2015) and, furthermore, its recent involvement in the Arab Spring has led to its actions being questioned in the context of whether they actually assisted authoritarian instead of democratic rule (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014). Even more recently, we have seen how mutual interests in the Russo-Hungarian case can alienate an existing EU member state from the Brussels authorities (Buzogány 2017). This logically encourages a debate about possible alternatives and regime preferences, as authoritarians are likely to oppose and negatively affect support for the EU (Tillman 2013). This is even more striking if we consider projections suggesting that authoritarianism is likely to rise (Bloom 2016; Diamond 2008; Puddington 2008), accompanied by more international collaboration among authoritarian regimes with the aim of maximising domestic survival (von Soest 2015). Looking at the Balkans, "[m]any countries in the region have a record of electing persons who behave in an authoritarian way after the 'democratic' election" (Farkas 2007: 65). Still, before fully endorsing authoritarianism, political actors may embrace semi-authoritarian modus operandi as a starting point; as some authors have put it, "unfavourable conditions – including weak democratic institutions and political organizations, persistent authoritarian traditions, major socioeconomic problems, and ethnic and religious conflicts – create formidable obstacles to the establishment and, above all, the consolidation of democracy" (Ottaway 2003: 4-5).

In the case of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party has, since its inauguration, continuously pursued the idea of doing what it deemed necessary for Serbia to move forward. Indeed, by continuously accusing the then Democratic Party-led government of (1) having failed to address Serbia's unsatisfactory economic performance, high levels of corruption across all sectors, poverty and unemployment rates, and (2) having allowed some of its own representatives to develop individual and often corrupt activities contradicting the party's original aims, the SNS, notwithstanding, received impressive support in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Following Tomislav Nikolić's victory, some EU officials noted that Serbia was "at a crossroads"; his victory "proved that the country's political landscape had become more complex and that the EU needs to be involved in an intensive dialogue with Serbian authorities and all political leaders from the very first moment" (Lajčák 2012). Indeed, José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, welcomed Nikolić to Brussels, interpreting his choice for his first official visit abroad as "a clear sign of the priority the President and Serbia attach to their European reform agenda" (Barroso 2012). Aleksandar Vučić, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia after the 2012 parliamentary elections and subsequently, the most visible member of the Serbian political elite, had an abrupt volte-face regarding reformist, Zoran Djindjić, whom he had initially vehemently opposed. For example, after Djindjić's assassination in 2003, he even posted a fake street plaque with the name of war crimes fugitive, Ratko Mladić, on a Belgrade boulevard named after Djindjić in 2007. Vučić has since altered his position to the extent that he started recalling and expressing appreciation for Djindjić's pro-EU stance and vision of Serbia's future. He is even on record as saying that he actually felt flattered when compared to him (*B92* 2013) and in interview with the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ* 2014), he tried to defend his drastic transformation by claiming that he misinterpreted the post-Cold War trends for a long time and thus developed wrong ideas.

Overall, by analysing the period following the 2012 elections, it can be argued that the Progressivists have decided to switch their focus from an advocacy of life for politics to a life from politics – a tendency largely confirmed by the growing intention to replace political figures with different political affiliations with the most trustworthy members of the Serbian Progressive Party. Securing a whole range of positions in public administration institutions has meant direct influence on those institutions, cross-sectoral collaboration and also involvement in numerous private sector endeavours whose approval and realisation directly depend on state permission. More problematically, by the 2014 snap elections, viable opposition in Serbia had vanished with political plurality being seriously endangered. However, the Brussels authorities welcomed newly-elected Prime Minister Vučić as someone who could be trusted. For example, Commissioner Barroso said that "[he is] confident that under [Vučić's] determined guidance, Serbia will succeed in addressing the key challenges ahead" (European Commission 2014a). And, when EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, told him that the EU is "determined to help and support Serbia in its efforts to ensure a strong economic path for its people", Vučić reassured her: "We are not poor people seeking charity, we need support for true reforms" (*RFE* 2014). German Chancellor Angela Merkel also congratulated Vučić on his election and invited him to visit Berlin, which he eventually did. On this occasion, she praised his efforts and assured him that Germany would support Serbia on its road to the EU, although she also underscored the significance of reforms, the rule of law and further normalisation of relations with Kosovo (Mitrović 2014).

The EU's welcoming stance and signature of the 2013 Brussels Agreement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalisation of relations between them, as well as the opening of negotiations for Serbia's EU accession in 2014, provided Vučić with more credibility and potential for manoeuvring at home and vis-à-vis the EU. His apparent readiness to pursue economic reforms and market liberalisation sounded much more attractive to foreigners' ears than them getting involved in discussions over his intentions to minimise any competition for power and the suppression of the opposition. The studies on semi-authoritarian regimes also make a reference to the pursuit of economic reforms and reduction of government control in the context of international pressure: "[S]emi-authoritarian regimes can undergo market liberalization with little political liberalization or separation of economic elites from political elites. The linkage between economic liberalization and democratization is complex, and it is dangerous to assume that the former always encourages the latter" (Ottaway 2003: 18). So, Western governments have intentionally avoided adopting a firmer stance against any government policies going against so-called Western values. They expect much from the Vučić government that would not only serve the West's geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Serbia, but also in the Western Balkan region as a whole. Different European Commission statements about Serbia's progress have communicated a highly problematic message that the status quo, with some occasional baby-steps, is actually acceptable. For example, one statement in 2014 indicated that "[t]here is a strong political impetus to fight corruption" and "[t]he new government remains fully committed to EU integration" (European Commission 2014b: 1, 8). A year later the Brussels technocrats agreed that "Serbia's institutions for preventing corruption broadly meet international standards and have shown good potential" with sporadic suggestions as to what should be improved (European Commission 2015: 52).

In reality, the government failed to enhance the business climate, downsize the public sector or come up with measures that would introduce meritocracy in the public sector. More precisely, the Vučić regime took control of it and poured enormous subsidies into public enterprises, the so-called big budget losers. Altogether, they have employed thousands of new party members, many of them in fictional jobs. The German sociologist, Max Weber – whom Vučić paradoxically tends to quote when saying that the Serbian people should adopt the protestant work ethic and be more like the Germans (Malić 2016) – used to write about the benefit-inspired relationship between leaders and their supporters: "The party following, above all the party official and party entrepreneur, naturally expect personal compensation from the victory of their leader – that is, offices or other advantages … They expect that the demagogic effect of the leader's *personality* during the election fight of the party will increase votes and mandates and thereby power, and, thereby, as far as possible, will extend opportunities to their followers to find the compensation for which they hope" (Weber 2009 [1919]: 103). So, many members joined the SNS purely because of available benefits and not because of the party's programme and ideological doctrine. The more the leadership has succeeded in proving that party membership leads to benefits (such as employment, career change, promotion, additional capital accumulation, etc.), the stronger the interest in being affiliated with the party.

## 3. 'L'ÉTAT, C'EST MOI'

The outcome of the April 2016 parliamentary elections, which reconfirmed Vučić's dominance, came as no surprise. As a prime minister, he had been craftily solidifying power during the previous few years, taking control over state institutions as well as non-state actors, such as media. The scholarship discussing power diffusion has carefully explained that "in today's information age, so many decisions are made outside the control of even the most powerful states. Power diffusion also widens the scope of coalition-building. Leaders must win the support of not only other states but also a whole range of non-state actors including media, NGOs, and businesses" (Cooper 2015: 42). In Serbia, ninety-seven local and national-level opposition leaders were arrested in the previous four years. In almost all of these cases the charges were dropped and no indictments were handed down. Of the remainder, only four trials actually commenced, but no verdicts were delivered (Vasić 2015). In local elections, tens of opposition activists were attacked or kidnapped and the police did not resolve a single case (*Novi Magazin* 2014). Finally, the elections confirmed that the relevant administration had not been reformed and, even worse, that the elections suffered serious irregularities which cast a shadow on the democratic process (*Balkanist* 2016).

Since 2012, the dominant media in Serbia have generally tended to support Vučić's actions and reactions at home and abroad. By avoiding criticism and, even more worryingly, applying auto-censorship as a result of warnings and pressures about what can or cannot be reported, the media have indirectly facilitated the continuation of well-embedded practices. One analysis uses a pyramidal structure to illustrate the trend; in this case, "[m]anipulations under the mask of free media help the pyramid to expand in ways [in which] it sustains itself. This is most obviously reflected in the leader's unusually frequent appearances in the media. Moreover, there are more and more journalists and celebrities joining the pyramid. These are exactly the conditions for self-censorship and inferiority to the leader … Many people choose to obey the rules of practice in order to preserve their positions and benefits" (Kelić 2016). It is also worth remembering that Vučić was in charge of the Ministry of Information in the late 1990s when Slobodan Milošević was in power: "[He] was the hatchet man for the media who defended the vast ethnic cleansing by paramilitary police of more than 60% of the 90%-majority Albanians living in the Serbian province of Kosovo" (Pond 2013: 7). Back then, newspapers were regularly fined or, even worse, closed, so that the public would primarily gather information from the state-controlled media or other media working in favour of the ruling elite. In fact, as Timothy Garton Ash (2009: 6-7, 16) has put it, "[t]he single most important pillar of [the Milošević] regime was the state television, which he used to sustain a nationalist siege mentality, especially among people in the country and small towns who had few other sources of information … Milošević's dictatorship was a television dictatorship. And television was equally central to the revolution. From teledictatorship, via telerevolution, to teledemocracy". Thus, aware of this and the ever-increasing relevance of the media in an information age, the Vučić regime has been determined to secure support from as many channels of communication as possible.

If we consider some of the European Commission's assessments regarding the media situation in Serbia, we can see that the former has been conscious of the problems. For example, in 2012, the annual progress report stressed that "violence and threats against journalists remain of concern, although their frequency has decreased slightly. The Serbian authorities have continued to provide police protection for journalists and media outlets which have received threats. Investigations into murders of journalists dating back to the late 1990s/early 2000s and into recurring threats against journalists have so far failed to identify the perpetrators … Access to advertising in the media remains under the control of a few economic and political actors, entailing a significant risk of influence on the media and of self-censorship" (European Commission 2012: 14). Two years later, the Brussels administration seemed even more concerned; this time around, it supported its findings by citing the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which, "media reporting was insufficiently analytical and was influenced by the political parties in power, including through public funding, which led to widespread media self-censorship" (European Commission 2014b: 7). In the Commission's view, "efforts are expected to identify and prosecute suspects of violations of internet freedoms. Pending the full implementation of the newly adopted legislative package, the Serbian media continued to operate in a blurred legal environment which delayed the state's withdrawal from media ownership, one of the cornerstones of the 2011 media strategy" (European Commission 2014b: 46). Most recently, the Commission noted that "[c]ivil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights defenders, who play a key role in raising awareness of civil, political and socioeconomic rights, continued to operate in a public and media environment often hostile to criticism" (European Commission 2016: 8), while "[h]ate speech is often tolerated in the media and is rarely tackled by regulatory authorities or prosecutors. Statements by state officials in relation to the investigative work of journalists have not been conducive to creating an environment in which freedom of expression can be exercised without hindrance" (European Commission 2016: 61).

Looking more closely at media performance during the 2016 election campaign, there was no record of a debate between government and opposition; prominent journalists were fired for reporting about government failures (Hadrović 2017;

Petrović 2016). For example, the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network's journalist, Stevan Dojčinović, who was investigating the property of public officials including Vučić (Dojčinović and Petrović 2016), was attacked by a pro-government tabloid with Vučić's aides labelling him a "foreign spy" and "conspirator" working for "the Western forces" (*Informer* 2016a; *Informer* 2016b). In fact, in its earlier extensive study, Human Rights Watch (2015) had exposed and criticised "[t]he inadequate state response to attacks and threats against journalists and media outlets, political interference including through the courts and curbs on funding, and smear campaigns targeting critical media and journalists". It also urged EU institutions, the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom and different Council of Europe departments to pressure the relevant authorities in Serbia to address the problems. In return, Prime Minister Vučić called the independent *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network* "liars" financed by Michael Davenport, the Head of the EU delegation in Serbia, to attack the Serbian government (*Balkan Insight* 2015; Dragojlo 2016). This was a similar reaction to the one he had when addressing the OSCE: "They are lying, and when you're lying, it is elementary decency to apologize. I will not let anyone attack Serbia … The OSCE has uttered falsehood and lies, and I'm telling the truth" (cited in Barlovac 2014).

None of the above has significantly eroded the government's popularity. Based on his previous involvement in politics, the Vučić regime has clearly understood what works with both domestic and international audiences. As it has always insisted, multiparty elections are held, the rights of citizens are theoretically recognised (although not always in practice), civil society and non-governmental organisations exist and manage to conduct research and communicate their findings (usually thanks to foreign financial assistance), the media reporting goes on, with the Internet being loaded with critical thinking, etc. Alongside this and in the context of semi-authoritarianism, "incumbent governments and parties are in no danger of losing their hold on power, not because they are popular but because they know how to play the democracy game and still retain control" (Ottaway 2003: 6). In the case of Serbia, playing the democracy game is further facilitated when the profile of the average voter is considered. Back in 2013, some surveys demonstrated that the typical voter tended to be largely uninformed or undereducated, with an interest in tabloids, reality TV shows and sports events. Even though he used to vote for the Democratic Party in the past, he now voted for the Serbian Progressive Party – a switch outlining the disloyal nature of half of the electorate and a tendency to vote for the majority party (Latković 2013). Right before the 2016 elections, different surveys repeated the previous description of the electorate, confirming that the support for the Progressivists was still strong and likely to remain so, at least for the foreseeable future (Vukadinović 2016).

In 2017, Aleksandar Vučić became the President of Serbia after crushing his opponents in the first round by winning 55% of the vote. While Vučić himself stated that "[w]hen you have results like this, there is no instability – Serbia is strong and it will be even stronger" (cited in Macdowall 2017), some academics nevertheless pointed out that "[t]his election was over before it began, for the same reason that last year's parliamentary elections were. The tight control that the governing party exercises over media, information, employment, and the distribution of benefits means that there is no level playing field and voters are not in a position to freely make an informed choice" (Gordy 2017). Given his dominance in the party and the Progressivists' majority in the parliament, this particular victory turned Vučić into the strongest and most influential political figure in Serbia which, in the long run, could mean more authoritarianism. EU representatives congratulated him in a similar manner as before; for example, in a joint letter, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, on behalf of the European Council and the European Commission, stated that Vučić's straight victory is a clear confirmation of the people's support for his EU-orientated programme. They also expressed confidence in his ability to promote regional stability and cooperation as well as moving forward the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština (*EURACTIV* 2017). A direct consequence of the glorification of Vučić's regional engagement is that the West's reliance on him will continue to keep him in power, whilst EU accession becomes of secondary relevance to him and the Brussels administration, alike. As could be expected, the street protests, which took place immediately after the election outcome – mostly attended by young people and students, shouting that the elections were not fair and that Serbia was becoming a dictatorship (Krajňák 2017; Rudić and Djurić 2017) – did not generate any critical reflection among the Brussels authorities. Cognisant of the external favourable position, Vučić himself reflected upon the chants *Vučić, You Stole the Election!* and *End the Dictatorship!*: "There are always people not satisfied with election results … It's a democratic process. Nobody intervened, we allowed them to protest" (cited in Rudić and Djurić 2017). Even here, by remaining calm in front of social discontent (mainly because of the participants' lack of organisation and therefore the unlikelihood of challenging the regime) (Pešić 2017), Vučić secured additional points internationally as being someone truly committed to functioning democracy.

## 4. CONCLUSION

The failure of post-Milošević and, even more worryingly, post-Djindjić leaderships to consolidate democracy and develop a clear future orientation of the Serbian state, has provided space for the formation of the Serbian Progressive

Party and the subsequent semi-authoritarian regime. The Vučić government has taken control of the media and numerous in-desperate-need-of-reform public sector institutions, leaving an impression that he has engineered his own system and is capable of remaining dominant over time. The Progressivists' insistence on the politics of opportunity has undoubtedly helped them generate public support at home as well as strengthening the Serbian regime's relevance internationally.

European Union representatives have welcomed Radicals turned Progressivists whilst turning a blind eye to numerous questionable moves and decisions. As pointed out, as long as the Progressivists continue to cooperate with the West or, at least, leave an impression of such an intention, the quality of political pluralism, state institutions, electoral procedures and media reporting, among others, is left to the regime to regulate. Nevertheless, the support for the EU in Serbia is at its lowest since 2000, which means that the EU is actually a big underachiever in the Serbian case (Cvijić 2017). More and more voices have argued that the rise of Vučić has, in fact, weakened the support for the EU because it revealed the EU's hypocrisy towards its core principles and values, such as the rule of law and human rights. Many from the intellectual elite, who firmly advocated EU accession in the past, are now disenchanted with the EU's lack of reaction to Vučić's alleged undermining of democratic principles. The result is that the forces underpinning the pro-EU agenda in public appearances have rapidly diminished, so it has become quite difficult to find those who would publicly confront the anti-EU forces. Vučić and his closest associates are known for being prone to sending mixed messages. On the one hand, they have declaratively supported EU values, pledged for EU accession and so on whilst, on the other hand, the slightest external criticism has resulted in a narrative that the West wants to overthrow Vučić, that big powers are working against Serbia and that Russia makes for a more honest friend. As rightly noted elsewhere, "Russia is positioned as the first friendly Other in the anti-European debates ... [It] is recognized as having historical ties with Serbia based on economic and energy collaboration, as well as certain cultural and religious commonalities and a similar language" (Russell-Omaljev 2016: 55, 103-5). With this in mind, it is not possible to exclude the scenario in which Vučić will turn to Russia upon realising that his pro-EU agenda is capable of generating more harm than benefit in terms of votes.

In case of the above turn, the Brussels administration would most likely start putting pressure on the regime, labelling its domestic policies as detrimental and not in accordance with the EU's accession agenda. At this point, Vučić's semi-authoritarian behaviour would suddenly become highly problematic and the West could claim the need to come up with a new approach so as to allow Serbia to genuinely pursue processes of democratisation and Europeanisation. As in other cases, the foreigners could opt for sanctions, which are generally ineffective, often causing more problems than they resolve. Accordingly, the West might decide to take the opposition seriously and provide it with necessary assistance so as to overthrow the regime – repeating what it already did with Milošević. In such a case, the infamous notion of lessons learnt would be defeated and become quite irrelevant for any future EU involvement in Serbia.

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# PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS AND STUDENT'S PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR IN STUDENT ORGANIZATION

**Abstract**

This text is based on the analysis of the data obtained from the wider research about the student's participation in Student organization. During May, 2017 the field research among students at University of "Ss Cyril and Methodius" (UKIM) in Skopje was conducted. The total number of respondents was 669. Respondents were students from 1 till 5 year from almost all faculties which constitute UKIM. For the purpose of this research, two scales (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) from the short version of IPIP NEO, (Five Factorial personality test) and Questionnaire were used. Agreeableness (A) personality dimension is a tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic toward others, and dimension Conscientiousness (C), is a tendency to be self-disciplined, to act dutifully. Both dimensions are relevant in institutionalized forms of participation (as

student organization is). Questionnaire contains set of questions which were indicators for student's participatory behavior. In this research participatory behavior has been defined as involvement and influence that students have in decision- making processes in student organization.
The overall findings of this research pointed out that independent variables - personality dimensions (Agreeableness and Consciousness) cannot predict student's participatory behavior in their student organization.

**Keywords**: personality dimensions, agreeableness, consciousness, participatory behavior, student organization

## INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to explore the interconnection between personality dimensions (Agreeableness and Consciousness) and student's participatory behavior in student organization. The participatory behavior in this paper has been defined with concepts like 'involvement' and 'influence' (Cheel 1985) and It is closely connected with the influence that students have in the decision-making process in their student organization. The participation of students in the decision-making processes on issues of their interest is present in almost all modern countries, and the reason for students' organizing is of diverse nature: from improvement of the curricula, cost of studies, ways of organizing higher education through the adoption of the law on higher education, to social initiatives that go beyond student life. Participatory behavior within organized and formally organized groups is a segment of political behavior. Participation in decision-making processes at all levels represents the essence of participatory political culture.

Taking in consideration that this research refers to student population, it is relevant to present some specific aspects of this group. This cohort of students belong to the millennial generation (aged mainly 18 to 25), a generation that from its birth to the present day has been a witness to a series of social events that generate a sense of insecurity and unsafely. When all the events that took place in the period of growth and development of this generation are put together, it can be concluded that they refer to living in a society that is continuously at high risk from a security, economic and social aspect. In the "Study on Young People in the Republic of Macedonia" (Latkovikj et al 2016), the following events were noted as socially negative: the 2001 armed ethnic conflict in the country, the natural disasters in the country, and the wars of the former Yugoslavia. The survey on the expectations of the young people in the Republic of Macedonia, carried out in 2006 (Taleski et al 2006) aims to give an overview of the perceptions of young people regarding the vital socio-economic, internal and external political issues, as well as issues in the spheres of education, migration, human rights. The general perception of the situation in the state, as well as the perception of the internal political situation, clearly demonstrates the state of lethargy among the youth, accompanied by mistrust towards the state institutions. These data are also confirmed in the more recent surveys conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (Cvetanova et al 2016 "Student Population Identities in the Republic of Macedonia"; Topuzovska-Latkovikj et al 2016, "Study on Young People in the Republic of Macedonia" - both studies were carried out in 2014). Surveys had shown that young people are usually not socially active, and those young people who are, are members of political parties, a lesser number are members of non-governmental and sports organizations and the smallest number are members of professional organizations. The percentages of students who answered that are politically active have cited pragmatic reasons: employment, a better standard, protection, etc. Regarding political ideology, socialist ideology is still dominant (characterized by collective responsibility, equal distribution of funds, non-conformism and expectation for the responsibility to be taken over by Government institutions) (Markovikj 2010).

## FIVE-FACTOR PERSONALITY MODEL/THE BIG FIVE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

The Five-factor personality model (the Big Five) distinguishes itself from the rest because it is not based on any personality theory, but is based on language analysis, the natural system in which people communicate in order to understand one another (McCrae, Costa 1992). The Five-factor model assumes the existence of five basic dimensions that are in the basis of the personality traits, and are obtained by analysing the language, that is, the attributes used in everyday speech for naming personality traits, as well as data obtained through the application of psychological measuring instruments. The model starts from the concept of hierarchical structure of personality traits. The basic five factors are named as domains and behavioural dimensions that can be grouped in different ways.

- Neuroticism is the dimension that distinguishes the adaptability and emotional stability from inadequacy and emotional instability;
- Extraversion refers to social relations, to social life;
- Openness is third dimension referring to aesthetic sensitivity, intellectual curiosity, intraceptiveness, need for change, independent thinking, preferences of diversity, i.e. inclination to non-dogmatic attitudes;
- Agreeableness is a dimension of interpersonal relations. It involves trust, compassion, the need to help others versus cynicism, selfishness and antagonism. The narrower aspects are trust, sincerity, altruism, modesty;
- Conscientiousness is the ability of self-control as disciplined direction for the realization of set goals, as well as adherence to one's own principles. It manifests itself through the processes of planning, organization, execution of duties and obligations.

Mondak and Halperin (2008) point out that the changes in the research approaches in the domain of political science occur owing to the research in the field of personality psychology where factorial personality models appear. Of these, the five-factor model is best known. The series of research in the field of political science has resulted in data indicating that all five personality dimensions (according to the five-factor model) have a certain connection with certain aspects of political behaviour. The relationship between personality and political behaviour, according to the authors, should be considered in two aspects. The first aspect is that differences in personality can directly affect different forms of political behaviour, for example: manner of voting, political attitudes, strength of identification with certain political parties, etc. The second aspect is that differences in personality can lead to indirect, situational effects on political behaviour.

Data from the surveys in the domain of political behaviour where the connection between personality dimensions and political variables have been explored, showed that the basic political predispositions are deeply rooted in the personality. The data has shown that personality dimensions are related to important political predispositions and attitudes. These dimensions/traits are not considered to be under our conscious control, but have been found to have a significant effect on thoughts, attitudes, and behavior. In the realm of politics they have been shown to influence one's political participation, sense of civic duty, partisanship, ideology, and political efficacy (Dusso 2016).

It has been demonstrated that Openness is negatively linked to identification with conservatism as an ideology, and a positive connection has been made between the indicated ideology and the personality dimension – Consciousness (Gerber et al 2009). Openness and Extraversion are positive linked to direct democracy e.g. to political protests (Brandstatatter and Opp 2014, Gallego and Oberski 2012; Ha et al 2013, Mondiak et al 2010). Other research pointed that Extroversion and Openness are conditioning factors of political activism (Ribeiro, Borba 2016). It has been shown that the dimension Neuroticism (emotional stability) influences the attitude towards political rights. Namely, the persons who are calm and secure are advocates of the politics of equality (Mondiak et al 2010).

Persons with high expressiveness of the Consciousness dimension have a sense of obligation to be good citizens and thus to participate in society (Verhulst, Eaves, Hatemi 2012), and also to stand behind traditional values (Geber et al 2009). Conscientiousness is the personality dimension that includes disposition to be safe, organized and accurate, as well as to work hard and be diligent. People with a high level of conscientiousness usually excel in school and at the workplace. Conscientiousness citizens are known to participate in politics if they perceive it as their civic duty (Monidak 2010). Agreeableness has proven to be positively related to interpersonal trust and trust in politics. Agreeable persons are known to be conflict avoidant and they will avoid political situations that are conflictive (Ackerman 2016). Agreeableness has proven to be positively related to interpersonal trust and trust in politics.

These are findings which support the hypothesis that Big Five have influence on political attitudes and behavior but there are other researchers (Hatemi, Verhulst 2015) who suggests the relationship between personality dimensions and political orientations are either not significant or weak. They declare that the covariance between personality and political preferences is not causal, but due to a common, latent genetic factor that mutually influences both.

## RESEARCH

### General hypothesis:

Personality dimensions (Agreeableness and Consciousness) can predict participatory behaviour of students at UKIM in their student organization (SPUKIM).

### Sample

Institute for sociological, political and juridical research (ISPJR) - Skopje in May 2017 conducted research on 669 students from State University Ss. Cyril and Methodius (UKIM). The research was conducted with quota sample as a first step and convenience sampling in second. Male students were 33,2% and female 61,8%. Respondents were students from 1 till 5 year from almost all faculties which constitute UKIM.

### Instruments

*-Short form of Five-factorial personality test IPIP NEO (Goldberg, 1992).*

For the purpose of this research, two scales were used that measure two personality dimensions: Conscientiousness and Agreeableness from the version of IPIP NEO personality test containing 50 items, which represents a brief measure of the Big Five Personality Dimensions (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness). In this form of the test, each dimension is defined with 10 items. This test uses the "Big Five Factor markers" contained in the International Personality Item Pool, developed and constructed by Goldberg (1992). This test is taken from the "Possible Questionnaire Format for Administering the 50-Item Set of IPIP Big-Five Factor Markers" (International Personality Item Pool.<http://ipip.ori.org/New_IPIP-50-item-scale.htm). The test contains 50 items ranked on a five-step scale where "1" is "very inaccurate", "3" is neutral "neither true nor false" and "5" is "very inaccurate".

The items were translated into Macedonian and the basic metrical features of the two scales were checked (Agreeableness and Consciousness).

The Cronbach's Alpha coefficient indicating the internal reliability of scales for the scale measuring the Agreeableness dimension is 0.79, and for the Conscientiousness scale it is 0.82. These coefficients indicate high reliability on both scales. It can be said that two scales have solid metric characteristics that allows their use in further research.

The minimum score that can be obtained on the Conscientiousness scale and the Agreeableness scale is 10, and the maximum is 50. The minimum obtained score on the Agreeableness scale is 16 and the maximum is 50. On the Conscientiousness scale the minimum score is 19 and the maximum is 50. The arithmetic mean for the Agreeableness scale is 38.07, and on the Conscientiousness scale it is 37.6. Both arithmetic means are above the 50th percentile, which would indicate above average expression of both dimensions in the sample respondents.

*-Questionnaire designed for the purpose of the research to examine the student's attitude toward their organization (SPUKIM)*

Participatory behaviour of the students in student organization has been identified through few questions from the Questioner which are indicators for students' participative behavior in student organization:

a) Involvement in activities organized by student organization ("Have you ever been involved in some of the activities organized by SPUKIM?") and participation in the work of student organization bodies ("Have you participated in the work of any of the bodies of SPUKIM?");
b) Voting for representatives in student organization ("Did you voted for the representatives in student organization at the faculty?" ; "Did you voted for the president in student organization at the faculty?"l; "Did you woted for the president of student organization at the University?")

*Results*

Before any further elaboration of the main general hypothesis it is relevant to highlighted very low level of knowledge and almost absence of student's participation in student organization (SPUKIM). The percentage of positive answers on the first question in the Questionnaire: "How much are you familiar with the work of SPUKIM" is very low and it is 11,3%. Only 10% of respondents give response that they have been involved in some activities organized by student organization, and only 0,8% are actively involved in the working activities of some

SPUKIM bodies. The percentage of respondents who give their vote for student's representatives is very low: 9% voted for representatives in student organization on the faculty level, 6,8% for president of student organization on faculty level, and 6.1% for president of the student organization on the level of University.

From a statistical domain, a situation where largest number of respondents are grouping in one category makes problematic analyse of the interconnection between variables (personality dimensions and student's participatory behaviour). To explore prediction of personality dimensions on participative behaviour, Binary logistic statistic was applied. Dependent variables (categorical one, with categories: "yes" or "no") are answers on the questions which are indicators for student's participatory behaviour and independent variables are scores on the two scales from the Five-factorial personality test IPIP NEO (Agreeableness and Consciousness). No statistically significance difference was found between variables, so it can be said that both personality dimensions cannot be assumed as predictor variables for student's participatory behaviour.

## CONCLUSION

Data obtained from applied binary regression statistic indicate that personality dimensions: Agreeableness and Conscientiousness cannot be assumed as predictor variables for student's participatory behavior. So, the general conclusion from this research points to the weak connection between the personality dimensions "Conscientiousness" and "Agreeableness" and the students' participatory behaviour in their student organization (SPUKIM). In a further in-depth study, it might be possible to continue exploration of the relationship between the other three personality dimensions: Openness, Neuroticism, Extroversion and the student's participative behaviour in student organization (SPUKIM).

This conclusion should be considered with caution. The absence of interconnection of variables maybe is a consequence of the absence of student's participatory behavior in student organization (SPUKIM). Weak expression of knowledge and low level of participation speaks about the apathy of students to organize them-selves in a formal student organization – SPUKIM, which in its Statute is defined as an association of citizens that has an autonomous character and whose main goal is advocacy and promotion of students' rights at all levels: local, central and international level[3]. It this case it is obviously that this particular student organization (SPUKIM) do not provide clime for their member to practice participative behavior through involvement and influence in the decision making

[3] http://www.gf.ukim.edu.mk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=54

processes. Since participatory behavior is part of a participatory political culture and primarily depends on the importance of the social role, then the student organization should invest in the processes of integrating its own members, making the role of a student important and significant to them.

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