

UNIVERSITY "Ss. CYRIL AND METHODIUS" in SKOPJE



INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL  
AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH



# ANNUAL of ISPJR 2021

Volume XLV

Number 1/2

Skopje, 2021

---

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL  
AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH  
UNIVERSITY "Ss. CIRYL AND METHODIUS" in SKOPJE

# **ANNUAL**

## **2021**

Volume XLV

Number 1/2

Skopje, 2021

---

**International Editorial Board:**

Bojana Naumovska PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Mirjana Najchevska PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Stefan Bouzarovski PhD, University of Birmingham - United Kingdom  
Ruzica Cacanaska PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Panajotis Cakiparologlu PhD, Palacky University Olomouc - Czech Republic  
Wojciech Kotowicz PhD, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn - Poland  
Reinhard Heinisch PhD, Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg - Austria  
Nijaz Ibrulj PhD, University of Sarajevo - Bosnia and Hercegovina  
Pande Lazarevski PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Vesna Zabijakin Chatleska PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Galina Ivanova Koleva PhD, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Bulgaria  
Marijana Markovic PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Boris Nieswand PhD, University of Tübingen - Germany  
Mina Petrovic PhD, University of Belgrade - Serbia  
Eleonora Serafimovska PhD, ISPJR - Macedonia  
Katerina Spasovska PhD, Western Carolina University - USA  
Ilka Thiessen PhD, Vancouver Island University - Canada  
Marcin Chelminiak PhD, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn - Poland

**Editor-in-Chief:**

Bojana Naumovska, PhD

**Published by:**

University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” - Skopje  
Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical  
Research – Skopje  
[www.isppi.ukim.edu.mk](http://www.isppi.ukim.edu.mk)  
Partizanski odredi bb, 1000 Skopje  
Republic of North Macedonia  
Tel. 02/3061-119  
Fax. 02/3061-282  
P.O. Box: 435

**ISSN 1857-7350**

**ISSN 0350-1825**

## CONTENTS

**Silvija Shaleva**

URBAN COMMONS AND COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC SPACES  
IN CONTEMPORARY CITIES .....11

**Elena Koprtla**

THE URBAN IDENTITY IN POST-SOCIALIST CITIES THROUGH  
THE LENSES OF THE BALKAN CINEMA .....29

**Nikola Gjorgjievski**

THE AMBIGUOUS SURFACE: POETIC, FORMAL AND PROGRAMMATIC  
READING OF THE TERRITORY .....39

**Mirjana Lozanovska**

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:  
*ABANDONED INDUSTRIAL AREAS IN THE CITY OF SKOPJE* .....47

**Srdjan Radović**

EVOLUTION OF A BELGRADE SQUARE FROM A TRANSPORTATION  
HUB INTO A (QUASI) HISTORICAL THEME PARK .....61

**Bojana Naumovska**

THE GERMAN ELECTORAL MODEL IN RESPONSE  
TO THE MACEDONIAN POLITICAL CONTENT .....71

**Nikola Gjorgon**

**Gordica Karanfilovska**

BREXIT AND THE EUROPEAN PEACE PROJECT PARADIGM.....85

**Nazan Mustafa**

THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTS ON THE PERFORMANCE  
OF FAMILY BUSINESS.....101



## FOREWORD

Dear readers,

In the discourse on urban life, there is always a risk of a constant emphasis on loss – the open and colorful city life in public spaces being privatized, commodified or segregated in new ways. Putting aside the urban imaginary and perceptions of the modern city (Donald 1999), the mere fact of urban densification inevitably leads to shrinking public spaces. While public spaces are always under threat, a diachronic perspective enables us to see how some areas and meeting places are enclosed or disappear while others are born. In a constantly changing cityscape, there are restrictions imposed but also new emerging potentials for claiming collective space. This transformation is additionally burdened by the demographic changes particularly noticeable in last decades. Cities have always been the hallmark of diversity and we must take into account this social fact.

As a basic fact of social life, one may safely say that there is no city without plurality. In terms of languages, religions, nationalities and citizenship, Europe is certainly more diverse today than 50 years ago. In that sense, we may indeed speak of progressing pluralization, or rise of superdiversity (Vertovec 2007). However, from a historical point of view, religious, linguistic, or any kind of diversity in Europe has rather been the norm than the exception. Diversification, nevertheless, is not a neutral or absolutely benign process, but is rather an ambiguous one. Any new type of diversity and every new wave of experienced difference will inevitably provoke debate, raise contradictions and endless confrontations bringing us to the predicament of difference (Ang and St Louis 2005). What poses a challenge to defining public interest is not the fact that there is diversity but rather the kind of diversity there is. Resolving those differences for the vaguely defined public interest in the contemporary cities is a daunting task, but it must not be ignored.

The various uses of public spaces and motions of users, differentiated by national, religious and otherwise defined backgrounds, in public spaces, as well as diverse and divergent aesthetic preferences, depending on social milieu, are putting pressure on urban planners, for whom these interests all too often appear to be mutually exclusive. Even priorities are a matter of controversy: should the focus primarily lie on designing public space for as many different interest groups as possible in one single space, or is aesthetics the key factor (and whose aesthetics)? Is it more important to promote local businesses or to counterbalance

social inequality? Finally, it appears that particular social groups that are more powerful, are always in a better position to define the “public interest”.

The theme of living together certainly has its continuity throughout the history and development of civilization, in which all transformations, every progress, and all social divisions are mirrored in the cities. This kind of diversity in ethnicity, culture and religion tend to create separate and different open/public spaces and more generally speaking, urban landscapes. The forms and shapes of the urban built environment, expressed through architecture and cityscapes reflects these efforts to organize social life, sometimes in accommodating manner accounting for the differences, sometimes by assimilatory design of dominant imposition. We have encouraged our invited authors to take an innovative research approach, bringing forward interdisciplinary research, ideally through the users’ experiences. This collection managed to combine various perspectives and provides for cross-disciplinary dialogue on a common platform broad enough to transcend the architectural and urban planning approaches, to better inform them and enrich them. Following Czepczynski, we argue that there are two, opposing approaches to understand landscapes: one, held by ecologists and urbanists understand landscape as an entity, other, held by anthropologists and historians, see landscape as relationship (2008: 2). With the papers in this special issue, we try to combine these different views into a productive discussion that hopefully enriches our understanding of the built environment and helps us recognize and articulate the needs that inhabitants have.

Architectural innovations to change communities’ lives come not merely from good intentions, but must be based on robust research and analysis from other fields of knowledge concerned with urbanity and the built environment. Built on concepts of anthropology, sociology, human geography, cognitive psychology, and other social science disciplines and humanities, successful human-centered architectural design projects are the results of a holistic understanding of their intended users. The success of human-centered architectural designs isn’t measured by their size or glamour, or pure aesthetical criteria, but by how much value they add to their users’ daily lives. Same wise, the research in various social science disciplines that deal with human habitats and social interaction could and should benefit from advances in architectural thought. Moreover, it becomes increasingly evident that such endeavors, which seek profound understanding of urban phenomena and the built environment, only benefit from conceptual and intellectual cross-fertilization of interdisciplinary approaches. This special issue of the Annual of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research aims at demonstrating the usefulness of such an open approach in furthering our understanding of many difficult and troublesome phenomena that burden our everyday lives.

The revelation that there is no universal answer to an actual question at the same time represents a critique of the current urban-architectural practices, which lack the idea of completeness and comprehensiveness of spatial action. In order to understand all the key aspects and factors of urban society, and to obtain and achieve quality and humane living spaces for people in the ‘modern’ society, the topics the authors in this special issue engage with involve propositions and world-views from theories in social science and are directly connected to environmental development and urban planning. The involvement of professionals from several different fields on the topic provides an opportunity for researchers to increase supervisory capacity, create collaborations in research projects, and

introduce creative practice research methodologies. The articles mainly address the topic from local perspective as the cases studied pertain on specific issues of the relationship between urban practice, urbanism, and theoretical approaches of the urban imaginary and urbanist conceptualization looking at particular at creation of public spaces in the cities in the region of South East Europe, but it is globally related topic to the processes of urban transformation, and urban innovation in the context of transitional societies.

This special issue contains five articles that aim at bridging a gaping hole in the approach to urban planning and citizens' urban practices. This schism exists because of incompatibility between the public and private interests that when set in motion eventually shape our cities and living environment at the expense of the former. This collection does not tackle directly the clash between the capital and the public interests of the citizens, but rather provides a conceptual framework to help grasp urban phenomena from a wider perspective, leading us to a meaningful understanding of urbanity, not confined merely to the technicality of urban planning, but the complexity of social interactions on a larger and greater scale, too. For example, invoking the urban commons should be self-explanatory, but it rather demands further elaboration when speaking with non-experts in the field, without any guarantees that it will resonate clearly even among those responsible for the designing and functioning of our cities. If we can help contribute towards bridging that gap would be the greatest satisfaction for this effort. In what follows is a brief introduction of each of the articles and the main issues they analyze.

We open with a text by Nikola Georgievski on the reading of territory, followed by a practical example of symbolic, but also social, economic, and political, hence, symbolic transformation of a public space in Belgrade by Srdjan Radović. The third article is by Elena Koprtla that offers a cultural studies perspective and looks at the interplay of the urban landscapes and cinematography and how they co-produce urban identity. After these more theoretically inclined papers, which provide a rich toolbox for further analysis of urban phenomena, two more texts, grounded on more particular examples from Skopje, Macedonia provide valuable explorations of "holistic" architectural approach, the one that takes in account, seriously, the social aspect of urban interventions in the built environment in agreement with citizens needs and uses. Silvija Shaleva looks at the urban voids, while Mirjana Lozanovska interrogates the abandoned industrial sites. Both articles are based on research in Skopje.

The very understanding of the territory, as a quintessential concept for the whole enterprise of urban studies, or urban planning particularly and it is thoroughly explored in Georgievski's contribution to this issue. Pressing for a broadened conceptualization of the territory as urged by the transition of the craft of architecture from design field to one of a social science discipline, while accepting the undeniable influence of the built environment in human societies, Georgievski offers three approaches to reading of territory. The first is the poetic, or metaphorical and subjective reading of the territory as per Solà-Morales in "Terrain Vague" (1995). The second reading is formal and here by calling upon Gregotti (1981), Georgievski explains the process of reaching an understanding of the anthropogeographical origins of the terrain with the better-defined role of the architect as a creator of functions, not of forms, while creating the landscape, once it is understood that the building is not just a product of an architect and that we must embrace wider understanding of the architectural projects beyond the linear trajectory of concept, analysis, and project. After



we establish classificatory division of the terrain in distinguishable fields it allows us to approach creatively the semantic reading of the terrain and to comprehend it as an ensemble created within a human - nature interplay. Finally, thus expanded understanding of the role of urbanism, it summons the programmatic role of architecture, as envisioned by Koolhaas, (1997) with a paradigmatic shift from creation of stable and fixed objects to one of fluidity and change in the landscape.

Whatever the academic and professional advances may intend to bring to the practice of urban planning in democratically insufficient states, some traditional, or even atavistic drives seem to prevail as the decision making is shifted towards the power holders and away from the citizens. This allows for expression of political ideologies in the public space. The intention to produce a fixed meaning in space is particularly present in the nationalist ideology and when given a chance, the nationalists insist on inscribing the public space with signs that supposedly permanently mark the dominance of their nation on that territory. We have seen that happening in Macedonia with the nationalist remaking of the capital city with the infamous project “Skopje 2014”, but we see it also just to the north of Macedonia in neighboring Serbia. Radović’s contribution to this volume speaks exactly of these processes where fluidity is tamed by nationalist fixity. Even the name of the space under scrutiny in the article reflects this process, so from vernacular term Štajga (with roots in German steigen – to climb, off and on, as in and out of trains, as it was the main railway and train station in Belgrade), later officially named the Square of Brotherhood and Unity, reflecting the ideologically loaded concept of socialist multiculturalism, to geographically derived Savski Trg (Sava river Square) aiming to neutralize the socialist legacy. Most importantly, it is now a site that hosts the biggest monument erected in Serbia, a 27 meter high sculpture of Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the most famous Serbian medieval dynasty. Radović offers rich analysis of the wider urbanistic, economic as well as the political transformations that led to this outcome and by diachronic presentation of its numerous developmental phases through modernity, post-modernity, to super modernity, that results with the triumph of the nationalist kitch.

The interplay, or interrelatedness of urban space and identity is in the main focus of Koprta when discussing it in this volume from the perspective of cinematographic treatment of cities. Theoretical approaches from both cultural/film studies and urban theories craftily interwoven in this article, produce enriching analysis of the urban space and explain the shaping of identity through films. Koprta approaches the urban imaginary and urban identity through a camera lens in films produced in post-socialist former Yugoslav lands. She points out the importance of visual representations and the power of images in identity formation. The post-socialist period of transition was marked by social disintegration, political confusion, and cultural ambiguity and Koprta observed that the frequent use of urban spaces of abandonment, neglect and murky transformation and urban decay in the films from this period was used for a successful portrayal of the prevailing social conditions in the region.

Shaleva turns her gaze to those ambiguous and decaying spaces, the urban voids, and proposes creative and productive approaches for their transformation. By rightly pointing out the notion of urban commons as, not only just and fair, but also most reasonable solution for those urban voids, Shaleva guides us through the cutting edge literature on the topic from both architecture and social sciences and provides the examples from real life, such as Berlin

and Skopje, one positively resolved, the other still in limbo. We are led from theoretical observations about public space and the role of the architecture in shaping the city to the perspective of participatory urbanism and other most advanced views and practices, best summed up with the conceptualization of architecture as a mediator.

Also insistent on the participatory approach is Lozanovska who analyzes the problem of another type of urban voids, the abandoned industrial sites in Skopje. Equally well informed and very informative is her use of the most relevant literature, focusing on the assessment of the level of participatory engagement of the local inhabitants in urban planning. She lists the consequences, positive or negative, that accompany its full application, or total neglect as is the case in the chosen site, the former Kuprum factory. Skopje was being developed as an industrial city during socialism and the collapse of Yugoslavia crumbled that economic system alongside the industrial complex that supported it. These ghostly industrial sites are left to decay for decades and as of recently the capital has been mobilized to turn them into lucrative residential and commercial buildings, often at the cost of the well-being of the neighborhoods where they are located while totally neglecting the needs of the local inhabitants.

We have invited our contributors to explore how the processes of politics and ideology affect the living experience in the city and its inhabitants, and how the cultural and ethnic differences made an impact on the public, and environmental development. The entire complexity of related and interwoven phenomena cannot be properly dealt with, even when a dedicated special issue allows for it, but we hope that we managed to contribute, at least modestly, to improved understanding of the possible paths that would lead us towards more comprehensive urban planning. Emerging from this collection is the need for envisioning the urban phenomena as urban social practice, not a playing field for lego architecture, nor as a battlefield for corrupted construction industry investors and administration, as it is the case in Skopje, the hometown of most of the contributors to this volume, who work and are educated in Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Copenhagen, and as in the similar case in neighboring Serbia, in Belgrade, presented here.

Without invoking, the somehow worn out, battle cry of urban activists, the right to the city, but hoping that this special issue manages to make it clear that it should be established fact, accepted and acknowledged by all the relevant factors in the society for the construction of livable, pleasant, and clean cities. This seems to be at odds with the pressure of the private capital to keep on building and the private interests for profit that exploit the public space, appropriating it and neglecting the common interest. This is not an ideological battle between those who are right and left, or right or wrong, as we all will continue to suffer the negative consequences of poorly conceived planning and the continuing exclusion of the citizens from the decision making processes that affect the future of our cities. We managed to pollute our cities to record levels and we and the future generations will be paying with our and their health all those ill-conceived decisions. Here we must add the nationalist symbolic pollution of our cities that insistently neglects the long-standing diversity. Diversity that has always been the main characteristic of urbanity and of this region in particular and is under assault by the nationalist symbolic reordering of the public spaces, making the cities semantically ineligible, or uninviting for the many with whom we share them.

These and many other post-socialist cities are post-industrial cities simultaneously and despite the de-industrialization they suffocate their citizens by uncontrolled densification,

poor public transport and overcrowded, car infested roads and pavements, that leave no space for pedestrians and cyclists, nor for wheelchairs or baby prams. The devastating loss of green spaces and the epidemic energetic poverty are a reason even more compelling for immediate rethinking of established urban (non)planning practices that must be remedied at once, without hesitation. We remain hopeful that the points raised in these articles and the critical literature that they are based upon will become at least a starting point for better informed development of our cities.

**Guest Editorial**

Goran Janev, Silviya Shaleva  
“Sts Cyril and Methodius” University in Skopje  
and University of Ljubljana

REFERENCES:

- Ang I and St Lous B (2005) “Predicament of Difference” *Ethnicities*, Vol 5(3): 291-304.
- Czeczynski M (2008) *Cultural Landscapes of Post-Socialist Cities: Representation of powers and needs*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Donald J (1999) *Imagining the Modern City*, Athlone Press, London.
- Gregotti V (2009) *The Form of the Territory*. OASE: Issue 80, pp. 7-22.
- Koolhaas R (1997) *Whatever happened to urbanism?* J. Sigler, ed. S, M, L, XL. s.l.:The Monacelli Press, pp. 960-971.
- Solà-Morales (1995) *Terrain Vague*. C. C. Davidson, ed. Anyplace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, pp. 118-123.
- Vertovec S (2007) “Super-diversity and its implications”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30:6, pp.1024-1054.

*Silvija Shaleva, PhD, research fellow*

University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Architecture, Slovenia

*silvijashaleva@gmail.com*

## URBAN COMMONS AND COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC SPACES IN CONTEMPORARY CITIES

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

- VIP Benefits:**
1. Converts the whole document.
  2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Urban commons arise from the basic need of man to protect his life from natural disasters and to establish his order in the cosmos, to oppose the power of nature. Since then, it has been constantly transformed, but still contains the elements of the ancient and the modern. Urban commons are not a new phenomenon, but their resurgence in contemporary cities do not mean the loss of urban values and the authenticity of the urban place, but their improvement and adaptation for the future. Change does not mean demolition and re-construction from the beginning, but the upgrading of the existing one. Urban commons or commoning is an increasingly intriguing topic, as experts and professionals are seeking a way to better manage them to accomplish commoning in urban societies. Urban commons are created with temporary processes continuously appearing and disappearing, depending upon the need of people. By adopting interdisciplinary methodology and creating a temporary use of open public spaces, where architects in the process of planning can contribute to promoting urban commoning rather than commercialisation on space. Knowing that cities and communities are in constant change, and for this reason, permanent design isn't always an immediate solution. Thereby the role of architects is to promote or support commoning, variations, opportunities and flexibility in the design processes, to promote more livability in urban spaces.

Remove it Now

**Keywords:** Urban commoning, common space, urban quality of life, temporary use



---

## PUBLIC SPACE AND ITS USERS

Urban planning is still a relatively young profession globally. As it developed more intensively in the 19th century and since then, much attention has been paid to controlled planning, construction and development of cities. From the beginning, the emergence of urban planning has been linked to the need to bring order to the city. The uncontrolled construction and building made it difficult to control the space. Also, it was an obstacle to achieving common needs, from basic infrastructure to a better quality of life. The tension between the private and common interests is recurring since. Urban commons, is a notion associated with the work of David Harvey (2012), focusing more closely on public spaces and their design, including the use of public space as places of commemoration. Besides, common interest must take in account the diversity of the urban population. In terms of languages, religions, nationality and citizenship, Europe is certainly more diverse today than half a century ago. In that sense, we may speak of progressing pluralisation. Any new type of diversity and every new wave of experienced difference will inevitably provoke debate among planners and architects. The sociology of space seems to offer a useful starting point for a relational approach to promoting and managing urban commons.


Building on Lefebvre's (1991, 2004) theory, there are numerous scientific studies redefining and specifying the concept of space to provide a new theoretical basis for the urban theory. 'Questions of the commons', writes Harvey (2012: 71), are contradictory and therefore always contested. Behind these contestations lie conflicting social and political interests. Professionals representing public interests have increasingly raised concerns that due to expanding social diversification, their mandate is becoming uncertain. The problem is obviously how to design public places in a 'city meant for all'. The different motions of users regarding public spaces, as well as dissimilar aesthetic preferences depending on social milieus are putting pressure on urban planners, for whom these interests all too often appear to be mutually exclusive.

Even priorities are a matter of controversy: should the focus primarily lie on designing public space for as many different interest groups as possible in a single space, or is aesthetics the key factor, and whose aesthetics? Is it more important to promote local businesses or to counterbalance social inequality? In the end, it appears that particular social groups that are more powerful, are always in a better position to define the "public interest".

The common land and an overall discussion of urban voids are describing places that are overlooked by the main actors and activists, we can immediately relate them to the concept of 'heterotopia'. This term was originally coined by Michel Foucault (1967) to describe places that are 'in relation with the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralise, or invent the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect'. Urban voids, thus recode functionless areas in a city. Urban voids are all areas in a city, whose functions and designs have not yet been decided upon conclusively. All these areas do not fulfil any concrete function in the urban system. They have lost their original function, being in some kind of in-between stage. In that way, the urban voids can be given a new meaning. As spaces for temporary use, or spaces for new social opportunities we can treat them as urban commons. Authors like Richard Sennett (1990) have applied this concept to urban theory, pointing out the possibility of 'liminal spaces' to bring together a diverse range of people and

activities, resulting in valuable exchanges and connections between them (Carmona 2010). Such diversity in ethnicity, culture and religion tend to create separate and different public spaces.

Knowing that through the years is the past expansion of migration in Europe has increased rapidly, followed by ethnic diversity, overpopulation and so on has increased urban divisions and land take (see: figure1). Expanding or open common space explicitly expresses the power commoning must create new forms of life-in-common and a culture of sharing.



**Figure 1.** (left): urban population density in 2015 for European FUAs in inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>; (right): population changes between 2015-2050 in European FUAs. The future of cities, opportunities challenges and the way forward by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. Available at: <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC116711> (Accessed 20 October 2021)

Threshold spatiality, a spatiality of passages that connect while separating and separate while connecting, will be shown to characterize such spaces produced in common and through commoning (Stavrvides 2016). Common space admits no criteria; it is open to all in the same way. What is often missed in the appreciation of common space is that it has the quality of being given to humans. Furthermore, a common space is not a public space, for it is not a human construct (Henaff M and Strong T 2001). Common space can be considered as a relation between a social group and its effort to define a world that is shared between its members.

## TEMPORARY OCCUPANCY ON PUBLIC SPACE AND URBAN COMMONING

The urban space is the most complex framework of human activities and reflects the needs, values and aspirations that society possesses at a certain time. This multi-layered medium is conceived and materialised through architecture. The physical structure of the city reflects the idea of social, economic, natural, technical and technological structures, it is an expression of urban life.

It is created in the long run from cultural, sociological and architectural considerations and urban planning marked by relative consistency and liveliness. Moving from the Antique period to the present, public space and democracy provide both historical accounts and a comparative analytical framework for understanding public space (Henaff M and Strong T 2001).

Architecture and physical changes in space are not only material forms but also bearers of deeper social meanings in a community. According to De Graff (2017), public space is used to accommodate defiance of prevailing powers; today it defines the notion of “the public” itself. Public Space is characterized as an area within a city that is accessible to all, excluding no one based on their background, gender, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic background.

In the book “Insurgent Public Space: Guerrilla Urbanism and the Remaking of Contemporary Cities”, Hou defines: Public space has been an important facet of cities and urban culture. In cities around the world, urban spaces such as plazas, markets, streets, temples, and urban parks have long been the centres of civic life for urban dwellers. They provide opportunities for gathering, socialising, recreation, festivals, as well as protests and demonstrations. As parks and plazas, urban open spaces provide relief from dense urban districts and structured everyday life. As civic architecture, they become collective expressions of a city as well as depositories of personal memories. As places where important historical events tend to unfold, public spaces are imbued with important, collective meanings – both official and unofficial (Hou 2010).

Furthermore, the quality of public space has changed over time. Indeed, contemporary trends and diversity in society have a massive impact on the possibilities and existence of such a space.

The dramatic changes of the modern city, its instability, temporality, fragmentation encourage us to think again about the architecture of the city, the way it is established and changed.



Although today there are a number of theories about the metastability of the architectural form as well as the relationship between social change and the spatial framework, it seems that they cannot fully explain the specificity and way the physical structure of our environment changes and the excesses and architectural transformation.

The first critical theories of modern discourse were formulated through which the city is perceived as a complex and contradictory configuration. Aldo Rossi specified the dual nature of the city in history: the city as a material artefact, a handicraft object, built over time, but also a city as a collective representation, which refers not only to the real structure of the city but also to the idea. In that sense, even in the periods of backwardness of the cities, it is possible to single out the “typological character of an indeterminate inherent order” (Rossi 1982: 127). The concept of collective memory, introduced by Aldo Rossi in the discourse of architecture, refers to the complementary character of the image of the city, which consists of a dialogue of material and intangible values, a synthesis of a series of values related to the collective Imagination:

“It can be said that the city itself is the collective memory of its inhabitants and, like memory, it is connected with objects and places” (Rossi 1982: 127–130).

The urban space is the most complex framework of human activities and reflects the needs, values and aspirations that society possesses at a certain time. This multi-layered medium is conceived and materialised through architecture. In the end, citizen-led or citizen engagement activities are becoming increasingly significant to rethink the future of our urban territories. Updated concepts or revised methodologies are no longer sufficient to analyze the new urban condition or to intervene in it. We must face the reified space of contemporary capitalism critically, focusing on the very foundations of the “society of the spectacle,” as well as on the environmental and social collapse in the era of “planetary urbanization.” (Medrano et al., 2021). Some ‘actors’ are taking more alternative models of exploration on possibilities that space can offer. Especially the young generation of architects lacking major projects turn to the basics, focusing not only on well-designed on paper architecture, but turning towards architecture made of actions. Those architects have become and have taken the role of activists in the field of architecture and urbanism. As long as there have been cities, there have been makers (Van der Moolen 2017).

Knowing that today’s public spaces in cities are being created in the commercial public realm (see: figure 2). That in most scenarios lack of support for public togetherness, there is almost no space for people to come together over productive activities or any kind of form that can support stronger bonds between the urban society.



**Figure 2.** New York Times Square during lockdown due to Covid Pandemic in 2020. Available at: <https://www.sciencenews.org/article/covid19-pandemic-lockdowns-seismic-noise-humans>. (Accessed 22 October 2021)

This is a challenge mostly for urban governments, but also developers whose interest is harmed by this conflict, in a way to find more diverse models to apply to the process of designing urban areas, outside of the market-driven logic. On this side, today there are plenty of fruitful examples, supporting that kind of collective participation and temporary usurpation on urban space, often recognized as urban commons.

In most cases, urban commons are set in reference to kinds of community gardens, and collective agriculture. But only by planting rhubarb, new urban policies cannot be achieved. This trend of urban commoning, and commoners in the city is mostly a bottom-up initiative on low cost and usually connected to tiny acts of resistance on a particular group of citizens, that can contribute to the local community. But non the less, commoning can be scaled up to influence everyday processes in a metropolis, opening questions for energy use, food distribution, green areas, clean air, lack of land for residential areas.

On the other side it is acknowledged that the “public” is in retreat. Public services, public housing, public space more and more belongs to the private sphere. In this emerging order, the commons offer an alternative, between public and private. At least in theory the commons are a radical potential, the idea of land that is commonly owned and managed speaks of 21<sup>st</sup>-century sensibility for participation by citizens.

We will take Berlin as one example that is different from other divided cities because it reflects an ideological separation caused by political differences, rather than ethnic, national, or religious ones (Molnar 2010). Either way, it shows an example of urban planning and a way or approach, as ‘giving’ back the public space to Berlin’s citizens. Urban strategies and planning after the reunification of the city were supposed to connect two entities. Due

to ideological differences between Capitalist and Socialist regimes, planning discourses evolved differently. One example of mending these gaps in recent history is the case of the Tempelhof airfield in Berlin. With a unique status, this valuable piece of land of 300 ha was given to the citizens in 2010. This recreational hub on such an open space in the frames of a previous airport located so close to city Berlin's centre is quite an opportunity for investors and developers. Negotiations that were set on by the government, intended to take 25% of the site to be used for buildings to provide affordable housing, since migratory pressure to Berlin increases. Yet after debates and a campaign backed by the media, 64.3% of voters chose to keep Tempelhof as it is (see: figure3, figure4, figure5). The government and developers were left empty-handed. The airport symbolised freedom, after being on the frontline of the cold war. The site is called Tempelhofer Freiheit, or Tempelhof Freedom. People of Berlin have their space of free spirit, it is no surprise that they are not willing to give it back.

In this way, a new trend is acknowledged by many practitioners who are ready for a more progressive and exciting approach. That can make the underused space open for different setups and programs that in another way would not be able to bring spontaneity, new meaning to the existing urban environment.

In such a theory, Berlin is one of the pioneers in reusing abandoned sites, decaying lands, and revitalizing urban areas.



**Figure 3.** Frauendorf M. (2020) Tempelhof Feld and the city Berlin in the background. Available at: <https://www.berlin.de/tourismus/parks-und-gaerten/3561883-1740419-tempelhofer-feld.html>. (Accessed 22 October 2021)




**Figure 4. Figure 5.** Frauendorf M. (2020) Berlin: People are out and about on Tempelhofer Feld during sunset (community gardens can be seen at the top left). Available at: <https://www.berlin.de/tourismus/parks-und-gaerten/3561883-1740419-tempelhofer-feld.html>. (Accessed 22 October 2021)

The second example in this article is located in the city of Skopje, N.Macedonia. Our location is situated below the fortress hill Kale, less than a kilometre distant from the main city square “Plostad Makedonija”. It stretches out along the northern bank of the river Vardar.

It is a space that with time spontaneously got new meaning or new temporary programs defined by the local users. For decades it has been a buffer zone in the divided city, no one's and everyone's non-place. In this terrain, vague many completely independent and unrelated functions have developed next to each other – without actually interfering with each other. This site has spontaneously become an informal trading place especially amongst unemployed and retired from all ethnic groups. Due to its central position in the city, the location is easy to reach by foot or bicycle from Albanian and Macedonian as well as Roma neighbourhoods. With this one example, a process that appeared at once as an informal site presents the possibility and will of people to occupy a space according to their needs.

Since the competition project after 1963 from the Kenzo Tange team for the master plan of the city centre, the core element was the distinct zone along the riverbanks enhanced with numerous public functions intended to turn the boundary of the river into a space of collectivity and openness for every citizen of Skopje. These plans were to include a recreational green space in the area adjacent to the fortress Kale. However, the plan was frequently modified and only partially realised. In the decades since reconstruction, Tange's concept for the river recreational zone never became the intended unifying core but rather an urban void. This is just one of few examples, since the practice and urban strategies in Skopje do not allow many opportunities, and free space where and urban commoning is promoted instead of commercialisation on such space. These spaces are so-called urban voids, land that no one uses, even though it is in the very centre of the city. In the end, this kind of abandonment on the site is usually a base for the urban commoning to appear, which is not acknowledged by representatives and city planners. Which shows the lack of ability from governance to deal with the urban voids in the capital city. Once a training area of the state automobile association, then a temporary flea market, today a non-formal parking space, and an empty abandoned space (see: figure6, figure7, figure8).



**Figure 6.** Author's photography 2021. Urban void, previous training area of the state automobile association.



**Figure 7.** Hristov D. 2015 Crv Pazar, Skopje. Informal Market Worlds Atlas. NAI Publishers, Rotterdam pp. 236-241



**Figure 8** Author's photography 2020. Green area on site.

The long-lasting debate over the use of public or open spaces in cities led to many experimental approaches in urban development. Temporary proposals or activities can show the potential of temporary use that are not planned or institutionalized. These actions can be seen as part of the urban commoning since that is a usually localized bottom-up process in one society.

Temporary use is the opposite, the antagonist of professions like architecture and urban planning, but the one that in short term can adjust more rapidly to the new proposals or changes brought by the users. With this approach, a different set of tools can be offered. To be able to design space for specific use in a specific time and still leave space for future changes and adaptations to be made easily. The new relationship between planners and users is growing more than ever in the urban context. On the contrary to the permanent design, which is a final development ending with one result, the temporary one remains as an open system that encourages modification and revision.

Temporary use can be implemented or seen in many kinds of forms and situations especially in the urban environment (see: figure9). Space that will offer temporary activities, or temporary programs that are needed at the very moment. Later that use can be easily changed or put back to the original use that space once had. This kind of new opportunities can generate a mix of uses but also innovation, reuse of materials, eco programs and sustainability for local settlements. Strategies that involve the citizens in the process of creating new urban developments, designs, offering a more open approach where people can see the meaning and be able to contribute to a better quality of urban life.

## ARCHITECT AS A MEDIATOR

Architecture is essentially a profession that strives to spatially absorb the needs of people in everyday life, but also to meet their value, cultural and aesthetic expectations. This process creates a discourse based on the need for constant research and observation, which opens up an endless field of creative wandering in which architects enjoy. With this way of self-articulation in the created reality, they influence the behaviour, but also the creation of relations between people. In this act of overlapping communions and the creation of new meanings and relations in space, the architects themselves are one of the main actors.



**Figure 9.** Parc des Buttes-Chaumont, Paris, France. The future of cities, opportunities challenges and the way forward by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. (2019) Available at: <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC116711> (Accessed 20 October 2021)

The architecture was first used as a de-establishment tool, and social utopians like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen made their communal phalanxes in which, in addition to freedom, they also housed the ideas of togetherness and equality. Freedom in architecture is associated with two terms. The first refers to generosity, and the second to communication between people or social interaction. The idea of giving or even more sharing is the basis of the concept of generosity. According to the architects Lacaton & Vassal (2015) and their statements in “Freedom of use”, presented from an architectural point of view, refers to quantify more space than expected because in that way a “creative” redundancy is created which expands the use of space with additional possibilities. With that, space gets the freedom of use and is appropriated in ways that activate new and enrich the existing relations between people. Generosity in architecture does not mean a wealth of materials - an effect that often creates



aesthetic hegemony, but a spatial wealth, because (unexpectedly obtained, however random) additional space gives users the freedom to conquer and organize their habitus, their being in space (personally and collectively), thus creating new social conventions inside the home, but also in the space between buildings, in the public shared space.

By presenting “In Life between buildings: using public space” Gehl (2011) showed kind of a rebellion, a protest against the principles of planning cities and residential areas that prevailed in the period of 70s. Explaining the main concern about the space between the built structure and the interaction of people in those spaces. Life between buildings become a dimension in architecture that needs to be carefully treated as, hard to argue against it, the livability and liveliness of cities is an important issue. The request for better defining public spaces and quality of life in contemporary cities emphasizes this statement (see: figure10). The character of life between built structures changes with variations in a different social context, but the essential principle and criteria are constant. Architecture is not a machine for social and cultural engineering, but a place where the spatial and social complexity and multiplicity of relations in everyday life are encouraged and overlapped. From this multitude, the architecture of the city is created as a body structure, but also as an interaction. Where the city is a field of events created by contradictions arising from the diversity of each individual. It is in this way that architecture liberates because it becomes a communication layer, the basis for creating the freedom of everyday life where through the process of resistance it cohabits with the institutions of the system while aiming to improve their performance.



**Figure 10.** Barcelona aerial view. The future of cities, opportunities challenges and the way forward by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission's science and knowledge service (2019) Available at: <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC116711> (Accessed 20 October 2021)

The public domain, the public interest, finally the public space as their structural denominator is exactly the segment where the relationship of architecture-everyday life-society is most visible and where generosity, social interaction, architecture and freedom overlap.

In a broader interpretation, public space is a place where the character of the city is built. Here we look for personal experiences, where the individual develops a relationship to the immediate social environment and makes an attempt to connect with self-similar entities and create a broader identity and sense of belonging, to find his place in the complex relations within the collective and the city. For that reason, cultivating ethical values depends on the public domain, and thus the quality of life in many ways.

## CONCLUSION – URBAN COMMONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO FUTURE URBAN PLANNING

What is happening in the world today and the dominance of the neoliberal economy is prompting new measures to control the rampage in cities. Given the global commitment to inclusivity, common places as places for all and even sustainable urban development, new recommendations, methodologies, guidelines and sets are being created. The participatory design strategies and tools for new urbanism and modern urban planning appear. In the search for new ways of planning cities, new ones are born, but the old proven theories for planning also revive. Nowadays, cities are places for cultural innovation; they allow citizens to live a quality contemporary life. Citizens often create, negotiate and test ideas and solutions, collectively contributing towards shaping the future urban condition (Sassen 2010; Sassen 2018).

The local culture and cultural heritage are vital assets for regional competitiveness and social cohesion and help to shape the identity of cities and regions. Furthermore, cultural participation has a significant impact on residents, contributing to their wellbeing and sense of belonging which raises the quality of life in urban areas. But when we take into account constantly changing demographics and changes of lifestyle, Jan Gehl in “Cities for people” explains how cities should be observed on a very small scale. This small-scale view, the human scale he points that is too frequently neglected in contemporary projects, especially in the fast-growing cities.

The meaningful integration of citizens in urban governance processes is now valued more than ever. This triggers a new way of thinking and allows people to exchange values, concepts and practices, enabling cities to become spaces for engagement, regardless of size, density or complexity. That in the end, what makes a statement in this society is the consumers, the people. Expanding commoning through institutions that prevent any accumulation of power is possible in the only social context that supports creative individuals in their non-hierarchical collaboration.

Worlds of commoning are not simply worlds of shared beliefs and habits but are strongly connected to ways of sharing that open the circle of belonging and develop forms of active participation in the shaping of the rules that sustain them. Worlds of commoning are worlds in movement (Stavrvides 2016).

Temporary use of space could be analyzed as part of the urban development process with its temporal and spatial fluctuations and its multivalent outcomes. It could investigate the temporary use of spaces as a space of opportunity and a flexible method of production. Beyond the realm of necessity, it may be transformed into a cultural choice, for a new way

of urban development and a medium of social change, signifying a space of opportunity for some and vulnerability for others.

To achieve anything, architects must serve the powers they strive to critique, finding themselves in a perpetual conflict of interest. Beyond their duration, temporary uses can have a strong impact on the cultural and social capital of cities. Due to the innovative characters, they very often establish new cultural and social practices and lifestyles, which are absorbed into everyday life.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Graff R (2017) *Four Walls and a Roof: The Complex Nature of a Simple Profession*. London: Harvard University Press pp.115-121.

Foucault M (1967) *Des espaces autres*, basis of a lecture given by Michel Foucault in March 1967 on a conference at the Cercle d'études architecturales, published in *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité*, n°5, octobre 1984 pp. 46- 49

Harvey D (2012) *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London:Verso.

Henaff M and Strong T (2001) *Public Space and Democracy*. University of Minnesota Press pp. 2-27.

Hou J (2010) *Insurgent Public Space. Guerrilla urbanism and the remaking of contemporary cities*. London:Routledge.

Gehl J (2011) *Life between buildings: using public space*. Island press.

Gehl J (2011) *Cities for people*. Island press.

Lacaton A and Vassal P (2015) *Freedom of use*. Sternberg press.

Lefèbvre H (1991) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lefèbvre H (2004) *Rhythm analysis: Space, Time and Everyday Live*. London: Continuum.

Medrano L, Recaman L and Avermaete T (2021) *The new urban condition: Criticism and theory from architecture and urbanism*. Routledge: 1st edition *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 331-338.

Marcuse P and Van Kempen R (2002) *Of states and Cities. The Partitioning of Urban Space*. Oxford: University Press, pp 11-34.

Molnar V (2010) *The cultural production of locality: reclaiming the “European City” in post-Wall Berlin*. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 281–309.

Rossi A (1982) *The Architecture of the City*. The MIT Press.

Sassen S (2010) “The city: Its return as a lens for social theory”. *City Culture and Society*. Elsevier Journal pp. 3–11.

Sassen S (2018) *In the post-urban world. Emergent transformation of cities and regions in the innovative global economy*. London: Routledge pp. 249-259.

Stavrides S (2016) *Common Space: The City as Commons*. Zed Books Ltd, The Foundry.

Swenarton M, Avermaete T and van den Heuvel D (2014) *Architecture and the welfare state*. London and New York: Routledge.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT (2017) *Trends in Urban Resilience*. Available at: <https://unhabitat.org/books/trends-in-urban-resilience-2017/#>.

Van der Moolen K (2017) *From neighbourhoods to MakerHoods*. Available at: <https://waag.org/en/article/neighbourhoods-maker-holds>.

*Elena Koprta, PhD, independent scholar*

elenskaja91@gmail.com

## THE URBAN IDENTITY IN POST-SOCIALIST CITIES THROUGH THE LENSES OF THE BALKAN CINEMA

### Abstract

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

The paper deals with the city and its identity in film, through examples of Balkan or Post-Yugoslav cinema. The film is a product of the predominantly urban psyche because its appearance is associated with the modern city. As a result of distribution, film continues to influence our perception and understanding of urban space. All cinematographies in their

- own” that are directly or indirectly a constant subject of filmmaking and main protagonists - Paris, Berlin, London, New York, Shanghai, but also visions of an undefined city in numerous sci-fi and noir achievements, films from Italian neorealism, French poetic realism, film-dedications and omnibuses. In the first section
1. Converts the whole document.
  2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

are analyzed various ways of representation of the urban space, contemporary film narratives are analyzed and the city as a living

well as the duality between the concrete reality of the city and its fictional representations in cinema. In the second section I give an overview on the political and social changes in former socialist countries in Europe and the changes in the urban landscape (therefore the urban identity) after big historical turns. Following Stuart Hall (1996: 16) the impossibility of simplifying the very concept of identity raises two questions: the question of agency and the question of the political. When it comes to the political, these are at the same time the meanings in the modern forms of political movements, its main connection with the politics of the location, but also all the difficulties and instabilities that affect all modern forms of “identity politics”. When it comes to agency, then it is the subject or identity as the centered author of social practice or the re-articulation of the links between the subject and the discursive practices where the question of identity is repeated. The last section is an overview of these changes in the post-Yugoslav cities, the genealogy of the Balkan city images and the urban identity in context of the post-Yugoslav cinema.

Remove it Now

**Keywords:** City, cinema, identity, Balkan, urban landscape



## INTRODUCTION

The urban landscapes in the film represent the identity of the city and its inhabitants. Christopher Lukinbeal (2005) places the landscape as a central figure in the formation of the film space and gives meaning to the film events and positions the narrative in a certain historical context. Of all the arts, the cinema is largely a part of the social reality – although in recent decades the ideological influence of other media is greater – and from a theoretical point of view its “civic” power (and perhaps duty) is highly valued: *The cinema is exclusively equipped to mark and publish the physical reality and with that it tends towards it* (Stojanović 1978: 387). Therefore, urban identity is an idea closely related to the real or ideal landscape. Ethnic identity is the one that shapes the urban as well as the aspiration towards the ideal identity and is a product that is subject to interpretations by the individual and the institutions in a certain cultural context.

The growing interest in spatial-identity phenomena contributes to the interest in urbanism in cinematography and the changes in the urban space and the changes between the inhabitants; how the urban cinematography and the social, political and historical developments have influenced the change of the architecture, and thus the change of the identity of the inhabitants

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

### VIP Benefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now

For the analysis of the identity of the city, the connection with the place should be comprehended, as well as the local interest should become defined; for the identity of the city is not necessarily what individuals see, nor is it an accurate map of the place. New places and new lifestyles have increased the need for new concepts to help individuals understand identity. The starting point was a break with the space and place of the 20th century. The mentioned concepts belong to the issues of identity transformation in cities and buildings as a consequence of cultural globalization, the transformation of local, cultural and architectural values and the sense of belonging.

*Urban identity is inevitably a constructed idea that is tied to a real or ideal landscape. This quality of inseparability from landscape distinguishes identity from image. Ethnic association shapes urban identity and the ideal landscape is forged through a process*

Lana Slavuj (2011) talks about the processes of creating identity in the place, because these identities are subjective and dynamic categories that are constantly constructed and reconstructed, i.e. do not exist as an objective reality in themselves, but people attribute to



them a certain identity depending on their needs and interests. Identities of places do not expect to be discovered, they are mental constructions.

Thus, according to Slavuj, there are two key processes in the creation of the identity of the place: the first is the assignment of an identity based on positive feelings and connection with the place; feeling when someone is somewhere “at home”. In the second case, identification can also take place by attributing negative feelings to one place, to other, lesser-known places. Places are limited by personal, social and cultural meanings and hence represent an important framework in which identities are shaped and maintained. They are an integral part of everyday life and as such make important the mechanisms through which identities are defined and situated. The concept of “imagined communities” states that the film also plays a central role in the development of national identities, and can be applied to cities, neighborhoods, smaller communities, etc. The post-socialist cities underwent radical changes in the recent past and lend themselves to such analysis.

### FROM SOCIALIST TO POST-SOCIALIST URBAN IDENTITIES

The emphasis is primarily on the post-socialist change of architecture in all capitals across the former state and on the metropolitan identity of these cities and their layered urban landscape. For Crowley and Reid (2002: 2–3), from the incorporation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the socialist space dominated by the Soviet Union to the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc between 1989 – 1991 – there are numerous examples that suggest that in case of postwar socialism the answer to the question ‘do spaces have politics?’, must be affirmative. The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe created a non-classical model of territorial “occupation”. Namely, the migrations of citizens from Eastern to Western Europe were then considered an act of occupying. The fall of communism created in the “other Europe”, behind the Iron Curtain, conditions similar to those in the former colonies in Africa and Asia, that is, a parallel migration movement.

These countries embarked on a long process of transition involving major political changes in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Eastern European societies ousted autocratic regimes and began the process of building a democratic society. Transitional culture, on the other hand, signifies the symbolic practices that arise from these socio-political transformations, i.e. transition from the socialist/communist order to a liberal-democratic arrangement. Migrations to the West have created “a post-communist diaspora and speak of the crisis in the home: the search for love and bread in the fortress of Europe and the futility of that search” (Daković 2008: 45-46). Ana Miljački (2003: 5) writes that in most cities of Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, the masses transformed into citizens, in the old, political sense of the word. They came out of political hiding, took risks and took part in collective action, and the city is the main point of revolution.

The city was the unit of the 1989 uprisings indeed. In 1989, the citizens became visible in Eastern Europe; indeed, the city was articulated through the practice of its citizens, at least for a certain amount of time. In the case of all the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the transformation has been marked by economic collapse, factory closures, rampant unemployment and growing workers’ dissatisfaction. Under terms of the urban landscape,

the restructuring of space, iconography and identity begins. Nationalist aspirations, which previously existed under the official rhetoric of communism and the mask of architectural urbanity, are becoming dominant factors in shaping the urban landscape.

Diener and Hagen (2013) develop the term “post-socialist urbanism” which in urban studies refers to trends in these countries and has three important characteristics. First, it’s obvious that it dates back to the period of urban development that followed socialism. Second, it covers continuity, achievement and shortcomings in understanding modern urban trajectories. And third, by labeling this “post” by negation, by what is and what is not implicit, it shows contemporary uncertainty, transiency, and contingency. Although socialism has brought some uniformity to architecture and urban planning, post-socialist urbanism largely remains in line with some previous strategies.

*Transitions from state to private ownership, from industrial to service based economies, and from urbanization to suburbanization and peri-urbanization, combine with new modes of urban governance to constitute new cityscapes. These changes have been accompanied by equally dramatic transformations in cultural and political identity, especially the inscription of new narratives of the nation and its history into the urban landscape.* (Diener and Hagen 2013: 488)

Post-socialist urbanism is also evolving in a different political context: in some countries it is evolving into an autocracy or oligarchy, where governments have particular authority over urban planning, architecture, and iconography. After 1989, city authorities in almost all Eastern and Southeastern European countries decided to highlight certain periods of the past and ignore others and hence (re)write their own versions of (urban) history and (re)shape (urban) identities.

In these countries the question of memory and oblivion becomes dominant, and the geographical spread of the culture of remembrance has served political purposes and mobilized the mythical past, which aims to support aggressive chauvinist and nationalist policies. New monuments, plaques, street names and museums are emerging just as quickly as those that have been thrown out of the cityscape. A confrontation with socialism at the institutional level begins, revisions of the socialist monumental heritage and a specific articulation of socialism in the textbooks have taken place.

## THE POST-YUGOSLAV URBAN CINEMA

In the countries that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, burdened with fresh and highly unpleasant memories of civil wars, socialist monuments came to represent oppression. In Croatia alone more than half were destroyed between 1990 and 2000 and in recent years only 100 of those have been restored. In Macedonia, belatedly, the incumbent ruling elite undertook a change in the symbolic landscape of the capital city, since capital cities are representative spaces for the nation. The project “Skopje 2014” not only redefines the socialist past, but also offers a glorified ancient past in its place and as such aims at rewriting history in the public space, directly (Janev 2017: 153-154).

The changes are taking place in a range of practices somewhere from ambitious projects that re-create an entire urban space to a seemingly banal change of street names.

Three main themes are intertwined in scholarly and popular discourses on the transition from socialist to post-socialist urban identities. The most obvious theme encompasses national histories are constructed and commemorated through urban space. A second theme highlights the unintentional and ambiguous nature of these re-negotiations. Despite the rhetoric of renewal or rebirth originating from this “return to history”, new narratives of national identity and public commemoration are uneasily reconciled with overlapping local, minority, or other identities, as well as established daily practices. Finally, post-socialist urbanism is evolving within the broader context of neoliberal globalization, supranational cooperation, and cultural hybridity. (Diener and Hagen 2013: 496)

The transformation processes in these cities are under a complex division of similar institutional and spatial heritage, a low degree of commitment to political, economic and institutional reforms in the field of urban policy and strategy. Urban strategies are dominated by the renewal of tradition or the re-traditionalization of society and the shaping of identity by attracting collective ties based on well-known categories and values: nation, traditional family and religion. For Serbian filmologist and sociologist of culture Nemanja Zvijer, a key feature of the post-socialist space was reflected in the radical ideological shift that meant the spread of the dominance of nationalism and thus the suppression of the ideology

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

#### VIP Benefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now

The film transforms its narrative with a visual representation. The Balkans function as a specific subcategory of Eastern Europe, as a synonym for a return to the primitive, barbaric. In a way, the Balkans are the only region that is not to become Europe, although geographically it has always belonged there. The notion of Europe is becoming more popular than ever: every major Balkan city has a hotel or café with the name Europe (the project Skopje 2014, an attempt is being made to establish a

local history, the so-called “Europeanization” of architecture and placing Western identity before the Ottoman and socialist heritage. And in some ways it seems that the intended Europeanisation abandons the idea of multiculturalism (cf. Mijalković 2011).

The film continuously revises Europe and its ambiguous nature as a defined location and unattainable destination, which continuously problematizes it. For Aida Vidan (2011: 174) one of the dominant film trends in the region after 1991 is the exploration of space both as a narrative and as a political category following the opposition “place” and “space” by Michel de Certeau. Movement that leads nowhere warns of non-arrival as a permanent state. It also points to the lack of a tidy place, as in De Certeau’s, in which objects (both material and ideological) have a solid point that allows them to coexist. Even when moments of stagnation are shown, narrative tension serves as a centrifugal force that (eventually) catapults characters from their forced stationary accommodations. The concept of movement equally shows the instability of political and spatial terms, because it either continues to take place in eternal times in circular motions or is violently interrupted by the physical death of the characters, which further destabilizes both the narrative and ideological reference point. The

place or country (Yugoslavia) that was used as an organized and stable construct has now disintegrated into a fragmented and uncertain space of competing agendas. In the process of symbolic representation of identity and identification, one of the most important categories is “country” - country of birth, end, landscape, as are the elements of that landscape.

A new theme in post-Yugoslav film is urbicide - the death and destruction of cities caused by military devastation (Sarajevo, Vukovar, Mostar), the changing demographic structure between war and transition (Belgrade, Zagreb) or the escalation of the perpetual conflict between urban and non-urban writes the chronicle of these areas.

*Unfortunately, in the areas of the Central Danube and the Western Balkans, there are many cities whose characteristics have been deliberately humiliated and annihilated. If the war breaks out and those cities can be re-established, will we be able to recognize them? Or, even if they are renewed, they will be transformed into something they were not or, worse, something they did not want to be. Because the killers of cities with infallible, beastly intuition, targeted every city precisely in its vital center: in its memory, in the talisman of self-awareness and identity.* (Bogdanović 2008: 121)

After the wars, the struggle for Europeanization began in the 1990s, centered around the clash of rock and turbofolk as an emanation of primitive nationalism. Since the early 2000s, the representation of cities in Balkan film has begun to change in terms of genre and style: of change” (Daković 2008: 165). One of the reasons for the small number of films that deal with urbanity in the cinemas of the former Yugoslavia in the last 25 years is, as Ryan J. Graves believes, “the concept of the city as a framework for (more) civilized life” in the popular Western imagination. The city in northern Europe after the Middle Ages represents freedom, although this representation is less common in the Balkans where cities were places of regional control and the most visible representation of the Constantinople imperial reach. The city and urbanization - as a material process and cultural transformation - everything that made Europe Europe.

This connection between the concepts of “city” and “civilization” in Europe was further strengthened by the understanding of the city as a place of tolerance and decency. The result of this ideological legacy that connects Europe/civilization with urban living is that ethnic violence is what is against the city and is foreign to the city, hence the urbicide is unavoidable consequence. The rise of nationalist parties in the 1980s, the subsequent wars in these areas, and ethnic cleansing in BiH and Croatia represent a triumph of rural culture over the city’s ideals:

*if violence is foreign to the city, it must be an import from the countryside. Of course, this constructed dichotomy of city-countryside ignores the numerous gradations of urbanity present in Bosnia, where no such tidy spatial division between the town and the countryside can be found* (Graves 2017: 25-26).

The very search for identity in cities and the very identity of cities become dangerous in time of war, because they would stifle any idea of change, difference and innovation. The people were dissatisfied with the identity based on land and landscape and this only increased the tension between the opposing groups who claim that this particular landscape is theirs.

The genealogy of the Balkan city images encompasses a classic and post-war landscape seen through the eyes of a traumatized protagonist. The landscapes of the city are a document of reality and an artistic-textual image. Mapping as a metaphor of the process in the political unconscious, that is, the unconscious military traumas and conflicts of local and global in

Balkan films, opens a different reading of images of cities. The Balkan cinematic landscape is a complex element in the construction of the transcultural identity of the city, which is strongly captured in the collective memories and that landscape invented the tradition and history of the city's transcultural past.

The evolution of that transcultural identity is mapped as a succession of clashes between exotic Ottoman Balkanism and European cosmopolitanism (mostly in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Skopje) and clearly projected on visions of the city. The wars produce erosion of the urban fabric of the city which is visible in the damage to buildings, ruins, exposed interiors and the general state of infrastructure collapse. The architecture of the city is a dark matter, deformed and eroded; it merges with the ground rather than appearing as an articulated presence and composed presentation. The films present the architecture of the city as a spatial field in which social disintegration, political confusion, and cultural ambiguity take place. Often in the plots and narratives of these films there are unresolved questions of nationality and identity of persons, and these are associated with the redrawing of maps and plans (see Lozanovska 2003: 251).

In the postwar cinema, the "blocker films" are also current, as Anikó Imre (2007: 71) names them. The name refers to dilapidated apartment blocks, which are the most common *mise-en-scène* of post-socialist films. The protagonists in these films are in search of female care and male figures - a search that is most often doomed to failure because it takes place in an era where idealistic energies are turning away from political control. This type of film became dominant in Serbian cinema after 1990ies, like *We Are Not Angels* (Srđan Dragojević 1992), *The Black Bomber* (Darko Bajić 1992), *Rage* (Slobodan Skerlić, 1997), *The Wounds* (Srđan Dragojević 1998), *Absolute 100* (Srđan Golubović 2001), *One on One* (Mladen Matičević 2002), *Seven and a Half* (Miroslav Momčilović, 2007), *Tilva Roš* (Nikola Ležaić 2010), etc., which is not the case with other cinemas of the former Yugoslavia, where such films are the exception.

In Croatia, films made after 2000 have a different approach to the treatment of urban and urban areas and deal with the post-war and post-traumatic society in Zagreb. One part of the cinema production analyzes the conflict in the postwar environment and trauma is what determines the entire narrative and ideological universe of the film and it seems that local ethnic polarization, although not necessarily the exclusive paradigm for this type of representation, is dominant.

The new wave of films deals with the city in the new millennium and the transformation of its inhabitants, and Zagreb is again set as a place between the center and the periphery (Europe and the Balkans), characteristic of modernism in the 1960s: *Here* (Zrinko Ogresta 2003), *Armin* (Ognjen Sviličić 2007), *Metastases* (Branko Schmidt 2009), *Mother of Asphalt* (Dalibor Matanić 2010).

In Macedonian cinema, the transition city is themed, followed by the transformation of the subcultural scene and the crisis of urban consciousness. The capital is almost without exception crumbling, chaotic and dirty: in parts *Shadows* (2007) and *Mothers* (2010) by Milčo Mančevski, a blend of urban folklore and underground, like *Punk is not dead* (Vladimir Blaževski 2011), *Amok* (Vardan Tozija, 2016) or a memory of what it once was, like *Upside Down* (Igor Ivanov 2007).

## CONCLUSION

The paper is an observation of the nature of the film, city, and identity in post-Yugoslav cinema and the main goal was to show how socio-political and ideological changes affected the architecture and urban landscape in the Balkan city and to change the identity of urban residents in the former Yugoslavia. The main cities in this environment are the areas that first reflected these changes because their geographical, historical and social context is similar.

In post-Yugoslav film, almost without exception, the boundaries between city and suburbs or between urban and rural are lost, because these cities are not megalopolises, but limited spaces, and the conurbation is metaphorical. Fredric Jameson clearly sees postmodernism as closely related to cities, and much of what he considers a feature of individual postmodern buildings applies to postmodernist film portrayal of architecture and cities. However, this cannot be applied to Balkan film, although the cinema itself portrays a postmodern world. According to Ian Robinson (2010: 116), these films cannot be treated and read only as a response to the problems of urban homogenization, loss of local and personal identity, but also as an argument about where the city is positioned in film art and how it should be represented. These films suggest new ways in which the city can be redesigned and conceptually redefined. Thus, the similarities in these works refer to certain contents that appear in all these films: history, war, trauma, post-war everyday life, revisionism, transition and interaction in urban space, rural-urban relationship and in some films there is a recurring sense of nostalgia, which affects human relationships in the urban environment.

The urban identity is a cinematic field that is still incompletely researched and can be a stimulus for change in the research of the city identities and the future film representations in the urban areas. The film transforms the political, economic and cultural reality and transforms our perception and reading of the urban environment. For these reasons, films should be a regular subject of socially oriented studies in geography, whether it is an analysis of Hollywood production, a particular national cinematography, or a particular authorial poetics. Film practice encourages the process of spatialisation because it itself arises from the exchange between the film text and the viewer, and that exchange creates discursive practices that map socio-political geographies and they articulate them. Films transform places where they are shot into critical spaces.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arreola D (1995) "Urban Ethnic Landscape Identity". *Geographical Review* 85(4): 518-534.

Bogdanović B (2008) *Tri ratne knjige*. Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing.

Crowley D and Reid S (2002) *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc*. Oxford, New York: Berg.

Daković N (2008) *Balkan kao (filmski) žanr*. Beograd: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti: Institut za pozorište, film, radio i televiziju.

Diener A and Hagen J (2013) "From socialist to post-socialist cities: narrating the nation through urban space". *Nationalities Papers* 1(4): 487–514.

Hall S (1996) "Who needs 'identity'?". In: du Gay P, Evans J and Redman P (eds.) *Identity: a reader*. IDE: Sage Publications Inc, pp. 15-30.

Imre A (2007) "The Age of Transition: Angels and Blockers in Recent Eastern and Central European Films". In: Shary T, Siebel A (eds.) *Youth Culture in Global Cinema*. Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 71-86.

Jordanova D (2001) *Cinema of Flames*. Balkan Film, Culture and Media. London: British Film Institute.

Janev G (2017) "Burdensome past: Challenging the socialist heritage in Macedonia". *Studia ethnologica Croatica* 29 (1): 149-170.

Lozanovska M (2003) "The Architectural Edifice and the Phantoms of History". *space & culture* 6 (3): 249-20.

Miljački A (2003) "Anti-Lobotomy: The Visible Evidence of Resistance in 1990s Belgrade". *Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal* 34: 94-107.

OBC Transeuropa. Available at: <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/North-Macedonia/Skopje-the-bastard-city-100551> (accessed 8 November 2021)

Robinson I (2010) "Searching for the City: Cinema and the Critique of Urban Space in the Films of Keiller, Cohen, and Steinmetz and Chanan". In: Roberts L, Koeck R (eds.). *The City and the Image: Urban Projections*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 114-124.

Siegel A (2003) "After the Sixties: Changing Paradigms in the Representation of Urban Space". In: Shiel M, Fitzmaurice T (eds.) *Screening the City*. London, New York: Verso, pp. 137-159.

Stojanović D (1978) *Teorija filma*. Beograd: Nolit.

Slavuj L (2011) „O mjestima i identitetima“ Available at: <https://geografija.hr/o-mjestima-i-identitetima/>, (accessed 8 November 2021)

Šarinić J and Čaldarović O (2015) *Suvremena sociologija grada. Od nove urbane sociologije prema sociologiji urbanog*. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.

Vidan Aida (2011) "Spaces of ideology in South Slavic films". *Studies in Eastern European Cinema* 2 (2): 173-192.

Zvijer N (2015) *Ideološki sadržaji u igranoj filmskoj produkciji na postjugoslovenskom prostoru*. Beograd: Filozofski fakultet.

**Nikola Gjorgjievski, M.LArch, M.Arch, B.Sc, Research assistant**  
Institute for Territories, Architecture and Transformations Aarhus School of  
Architecture, Aarhus  
ngj@aarch.dk

## THE AMBIGUOUS SURFACE: POETIC, FORMAL AND PROGRAMMATIC READING OF THE TERRITORY

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

### Abstract

#### VIPBenefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Prior to the emergence of landscape urbanism as a disciplinary discourse, a series of treatises in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 2000s set out to unriddle the complex space of the territory. However, an intertextual section exposes a common descriptive problem of the space of urbanism parallel to its systematic shift from a design discipline to a projective scope of urbanism. Adding to this ambiguity is the lack of design and form-giving discourse in the projective scope of urbanism parallel to its systematic shift from a design discipline to a projective scope of urbanism. In the past century, the modern world has been dedicated to the city, and thought about the space of the territory which has substantially and

Remove it Now

smearred backside that maintains the cities. Moreover, a twofold condition corroborates this notion since the late 1960s – a tug of war between the postmodern architects’ preoccupation with nostalgic, stylistic, scenic, and shallow buildings and the urbanists’ increasing concern for the city as a social problem at the cost of avoiding architectural design. At the Aspen Design Conference in 1955, architect Victor Gruen advocated that architects should expand their views beyond individual buildings and find architecture in the environment, employing architecture instrumentality, perhaps, on concepts of climate, geography, and geology. Therefore, the central idea of this paper is to explore the “terrain beyond the built” from a poetic, formal, and programmatic perspective and to question the role of the architect in the foreseeable future.

**Keywords:** Landscape, urbanism, territory, transformations



*'Architecture today cannot concern itself only with that one set of structures that happen to stand upright and be hollow "buildings" in the conventional sense. It must concern itself with all manmade elements that form our environments: with roads and highways, with signs and posters, with outdoor spaces as created by structures, and with cityscape and landscape'* (Gruen 1955).

## POETIC READING OF THE TERRITORY

A formatively allusive understanding of undetermined spaces is given in the text “Terrain Vague,” 1995, written by the Spanish architect Ignasi de Sola-Morales. The author informs the reader, not of figurative or pragmatic findings but indicatively, of a metaphorical and subjective understanding of the landscape. In his introduction, Morales briefly discusses photo montaging, fragments of photographic images that do not show a real landscape or a city but steer the viewer into a specific realm of semiology. Moreover, this concept speculates a practical notion that casts light on a fundamental morphological comprehension of the landscape as a series of elements, signs, and symbols, and in this case, graphical images. Further in the text, I shall discuss these spatial presentations coinciding with Greggoti’s article “*The form of the territory.*”

Nevertheless, a poetic approach is essential to begin with because, as Morales suggests, the essence of the landscape may dissolve when it is bluntly verified with a set of already approved urban procedures. The author describes the field as an *‘empty, abandoned space in which a series of occurrences have taken place and subjugated the eye of the urban photographer. Such urban space, a terrain vague, assumes the status of fascination, the most solvent sign with which to indicate what cities are and what our experience of them is’*

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

Morales primarily explores the etymology of the word “terrain” due to the limited connotations of the English word “land.” In contrast to the concept of land, the terrain concept is more expansive, including more spatial connotations, and moves away from the idea of an exploitation plot. “Vague”, on the other hand, confines an abundance of definitions. Firstly, in the terrain, the movement of seas: oscillation, instability, and fluctuation. Secondly, from the French language, the roots lay in “vacuus,” which yields connotations of vacancy, emptiness, and availability. Another meaning derives from the Latin “vagus,” closely linked to future models of “program and event” in the landscape, which is giving indeterminate, imprecise, blurred, and uncertain sense.

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now

The inhumane scale and lack of evident information make it easy to do justice to the vastness and inhospitable openness of the terrain as uncertain and unknown, concluding that contemporary city planning cannot do justice to such space. Despite that, a terminological distinction can foster metaphorical understandings that can evolve into morphological concepts that can illustrate a comprehending of the terrain. The author suggests denoting such an ambiguous and open space as a gestalt of dual indeterminacy. He gives an example of such binary understanding of polarities, describing the common modern dweller seeking for: *‘forces instead of forms, for the incorporated instead of the distant, for the haptic* LQVWHDG RI WKH RSWLF WKH UKA JRP DAWL FOLQVWHDG RI μIRUHYHU RQ WKH VLGH RI IRUPV RI WKH S IGMVWSDQW RI (Sola-Morales 1995: 123).

When dealing with the space of the territory as a subjective ensemble of meanings and material/immaterial presentation which potentially reveal the true nature of such space, Morales (1995: 123) questions: *‘how can architecture act in the terrain vague without becoming an aggressive instrument of power and abstract reason?’*

This statement is closely related to the shortcomings of our administrative understanding

of cities as formal, rational, and static concepts which prescribe the same logic over non urbanized residual spaces. Suppose we are to avoid this predicament of orthodox urban planning. In that case, Morales (1995: 123) suggests an elastic architectural comprehension of urban continuity. He writes:

“QRW WKH FRQWLQXLW\ RI WKH SODQQHG HýFLHQW DQG  
*the rhythms established by the passing of time and the loss of limits... we should treat the residual city with contradictory complicity that will not shatter the elements that maintain its continuity in time and space.*”

Morales imposes the fundamental question of how to approach a terrain vague when all urban planning rules become obsolete. Finally, and in relation to his question, once we develop a poetic recognition of the space of the territory, it is essential to investigate figurative and formative theories to understand the terrain as a physical concept should we attempt to design such a space.

## FORMAL READING OF THE TERRITORY

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

### VIP Benefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now

QH Z VFLHQWL F KISRWKHVHV DERXW QDWXUH PDWWHU  
 DQG GLYHUVL HG JGDWYH WHFKQLTXHV

Unlike Morales, Gregotti defines four disciplinary conditions and prescribes a four-step operation to determine the space of the territory as a physical agglomeration. The first condition is to understand that the design process is no longer a linear trajectory between concept, analysis, and project. The second condition is to dissociate the building as the exclusive outcome of architecture. The third condition is to undefine the architect as a creator of forms but of functions. Finally, the fourth condition is to acknowledge that the architect can construct a landscape. Gregotti stresses the fact that the abundance and potentials of constructing a landscape are not exclusively bound to the physical realm but that the physical realm is the most revealing one. It enables recognizing the universe as the quality of matter and allows modulation if the landscape is perceived as an ensemble.

As Hashim Sarkis explains: <sup>3</sup> \*UHJRWL DSSOLHV D GXDOLW\ RI W\SR  
*the ensemble, to organise and relate across scales from the architectural to the territorial’* (Sarkis 2014). Moreover, a definition of a field can be detected when *‘the sign made by man*

or nature determines a formal ensemble that can be demarcated' (Sarkis 2014). Therefore, one field can be a constituted chain of elements or a macrostructure that cohabits a series of smaller fields. However, as suggested, these demarcations are not always physical signs but metaphorical and rely on and are limited to cultural semantics, semiotics, and landscape hermeneutics. Before exploring the meaning of the signs, here are the four steps by which Gregotti (2009:14) addresses the problem of terminology (semantics) and a formal description (semiotics) of an "in situ" territory (landscape hermeneutics):

1. Reading and classifying formal typologies and anthropogeographical structure;
2. Implementing cartography of the formal values of the territory from the point of view of the geographical subsoil and the intervention;
3. Reading and representing signs of formal transformations generated by the introduction of planning structures; and

(VWDEOLVKLQJ GH¿QLQJ FULWHULD IRU WKH UHSHUWR

Now, essentially, the space of the territory has been demarcated into several fields (landscapes), each unique and itself limited. However, this limitation should transcend the factual and geomorphological boundaries if we are to discover concepts and operations unknown. If, for a moment, these geophysical dimensions shift to spheres of meanings of signs, there flickers a possibility for new curious findings. Intrinsically, man would primarily denote these fields by evoking an inventory of already known, learned, or obvious signs, which are in close relation to cultural and historical influences, and maybe this is the obstacle that we need to overcome. For example, a plot of land with fertile soil exploited for growth of vegetables would instantly be recognized as agrarian, "an unspoiled form of nature," which is recognizable in itself. This recognition is beneficial in the first steps of demarcating the terrain into fields, and however, it limits the field to a primordial function and gives no further new opportunities.

What if we change the understanding of this well-established sign into something else. What if the agricultural plot is no longer seen primarily for its land-productive feature but rather, for example, as a belt of transmission or a field connector. Perhaps this could help us escape such well-learned notions and open opportunities for writing new inventories of meanings? Could this then inspire new concepts of approaching the terrain? On the subject, Gregotti (2009:15) writes:

μ7KH UHYHUVLELOLW\ RI WKLV UHODWLRQ LPSOLHV WKH  
form that can be remodeled with appropriate symbols that have yet to be deciphered.'

Subsequently, Gregotti (2009: 18) finds similar approaches and opportunities in other disciplines such as, for example, contemporary mythology. One exciting fact derives from this view of giving new meanings to familiar signs and elements that can create an overall figurative and semantic concept that differs from nature by which it is surrounded, empirically and "a priori." Like mythologies, establishing semantic relations with values that are later inscribed into a series of images can suffice for a formal structuring of an environment. However, some landforms radiate such a strong physical, historical, and philosophical presence that they are not prone to changes. Gregotti calls these presentations "natural totemic elements" or landscape formations that emanate such exceptional nature and should consistently be recognized as physical references, such as the volcanic atoll, the acropolis, or the center of a radial plane.

Moreover, the totems become initial markers, starting points of determining the field conditions of the space of the territory. These geomorphological moments across the terrain could perhaps give insight to what Morales describes as elements that maintain continuity in time and space. These pragmatic theories that constrain or decrease the ambiguity of the physical space of the territory also open doors to architectural procedures that form methodological processes and design principles that include territorial scales from biological to geological, from artificial topographies (extrusions) depressions) to fabricating terrains, from megaforms to masterprogrammes.

### PROGRAMMATIC READING OF THE TERRITORY

Lastly, the third component necessary to comprehend the space of the territory is the functional perspective relating to its ecology and intrinsic programmatic concepts through landscapes. On a larger scale, the space of a territory represents a place on Earth's surface constructed of several compounds. The space of the territory can also be called a geographic space constituted of natural, social, cultural, political, and economic components. Some of these are physical and concrete, some are fluid and in processes, and some are imaginary constructs and invisible boundaries. However, the ungraspable scale and unobtainable human comprehension of such complex geographic surfaces require a scale down to organizational models that today, perhaps, with all digital tools at hand, can correspond to the disciplinary framework of architecture urbanism, and landscape. Moreover, a framework of a new architecture that parts way with postmodernism, a new urbanism that no longer avoids architecture and treats the city solely as a social problem, and new landscapes that part way with pastoral environmentalism. Related to the newness, Rem Koolhaas wrote an article "Whatever happened to urbanism?" published in the book "S, M, L, XL," 1995 in which he states:

*'If there is to be a "new urbanism" it will not be based on the twin fantasies of order and omnipotence; it will be the staging of uncertainty; it will no longer be concerned with the arrangement of more or less permanent objects but with the irrigation of territories with*

SRWHQWLD O , W ZLOO QR ORQJHU DLP IRU VWDEOH FRQ ¿ .  
 WKDW DFFRPPRGDWH SURFHVVHV WKDW UHKLQVWK WR EH F  
 1997: 969).

In that manner, the uncertain, irrigable, unstable and uncrystallized landscape starts to act as the ideology of urbanism; if we consider urban and spatial planning disciplines that program surfaces. Furthermore, if we agree with Stan Allen's statement that *'landscape is not only a formal model of urbanism today but perhaps more importantly, a model for process'* (Allen 2002), then we also agree that its programmatic features represent that exact processing nature. However, it is only very recently that the realm of architecture is becoming adjacent to the non-anthropocentric environment, tackling challenges and consequences caused by newly emerging climate, also known as anthropogenic climate change. While our design discipline, specific to the architecture of buildings, is waking up from what Rem Koolhaas calls the "semantic nightmare" of postmodernism, other spatial typologies have begun to evolve, conceptually and morphologically, more precisely, that of the "park." The space and

the image of the park, an instance of landscape and, therefore, a piece of territory, slowly started to act as a field operator that parted ways with what de Sola Morales described as “Terrain Vague” and viewed the territory as a space of abundant information, introducing geography to the realm of architecture. Because the park is a medium between the metropolis and the landscape, it absorbs inputs for both sides, explaining its immense design and program complexity - opening questions and spatial challenges in favor of the unfinished, aformal, imprecise, and undecided approach. Given today’s speed of our transforming urban culture and global ecology amidst a rapidly changing climate, we must ask ourselves, “what does it mean to design a park in the 21<sup>st</sup> century?” As Charles Waldheim writes in “Landscape as Urbanism” (2016), two projects in the fourth quarter of the previous century suggested a paradigm shift in the re-conception of contemporary urbanism. In these two projects, the first by Bernard Tschumi, and the second by Rem Koolhaas and OMA for the “Parc de la Villette” competition, the landscape is perceived as a spatial model capable of dealing with complex intersections between public life and public events, urban infrastructure, and flexible enough to plot future unprecedented city scenarios. The two projects did not focus on reproducing familiar public park typologies or typical city regeneration strategies. The latter demonstrates a construct of horizontal fields that would inadvertently change over time, a normed schema capable of cohabiting unpredicted circumstances in the future, invoking Koolhaas’ Delirious New York vertical juxtaposition of myriad programs superimposed in Manhattan’s skyscrapers. Subsequently, Waldheim (2016:15) writes that in these projects, the landscape became a model of urban processes carried out through the “design” of programs and events as surrogates for contemporary urbanism.

## CONCLUSION

In sum, the exploration of this text suggests that the space of the territory can be recognized as a geographical, socio-cultural, and philosophical construct through aspects of poetic subjectivism, typo-morphological investigations, and programmatic inscriptions. It accentuates the differences between the three ways of reading and understanding the territory, albeit points towards their mutual codependence in comprehending the space of the territory as a coherent and meaningful whole. Moreover, it recognizes the urge for a necessary evolution and hybridization of architecture, urbanism, and landscape with other scientific disciplines and entities. Employing a multiscalar and multidisciplinary approach influences the design discourse and praxis and, thus, influences the material realities of cities, regions, and landscapes. It pushes away the focus and obsession with the city as a man made large-scale object and advocates, instead, for infra-surfaces of endless intensifications, opportunities, and diversifications. Furthermore, it stages the landscape as the emblematic space of the 21<sup>st</sup>-century design ideology, attentive to what Koolhaas (1997: 969) describe as no longer ‘... DER XW PHW LFXOR XV GH ÷ QLWLRQ WKH LPSRVLV notions, denying boundaries, not about separating and identifying entities.’

The different explorations suggest a disciplinary turn that does not codify the architect as the creator of forms and detaches the building as the object with which architecture is purely identified. Moreover, it credits the architect capable of constructing a landscape.

This specification does not aspire to erase the bond between architecture and buildings. However, it is necessary to delegate a different disciplinary objective that links architecture, urbanism, and landscape architecture within the context of function-defining sciences. This need becomes evident when the architect turns to other disciplines to elaborate projects outside architecture's orthodox scale. If interested to escape the predicament of uneasily justified territorial interventions, it is essential to expand the architect's inventory of tools and procedures with formal findings from other sciences and scientific systems, aiming not to discredit the current work of the architects but rather entrust them with tasks that channel and formalize a larger scope of data, functions, and space.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen S (2002) *Mat Urbanism: Thick 2D*. H. Sarkis, ed. CASE: Le Corbusier's Venice Hospital and the Mat Building Revival. s.l.:Prestel Pub, p. 124.

Gregotti V (2009) *The Form of the Territory*. OASE: Issue 80, pp. 7-22.

Gruen V (1955) *Cityscape-Landscape*. Arts & Architecture. s.l.:John D. Entenza, pp. 18-37.

Koolhaas R (1997) *Whatever happened to urbanism?* J. Sigler, ed. S, M, L, XL. s.l.:The Monacelli Press, pp. 960-971.

Sarkis H (2014) *Geo-Architecture: A prehistory for an emerging aesthetic*. Harvard GSD Design Magazine, Volume 37.

Solà-Morales (1995) *Terrain Vague*. C. C. Davidson, ed. Anyplace. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, pp. 118-123.

Waldheim C (2016) *Landscape as Urbanism: A General Theory*. Princeton, New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press.

**Mirjana Lozanovska, PhD, research fellow**

University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Architecture, Ljubljana, Slovenia  
mirjana.lozanovska.ml@gmail.com

**CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:**  
*abandoned industrial areas in the city of Skopje*

**Abstract**

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

One of the biggest concerns of modern societies/cities is the alienation of citizens from decision in the decision-making processes. This is most evident in the future development of the abandoned industrial zones which once at the periphery now are part of the city urban area. To understand the importance of citizen participation and the involvement of locals, it is necessary to divide the document into many connected aspects of the whole issue. Today there are many cases of transformation of the abandoned industrial areas, and the local residents are not the main beneficiaries of that transformed space, but the main customers become tourists or people from the city centre. Often, the locals get excluded and not see benefits and in many cases, they eventually have to move to other areas.

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

This is a very important point when we think about the transformation of abandoned industrial areas. It is crucial to look at the different levels of transformation, what the transformation brings/means to the city, but also what the transformation brings to the local communities? Because, usually the locals are functionally, locally symbolically much more connected with these areas. According to Irvin and Stansbury (2004), citizen participation can play a crucial role in building more inclusive and sustainable cities. The involvement of residents in decision making is recognized as an important instrument to improve the living environment in localities, as well as to strengthen local autonomy.

In this context, the participation of citizens is an important element of democratic processes and decision making. In the neighbourhoods where we can find abandoned industrial areas in Skopje, there is a very low level of public participation. The communication of local citizens with the city administration is poor and did not facilitate the participation process. Most often old abandoned industrial zones are classified as Degraded Areas, and in terms of rehabilitation of these areas, they should be an important priority of spatial development of cities/municipalities, because on the one hand, we can treat them as a financial burden for society, but also, on the other hand, they have huge development potential according

Remove it Now




to the research article from Križnik et.al (2019) about the established relations between the state and civil society. The statement is that these relations are of essential importance. This points towards an ongoing restructuring of the state civil society relations, and to consequent transition from developmental urbanisation towards what could be seen as post-developmental urbanisation.

**Keywords:** Citizen participation, participation process, civil society initiatives, abandoned industrial areas/zones, Skopje

## THE PARTICIPATION PROCESS AS PART OF THE URBAN PLANNING PROCESS THROUGH ARNSTEIN'S LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

As described in Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969) public participation in urban planning can vary from the lowest level of participation (manipulation) to the highest (control). At the lowest levels (nonparticipation) and the first phase, not only do people have no influence on decision-making but they are manipulated into believing that everything is done in their best interest (see: figure 01). It assumes that the proposed plan is the best, and the task of participation is to achieve public support through public relations. In the second phase of passive participation (tokenism), they receive information about urban projects as they happen, without any possibility of intervening. Only placation allows members of the public to advise or plan ad infinitum, but it retains the right for power holders to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. Under citizen control (partnership and delegation), power is redistributed through negotiation between the public and power holders. The highest level and the final phase of participation implies that residents can initiate urban projects and thus design their own living space with no intermediaries or source of funds. At this level, they can control urban policy and be an equal member of the entire planning process.



Arnstein's Ladder (1969)  
Degrees of Citizen Participation

**Figure 01.** Arnstein's Ladder (1969) Degrees of Citizen Participation

The ladder is a guide to seeing who has power when important decisions are being made. It has survived for so long because people continue to confront processes that refuse to consider anything beyond the bottom rungs.

Here is how we can describe the 8 rungs of the ladder:

1 Manipulation and 2 Therapy. Both are non-participative. The aim is to cure or educate the participants. The proposed plan is best and the job of participation is to achieve public support through public relations. 3 Informing. The most important first step to legitimate participation. But too frequently the emphasis is on a one-way flow of information. No channel for feedback. 4 Consultation. Again a legitimate step is attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings and public enquiries. But Arnstein still feels this is just a window dressing ritual. 5 Placation. For example, co-option of hand-picked 'worthies' onto committees. It allows citizens to advise or plan ad infinitum but retains for power holders the right to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. 6 Partnership. Power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power holders. Planning and decision-making responsibilities are shared e.g. through joint committees. 7 Delegation. Citizens holding a clear majority of seats on committees with delegated powers to make decisions. The public now has the power to assure accountability of the programme to them. 8 Citizen Control. Have-nots handle the entire job of planning, policy-making and managing a programme e.g. neighbourhood corporation with no intermediaries between it and the source of funds.

Many authors later followed Arnstein's scheme. For example, Anokye (2013) also describes various paths to participation: the higher level is the transformative approach, and the lower one is the instrumental approach, and there is also a combination between the two of them. The transformative approach is equivalent to Arnstein's citizen control and the instrumental approach is the equivalent to her nonparticipation. Most participation systems are in the mixed model, implying that residents know about or have occasionally participated in some kind of consultations, and they are in a certain way informed about the decisions that city authorities will implement. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they have really participated in the process and that they will be empowered to change political decisions. This approach is therefore instrumental in a way, employing methods that involve top-down information flows and not strengthening the actors (Anokye 2013: 82). According to Hordijk et al. (2015), this approach is related to the diminished roles of the state and its citizens, referring to them as clients or consumers that cannot influence the process of making decisions but can only adhere to them because they are unchangeable. The transformative approach uses bottom-up communication and represents a higher level of participation, in which stronger public involvement can be expected.

## EXAMPLE OF THE CITY OF SKOPJE

In the former Yugoslavia, of which Skopje was part, spatial management was conditioned by the socio-political context, and it was largely based on planning and state control. Social, economic, and spatial development issues were addressed comprehensively within the social planning system. Unfortunately, the state's role in spatial management ceased to exist in the post-communist period of the city of Skopje. Even the Institute of Urbanism of the

City of Skopje was made redundant and was eventually closed. The focus shifted to the privatisation of space and real estate, land reuse and redevelopment, and redefinition of the roles of planning institutions.

Today Skopje's urban landscape is a kind of urban-architectural conglomerate, a system of overlapping historical and morphological layers which in their nature are contradictory among themselves. The city is faced with various circumstances and predicaments and has undergone several processes of evolution and change. Certainly, a great influence on the development of the city of Skopje plays the development of the industry. Exemplary is the development of the residential settlements around the Industrial enterprises most of which are today closed and abandoned. However, the market-oriented economy revealed a lack of common interest and vision in urban planning. Instead, a certain laissez-faire approach or economic liberalism was embraced in urban planning and public policies, which created (and continues to create) uneven urban development and economic inequality (Offe 1997; Jaakson 2000; Nikšič & Sezer 2017). As a result, attractive city locations have become large building sites, profits on various investments have soared, and less-attractive locations have stagnated (Nikšič 2014; Patti and Polyak 2017).


It is interesting that the Master Plan for Skopje has been modified for years depending on market needs. Public interest is declared to be important and valuable, but collaboration with

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

#### VIP Benefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now



**Figure 02.** City of Skopje - Position of abandoned industrial zones in the context of the urban city area

The post-socialist transition of Skopje created amazing challenges in planning and creating the urban landscape of the city, setting completely new frameworks for its spatial development. By changing the urban planning system, i.e. the emergence of previously non-existent participants in this process (private land-owners, private investors, private planning companies, private construction industry, local government with responsibilities in the field of urban planning, etc.), completely new conditions for urban development of the city were created. As a result of these factors, in conjunction with economic and socio-political challenges related to the nation-building processes, the crucial decision of Skopje's transformation in the post-socialist period are the cruel forms of privatisation of the abandoned industrial areas such as the Kuprum factory, Treska factory, Staklara factory and many more in the City of Skopje (see: figure 02).

The period of transition was mostly spontaneous, which occurred as a result of a sudden inclination of the local authorities without premeditation, plan and existence of a general strategic framework for the development of the city. The city's transitional forms of densifying are chaotic. The remains of the abandoned industrial areas are often subject to extinction and oblivion. According to Goran Janev (2017), the appropriation of space is connected with the neoliberal capitalist appropriation of space. As he demonstrates, the

neglect of socialist monuments, but not only those sites in the city, as I will show below as with the abandoned industrial sites, is indicative of grey-zoning, a governmentality technique that allows neoliberal practices to flourish unhindered by any productive public debate.

In the urban context of the City of Skopje, the abandoned industrial areas are being rudimentary, privatised and commercialised on a daily basis, it is crucial to find a way so they can be socially and economically reintegrated through different strategies. Also, very often these spaces are “occupied” or “appropriated” by local residents and emerging communities and expand the notion of social and economic integration to symbolic integration too. In some cases, the usage of abandoned industrial sites by the local people can have a positive effect and improve the image of the neighbourhood as well as the space itself, but in other cases, abandoned industrial sites in Skopje can bring negative value due to vandalism or uncontrolled appropriation by people.

Case Study - Kuprum factory

**Figure 03.** Kuprum Factory – Author photography, 2021.

This abandoned industrial area is strongly connected with the city centre, and at the same time, it has a strategic position for the future development of the municipality of Gjorche Petrov. Historically, this area was a peripheral settlement of agricultural character before 1963, and in the last decades the expansion of the city this area became part of it, but as a degraded abandoned zone (see: figure 03).

The crisis of traditional industries in the early 1990s resulted in rapid de-industrialization. Kuprum factory has had to face dramatic changes that finally resulted with abandoned degraded industrial space in the middle of the city urban area. Particular importance for the city of Skopje is the architectural approach to urban development towards these abandoned industrial places, that today occupy a large part of the urban identity of Skopje. They help us to define the character of our society, they also play an important role as an integral part of the city's collective memory. They have huge potential to grow into something that would make a huge contribution to our cities, from the cultural, social, and architectural aspect.

## CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The main focus of this paper is the question and importance of citizen participation could have in the decision-making process for the future development of abandoned industrial areas. What is crucial fact is that these settlements are actually created around industrial facilities, in the past the main connection of the surrounding inhabitants was with industry as their existence point as a place where the entire neighbourhood was employed and a place where the daily life of the local people took place. Through the years many things have changed, but the connection of the inhabitants with these areas certainly exists (see: figure 04). It is visible, both strong and unbreakable.

In the post-communist city, market demands and private interests are much more relevant than planning as a process. Even public investments are focused on the sectors and projects that can improve the attractiveness of the city for profit rather than improve the general quality of life for its residents (Stanilov 2007; Sykora 2007; Patti and Polyak 2017). The urban planning transition from communism to post-communism has been marked by the neglect of the social dimension of urban living and housing and strategic and long-term urban planning.



**Figure 04.** Local residents on-site \_ Abandoned industrial zone Kuprum. Author photography, 2021.

The market economy characteristics present since the 1990s (privatization, reduction of public space, and the global financial system) influence the relations among the stakeholders in the urban planning processes; specifically, their roles and powers. Western countries use terms such as high levels of citizen participation, high legal standards, and successful public-private partnerships. In urban planning, the countries of the former Yugoslavia are struggling with limitations in the legal system and insufficient public participation in the decision-making processes. However, the reasons for the rather slow transition in most parts of the former Yugoslavia certainly lie in the conflict of the 1990s and the break with and isolation from European and global trends (Beyea et al. 2009).

In the case of Kuprum all these problems are becoming apparent. One of the basic problems for greater citizen participation is the lack of knowledge of the process of public participation in decision-making, i.e., lack of knowledge of the legislation and responsibilities that every citizen has, including civil society organizations. I conducted a number of interviews with local residents in order to elicit data about whether locals are informed about the possibilities of the process of decision making and the findings are very disappointing (see: figure 05, figure 06).

The active participation from local society and particular target groups which are inhabiting the area could contribute to the process of making important solutions and future decisions or developments for the abandoned industrial areas, not only on this site.

**Figure 05.** Local residents on-site \_ Abandoned industrial zone. Author photography, 2021.

It would be advisable to develop a set of objectives to allow for increased civic participation by the local community, or communities, as in the case in Skopje where the abandoned industrial sites are significantly present. The overall goal would be reaching to increase the involvement of civil society organizations in the environmental decision-making process at the local level. They could initiate and facilitate the achieving of a more specific objective of improved cooperation of the civil society sector and the local self-government in the field of decision making. This will certainly result in increased involvement of citizens in the decision-making process and joint problem solving, networking in order to successfully make decisions in the field of abandoned industrial zones, and raising awareness in civil society in order to promote social change.

**Figure 06.** Local residents on-site \_ Abandoned industrial zone. Author photography,2021.

## CONCLUSION

Public participation in urban planning and the renewal and protection of public space still remains relatively low, as can be seen from the Example of the City of Skopje. The public has very little influence on changes in spatial plans, and ultimately on the conversion of space, most often public space. Following the example of Arnstein's Ladder and comparing the situation in which the city of Skopje is, we can see that in fact, the level of participation is very low. Actually, the nonparticipation is evident, and not only do people have no influence on decision-making but they are manipulated into believing that everything is done in their best interest.

Public interest is declared to be important and valuable, but collaboration with the public is lacking. Realizing the real context of the Skopje situation through the examples of the abandoned factory Kuprum, the situation in which the currently abandoned factory Treska is, the abandoned factory Alumina is a concrete example of disrespect and without implementation of public participation in making important decisions in urban planning and protection of public space.

The importance of the involvement of the local residents on-site that live around the abandoned industrial zones in Skopje in the decision-making processes is of great importance, but also of great value, both for the citizens themselves and for the decision-makers, i.e. the authorities at a national and local level. With this approach, on the one hand, the city of Skopje will be closer to its citizens, while the citizens will express a desire for them to contribute with their ideas and participate in creating their environment. Their awareness of protecting the city will increase which is strongly connected with the future development of the city.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anokye A (2013) Stakeholder participation in water resources management: The case of Densu Basin in Ghana. Doctoral thesis. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.

Arnstein R (1969) A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, pp. 216.

Beyea W, Geith C and McKeown C (2009) Placemaking through participatory planning. Chapter 4. In: Foth, M. (ed.) *Handbook of research on urban informatics: The practice and promise of the real-time city*. Hershey, PA, Information Science Reference, pp. 55– 68.

Janev G (2017) Burdensome past: Challenging the socialist heritage in Macedonia. *Studia ethnologica Croatica*, 29 (1): 149-169.

Jaakson R (2000) Supra-national spatial planning of the Baltic Sea region and competing narratives for tourism. *European Planning Studies*, 8: 565–579.

Hordijk M, Miranda Sara L, Sutherland C and Scott D (2015) Participatory instruments and practices in urban governance. Gupta, J., Pfeffer, K., Verrest, H. & Ros-Tonen, M. (eds.) *Geographies of Urban Governance*, 26(1): 130–146.

Irvin R and Stansbury J (2004); Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort? *Public Administration Review*; ABI/INFORM Global, pp. 55.

Križnik B, Cho S and Kim S (2019) Preobrazba mest v Vzhodni Aziji: Primerjava vključevanja javnosti v prenovo stanovanjskih sosesk v Južni Koreji in Singapurju. *Asia Review* 8(2): 65–102.

Nikšič M (2014) Access to quality open public space as an urban sustainability measure. In: Bokor, L., Munkacsy, B. and Nikšič, M. (eds.) *Locality and (un)sustainable settlements*. Shrewsbury: Frugeo Geography Research Initiative, pp. 284–303.

Nikšič M (2018) Participatory revitalisation of urban public open space: Urban planners' skills needed for improvement of urban public spaces in a participatory manner. In: Novaković, N., Grom, J. P. & Fikfak, A. (eds.) *Realms of urban design: Mapping sustainability*, Delft, TU Delft Open, pp. 197–215.

Nikšič M and Sezer C (2017) Public space and urban justice. *Built Environment*, 43(2): 165–172.

Offe C (1997) Microaspects of democratic theory: What makes for the deliberative competence of citizens? Hadenius, A. (ed.) *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, pp. 81–104.

Patti D and Polyak L (2017) *Funding the cooperative city*. Vienna: Cooperative City Books

Institute of Ethnography SASA, Belgrade, Serbia  
srdjan.radovic@ei.sanu.ac.rs

## EVOLUTION OF A BELGRADE SQUARE FROM A TRANSPORTATION HUB INTO A (QUASI) HISTORICAL THEME PARK

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

**VIP Benefits:** examines the urban, landscape and symbolical development of a Belgrade city square (Savski trg) and its surrounding area (Savamala, colloquially and locally called Štajga, presently evolving into Belgrade Waterfront), in the course of over a hundred years. The square and its surrounding area grew out of the turn of the century modernization after the war. The square, together with other transportation facilities in the vicinity, it represented the city's main transportation hub in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This urban node and its surroundings started undergoing profound transformations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, following the general transitioning of the city from an industry-based economy, and Belgrade's evolving into a 'postmodern city' characterised by

1. Converts the whole document.

2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Remove it Now

development and entrepreneurial urbanism. The area first witnessed gentrification occurring in the area north of the Savski trg, and later on a large-scale development project taking place west and northwest from the square, gradually replacing earlier transportation and other facilities. Savski trg itself also underwent two successive symbolic and memorial renovations in the last ten years, and the paper will examine neighbourhood transformation, uses of public space, and identity politics shaping the makeover of the square and its vicinity.

**Keywords:** Belgrade, Belgrade Waterfront (Savamala, Štajga), Savski trg, urban (re) development, symbolic urban landscape, modernity and postmodernity

## ŠTAJGA: ENTER MODERNITY

On May 5<sup>th</sup> 1980,<sup>1</sup> journalists of the Yugoslav state broadcaster solemnly reported in a live TV broadcast: “Since the early hours of the day, columns of Belgraders have poured towards the grand Square of Brotherhood and Unity in front of the main railway station to await the special train from Ljubljana and Zagreb, carrying the body of the late president Tito. It is exactly 5 PM – the ‘Blue train’ with the late president of the Republic Tito, enters Belgrade’s central rail station (...) Entire Belgrade congregated on the Square of Brotherhood and Unity.”<sup>2</sup> On that day this city square had witnessed probably the largest crowds in its entire history which now spans over 135 years, since when Belgrade’s main railway station (a landmark building defining the creation of the square), had been opened. Savski trg (Sava Square, named after the river Sava passing nearby), as it is now called, started to form around the railway station opened in 1885 – this hub was central in the development of the nascent Serbian railway system and in the urban development of this part of town. Just north of the building stood the neighbourhood of Savamala with the city’s river port, and towards the south a large marshy bog called Ciganska bara (Gypsy pond) or Bara Venecija (Venice pond) - its draining enabled the gradual development of this vast area. At the turn of the century, the square in front of the rail station and surrounding streets became a bustling area of flux of people and goods, and the square was thus named Žitni trg (Grains Square) because it also provided for the massive shipment of grains and cereals.<sup>3</sup> Another unofficial name of the square and its wider surroundings referred more specifically to the circulation of people – for the most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century until the present day, Belgraders have called this location Štajga, a term stemming from German steigen – to climb (also absteigen – to get off; aufsteigen – to get on; etc.), alluding to the coming and going of people by primarily trains. Indeed, the square (renamed to Vilsonov trg after World War I, commemorating the US president Woodrow Wilson) and the neighbouring area established itself as the city’s prime transportation hub. Traversed also by tram lines, the square provided for the circulation of people and goods – besides the rail station and the adjacent river port, the city’s biggest post office building was built in 1929 on the location, and by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the entire area catered for the most of the transfer of people in and out of the capital, and transport of merchandise and mail. In 1966 city’s central bus station was erected just next to the railway station building, and given that one of the urban transit routes for trucks also passed through this area, the square and its surroundings became the most important urban node in Belgrade. For the most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the neighbourhood of Savamala or Štajga, hosted working and middle-class housing and primarily catered for city’s transportation accompanied by storage facilities, repair shops, retail, restaurant and lodging businesses (small hotels and inns), including unofficial and sometimes illegal activities that usually go along with

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper is the result of research carried out at the Institute of Ethnography SASA, Belgrade (funded by the MPNTR – Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, contract no. 451-03-9/2021-14/200173).

<sup>2</sup> Transcribed and translated from the videotaped live broadcast of the funeral of Josip Broz Tito on TV Titograd station on May 5th 1980 (last viewed and accessed on August 1st 2021).

<sup>3</sup> Historical overview of the square’s and area’s development is based on Čubrilović 1974, and relevant onomastic data stems from Leko 2003.

constant circulation of people (such as unofficial open-air trading and barter, small-scale con artists, dealers of illegal substances, prostitution, also a pornographic movie theatre, etc.). Although technically centrally positioned in the city's perimeters (less than 500 meters away from Belgrade's point zero and main square), present-day Savski square and surroundings were not symbolically and culturally perceived as being central, foremostly because of their primary transport functions, lack of representative public buildings and sometimes shady reputation.

Many Belgraders perceived this area as a non-place, to use Marc Augé's term, a location not significantly connected to any particular cultural or symbolical value, as transport hubs and station facilities usually are depicted in such a discourse (Augé 2005: 75-76). On the other hand, Savski trg and its stations were the place for people coming to Belgrade (sometimes arriving in the city for the first time, with a plethora of modern cultural references connected with Savski trg as an entrance point for Belgrade 'newcomers'), and those dwelling in this area. Thus, it could be argued that the Štajga area ultimately could not be relegated to a complete symbolical void by almost anyone – the bustling, yet unrepresentative and somewhat shanty service-oriented area placed just next to the brightly lit downtown zone could not be completely ignored. It was culturally projected into the realm of urban "otherness" by some (when envisioned from the perspective of urbanite and well-established social strata with advanced cultural capital, both in capitalism and socialism), while others (area locals, commuters, long-distance travellers, newcomers to the city, and most of the city's blue-collar strata) perceived, practised and performed Štajga in more favourable and culturally intimate ways. The area generally lacked prominent onomastic or architectural memorial markers in the area – the neighbourhood was not the site of any major monuments or landmark buildings (part for the train station), or regular mass rallies (part for the one mentioned in the beginning of this paper).<sup>4</sup> The square's penultimate official name, Trg bratstva i jedinstva was the only ideologically pronounced spatial marker (English: Square of Brotherhood and Unity, as it was renamed in 1946, following the establishment of socialist and federal Yugoslavia, and commemorating the country's unofficial slogan denoting the Yugoslav socialist concept of multiethnicity).

Socialist urban modernity in its Yugoslav iteration also meant large scale development of the capital, best epitomized in the erection of the Novi Beograd (New Belgrade) borough. Coordinated actors (political and professional-managerial social strata leading public institutions and the economy) of the planned and, for the most part, controlled and supervised urban politics, also envisaged gradual relocation of the existing transportation hub further from the city centre through the deployment of railway infrastructure to other parts of the city, opening up Štajga area and Sava river banks for further development.<sup>5</sup> Gradual execution of this endeavour was progressing in the 1960s and 1970s, but was halted due to the economic crisis of the 1980s, and (temporarily) abandoned by the beginning of the 1990s – collapse of socialism and multiethnic Yugoslavia also heralded the end of the modern(ist) era, including its urban public projects.

<sup>4</sup> Political and other organized mass rallies were taking place more frequently on the squares of the Belgrade's historic nucleus (municipality of Stari Grad/Old Town).

<sup>5</sup> Urban development plans for the area are presented in detail in the journal *Urbanizam Beograda*, vols. 1–66/67 (1969–1982).



## SAVAMALA: ENTER POSTMODERNITY

The beginning of the Yugoslav wars did not affect Belgrade directly as it did many cities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that suffered brutal warfare and destruction, but it profoundly altered its social and urban fabric. Economic and cultural downfall ignited by fueling nationalism led to the ‘deformed urbanization’, and ‘dysfunctional urban functions’ (Petrović 1997), mass (in)voluntary emigration and immigration, and increasing poverty. The Square in front of the central rail station symbolically and factually bore witness to that. On a symbolical level, it was renamed in 1992 from a previous socialist multiethnic marker into its current newly coined name. On a factual level, it testified to a significantly smaller number of guests and travellers exiting railway and bus stations, with refugees and displaced persons walking those routes instead. Besides a short-breath 1995 propaganda stunt announcing the development of the wider area around the square (branded as Europolis – Beograd na Savi, and echoing earlier visions of the area’s development), no actual development or renovations occurred by the end of the century.

The fall of the regime of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 (in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO intervention), reopened the possibilities for social and economic development of Serbia after the devastating *fin de siècle*, but also faced the society with challenges of the so-called (post-socialist) transition and (late) inclusion into postmodern and globalizing currents already enveloping throughout Europe. Capillary effects of the wider circumstances were also felt in the Štajga area. Many local retail stores, workshops and storage facilities (including most of those run by former socially owned enterprises), started going out of business, and coupled with the crippling of the transportation sector, led to the demise of this branch of industry. Dubious bankruptcies, buyouts and privatizations added to the generally unstable economic climate, and new establishments found their place in former industrial facilities. Gentrification has swung in full force in the Savamala area north of the Savski trg, less so by means of influx of new residents, so much as by the opening of bars, clubs, hostels, galleries, cultural and NGO hubs, and other entertainment and hospitality businesses that conveniently took over former industrial, artisanal and transport spaces.<sup>6</sup> Soon, this area gained novel cultural capital, eloping previous industrial and shantytown perceptions, and already in 2015 residents of the neighbourhood could attest to the public image transformation of Štajga (a slightly derogatory name, how most of the locals and Belgraders used to call the area) into Savamala (historic and more upscale name, prevailing in recent times) (Bukumirovic 2015). The area’s ‘rebranding’ was promoted by city’s officials (together with raging marketing of Belgrade as a tourist and nightlife hotspot, bordering on self-exoticism), testifying to more or less coordinated effort of politics, business and cultural industries (the way most gentrifications usually operate in other places as well).

Urban ‘renewal’ of (former) Štajga could be monitored as a small-scale case of a steady transformation of Belgrade into a textbook ‘postmodern city, with properties transformed into marketed real estate, entrepreneurial and investors’ monopoly in the creation of the urban content, and the absence of defined urban politics (Petrović 2009). Consumption has become one of the cornerstones of the area’s development, and the people to whom the new

<sup>6</sup> The process could only partially be defined as pioneer gentrification (Backović 2019), and some depict it as a culture-driven urban transformation (Lazić 2019).

urban content was created were the consumers (mostly meaning consumers not living in the neighbourhood itself). The ‘upgraded’ Savamala was to attract people from other parts of the city (and beyond) for leisure and entertainment, as one of the showpieces of the new image of Belgrade as open for guests (primarily tourists), symbolically overcoming and setting aside the difficult years of wars and isolation of the 1990s. Just south of the emerging slick neighbourhood, Savski trg with its stations stood ready for its own makeover to add up to the flare of the gradually refurbished and rebranded Serbian capital.

In 2006, city authorities and the Serbian Ministry of culture commissioned what would eventually be known as the “Memorial to victims of the wars and defenders of the Fatherland from 1990 to 1999”, to be situated on Savski trg. Following initiatives to commemorate war victims of the 1990s, but also initiatives from Serb veterans’ associations of those same wars, the authorities came up with a mish-mash concept which left many discontent. A monument obscuring the nature of the Yugoslav wars and equating war victims and perpetrators was in complete accordance with dominant self-abolitionist Serbian discourses, renouncing any real accountability for the recent wars in former Yugoslavia. At the same time, this gave an opportunity to authorities to leave their memorial footprint in the public space, and an elaborate memorial blueprint was chosen for the site. However, although not big in numbers, vocal opposition to the monument ensued, triggering a public debate on the matter mostly procured by the artists’ group Spomenik.<sup>7</sup> This caused the stalling off the erection of the memorial, and gradual falling into the obscurity of the entire question, just until 2012, when city officials decided to swiftly proceed with the placement of the monument, only not in its elaborate original form. Savski trg thus hosted the opening ceremony of a modest and rudimentary small-scale memorial which left almost everyone disheartened (which showed already at the opening event with incidents and angered shout-outs from the congregated public).

Prolonged instalment of the war memorial on Savski trg unveiled multiple actors taking part in the process of creating symbolized urban space, with the political sphere eventually having the last say on the matter. Plurality of social actors engaged in the practising of contemporary Balkan cities is obviously hierarchically ordered, and participatory decision-making involving citizens is decreasingly present and sometimes discouraged. Primacy of the business/entrepreneurial sphere in urban development and of the political elite in memorial and symbolic production of urban space thus seems to be almost unchallenged. Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Belgrade has witnessed mostly undisputed advancement of entrepreneurial urbanism and excessive real estate development (in Serbia sometimes dubbed as investment, or investor urbanism), enabled by this neoliberal urban alliance, which will reach an unprecedented scale from 2014 onwards, precisely in the Savski trg area.

<sup>7</sup> The group’s website: <https://grupaspomenik.wordpress.com>. More elaborately on the entire issue of the memorial see Radović 2013 and David 2014.

## BELGRADE WATERFRONT: SUPER MODERNITY RELOADED

Since 2014 Savski trg has become the epicentre of a large-scale urban (re)development project (brownfield investment), when a special public-private joint venture (enacted also through a special bill passed in the Serbian parliament) took off. Business partnership between the Serbian government and an Emirati investment and development company envisaged the creation of a new urban quarter in the place of still existing transport and storage infrastructure west and northwest from Savski trg and Savska street, branded as Belgrade Waterfront (Serbian: Beograd na vodi). This joint venture projected densely built properties mostly comprising residential, office and retail real estate leaning on the Sava riverbank, and is currently under intensive construction. Echoing 20<sup>th</sup> century general visions for the development of this area, the project, however, maximized the share of real estate for sale and lease (also by projecting compact clusters of high-rise properties) and minimized the share of non-commercial public-use facilities. Neglect of the public interest in this business venture became evident with hasty shut-down of the main railway station on Savski trg in 2018, while no other fully capacitated major train station was still operational in Belgrade, which is presently still the case (central bus station is to be relocated in 2022). Vocal public criticism and opposition channelled by a number of political, NGO, academic and professional organizations targeted many aspects of the project. Besides the gargantuan proportions and planned cramming of buildings, critics pointed out dubious legality of the venture, non-transparent financing, disregard for public interest, illegal and violent evictions of previous users and owners and their property in the area, etc. Proponents of the project (centred around, but not limited to Serbian and Belgrade authorities and their business partners) ignored or downplayed these issues, and despite the fact that Belgrade Waterfront has become one of the focal points of political struggle and public debate for years, the project is being executed mostly without interruptions.<sup>8</sup> A firm grip of leading business and political actors on urban development has further tightened compared to the preceding decade.

By now fully ongoing urban development plan has already attracted academic attention, and has been interpreted also through the lens of advanced and state-led gentrification (Backović 2019), while similarities with the Dubai-style development initiated analysis of the project's operational aspects and transnational capital-flow (Koelemaj 2021). Novelty of the Belgrade Waterfront in the Serbian and even wider context is the driving role of the state authorities in this development, and the fact that the nation-state (and not the local authorities which is more common), is not only assisting the investors, but also directing the development process (see Grubbauer and Čamprag 2019). Such a situation which resembles the prime time of modern urban development can lead us again to Augé and his explanation of supermodernity as a pinnacle of modernity, or being in excess of the modern, and the haste, spatially and temporally saturated development of Belgrade Waterfront could be designated as supermodern in this sense.

Given how David Harvey (2008) has repeatedly shown that excessive urban development and rapid urbanization serve the aim of surplus capital absorption, it is clear that this specific development does the same with (transnational) migrating surpluses. The twist with the

<sup>8</sup> For more details of the venture and scholarly analysis see Petrović and Backović 2019.

nation-state's prominent role in the process relates to the 'supermodern' Waterfront maybe not only with its super/post-modern Dubai role model, but even more so with the 'classic' modern Paris of Haussman and Bonaparte, and the then intensive symbiosis of capital, nation-state politics, and state authority in the radical reordering of the capital (see Harvey 2005). The uncanny parallels diverge in the 'supermodern' conditions of the Belgrade case, with its peripheral location in the globalized world of capital and limited spatial scope of the project. On the other hand, what also makes this development akin to 'classic' modern grand-scale projects is the effort to also inscribe ideology into public space and "project values onto stone and space" (Schorske 1998:25). The backdrop for such a symbolic intervention in the public space of an otherwise bland sum of mass-produced buildings was found on Savski trg.

With the eviction of the railways, Savski trg no longer served the function of transit of people and vehicles to the station, presenting a more or less clean slate for public space design, ready to be inscribed with (an) 'identity'. Fabric for identity (re) modelling can stem from diverse and layered local heritage, and from what can be described as cumulative texture of local urban culture (Spasić and Backović 2017: 23). Štajga area and its long-lasting and defining tradition of transportation offered quite a bit in this respect, but Serbian and Belgrade officials had other priorities in mind. Thus, the initiative to turn the defunct rail station building into a railway museum was outright rejected, with authorities proclaiming that the facility will host some kind of historical museum. After prolonged considerations of what kind of historical museum would suit the location (potentially also a newly established one), the latest decision (November 2020) of the building's proprietor (Serbian government) is to relocate the existing Historical Museum of Serbia to these premises. Elaborate redesign of the square itself was the priority, clearly aiming at grandeur and the historical, as announced by the leading national and city-level politicians who acted in this instance as deal-breaking 'memorial entrepreneurs' (Jordan 2006: 77).

In 2016 it was announced that a monument dedicated to Stefan Nemanja (ruler of medieval Serbia and founder of its prominent feudal dynasty) would be erected in front of the former station building. The location was presented as convenient since Savski trg is also the endpoint of a major street named after this ruler (Nemanjina st.). At the same time, this identity choice towards medieval traditions corresponds with prevailing memory discourses throughout contemporary Balkans which bypass most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a symbolic pool for legitimization of current national identities, and turn to earlier, often medieval past (Radović 2003: 310–315). The actual public discussion about the proposed monument started only in 2018 when the winning design of the competition was unveiled. A 23 meters high mastodon monument was chosen, and immediate uproar from professional and general public ensued (lasting almost till the present day). The contentious points included firstly the enormous scale of the monument, but also its style and detailing, symbolism present in monument's segments, competition procedures and financing, etc.<sup>9</sup> The opponents of the statue perceived it as a disproportionate pseudo-traditionalist kitsch (comparing it to the infamous Skopje 2014 project), while its supporters applauded its over-scaled grandiosity and historicism. Regardless of the conflicting response of the public, the project (expectedly) proceeded as planned, which also included the overall remodelling of the square (changes

<sup>9</sup> For a minute overview and commentary of the issue see Makuljević 2019.

in traffic layout, partial pedestrianization, new public and decorative lightning etc.). In the novel context, the 1990s war memorial (appearing miniature in comparison) became a sidekick of the new show, and was relocated to the storage facility of the city's heritage protection institution, until a new location is found for its placement.

## THE BEGINNING OF AN EPILOGUE

The grand opening of the monument in January 2021 (organized regardless of the raging Covid pandemic) revealed the intentions and functions of the upgraded Savski trg. Political and religious leaders of Serbia, joined by ethnic Serb dignitaries from other post-Yugoslav countries, espoused "national unity" in a political rally on a stage consisting of the biggest standing statue in Serbia and soon to be a historical museum. Savski trg is probably to become a rallying ground for manifestations like this, and its vast open space has proved to be convenient for such purposes since (either for organized or spontaneous rallies and demonstrations). When not used in such a manner, the square is saturated with national symbolism, and can serve the ideological function indirectly, echoing archaic architectural and monumental concepts. We should be reminded how national identity is forged around certain objects, including the built environment. In a two-way process whereby a nation projects on to the environment certain values (as though on to some blank screen), and then reads itself back into that environment, invested as it now is with certain values (Leach 2002: 89). It might well be that the square's remodelling had this as an intention, to concoct not just a new symbolic space in the urban tissue, but also to create a national symbol in Belgrade's urbanscape, and (as increasingly frequent public narratives allude), city's new main square in what could become the new city center (Belgrade Waterfront after its completion).

While the potential transition of the city's epicentre to a different location can prove to be a long stretch (which also depends on a number of unaccounted factors), restructuring of the square decisively alters its uses and image. Given that on the side opposite of the former station lay infrequently visited public and commercial facilities and housing, current state of the square could be depicted as a theme park (Makuljević 2019), moreover, a (quasi) historical one. Of course, only once the entire Belgrade Waterfront project is completed will it be possible to definitely assess what the actual dynamics of the square will be. One of the paradoxes of this renovation is the fact that Savski trg, for now, represents one of the rare public spaces in central Belgrade (apart from parks), that offers vast walking spaces (given that majority of downtown's sidewalks and pedestrian streets are infected with sprawling open-air cafes and restaurants), and free leisure. Free nationalist leisure though. While consumption of prime real estate and upscale retail in Belgrade Waterfront is accessible to few, and consumption of cultural lifestyles in Savamala affordable to some, former Štajga's main square is free to consume for everyone, as national(ist) public markers usually are.

With Belgrade Waterfront west of the square still mostly under construction, and Savamala north of it for the most part catering for nightlife, Savski trg is presently not too lively, except for mostly West Asian migrants and refugees who largely contribute to the area's vivacity. Since the central bus station is still located in the area, people on the move spend most of their quotidian life in open spaces near the facility, being also a reminder of bygone dynamics

of former Štajga. When the bus station relocates further away (next year according to plans), so will the migrating community probably. Once that occurs, and most of the adjacent development is completed, Savski trg will likely become a social and cultural laboratory providing us with insight on how an urban public space born out of the intersection of gentrification, entrepreneurial urbanism and nation-state politics grows.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Augé M. [Ože M] (2005) *Nemesta: uvod u antropologiju nadmodernosti*. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek.

Backović V. (2019) “The Specificity of Gentrification in the Postsocialist City: The Case of the Belgrade Waterfront Project”. In: Petrović J and Backović V (eds.) *Experiencing postsocialist capitalism: urban changes and challenges in Serbia*. Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja: pp.23–44.

Bukumirović D. (2015) Odrastao je na ‘Štajgi’, a sada živi u ‘Savamali’, *vice.com*, 29 July 2015. Available at: <https://www.vice.com/sr/article/pgb5xb/odrastao-je-na-stajgi-a-sad-zivi-u-savamali> (accessed 10 August 2021)

David L. (2014) “Mediating international and domestic demands: mnemonic battles surrounding the monument to the fallen of the wars of the 1990s in Belgrade”. *Nationalities Papers* 42(4): 655–673.

Čubrilović V. (1974) *Istorija Beograda*, main ed. vols. 1–3. Beograd: Prosveta.

Grubbauer M. and Čamprag N. (2019) “Urban megaprojects, nation-state politics and regulatory capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe”. *The Belgrade Waterfront project*, *Urban Studies* 56(4): 649–671.

Harvey D. (2005) *Paris, Capital of Modernity*. Milton Park: Routledge.

Harvey D. (2008) *The Right to the City*. *New Left Review* 53 (Sep/Oct 2008): 23–40.

Jordan J. (2006) *Memorial Projects as Sites of Social Integration in Post-1989 Berlin*. *German Politics and Society* 81(84): 77–94.

Koelemaj J. (2021) “Dubaiification in practice: an inter-scalar analysis of Belgrade Waterfront”. *Urban Geography* 42(4): 439–457.

Lazić S. (2019) “The Role of the Civil Sector in the Urban Transformation of the Savamala Neighbourhood”. In: Petrović J and Backović V (eds.) *Experiencing postsocialist capitalism: urban changes and challenges in Serbia*. Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja: pp. 211–228.

Leach N. (2002) “The Denazification of Post Revolutionary Berlin and Bucharest”. In: Leach

N. (ed.) *The Hieroglyphics of Space – Reading and Experiencing the Modern Metropolis.* Milton Park: Routledge, pp.15-30.

Leko M. (2003) *Beogradske ulice i trgovi: 1872-2003.* Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.

Makuljević N. (2019) “Nacionalni spomenik u zabavnom parku: Stefan Nemanja u Beogradu na vodi”, *pescanik.net*, 21 March 2019. Available at: <https://pescanik.net/nacionalni-spomenik-u-zabavnom-parku-stefan-nemanja-u-beogradu-na-vodi/> (accessed 15 August 2021)

Petrović J. and Backović V. (2019) “Experiencing postsocialist capitalism: urban changes and challenges in Serbia”. Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja.

Petrović M. (2009) “Transformacija gradova: ka depolitizaciji urbanog pitanja”. Beograd: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.

Petrović S. (1997) “Grad u senci rata. Beograd”: Prometej – Institut za sociologiju.

Radović S. (2013) *Grad kao tekst.* Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek.

Schorske K [Šorske K] (1998) *Fin-de-siècle u Beču: politika i kultura.* Beograd: Geopoetika.

Spasić I. and Backović V. (2017) *Gradovi u potrazi za identitetom.* Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet.

***Bojana Naumovska, PhD***

Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research,  
University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” in Skopje  
bojana@isppi.ukim.edu.mk

## THE GERMAN ELECTORAL MODEL IN RESPONSE TO THE MACEDONIAN POLITICAL CONTENT

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

GERMANСКИОТ ИЗБОРЕН МОДЕЛ КАКО ОДГОВОР НА  
VIPBenefits: МАКЕДОНСКИОТ ПОЛИТИЧКИ КОНТЕКСТ

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Having regard the role of the electoral model on the political behavior of the citizens in a country, as well as the impact it has on the party system, this paper offers the German electoral model that is most appropriate for the Macedonian political context.

Guided by the characteristics of the electoral systems, as well as their application in specific state systems, the research question of this paper will focus on determining the adequacy of the German electoral model in relation to the detected shortcomings of the existing Macedonian electoral model.

In order to answer the main research question, this paper, in addition to presenting the German election model, through the presentation and analysis of primary and secondary data will try to connect the detected shortcomings of the existing Macedonian model with the basic characteristics of the offered most appropriate model.

***Keywords:*** electoral systems, German electoral model, Macedonian electoral model, electoral behavior





## ВОВЕД

Каков ќе биде изборниот систем е од исклучително значење за секоја држава. Покрај тоа што со него се уредува начинот на кој граѓаните ќе го пренесат својот суверенитет, истиот влијае и на политичката структура во една држава. Македонската држава во повеќе наврати имаше искуство со промена на изборниот систем во насока на поголема вклученост на граѓаните во процесот на изборите, порамномерно претставување на етничките заедници, како и во насока на намалување на бројот на пропаднати гласови. Но, и покрај овие промени, после 20 години од воведувањето на пропорционалниот модел и вкупно 7 изборни циклуси организирани по истиот, доминира негативниот став на граѓаните во однос на целокупната политичка состојба во Македонија. Имајќи го во предвид степенот на политичката партиципација изразен преку процесот на гласање, незадоволството на граѓаните, како во однос на самиот начин на избор на пратеници, така и во однос на нивното застапување и претставување, но и во насока на рефлексивната која ја имаат изборните правила во однос на политичката структура, овој труд ќе има за цел да понуди нов изборен модел, кој треба да претставува најсоодветно решение. Во таа насока, главното истражувачко прашање на овој труд ќе се фокусира на утврдувањето на соодветноста на Германскиот изборен модел во однос на детектираните недостатоци на постојниот Македонски изборен модел.

Во насока на давање на одговор на главното истражувачко прашање, овој труд покрај тоа што ќе го прикаже Германскиот изборен модел, преку прикажување и анализа на примарни и секундарни податоци, ќе се обиде да ги поврзе детектираните недостатоци на постојниот модел со основните карактеристики на понудениот најсоодветен модел (Германскиот).

## ТЕОРЕТСКА РАМКА

Во поширока смисла на зборот изборниот систем опфаќа збир на правила и постапки кои се однесуваат на целината на изборниот процес, вклучувајќи го и изборното право на граѓаните, односно целосната изборна организација на системот. (Каракамишева, 2004) Што се однесува до потесното дефинирање на изборниот систем, тој го опфаќа процесот на претворање на изборните гласови во освоени мандати, низ законски регулирани техники и формули. Овие правила влијаат врз однесувањето на гласачите, но исто така влијае и дали тие ќе гласаат за личност или за партија.

Врз основа на изнесеното, изборните системи имаат двоен ефект, ефект врз избирачот и ефект врз партискиот систем, односно колку од постојните политички партии се здобиваат со статус на легислативни. Овие ефекти потребно е одделно да се разгледуваат бидејќи бројот на партиите не произлегува само од однесувањето на гласачите туку и од тоа како нивните гласови се трансформираат во пратенички места.

Партискиот систем, пак, претставува стабилен состав од политички партии, кои се натпреваруваат на избори. Системот се карактеризира со тоа колку партии постојат, за што се залагаат и кои се нивните сродни сили (Бејл, 2009).

Македонскиот изборен систем, онака како во моментот е поставен, и покрај тоа што е пропорционален, не обезбедува целосно пропорционална распределба на изразената волја на граѓаните, односно бројот на добиените гласови на партиите не кореспондира со распределбата на мандатите. Големiot број на изгубени гласови, како и различниот број на потребни гласови за да се стане пратеник, се директна последица на изборниот систем. Секако оваа состојба има негативен ефект и врз бројот на политички партии во Собранието, односно има негативен ефект врз присуството на помалите политички партии.

Како првичен индикатор за незадоволството на граѓаните, претставува степенот на политичката партиципација, која го подразбира секој начин со кој граѓаните го изразуваат својот став, со цел влијание врз процесот на креирање на политики на нивната влада (Hague, Harrop, 2007). Како главен процес на политичка партиципација претставува гласањето на изборите, иако се препознава и во помалку конвенционални форми како што се потпишувањето на петиции и учеството во протести. Политичката партиципација во македонскиот контекст може да претставува првичен индикатор за подлабок пристап кон разгледување на прашањето за (не)соодветноста на постојниот изборен модел и можностите кои истиот им ги остава на граѓаните за јасно изразување на нивниот став.

Во однос на граѓанскиот став како основ за промена на изборниот модел, во повеќе истражувања се истакнува нивното незадоволство од начинот на кој пратениците ја извршуваат својата функција (гледано од повеќе аспекти), како и незадоволство од застапувањето на интересите на граѓаните од страна на политичките партии. Овие примарни и секундарни податоци (кои ќе бидат прикажани понатаму) заедно со функциите кои граѓаните сметаат дека македонскиот изборен модел треба да ги остварува, а имајќи ги во предвид основните карактеристики на секој изборен систем, упатуваат на потребата од подетална анализа на персонализираниот пропорционален систем или уште познат како мешаниот изборен систем со пропорционален предзнак (mixed member proportional MMP system).

Системите за плуралност и пропорционална репрезентација обично се сметаат за алтернативи, но сепак се појави хибридна форма која ги комбинира двата. Овој мешан метод комбинира географска застапеност со партиска застапеност (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2000). Најпознатиот мешан систем, или попознат како мешаниот изборен систем со пропорционален предзнак (ММР), го задржува механизмот за постигнување севкупна пропорционалност и е навистина форма на пропорционален систем. (Hague, Harrop, 2007). Овој ситем се применува во Германија и Нов Зеланд.

## ГЕРМАНСИОТ МОДЕЛ

Германија е парламентарна демократија и федерација во која голема автономија им е отстапена на регионите/држави (ландери). Парламентот на Германија е дводомен:

долниот дом Бундестагот е резултат на гласовите на народот, а горниот Бундесрат е составен од 68 претставници на ландерите, поточно е составен од претставници на владите на шеснаесетте федерални републики. (Секоја делегација е составена од три до шест члена во зависност од големината на ландерот.)

Пратениците во Бундестагот се избираат според мешовитиот изборен систем со пропорционален предзнак, односно еден дел се избираат од партиските листи, а другиот дел од униноминалните изборни единици.

Како карактеристика на германсиот изборен систем е двојното гласачкото ливче (кое е поделено во два дела), на кое што од левата страна може да се даде првиот глас за конкретен кандидат од униноминалните изборни единици, а на десната страна - вториот глас, избирачите го даваат на една конкретна партија. Според мнозинскиот изборен систем мандати добиваат 299 претставници за кои се гласа во исто толку изборни единици, а истите се сметаат за избрани доколку освојат најголем број на гласови. Овие мандати уште се нарекуваат и „директни мандати“. (Jesse, 1995)

Другата половина односно останатите 299 пратеници, во Бундестагот влегуваат преку партиските листи истакнати за секоја покраина одделно. За овие листи се дава вториот глас, на десната половина од избирачкото ливче.

Според соодносот на освоени втори гласови се определува бројот на пратенички места што ги добива една партија во парламентот. Од тие севкупни мандати, потоа се минусираат директните мандати освоени со првиот глас на избирачите. Само преостанатиот дел мандати се пополнува со кандидати од покраинските листи на партијата. Затоа, вториот глас решава колку многу ќе биде една партија застапена во парламентот. Доколку партијата освои повеќе окружни места од предвидениот сооднос според партиските гласови, таа ги задржува дополнителните места и Бундестагот се проширува по големина (Kreuzer, 2004).

Како што може да се види и од табелата во прилог, без земањето во предвид на вториот глас, односно без внесувањето на пропорционалниот елемент, Бундестагот би бил целосно доминиран од страна на големите политички партии. Начинот како се распределуваат гласовите прикажан во колоната “С“, ја обезбедува пропорционалноста на национално ниво.

**Табела 1:** Како мешаниот изборен систем со пропорционален предзнак функционира: Германските федерални избори, 2005

	А Гласање за партијска листа (%)	В Број на освоени околни места	С Број на доделени места од листата (да се приближи D поблиску до A)	D Освоени места во Бундестагот (%)
Христијанско демократска унија/ Христијанско социјална унија	35.2	150	76	36.8
Социјалдемократска партија	34.2	145	77	36.1
Слободна демократска партија	9.8	0	61	9.9
Партија на Левицата	8.7	3	51	8.8
Партија на Зелените	8.1	1	50	8.3
Останати	4	0	0	0

Извор: (Nague, Harrop, 2007)

Поделеноста на гласачкото ливче, односно можноста од една страна да се гласа за личност, а од друга за партија, суштински влијае на поделбата (splitting) на гласовите. Учесството во поделбата на гласовите различно е за секоја партија. Оваа поделба на гласовите многу е помала кај големите партии одколку кај помалите.

Гласањето за личност во едномандатните изборни единици има за цел да обезбеди поблизок однос помеѓу гласачите и нивните претставници. Иако идејата на моделот е да обезбеди поголемо поврзување помеѓу гласачите и пратениците, во Германија, гласањето во едномандатните изборни единици во поголем дел се базира на гласање за одредена партија, отколку за гласање за одреден кандидат. Сепак овој елемент помага да се премости јазот помеѓу гласачите и пратениците кој вообичаено е голем кога станува збор за чисто пропорционален модел со затворени партиски листи.

Понатаму, системот со два гласа им овозможува на гласачите стратешки да ги поделат своите гласови помеѓу постоечките или можните коалициски партнери. Всушност, поделбата на гласовите е вообичаена меѓу поддржувачите на помалите партии. Со оглед на тоа што кандидатите на помалите партии имаат мали шанси да освојат пратеничко место според мнозинскиот модел, нивните поддржувачи често го даваат својот прв глас за кандидат за изборна единица од поголемата коалициона партија. Слично на тоа, поддржувачите на поголемите партии можат да го „насочат“ својот втор глас на помала партија од коалицијата, со цел да се осигураат дека таа ќе го помине изборниот праг. Така, поделбата на гласовите стратешки се користи од гласачите за да го поддржат коалициониот партнер на „нивната“ партија или, барем, да ги наведат нивните коалициски преференции.

Иако за составот на Бундестагот решавачки е процентот на освоени гласови, од исклучително значење за помалите партии се останатите изборни правила. Според овие правила, партиите стануваат дел од Бундестагот само доколку освојат минимум од 5% од вторите гласови, или пак доколку освојат минимум три мандати од едномандатните изборни единици.

Посебност за германскиот изборен систем се „вишокот места“. Во неколку избори, овие места ја зголемуваат големината на Бундестагот. Во 2005 година, на пример, во Бундестагот бројот на редовните 598 места беше зголемен на 614. Со други зборови, речиси 3 % од местата беа дополнителни. (Behnke, 2007) Покрај споменатите резултати во 2005 година, состојбите се различни после секој изборен циклус. Па така, при Сојузните избори од 1990 година, беа создадени шест места повеќе; во 1994 година, оваа бројка се зголеми до 16; во 1998 година, имаше 13, а во 2002 година 5. Оваа бројка се зголемува во следните изборни циклуси, па така во 2009-та изнесува 24, во 2013-та има 33 дополнителни мандати, во 2017 овој број се искачува на 111, а на последните избори во 2021 година изнесува рекордни 137 мандати.

Вишокот мандати можат да настанат од повеќе причини. Тие се појавуваат, пред сè, тогаш кога споделувањето на изборите во некоја сојузна покраина е помала од просекот на вкупното избирачко подрачје, или кога некоја партија ќе ги стекне своите мандати во изборните окрузи во целина со многу мала гласовна предност, додека другата партија ја постигнала својата победа во изборните окрузи со голем вишок на гласови. (Наумовска, 2011)

Според Германскиот изборен закон за вторите 299 места дистрибуирањето е според пропорционалната Харе-Niemeyer постапка, во две фази. Во првата фаза, местата се распределени помеѓу партиите. Во втората, местата на секоја партија се дистрибуираат помеѓу различните Регионални листи на самата партија. Втората фаза е особено важна во создавањето на вишок места. Ваквата пракса може да се промени доколку постои Федеративна партиска листа, па така вишок места би се елиминирале. (Volleyer, 2007)

Овој модел создава високо пропорционално претставување, што значи дека мнозинството речиси е невозможно да биде составено само од една партија. Всушност, во изминатите пет декади, владите биле најчесто коалициони и секоја промена на владата била најчесто како резултат на промената на составот на коалицијата.

Германските коалициони влади се најчесто стабилни и уживаат легитимитет кај електоратот. Главната контролна функција ја има опозицијата, која, исто така, е претставена преку голем број на пратеници. Односот помеѓу владата и опозицијата е најчесто консензуален и се базира повеќе на соработка отколку на конфронтација. Но сепак, ваквите релации повеќе се резултат на германската политичка култура отколку на самиот изборен систем и неговите ефекти.

## МАКЕДОНСКИ СОСТОЈБИ (АНАЛИЗА НА ПРИМАРНИ И СЕКУНДАРНИ ПОДАТОЦИ)

На изборите во 1990 и 1994 година процесот на избор на пратеници се спроведува согласно мнозинскиот изборен модел, а територијата е поделена на 120 изборни единици. Првата промена на изборната регулатива е направена за изборите во 1998 година кога се воведува комбинираниот модел, според кој 85 пратеника беа избирани според мнозинскиот, а 35 според пропорционалниот модел за што целата територија претставуваше една изборна единица. Дополнително, за пропорционалната листа беше воведена клаузула од 5%, односно за да една партија стане дел од Собранието требаше да освои минимум 5% од вкупниот број на избирачи кои гласале на изборите.

Последната поголема промена е направена за изборите во 2002 година, според која во Македонија изборите се огранизираат според пропорционалниот изборен модел во 6 изборни единици, а од секоја изборна единица се одбираат по 20 пратеници. Бидејќи излезноста во секоја изборна единица е различна, тоа влијае и на бројот на потребни гласови кои треба да се освојат за да се стане пратеник. Според податоците од последните избори, гледано во просек, за да се стане пратеник од четвртата изборна единица биле потребни околу 8.500 гласови (каде што има најголема излезност), додека да се стане пратеник од шестата изборна единица биле потребни околу 6.190 гласови (каде што има најмала излезност). Ваквата состојба на нееднакво вреднување на секој глас претставува еден од недостатоците на постојниот изборен модел.

Исто така, поделеноста на територијата на 6 изборни единици не овозможува во целост еднакво претставување на политичките партии во Собранието, односно иако на национално ниво одредена политичка партија може да освои повеќе гласови, поради распределеност на гласовите по изборни единици, на крајот може да добие несразмерен број на пратенички места (на поледните избори ова беше случај со гласовите на партијата Левица). Овој факт исто така се истакнува како недостаток на постојниот изборен процес.

Вака поставениот модел, покрај тоа што директно влијае на бројот на политички партии во Собранието, исто така има влијание врз однесувањето на граѓаните во процесот на гласањето.

Политичката партиципација на граѓаните, гледана од аспект на нивната вклученост во изборните процеси, претставува сам по себе индикатор за задоволството на граѓаните од политичките процеси. Според прикажаните податоци во Графикон 1 јасно може да се види излезноста на изборите. Од сите изборни циклуси организирани според пропорционалниот модел, на последните Парламентарни избори одржани во 2020 година забележана е најниска изборна излезност, па така, додека во претходните три изборни циклуси истата се движи над 60%, на последните избори е забележан најголем пад на 51,34%.

Графикон 1: Парламентарни избори 2002-2020 – изборна излезност



Покрај гласањето како процес, граѓаните јасно го изразуваат своето незадоволство од моменталната политичка состојба, што може да се види и од податоците кои ќе следат. Според податоците на Институтот за демократија од истражувањето на јавното мислење во 2021 година може да се види дека граѓаните сметаат дека во фокусот на пратениците воопшто не се интересите на народот, туку дека во нивното однесување пратениците најмногу се водат од партиските и личните интереси. Поконкретно, 76% од анкетираниите сметаат дека пратениците секогаш ги застапуваат интересите на нивните политички партии, исто така 70% сметаат дека секогаш ги застапуваат своите лични интереси, а 57% сметаат дека секогаш застапуваат нечии бизнис интереси. На дното на скалата се интересите на граѓаните, за кои само 10% од анкетираниите сметаат дека секогаш се застапувани од страна на пратениците. (Речица, Јовевска Ѓорѓевиќ, 2021). Од истото истражување произлегуваат и податоците дека 65% од испитаниците сметаат дека пратениците не се подготвени да носат одлуки во име на граѓаните, и податокот кој што е исклучително значаен за овој труд, околу 60% од испитаниците сметаат дека со промена на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници може да се придонесе кон поквалитетен состав во Собранието.

Според истражувањето на Институтот за социолошки и политичко-правни истражувања на тема Ставовите на граѓаните и политичките партии за промена на изборните правила, добиени се сознанија во иста насока, односно и од податоците добиено од ова истражување јасно се гледа незадоволството на граѓаните од политичките состојби, како и потребата од промена на изборниот модел.<sup>1</sup> Според презентираниите податоци од ова истражување, во сите изборни единици и меѓу сите категории на граѓани, владее силен негативен став и разочараност од начинот на кој пратениците ја вршат својата функција на застапување на интересите на граѓаните. Најголем дел од нив сметаат дека пратениците во Собранието ги остваруваат своите лични и партиски интереси, добиваат прекумерни награди/надоместоци за нивниот ангажман, лојални се на партиските лидери и не ги остваруваат предизборните ветувања кои им ги даваат на граѓаните. (Наумовска, 2021)

<sup>1</sup> Истражувањето е направено во соработка со Националниот демократски институт (НДИ), а наодите беа презентирани на 9 Јуни 2021 годинина



Дополнително, како резултат на незадоволството од случувањата во политичкиот живот во континуитет гледано, ставот на испитаниците е дека се потребни промени на начинот на избор на пратеници, постои генерална поддршка за еднаквото вреднување на секој глас, оставањето поголем простор за малите политички партии и воведувањата на една изборна единица за парламентарни избори.

За потребите на овој труд, беше направена онлајн анкета со цел да се видат кои се приоритетите на граѓаните во однос на изборниот модел, односно кои карактеристики според нив се најбитни. Врз основа на издвоените приоритети понатаму би можел да се креира новиот изборен модел. Во оваа анкета учество земаа 379 испитаници, а истата е спроведена во период ноември-декември 2021 година. На прашањето „Која би требало да биде целта на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници во Собранието“, беа понудени повеќе одговори, а учесниците во анкетата можеа да одберат најмногу до 3. Според општата дистрибуција на одговори може да се види дека за граѓаните е најбитно изборниот модел да овозможи одговорност на пратениците пред граѓаните, но и да овозможи еднакво вреднување на секој глас на целата територија. Како трет приоритет се издвојува соодветното претставување на граѓаните од различните региони. Од понудените одговори за испитаниците најмалку приоритетни се соодветното претставување на различните етнички групи и обезбедувањето на стабилно владино мнозинство.

**Табела 2:** Која би требало да биде целта на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници во Собранието?

Можни одговори	Честота
Да овозможи еднакво вреднување на секој глас на граѓаните на целата територија	235
Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни региони	118
Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни етнички заедници	53
Да овозможи одговорност на пратениците пред граѓаните	243
Да овозможи стабилно владино мнозинство	67
Друго-----	6
Не знам/ не можам да проценам	23

Гледано од аспект на независните варијабли, не се забележуваат поголеми разлики особено кога станува збор за првите два истакнати приоритета, односно тие се приоритетни за секоја категорија, независно дали податоците се гледат од аспект на пол, возраст, степен на образование или етничка припадност. Единствено постои разлика во тоа кој е прв приоритет за одредена категорија. Па така, за жените прв приоритет претставува одговорноста на пратениците, а за мажите прв приоритет претставува еднаквото вреднување на секој глас (Табела 3).

**Табела 3:** Која би требало да биде целта на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници во Собранието/според полот

Пол	Да овозможи еднакво вреднување на секој глас на граѓаните на целата територија	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни региони	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни етнички заедници	Да овозможи одговорност на пратениците пред граѓаните	Да овозможи стабилно владино мнозинство	Не знам/ не можам да проценам
Машки	34,8%	18,1%	6,7%	28,7%	8,9%	2,8%
Женски	30%	14,7%	7,4%	35,4%	9,2%	3,3%

Од аспект на степенот на образование, за испитаниците со средно и високо образование, прв приоритет е одговорноста на пратениците, додека за испитаниците со магистерски и докторски студии прв приоритет претставува еднаквото вреднување на секој глас (Табела 4).

**Табела 4:** Која би требало да биде целта на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници во Собранието/според степенот на образование

Степен на образование	Да овозможи еднакво вреднување на секој глас на граѓаните на целата територија	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни региони	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни етнички заедници	Да овозможи одговорност на пратениците пред граѓаните	Да овозможи стабилно владино мнозинство	Не знам/ не можам да проценам
Средно обр.	30,9%	11%	7,4%	36%	8,8%	5,9%
Високо обр.	30%	18,4%	6,6%	33,1%	9,4%	2,5%
М-р/Д-р	34,3%	15,9%	7,6%	31,4%	8,7	2,2%

Во однос на третиот приоритет единствено разлика се забележува од аспект на етничката припадност на испитаниците, односно кај етничките Албанци како трет при-

оритет се истакнува соодветното претставување на граѓаните од различните етнички заедници (Табела 5).<sup>2</sup>

**Табела 5:** Која би требало да биде целта на изборниот модел за избор на пратеници во Собранието/етничка припадност

Етничка припадност	Да овозможи еднакво вреднување на секој глас на граѓаните на целата територија	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни региони	Да овозможи соодветно претставување на граѓаните од различни етнички заедници	Да овозможи одговорност на пратениците пред граѓаните	Да овозможи стабилно владино мнозинство	Не знам/ не можам да проценам
Македонци	32,9%	16,2%	5%	34,5%	8,4%	2,9%
Албанци	23,7%	14,5%	19,7%	26,3%	11,8%	3,9%

Врз основа на презентираниите податоци во овој дел, јасно може да се види незадоволството на граѓаните од политичките состојби, нивниот степен на политичка партиципација, како и незадоволството од нивните политички претставници во парламентот. Дополнително, изразената потреба од промена на изборниот модел, како и детектираните приоритети, претставува основа за градење на нов модел.

## ЗАКЛУЧНИ СОГЛЕДУВАЊА

Изборниот модел го дава основот на политичкиот живот во една држава. Тој ги уредува правилата според кои изразената волја на граѓаните во изборниот процес се преточува во мандати и нивно претставување во законодавниот дом. Презентирираниот Германски изборен модел, преку својата поставеност, покрај тоа што обезбедува пропорционален сооднос на добиените гласови и освоените мандати, обезбедува и поврзување, односно одговорност на пратениците пред нивните гласачи. Ваквиот модел во себе ги вклучува позитивните карактеристики и на пропорционалниот и на мнозинскиот систем, со што води сметка и за пропорционалноста и за одговорноста пред гласачите.

<sup>2</sup> Бидејќи анкетата не е спроведена на репрезентативен примерок, етничките заедници не се соодветно застапени, односно анкетата ја имаат одговорено 84% Македонци, 10% Албанци и 6% од другите етнички заедници, од тие причини (заради малиот број на одговори од другите заедници) податоците за останатите не можат да бидат прикажани.

Како резултат на Македонскиот изборен модел во овој труд се истакнати двата директни недостатоци, нееднаквото вреднување на секој глас и несоодветното претставување на партиите во Собранието во однос на вкупно освоените гласови. Од друга страна, беа презентирани податоци во однос на незадоволството на граѓаните во однос на самите политички структури и однесувањето на пратеници, но и во насока на промена на постојниот изборен модел.

Од оригиналните податоци презентирани во трудот, јасно можат да се видат најбитните елементи кои треба да ги содржи новиот модел. Еднаквото вреднување на секој глас заедно со одговорноста која треба да ја имаат пратениците пред граѓаните и соодветното претставување на одредени региони во Собранието претставуваат приоритетите кои треба да бидат вткаени во нови идни законски решенија.

Имајќи го во предвид Германскиот модел и приоритетите кои беа истакнати, може да се каже дека овој модел во најголем дел е соодветен. Еднаквото вреднување на секој глас се обезбедува со пропорционалната листа на национално ниво, а можноста за дополнителни места во целост ја обезбедува таа пропорционалност. Од друга страна обезбедувањето на половина од пратениците според мнозинскиот принцип, обезбедува директно поврзување на пратениците со гласачите и нивна одговорност пред народот. Мнозинскиот принцип во најголем дел го обезбедува и третиот приоритет истакнат од анкетираниите, а за да се обезбеди истиот во целост, би била потребна дополнителна клаузула која би гарантирала порамномерна застапеност и на пропорционалната листа од кандидати за пратеници од целата територија на Македонија (иако и овој принцип е застапен во Германскиот модел, сепак, заради различното уредување, мора да биде различно уредено).

Според изнесеното во овој труд а во насока на поставеното истражувачко прашање, во овој момент најсоодветен модел за Македонија е Германскиот, односно, 60 пратеници би станале дел од Собранието според мнозинскиот модел (во едномандатни изборни единици), а 60 (и повеќе) би се одбрале според пропорционалниот модел во зависност од бројот на освоени гласови за оваа листа (одредениот вкупен број на мандати кои ќе треба да го добие секоја партија минус освоените мандати според мнозинскиот принцип). Дополнително треба да се обезбеди регулатива која ќе гарантира рамномерна застапеност на сите региони на пропорционалната листа. Овој модел, со примарно пропорционална димензија, но и димензија на градење блискост со електоратот, во конкретниот општествен и политички контекст, претставува најсоодветно решение за Македонски изборен модел.

## БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА

Behnke, J., (2007). *The Strange Phenomenon of Surplus Seats in the German Electoral System*, German Politics, Vol16 No4

Бејл, Т. (2009) Европска политика, компаративен вовед. Скопје: Академски печат

Bolleyer, N., (2007) *Small Parties: From Party Pledges to Government Policy*, West European Politics, Vol30 No1

Каракамишева, Т. (2004). Избори и изборни системи. Скопје: Култура

Kreuzer, M. (2004). Handbook of Electoral System Choice, *Germany: Partisan Engineering of Personalized Proportional Representation*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Jesse, E. (1995). *7 KH PHWKRGR I HOHFWRQ WKH \*HUPDQ %XQGH* Representation, Vo.33 No1

Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2007). *Comparative Government and Politics*. England: Palgrave Macmillan

Наумовска, Б. (2021) Ставовите на граѓаните и политичките партии за промена на изборните правила (презентација на истражувачки податоци), Скопје: 9.Јуни, Мериот Хотел

Наумовска, Б. (2011). Влијанието на изборните модели врз помалите политички партии во Република Македонија (сопруга и сопруги). Скопје: Универзитет „Св.Кирил и Методиј“ Институт за социолошки и политичко правни истражувања

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

#### VIP Benefits:

Shugart, M., Wattenberg, M. (2000). *Mixt-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

[https://https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/project-2-uploads/2021/04/MKDWEB\\_A4\\_Terenska\\_anketa\\_mart\\_2021-2.pdf](https://https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/project-2-uploads/2021/04/MKDWEB_A4_Terenska_anketa_mart_2021-2.pdf)

Remove it Now

UDC 341.171-042.55  
(4-672EU)  
Original research paper

***Nikola Gjorgon, PhD***

Ss. Cyril and Methodius University–Skopje (alumni)  
nikola.gjorgon@gmail.com

\* R U G L F D . D U D Q Ć O R Y V N D 3 K '

Ss. Cyril and Methodius University–Skopje (alumni)  
gordicak@gmail.com / gordicaibti@gmail.com

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

BREXIT AND THE EUROPEAN PEACE PROJECT PARADIGM

VIPBenefits:

#### Abstract

1. Converts the whole document.

2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

Since its foundation, the European Union (EU) has been a peace project aiming to prevent another major war, while spreading peace, stability and prosperity across the European continent. In the past decade and a half, the EU has been facing numerous political and economic challenges on multiple levels. Its complex structure and unresolved issues have significantly limited its decision-making capacity in a rapidly changing environment.

Remove it Now

that the EU paradigm is facing a crisis. Building upon the Kuhnian paradigm approach, this paper will address the cause and effect links between the possible crisis of the European peace project and Brexit. Five years after the referendum of 2016, by taking a closer, retrospective look into the root causes of Brexit, the campaign and the referendum results, the paper will also try to answer the following questions: did part of the British political elite made decision concerning Brexit much earlier than the Brexit referendum? Did they believe that the challenges with which they would face in EU would exceed the benefits of EU membership?

***Keywords:*** *Brexit, European Union, paradigm shift, immigration, Euroscepticism*



## EUROPEAN PEACE PROJECT PARADIGM

The two World Wars and the beginning of the Cold War served as a catalyst for a new European paradigm: prevention of another major war, spread of peace, stability and prosperity across the European continent. Among the many narratives that summarize this paradigm of Europe as a peace project, one states that “Europe is the place of freedom, tolerance and peace, conditions for the coherence of a multidimensional society. It is the cultural treasure of the future and for our descendants.” (European Academy of Sciences and Arts 2012) A public recognition came in 2012, when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (The Nobel Peace Prize, 2012). On the occasion of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the then President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy stated: “I believe this [peace] is still our Union’s ultimate purpose” further adding that EU “is a new legal order, which is not based on the balance of power between nations but on the free consent of states to share sovereignty” (Herman Van Rompuy, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture on behalf of the European Union). Only four years later, the Brexit vote took place. This was experienced as a shock to the European paradigm.

Each paradigm has two basic functions: a cognitive and a normative function (Kuhn, 1996). While the cognitive function means that the paradigm is the prerequisite to perception itself, the normative function enables the paradigm to regulate and influence reality. In this manner, by filtering the inputs and outputs, the paradigm helps us successfully navigate the sea of challenges and opportunities of a given system. Paradigms change along with the very reality they try to explain. When a paradigm ceases to provide a sound explanation to problems, the paradigmatic view of the world soon becomes ‘paradigmatic’ and finally ‘dogmatic’, giving a false image of reality. While analyzing scientific revolutions Kuhn locates three preconditions for a paradigmatic shift: (1) A growing feeling that the existing paradigm does not function adequately; (2) growing number of evidence that do not fit in the existing paradigm; and (3) convincing argumentation for a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1996, 90-110). In the heart of the process of paradigm-shift is entropy defined as “the degree of disorder or uncertainty in a system.” According to Kenneth D. Bailey, “if the degree of disorder is too great (entropy is high), then the system lacks sustainability. If entropy is low, sustainability is easier. If entropy is increasing, future sustainability is threatened” (Bailey, 2010 2). Entropy is an inherent element of the life cycle of every paradigm that ends either with adaptation of the existing paradigm, or its complete replacement with a new one.

How does this apply to the European peace project paradigm? The world has changed, but so has EU, which has grown in territory and deepened in integration, bringing new cultures and sometimes conflicting political and economic interests under one roof. In this regard, there are some unresolved tensions between the Union and its members. For instance, Geopolitical Futures analysts note that the European integration merely “masked an underlying reality of fragmented nations, each facing its own unique political, economic and geographic challenges.” (Geopolitical Futures 2015). The member states have moved extensive decision-making powers from the national to the European level, in some aspects at the expense of democratic legitimacy and transparency. In the sphere of economy, over time, the European single market contributed to more market opportunities and jobs, higher



living standard and better quality of life. However, the global economic crisis of 2008 and the multi-year European debt crisis posed new challenges for the EU, such as global competitiveness and rising unemployment in many EU countries. In that process, certain aspects of its paradigm have shifted from their original place. There is a gap between the common aims of the European Union and the interests of individual member states.

## EUROPEAN CHALLENGES

The EU has been facing a number of diverse challenges on multiple levels. Due to the pace of its decision-making process, keeping up with the dynamics of global and local tensions sometimes is a challenge for the EU. Lacking the full commitment of its member states in terms of its foreign policy, EU cannot be very effective in moments of crisis (Seralgudin, 2014).

According to Colibasanu, the EU “evolved without developing crisis management tools or processes, which has slowed down the EU’s response to challenges since 2008.” (Colibasanu, 2016). Furthermore, the EU’s complex structure, the overwhelming and increasing complexity of its regulations and the unresolved sovereignty issue have contributed to limited decision-making capacities in times of crisis (Offe, 2015). This has resulted with reduced capacity to simultaneously manage multiple crises and different states. This was deepened by the increasing resistance by voters and public opinion in member-states, which made it even harder for the national governments to support implementation of Brussels’ recommendations. The final consequence of this is the inefficiency of EU regulatory bodies when dealing with problems.

The EU, which functions well in times of peace and prosperity, is not as good in times of crisis, such as the combination of the unresolved financial and credit crisis, the migrant crisis and security threats. We will briefly examine some of these challenges.

## MIGRANT CRISIS

Until 2019 one of the key challenges for the EU was the migrant and refugee crisis. The violence in the Middle East as well as the poverty in underdeveloped and developing countries generated a flow of refugees and migrants. According to the UNHCR, from 2015 through January 2016, more than 1 million refugees and migrants came to Europe (UNHCR, 2016). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that from January to September 2016, some 306,800 migrants arrived in Europe. Although the majority of them originate from conflict areas in Syria (30.3%), Afghanistan (15.9%) and Iraq (9.7%), there is a rising number of economic migrants from Bangladesh and Sub-Saharan African countries (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2016).

By establishing the Schengen Agreement, EU erased its internal borders without protecting the external ones. As Stephen M. Walt argues, “if Europe cannot control access to its own territory, it will not be able to control its political fate either.” (Walt, 2016). The massive first

migrant wave of 2014-2016 caught EU off guard. According to Europol, 90% of migrants who came to Europe last year used illegal people-smugglers. In 2015, organized crime networks earned between €3 billion and €6 billion from the migration business (Europol, 2016). The rising number of falsified Frontex documents, forged Syrian passports (“How easy is it to buy a fake Syrian passport?”, 2015) and a failure to properly register refugees and migrants showed an erosion of European institutions, mechanisms and policies. For instance, the European Migrant Smuggling Center – EMSC, established by the European Commission, began its work on February 22, 2016, during the climax of the migrant crisis (European Commission, [EC] 2016).

The migrant crisis unveiled the inflation of words and declarations, and deflation of concrete action. Unilateral actions by European states followed. Tensions rose as member-states began to re-impose their borders and deploy their national armies. The migrant crisis escalated in August 2015, when an uncontrollable number of refugees and migrants tried to illegally cross the Greek-Macedonian border. Regional alliances within the fragmented EU soon emerged. The Visegrád Group countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) – along with other EU member-states such as Austria, Slovenia and Croatia, supported the Macedonian efforts to close the Western Balkans migrant route (“Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group Countries on Migration.” 15 February 2016). This led to a paradoxical situation in which a non-EU state was protecting Europe from the threat of illegal migration that came from an EU member-state (Ivanov, 2016).

Although the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 18 2016 eased the burden on the EU (EC, 2016), the events in Turkey following the unsuccessful coup against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government and EU’s response to it puts the durability of the agreement in question (Baume, 2016).

## SECURITY THREATS

The migrant and refugee crisis soon opened the door for another EU challenge – a security crisis. The corridor was used not only by refugees and economic migrants, but also criminal networks and terrorists (Rayner & Mulholland, 2015). In its 2016 report, Europol states that “the overall threat to the security of the European Union has increased over recent years and remains on an upward trajectory” (Europol, TE-SAT, 2016). A major challenge is posed by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters from Europe in the Middle East battlefields. According to Europol, “more than 5000 Europeans are believed to have travelled to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq.” (Europol, TE-SAT, 2016). As expected, some of them took advantage of the refugee crisis to return to their native EU countries and bring with them the hatred of diversity. Following the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe in 2015 and 2016, German Chancellor Angela Merkel admitted that “in part, the refugee flow was even used to smuggle terrorists” (Carrel & Barkin, 2016).

The rising number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe has contributed to a shift of European public opinion and the rise of anti-integration movements across Europe. As Geopolitical Futures analysts note, “the presence and growing influence of nationalist and anti-system groups makes it more difficult for national governments to agree to compromises

on the European level, leading to more gridlock and incoherent European Union policies” (Geopolitical Futures, 2015).

This difficulty to answer the challenges caused a gap between EU’s wider interests and the national interests of its member-states, as well as a divergence between the European elites and the citizens. Along with the widespread criticism of democratic deficit of the EU, euro-skepticism was on the rise across the continent (Habermas 2001; Torreblanca and Leonard 2013). In light of this, national governments had a difficult time defending the EU before their citizens. This was particularly the case with the UK.

## THE CASE OF BREXIT

### **The Roots of Brexit**

Much is being written about the UK-EU Brexit negotiations under former Prime Minister Theresa May and current Prime Minister Boris Johnson. However, for the purpose of this paper, the authors will focus on the roots, the campaign and results of Brexit.

Since the beginning, the UK and the EU have shared a complex relationship. French President de Gaulle, twice vetoed UK application for membership in 1963 and 1967. It was only in 1973 that the UK finally joined the then European Economic Community (EEC). In 1975, only two years after the UK joined the EEC, the first UK-wide referendum was held. Its purpose was to decide whether the UK should stay in the EEC or not. The percentage of those that voted to stay (67%) shows that Britons were certain of the UK’s future within the ECC (Mason, 2016).

Forty years later, in the 2016 referendum, a new generation of Britons was facing the same dilemma whether to stay in the EU or not. However, a very logical question is entailed, namely, had the majority of the British political elite decided for Brexit much earlier than the Brexit referendum? Did they foresee that the challenges would exceed the benefits of EU membership? In this context, Crines suggests that “the referendum campaign was a long time coming. Approximately 26 years, in fact” (Crines 2016) while explaining that immigration has been the constant issue for Conservatives since the time of Margaret Thatcher.

In the 2005 campaign, the Conservative message on anti-immigration was present in the slogan “are you thinking what we’re thinking” posters, and then it explains: “It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration” (Crines, 2016). Rowinsky noted that the final Brexit result was facilitated by the fact that the discourse of taking back control and controlling immigration had already been part of the collective memory in the years prior to the Brexit campaign. He also mentions the image and slogan used by the Leave campaign on the campaign battle bus (Rowinski, 2016). Fenton continues the thought, adding that the euro-sceptic press has campaigned against EU for years by using misleading headlines and sensationalist reporting (Fenton, 2016). Finally, Mayer argued that “the issue here is not solely about the predominant anti-EU bias during the campaign itself, but the effects of negative press coverage of the EU on collective beliefs over decades” (Meyer, 2016).

Another argument that supports this point is the Home Office campaign that told people to “GO HOME or face arrest”, which involved poster-clad vans driving through six London boroughs between 22 July and 28 July 2013. The statement of the Shadow Home Secretary Andy Burnham for *The Independent* further enforces this presumption. “It is clear that the Government has contributed to the unwelcoming climate and that our new Prime Minister in particular is responsible” (The Independent, 2016). The director of the Institute of Race Relations Liz Fekete has stated, “One of the things that has become clear is that the hostile environment that has been an official aim of policy for the last few years is coming home. If a ‘hostile environment’ is embedded politically, it can’t be a surprise that it takes root culturally” (The Independent, 2016). A UK Home Office poster included the following texts: “In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest, 106 arrests last week in your area” and other parenthetically instructive information for the immigrants. Many complained about the phrase “go home” on the poster, believing that it was offensive and could intensify racial hatred and tensions in multicultural communities. In addition, in the past, racist groups have used the slogan to attack immigrants. The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) received 224 complaints against the Home Office campaign in 2013 (Saul, 2016). However, ASA clearly stated that political ads are exempt from regulation by the ASA system and disassociated itself from the responsibility for regulating advertising of that kind (Committee of Advertising Practice Ltd [CAP] and Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice Limited [BCAP]).

### **Brexit: the Campaign**

The UK’s frustration concerning migrants reached its climax during the ongoing European refugee and migrant crisis, which is heavily affecting the political, economic, security and demographic landscape across the EU. Seen through media and comments on social media, during the EU referendum the British public perceived immigrants as the ones who took away their jobs, houses, education and even caused crime and social disorder (Tebbit, 2014). According to the Ipsos MORI research “the June 2016 Issues Index which was released just ahead of the EU referendum showed concern about immigration had risen by 10 percentage points in the Issues Index; and the NHS, EU and Economy had also risen in importance” (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Police authorities stated that reported hate crime rose by 57 per cent in the four days following the referendum, and that 42 per cent more hate crimes were reported in the last two weeks of June (2016) than there had been in the corresponding period of 2015 (Lusher, 2016).

The main media streams focused on EU’s failure to manage the migrant and refugee crisis. Indicators point to the conclusion that Britain did not want to share the risk with the other EU member states and used the referendum to detach itself from the EU. However, during the EU referendum, the main UK political parties, Tory and Labour, failed to make a strong case for the single market benefits, such as the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. Thus, the main focus during the referendum was the contest between economics and immigration.

The Leave campaign group was run by the TaxPayers' Alliance (TPA), which was launched by Matthew Elliott and Dominic Cummings, a former aide to Conservative cabinet minister Michael Gove. This group was launched on October 9, 2015, and had a cross-party backing including MPs and peers from the Conservatives, Labour, UKIP and other parties. The Vote Leave group was collaborating with the other two groups Leave.EU and Grassroots Out, which merged later for the sake of the same goal (The Battle, 2016). In brief, the Leave campaign argued that leaving the EU would allow Britons to take back control by being in charge of their own borders and having control on immigration, to spend money on their own priorities such as the NHS, schools and housing, and would be free to trade with the whole world and make their own laws (Vote Leave, 2016).

On the other hand, the In campaign claimed that Britain was stronger, safer and better in Europe than if it would be out on its own, that it would have more jobs, lower prices, better protection of workers' rights, stronger economy with more money for NHS, Britain. (The In Campaign, 2016). Meyer has noticed "the Remain campaign started from a huge 'deficit' in public knowledge about the nature of the EU, its powers and the UK role within it." (Meyer 2016). The Remain group's positioning strategy was not chosen at the most fortunate time as EU was battling with large waves of migrants flooding into the Continent and the unsolved Greek debt crisis. Although Remain focus was on the economy, underlining the risks of leaving the EU, Britons were less touched by the slogan of 'stronger, safer, and better off' than Vote Leave's 'Take back control.' The economy as a theme was perceived more as an interest of the political and business elite than the people of Britain. Cameron's undelivered promises from 2010 to reduce the figure to the 'tens of thousands' was the winning chance for the 'Leave' to attack with immigration issue.

In the EU referendum the two campaigns offered a blend of myth and facts and in the debate the Remain camp failed to explain the benefits of EU membership. Despite the concerns of the UK Statistic Authority or organizations such as Full Fact and initiatives like UK in a Changing Europe of misusing claims, the final result showed that it is not easy to sway voters with facts. The most misleading claim, used on the Leave campaign's posters, was that the UK sends 350 million pounds each week to the EU, for which Nigel Farage has already admitted "that was one of the mistakes made by the Leave campaign" (McCann & Morgan, 2016). In addition, other misleading promises of the Vote Leave campaign were discovered and published by some of the media. Banducci and Stevens perceived that due to the media's treatment of all claims as equivalent, voters were not motivated by accuracy (Banducci & Stevens, 2016).

The immigration issue was more emotional and visible, with aggressive anti-immigration and anti-European sentiments compared to the economic issue that was perceived as represented by the elite and endorsed by many experts who failed to convey the facts to the electorate. However, people voted for change because they had a fear of what the future holds. The Leave campaign offered a very effective slogan (Take Back Control) that encompassed people's fears, hopes and responsibility to take back control of their country.

## **Brexit: the Results**

On June 23 2016, the political goal of the British political elite campaigning for leaving the EU won with 51.89% against to those that voted for remain 48.11% with turnout of 72.21% (The Electoral Commission, 2016). The political elite favoring the Leave campaign had a relatively easy task to prepare, analyze and predict the outcomes of the referendum although the results were narrow. The main “nutritive substances” of the political communication of the Leave camp were immigration and the current economic situation spiced with fear and hope effectively joined in the slogan “Take Back Control”. But interestingly, the Leave voters put the controlling immigration issue above the access of the single EU market, and they did not show rationality regarding this issue. According to the Economic Optimism Index of IPSOS MORI (July, 2016) the Economic Consumer confidence falls to (% better minus % worse) -34%, which is lowest since January 2012. In the same report, 89% of both the Leave and Remain voters say that they would not vote differently and that Brexit would be bad for the economy in the short-term, but good in the long term.

Brexit was the focus of many professional and leading academics in UK and the world and they gave extensive and comprehensive views on this pivotal moment for the British citizens. Meyer is suggesting that two lessons must be learned from this referendum experience: first, more investment is needed in educating the public regarding the EU, and the second, that inaccurate reporting and the press ownership creating it must not go without challenge (Meyer, 2016). Berry argues that the Leave campaign offered more coverage on their arguments unlike the Remain campaign which was unable to communicate a positive image for Europe. According to Berry, the reason for this partially lies in the failure of media and politicians to comprehensively establish and present European narratives in the past (Berry, 2016). Along the same lines, FitzGibbon commented that voters’ negative position toward the status quo of UK’s EU membership resulted in rejecting EU membership altogether, while lacking clear alternatives (Fitzgibbon, 2016). It seems Brexit was an urgent exit without any detailed plans for a post-Brexit Britain. Hughes suggests that voters’ unhappiness with the state of the NHS, housing and education was nothing to do with the EU or immigration but was a result of the Tories’ policies. He adds that “Labour, LibDem, Green and SNP voters all backed Remain by more than 60%. It was Tory voters who split 58% to 42% for Leave, plus almost all UKIP voters” (Hughes, 2016).

## **Brexit: the Aftermath**

Following the results of the referendum, the new Prime Minister Theresa May was considering the two possible models of Brexit: the so called ‘soft Brexit’ and ‘hard Brexit’, finally choosing a ‘hard Brexit’ which meant “excluded membership in the internal market, which would mean accepting EU legislation, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (CJEU), the freedom of movement for labour, and ‘vast contributions’ to the EU budget.” (Schimmelfennig 2018, 14)

The Brexit deal came into effect on 23:00 on 31 December 2020 after a complex process of negotiations. On 18 April 2017 Prime Minister Theresa May called for general elections,

arguing that this would strengthen the UK position in the negotiations with the EU. However, the Conservative party lost its majority and Theresa May had to form a new government with a more fragile support. The EU insisted that the “divorce issues” must be agreed first, and only then discuss the future relationship between the UK and the EU.

Without going into details, there were three issues on the UK-EU ‘divorce’ agenda. The first was the question of citizens’ rights. With over 3 million EU citizens living in the UK and over a million British citizens living in the EU, Brexit created a great uncertainty about their rights. The EU insisted that any “any EU citizen living legally in the UK before Brexit should be considered legally resident there, even if they did not have documents to prove this, and EU citizens’ rights had to be legally enforceable by the European Court of Justice” (O’Rourke, ). Since it would apply reciprocally for UK citizens living in the EU, the UK government agreed on this.

The second issue was the financial settlement. Theresa May stated that “the UK will honour commitments we have made during the period of our membership.” (O’Rourke 2018) This meant paying €20 billion to the EU budget ending in 2020. Having in mind the short, two-year period to activate Article 50 and, and the fact that UK could not discuss a future trade deal without solving the ‘divorce’ issues, the Government agreed to fulfill its financial commitments as defined by the EU.

The third issue was the border with Ireland. Following Brexit, the UK-Ireland border would be an external border of EU with a non-EU country. Having in mind historical sensitivity and the Good Friday Agreement, all involved sides agreed that the border between the UK and Ireland should be “invisible and frictionless”. However, according to O’Rourke, “the UK government wanted to keep all of its trade with all of the EU as frictionless as possible, despite leaving both the customs union and the Single Market. [...] Alternatively it suggested that what the British actually wanted to do was to use the Irish border issue as a Trojan horse.” (O’Rourke 2018, ch.11). However, the European Commission stated that “the aim should be not only to avoid a hard border, including any physical border infrastructure, but to ‘respect the proper functioning of the internal market and of the Customs Union as well the integrity and effectiveness of the Union legal order” (O’Rourke 2018, ch.11). The EU pointed that UK must resolve the problem with Ireland before proceeding with the discussion about the trade deal.

Although EU continuously insisted that trade agreement negotiations can begin only after Brexit, it made a concession to the UK by agreeing that “UK would be guaranteed a customs union agreement with the EU” even if Brexit negotiations failed (O’Rourke 2018). On 14 November 2018 Theresa May’s Cabinet approved the Withdrawal Agreement. The Agreement, along with the Political Declaration on the future relationship between the UK and EU were endorsed at the EU Summit on 25 November. However, following several defeats in the House of Commons over the negotiation strategy and the withdrawal deal to leave EU, Theresa May resigned on 24 May 2019. Boris Johnson formed a new administration and renegotiated the Withdrawal agreement. Following the renegotiations, on 24 January 2020 the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community was signed. After all parties ratified it, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU took effect on 11 p.m. GMT on 31 January 2020.

---

## DISCUSSION

The purpose of EU was to help overcome national differences and bring prosperity to its members. However, the EU did not erase the diverse geographic, political and economic realities of its member states, which came to the surface in time of crisis.

Apart from the political split, the great divide of Brexit was between the European paradigm, supported mostly by young and urban citizens, on the one hand, and the spirit of euro-skepticisms of elderly citizens living in rural areas, nostalgic for the past glory of their country. Euro-skepticism among the elderly citizens is a growing European issue. The EU referendum showed a demise of the “cosmopolitan paradigm” supported by younger generations and gave birth to the “parochial paradigm” of the elderly British citizens led by their political representatives.

As mentioned earlier, there are three preconditions for paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996, 90-110) that could be applied to EU. The first precondition for paradigm shift caused by entropy deals with the rising feeling that casts doubt in the adequate functioning of the current paradigm. In recent years, we become accustomed to the daily articles and analysis on the European crisis, but also to a great number of conferences on the future of Europe. As shown in this paper, Brexit was a result of decades long euro-skepticism among British voters and elites.

The second precondition is related to the evidence of challenges to the ability of the existing paradigm to explain the world and propose solutions to the problems. At the time of the Brexit referendum, in the eyes of many national voters, EU appeared to have failed to give timely solutions to the examined crises such as the financial and credit crisis, the migrant crisis and the security crisis. The immigration issue became relevant for many British politicians and was used by the Leave camp as one of the main themes during the 2016 referendum in order to appeal to the electorate. This served as argument for the Leave campaign that led to Brexit.

The third precondition for a paradigm-shift implies a convincing argumentation for a new paradigm. The proliferation of theories and the daily debates over fundamentals of the existing system indicates the entropy of the current paradigm. That is, of course, unless the current system manages to successfully answer the challenges.

The EU is facing contradictions between the vision and mission of the paradigm of Europe as a peace project, on one hand, and reality on the other hand. Reality changes rapidly, and we still hang on to our old paradigms, that give us a less realistic sense of security and predictability. There are two options ahead for the EU.

The first one implies internal change and adaptation to the rapidly changing world. The authors of this paper share the opinion that EU policy makers can and should work on reinforcing the EU paradigm that brought peace in Europe. In this regard, a self-evaluation could allow EU to re-discover itself while preserving the essential elements of its initial peace paradigm. A paradigm exists in people’s minds. EU needs Europeans, citizens who actively participate through greater democratic legitimacy and transparency. EU should learn from past mistakes. Its indecisiveness contributed to the economic, migrant and security crisis. It must repair the damaged credibility by providing timely solutions to crises. It must reduce the dependence of member states and increase the competitiveness of the economy. In order to protect unity in diversity, it must prevent the rise of radicalism, religious fundamentalism



and terrorism, by remaining faithful to its original ethical and moral values. Also, there is a need for change of the mentality of EU policymakers in order to include public opinion as an effective partner in policy-making by taking into consideration the electoral demands, party ideologies, goals of the governing political parties, macro and micro factors of, economic, social, cultural and political nature. Inadequate responsiveness to the electorate's needs and wants is "highly damaging to the EU project and to democratic principles in general" (Balestrini & Gamble, 2011). The art of managing the conflicting opinion of individual voters within the EU family, on one hand, with EU's collective interest and governing constraints that the national parties face, on the other hand, is necessary in order to improve the level of transparency and communication towards the electorate. The EU as a supranational entity does not face competition like political parties face during elections. Yet, the EU still has to adjust its own products, especially after the Brexit and the rise of anti-Europe parties in Germany, France, Netherlands and elsewhere.

The second option is a complete replacement of the existing with a new paradigm. This, however, would imply a thorough reconfiguration of the European structures that could plunge the nations of the continent into the unknown.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bailey, K. D. (2010). 'Entropy Systems Theory.' Parra-Luna, Francisco. Systems Science and Cybernetics. UNESCO, EOLSS.

Balestrini, P.P. & Gamble, P.R. (2011). 'Confronting EU unpopularity: the contribution of political marketing.' Contemporary Politics. Vol. 17.No. 1, 89-107.

Baume, M. D. L. (2016, July 20) 'Post-coup crackdown throws doubt on Turkey migration deal.' Politico.eu. <<http://www.politico.eu/article/post-coup-crackdown-throws-doubt-on-turkey-eu-migration-deal-recep-tayyip-erdogan/>>.

Carrel, N. & Barkin, P. (2016, July 11). "'Terrorists" smuggled into Europe with refugees, Merkel says.' Reuters. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-extremists-merkel-idUSKCN0ZR1AH>>.

Colibasanu, A. (2016, July 13) 'Decision-Making and Disarray in the EU.' Geopolitical Futures. <<https://geopoliticalfutures.com/decision-making-and-disarray-in-the-eu/>>.

Corcoran, K. (2016, July 11). 'Merkel admits her refugee policy helped bring terrorists to Germany.' <<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/07/11/merkel-admits-her-refugee-policy-helped-bring-terrorists-to-germany.html>>.

Geopolitical Futures. (2 December 2015). "Net Assessment of the European Peninsula." 13 July 2016 <<https://geopoliticalfutures.com/forecasts/european-peninsula/current-european-peninsula-assessment/>>.

Habermas, Jürgen. (September-October 2001). “Why Europe needs a Constitution.” *New Left Review* 11.

Ivanov, Gjorge. (6 March 2016). “Macedonia is defending Europe from itself.” *The Telegraph*. <[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/macedonia/12185464/Macedonia-is-defending-Europe-from-itself.html#disqus\\_thread](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/macedonia/12185464/Macedonia-is-defending-Europe-from-itself.html#disqus_thread)>.

Jackson D., Thorsen, E & Wring, D. (Eds). (2016). *EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign- Early reflections from leading UK academics*. The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community Bournemouth University.

Kuhn, T. S. (1996). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Lusher, A. (29 July 2016). “Racism unleashed: True extent of the ‘explosion of blatant hate’ that followed Brexit result revealed.” *The Independent*. 2 August 2016 <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-racism-uk-post-referendum-racism-hate-crime-eu-referendum-racism-hate-crime-eu-referendum-racism-unleashed-poland-racist-a7160786.html>>.

Mason, E. (June 21, 2016). “Britain decides: the first European referendum.” *History Extra*. <<https://www.historyextra.com/period/modern/britain-decides-the-first-european-referendum/>>.

McCann, K. & Morgan, T. (24 June 2016). “Nigel Farage: £350 million pledge to fund the NHS was ‘a mistake’.” *The Telegraph*. September 1, 2016 <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/nigel-farage-350-million-pledge-to-fund-the-nhs-was-a-mistake/>>.

Meyer, Christoph. (2016). *EU Referendum Analysis 2016*. <<https://www.referendumanalysis.eu/why-facts-did-matter-in-the-campaign-eu-referendum-analysis-2016-2/>>.

Offe, Claus. (2015). *Europe Entrapped*. Polity Press. Cambridge.

O’Rourke, Kevin. (2018). *A Short History of Brexit: From Bentry to Backstop*. Pelican Books.

Rayner, G. & Mulholland, R. (19 November 2015). “Paris attacks: How Europe’s migrant crisis gave terrorist Abdelhamid Abaaoud the perfect cover.” *The Telegraph*. <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12006713/paris-attacks-europe-migrant-crisis-terrorist-abdelhamid-abaaoud.html>>.

Saul, H. (9 October 2013). “Home Office anti-immigration ‘go home’ vans banned by advertising watchdog.” *The Independent*. 2 August 2016 <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/home-office-anti-immigration-go-home-vans-banned-by-advertising-watchdog-8868081.html>>.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. (2018): Brexit: differentiated disintegration in the European Union, *Journal of European Public Policy*.

Serageldin, I. “Facing Facts: What’s Wrong with the Current World Order!” *Preparation for the upcoming III Global Shared Societies Forum, Building trust in wider Europe*.

Tebbit, Norman. (10 June 2014). “Trojan Horse: I warned about this years ago.” Retrieved 19 January 2015. *The Daily Telegraph*.

Torreblanca, J.I. & Leonard, M. (May 2013). “The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism.” European Council on Foreign Relations. <[http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79\\_EUROSCEPTICISM\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf)>.

Van Rompuy, Herman. President of the European Council. ““From war to peace: a European tale”, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture on behalf of the European Union.” Oslo, 10 December 2012.

Walt, Stephen M. (14 March 2016). “Europe can still save itself.” *Foreign Policy*. <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/14/europe-can-still-save-itself-migrants-borders-syria-iraq/>>.

European Academy of Sciences and Arts – EASA. (5 December 2012 ). ‘Manifest for Europe in the 21st century’. <[http://www.euro-acad.eu/downloads/memorandas/502521\\_EN.pdf](http://www.euro-acad.eu/downloads/memorandas/502521_EN.pdf)>.” Last Accessed: 13 July 2016

European Commission. (22 February 2016). European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) launched today. <[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2016/20160222\\_1\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2016/20160222_1_en.htm)>.

European Commission. (19 March 2016). “EU-Turkey Agreement: Questions and Answers.” <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-16-963\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm)>.

Europol. (August 2016). “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report - TE-SAT” <<https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016>>.

Europol. (February 2016). “Migrant smuggling in the EU.” <<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/migrant-smuggling-in-eu>>.

IOM. “Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Weekly Report, 7 September 2016.” n.d. <<https://migration.iom.int/docs/WEEKLY%20Flows%20Compilation%20No24%207%20September%202016.pdf>>.

Ipsos MORI. (20 July 2016). “Research Highlights - July 2016.” <<https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/publications/1842/Ipsos-MORI-Research-Highlights-July-2016.aspx>>.

Visegrád Group. (15 February 2016). “Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group Countries on Migration.” <<http://www.Visegrádgroupp.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-on>>.

The In Campaign Ltd. (2016). “Britain Stronger In Europe.” <[http://www.strongerin.co.uk/get\\_the\\_facts#gVEUcHS5ORaWXxbh.97](http://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts#gVEUcHS5ORaWXxbh.97)>.

Nobel Prize. (2012). “The Nobel Peace Prize 2012: European Union (EU).” <[http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/)>.

The Electoral Commission. (25 August 2016). “EU referendum results.” <<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information>>.

UNHCR. (2016). “Refugee Emergency Response in Europe (Supplementary Appeal), January – December 2016.”

Vote Leave. (1 September 2016). “Vote Leave campaign in the EU Referendum held on 23rd June 2016 in UK.” <[http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why\\_vote\\_leave.html](http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html)>.

The BBC. (2016, March 14) “The battle to be the official EU referendum Leave campaign.” <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34484687>>.

‘Committee of Advertising Practice Ltd (CAP) and Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice Limited (BCAP).’ (2016, August 2). <<https://www.cap.org.uk/News-reports/Media-Centre/2016/Political-advertising.aspx#.V61eyDt95dg>>.

‘Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech.’ (2007, November 6). *The Daily Telegraph*.

“How easy is it to buy a fake Syrian passport?” (17 November 2015). *The Guardian*. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/how-easy-is-it-to-buy-fake-syrian-passport>>.



*Nazan Mustafa, PhD Candidate*

UNIVERSITY "Ss. CYRIL AND METHODIUS"

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH

nazan.mustafa@gmail.com

## THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF FAMILY BUSINESS

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

### Abstract

#### VIPBenefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
  2. No trial watermark on the output documents.
- Conflicts are considered an inevitable part of the family business. Aside from their positive impact, conflicts remain as one of the challenges to family business performance. This research aims to analyze conflicts and their main impacts on family business performance. The research aims to collect data, which included books with a focus on the family business field and conflicts as part of it, as well as analysis of research articles from various scholars, journals, and countries. The findings show that both positive and negative effects on family business performance. Task conflict has a negative effect, whereas task conflict and process conflict have a positive effect on the performance of a family business.

Remove it Now

The research has limitations because it can be considered using only secondary data based on other scholars' research results, it needs to analyze the systematic literature review and apply the quantitative approach to the particular study on the impact of task and process conflicts on family business performance. This research will demonstrate the importance of aspects to be processed, which are: the concept of family business and conflict; types of conflicts; positive and negative effect of conflicts and effective strategies application.

**Keywords:** Family business, conflicts, performance, strategies



---

## INTRODUCTION

The importance of this research is to demonstrate the impact of conflicts to family business performance. It touches upon many areas, be it economics, sociological, management, law and psychological.

Family business is a segment of micro economy that has big impact not only in economic growth but also in the alleviation of unemployment. As such, we can mention some of the companies like Samsung, Fiat, Ford Motor Company, Peugeot, BMW and Hyundai as the largest and most successful family businesses in the world. As part of family business beneficiaries are not considered only individuals, family members, society but also the global economy.

This is best illustrated through facts from Conway Center for Family Business where family businesses account for 64 % of U.S. GDP and generate 62 % of the country's employment. In addition, according to the Osunde (2017) study results, family businesses have a significant impact on the economy, such as showing higher profitability in the long run, paying a significant amount of taxes, and having a more focused strategy.

It is not always easy to run a family business. For various reasons, many families are not successful in increasing business performance. One of the challenges of family businesses is conflict. Not all of conflicts are easy to manage because they require a strategy for effective resolution. For this, it is important to know how one individual can be aware of and also overcome these conflicts to contribute positively to family business performance.

Caputo et al. (2018) study results underline the importance of conflicts in family firms, especially in three fields: maintaining entrepreneurial and innovative orientation, balancing multi-generation involvement, and counterbalancing the excessive power of family coalitions.

## THEORETICAL APPROACH

What do “family business” and “conflict” mean? In literature, we come across different definitions related to these questions, and some of those definitions are shown below. Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999) are some of the scholars who have defined family business based on behavior and have taken into account the inclusive theoretical definition. According to them, “The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention of shaping and pursuing the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families” (Chua et al., 1999: 25). Furthermore, “...Family business considers family business to constitute the whole gamut of enterprises in which an entrepreneur or next-generation CEO and one or more family members significantly influence the firm. They influence it via their managerial or board participation, their ownership control, the strategic preferences of shareholders, and the culture and values family shareholders impart to the enterprise” (Poza 2010:5).

On the other hand, there are also various definitions on conflicts, as well. Boulding defines it



as: “Conflict is an awareness on the part of the parties involved of discrepancies, incompatible wishes, or irreconcilable desires” (1963 cited in Jehn and Mannix 2001:238).

During the literature analysis, it is found that conflict within the family business area has been presented by different authors and scholars from different perspectives, as well as research evidence, which shows positive and negative effects on family business performance depending on conflict types. Most of the findings show three types of conflicts (relationship, task and process) which will be presented in result part.

**Relationship conflict** “...exists when there are interpersonal incompatibilities and disagreements that typically include tension, animosity, and annoyance.”(Nosé et al., 2017: 29).

**Task conflict means** “ « D Q D Z D U H Q H V V R I G L ü H U H Q F H V L Q Y L H Z S R L to a group task.” (Jehn and Mannix 2001:238).

**Process conflict** focused on how tasks would be accomplished (Jehn 1997).

Although in the past, conflict management has not been treated as it should be by being considered as damaging, over time, this view has changed. Effective management involves understanding the nature of conflicts and providing appropriate mechanisms for resolving them. In this context, employees must be encouraged to address conflict and seek solutions rather than avoid it. Hence, conflict that occurs in family businesses requires constructive

resolution. Preventing and overcoming the possible conflicts are values of family businesses. Constructive and open communication and cooperation amongst employees and management should be promoted and strengthened. In other words, “A good plan for conflict resolution includes anticipation of sensitive issues, agreed-upon conflict-resolution mechanisms, and an appreciation of the importance of addressing conflict to build trusting relationships.” (Carlock and Ward 2001:89).

This is a watermark for trial version, register to get full one!

VIP Benefits:

1. Converts the whole document.
2. No trial watermark on the output documents.

- Competition (win – lose)
- Accommodation (lose –win)
- Avoidance (no winners/no losers)
- Compromise (lose some –win some)
- Collaboration (win - win)

Remove it Now

From all the above strategies, collaboration is perceived as the most effective strategy. “Because the solution sought is advantageous to all parties, collaboration is often thought of as a win-win approach to resolving conflicts” (Robbins 2005:198). Furthermore, based on the research results, collaboration is indicated as the only strategy that is significantly correlated with business outcomes, which therefore suggests that family businesses that are interested in business success could benefit from it (Sorenson 1999).

Taken as a whole, to perpetuate the strong and successful family business, there are two things that should be taken into consideration. At this point, Ward (2004) considers: first, to keep the business strong and healthy enough to last into the next generation—during an era of such rapid change; and second, to continue a healthy family into the next generation.

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to analyze the conflicts and their main effects in family business performance. The following research questions are as shown below:

- How do conflicts impact the performance of the family business?
- Which type of conflicts has negative effect on the performance of the family business?
- Which type of conflict has positive effect on the performance of the family business?

The method of content analysis is used, which includes books with a focus on the family business field and conflicts within it, and analyses of research articles from different scholars, journals, and countries.

Family business, conflicts, and performance were used as keywords, but in some cases, they were combined, e.g., “conflicts” and “family business” for easier access to resource-related topics. Checking the list of references within scientific articles has helped me find other sources of interest on this topic. Also, Google Scholar as a search engine is used to find articles. Moreover, special attention has been paid to the year of publication of the references

used in this research, which should not be too old. In this regard, the period of publication of the books is from 1990 to 2015. The geographical area is focused on a number of countries, including the Northeastern USA, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Texas, Pakistan, etc.

The unit of analysis was the articles, whereas the sample size of this research consisted of

1. Converts the whole document.
  2. No trial watermark on the output documents.
- 16 international journals such as: *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* (2 articles), *Administrative Science Quarterly* (2 articles), *Int. J. Transitions and Innovation Systems* (1 article), *Journal of Family Issues* (1 article), *Journal of Business Research* (1 article), *Family Business Review* (1 article), *Journal of Business Venturing* (1 article), *Journal of Business Management* (1 article), *Academy of Management Journal* (1 article), *Journal of Intercultural Management* (1 article), *Research Journal of Recent Sciences* (1 article), *Journal of Entrepreneurship & Organization Management* (1 article), *Family Relations* (1 article),

Remove it Now

RESULTS

Some key findings results will be presented based on reviewed article scholars related to the research in question (See: T -1).

**T-1:** Finding results from reviewed articles scholars

<b>Author(s), year</b>	<b>Methods</b>	<b>Types of conflicts</b>	<b>Positive/negative Impact</b>	<b>Findings results related to the research in question</b>
Arifi (2018)	<b>Quantitative</b>		Negative	Conflicts negatively impact family business performance and family relationships
Nosé et al. (2017)	Quantitative	Relationship	Negative	Relationship conflict has a negative effect on firm satisfaction and firm performance
Fahed – Sreih (2017)	<b>Literature review</b>	Relationship Task Process	Negative Positive Positive	Relationship conflict has a negative impact on business, whereas task and process conflicts have a positive impact.
Frank et al.(2011)	<b>Systematic literature review</b>	Relationship	Negative	Relationship conflict has a negative effect that reduce performance of family firm.
Eddleston & Kellermanns (2007)	Quantitative	Relationship	Negative	Relationship conflict is negatively related to family firm performance
Kellermanns& Eddleston (2007)	<b>Quantitative</b>	Cognitive  Process	Negative  Positive	Cognitive conflict was found to be negatively related to family firm performance. Process conflict was not found to be significantly related to the performance
Kellermanns& Eddleston (2004)	<b>Qualitative</b>	Relationship	Negative	Relationship conflict does not only have a devastating effect on a family firm’s performance but also prevents task and process conflict from having a beneficial effect on performance

Jehn (1997)	<b>Qualitative analyses</b>	Task Relationship	Positive Negative	Task conflicts had a greater positive impact on performance, whereas relationship conflicts had a greater negative impact on performance.
Jehn (1995)	<b>Multiple methods</b>	Relationship Task	Negative Negative	Relationship and task conflicts were negatively associated with individuals' satisfaction, liking of other group members, and intent to remain in the group.

*Adapted source: (Jyrek 2018: 51 – 55)*

As it can be observed from T - 1. finding results show existence of conflicts and effects of three types of conflicts.

Research conducted with family businesses showed that 88% of surveyed family business representatives claimed that they had conflicts, whereas 66% of them claimed that these conflicts negatively impacted their family business performance as well as 29% claimed that conflicts had a negative impact on family relationships. (Arifi 2018).

According to Nosé et al., (2017), relationship conflict has a negative effect on firm satisfaction and firm performance. Also, they found that adaptability as one of the family climate dimensions (adaptability, cohesion, and open communication) was significantly related to firm performance. Similarly, another study result indicates that relationship conflict is negatively related to family firm performance, where altruism was found to significantly reduce relationship conflict and enhance a participative strategy process (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).

Previous research results by Kellermanns & Eddleston (2004) argued that relationship conflict does not only have a devastating effect on a family firm's performance but also prevents task and process conflict from having a beneficial effect on performance. In this regard, the effects of process conflict on performance are inconsistent in that only low-to-moderate levels of process conflict improve performance.

Furthermore, the negative effect of relationship conflict has been stated by other authors (Frank et al., 2011; Piper et al., 2013; Fahed-Sreih, 2017). Thus, Frank et al., (2011) indicate that relationship conflict has a negative effect that reduces performance. Pieper et al. (2013) indicate that relationship conflict decreases the performance and satisfaction of all parties in a family business. Fahed-Sreih (2017) indicates in his article that relationship conflict has a negative impact on business, whereas task and process conflicts have a positive impact.

Cognitive (task) conflict was found to be negatively related to family firm performance. While the process conflict was not found to be significantly related to the performance except when used in conjunction with a moderator, it did exhibit a performance effect (Kellermanns & Eddleston 2007).

The research results showed in organizational groups that a low level of process conflict positively impacted group performance, whereas a high level negatively impacted group

performance. Regarding the task and relationship conflicts, it was found the importance of the conflict enhanced its effects on performance. Hence, it is noted that task conflicts had a greater positive impact on performance, whereas relationship conflicts had a greater negative impact on performance (Jehn 1997). Whereas in the other previous research by Jehn (1995), results indicated that conflict was beneficial depending on the type of conflict and the structure of the group in terms of task type, task interdependence, and group norms. Moreover, according to these results, relationship and task conflicts were negatively associated with individuals' satisfaction, liking of other group members, and intent to remain in the group.

Furthermore, the findings of Khan (2015) suggest that conflicts and stress are positively correlated among employees. In this research, it is examined that work-family conflicts reduce an employee's performance and will affect the overall performance of an organization.

## DISCUSSION

In general, all literature analysis including study results indicate the presence of conflict. In this context, family businesses are also seen as fertile environments for conflicts (Fahed 2017; Yurek 2018). The findings showed that conflicts negatively and positively impacted family business performance. In the research done on organizational groups, negative effects of relationship conflicts were also found. For this, it is much more important to know the factors who reduce the conflict. Altruism and adaptation have been found to be key and relevant factors in reducing relationship conflict.

Apart from the negative impact of relationship conflict, task and process conflict were found as conflict types that positively impacted on performance. However, not all research shows that the conflict of task and conflict of process always have a positive impact. Furthermore, other research results indicate that the type of task group members perform affects whether conflict helps, hinders, or has no significant impact on individual and group performance (Jehn 1995).

With other words, there is an interrelation between conflict types as an integrated role as well as influencing each other in practice, although in theory, they appear separated.

## CONCLUSION

Considering the conflict as an inevitable part, the family business should develop and promote its own strong mechanisms to resolve successfully. Conflict resolution between family members is one of the added values for successful families to their business, in addition to active business leadership, strategy support, main transparency, making the environment hospitable, and deep understanding of the business (Motwani 2016). In other words, giving the access in educational, social and recreational activities (trainings, celebrations, excursions, retreat, etc.) as well as use of win-win solutions will have a positive impact on the relationship strengthening.

In conclusion, it is clear that conflicts affect the functioning and effectiveness of the family business including overall performance. In this way, families should successfully manage them, indicating their business performance increasing.

Through this research, it has been attempted to provide a modest contribution to future research in the family business area.

This research needs to be studied more thoroughly by analyzing the systematic literature review and applying the quantitative approach to the particular study on the impact of task and process conflicts on family business performance.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arifi, A. (2018) ‘Conflicts in family businesses: nature and effects’, *Int. J. Transitions and Innovation Systems*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.188–197. PDF Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324813027> (accessed 15 December 2021)

Caputo A, Marzi G, Pellegrini, M. M., & Rialti R (2018) “Conflict management in family businesses”. *International Journal of Conflict Management* 29 (4):519–542. DOI: 10.1108/ijcma-02-2018-0027.

Carlock S. R & Ward L. J (2001) *Strategic Planning for the Family Business. Parallel Planning to Unify the Family and Business*. Palgrave.

Chua J., Chrisman J, & Sharma P (1999). *Defining Family Business by Behavior*. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 23(4):19–37.

Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2007) Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 22, 545-565. doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.06.004.

Fahed-Sreih, J (2017). *Conflict in Family Businesses*. *Conflict in Family Businesses*, 53–78. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-62852-3\_3.

*Family Business Facts – Conway Center for Family Business*. Available at: <https://www.familybusinesscenter.com/resources/> (accessed 28 May 2022)

Frank, H., Kessler, A., Nosé, L., & Suchy, D (2011) Conflicts in family firms: state of the art and perspectives for future research. *Journal of Family Business Management*, 1(2), 130–153. DOI: 10.1108/20436231111167219.

Jehn, K. A. (1995). A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of Intragroup Conflict. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40(2), 256. DOI: 10.2307/2393638.

Jehn, K. A. (1997). A Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in Organizational Groups. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 42(3), 530. DOI: 10.2307/2393737.

Jehn, K.A. and Mannix, E.A. (2001). 'The dynamic nature of conflict: a longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and group performance', *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(2), 238–51. DOI: 10.2307/3069453.

Jyrek M (2018) "Conflicts in Family Firms in the International Context: A Literature Review, *Journal of Intercultural Management* Vol. 10 | No. 1 | March 2018 | pp. 43–61. Available at: <https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/joim-2018-0002> (accessed 15 December 2021)

Kellermans, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. (2004). Feuding Families: When Conflict Does a Family Firm Good. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 28 (3): 209–228. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00040.

Kellermans, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. (2007). A family perspective on when conflict benefits family firm performance. *Journal of Business Research*, 60(10), 10481057. DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.018.

Khan N M. May. (2015). Impact of Work - Family Conflict on Organizational Performance. *Research Journal of Recent Sciences* Vol. 4(5): 48-53. Available at: [isca.in/rjrs/archive/v4/i5/i5/8.ISCA-RJRS-2014-137.pdf](https://www.isca.in/rjrs/archive/v4/i5/i5/8.ISCA-RJRS-2014-137.pdf) (accessed 21 February 2022)

Motwani, B. (2016). Impact of Factors of Family Business on the Performance: A PLS-SEM Study. *Journal of Entrepreneurship & Organization Management*, 05(02). DOI:10.4172/2169-026x.1000183.

Nosé, L., Korunka, C., Frank, H., & Danes, S. M. (2017). Decreasing the Effects of Relationship Conflict on Family Businesses. *Journal of Family Issues*, 38(1), pp. 25–51. DOI:10.1177/0192513x15573869.

Osunde C (2017) Family Businesses and Its Impact on the Economy. *J Bus Fin Aff* 6: 251. DOI: 10.4172/2167-0234.1000251.

Pieper, T.M., J.H. Astrachan, and G.E. Manners. 2013. Conflict in family business: Common metaphors and suggestions for intervention. *Family Relations* 62 (3): 490–500. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43695309.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2022)

Poza J. E (2010) Family Business 3 E. USA: South-Western Cengage Learning.

Robbins, P. S. (2005) *Essentials of organizational behavior*. Eighth edition. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River.

Sorenson, R. L. (1999) Conflict Management Strategies Used by Successful Family Businesses. *Family Business Review*, 12(4), 325–339. DOI:10.1111/j.1741-6248.1999.00325.x.

Ward. L. J (2004) *Perpetuating the Family Business, 50 Lessons Learned from Long-Lasting, Successful Families in Business*. Palgrave.